The Collapse of a Superpower:

The fall of Communism, the military, and the threat of a coup in Russia

1992-1996

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APCs	Armoured personnel carriers
AWOL	Absence without leave
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMSPLR	Centre for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research
CPG	Corporate positional grievances
CRGs	Corporate resource grievances
FNPR	Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
FSB	Federal Security Service
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GKChP	State Committee on the State of Emergency
GNP	Gross National Product
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
KGB	Committee of State Security
KRO	Congress of Russian Communities
LDPR	Liberal Democratic People's party
MD	Military District
MIC	Military-Industrial Complex
MPA	Main Political Administration
MPD	Main Personnel Directorate
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
OMON	Special Designation Police Unit

SD	Special Department
SRF	Strategic Rocket Forces

LIST OF RESEARCH ABBREVIATIONS

AFS	*Armed Forces and Society*
APSR	*The American Political Science Review*
BBC MS: FUSSR	British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Service: Former USSR
CPCS	*Communist and Post-Communist Studies*
CSM	*Christian Science Monitor*
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
JIR	*Janes Intelligence Review*
JSMS	*Journal of Slavic Military Studies*
KRWE	*Keesing's Record of World Events*
KZ	*Krasnaya zvezda*
NYT	*New York Times*
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

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Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of regime transitions on the military, and the likelihood of a military coup. This examination is conducted within the context of the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Russian Federation. The thesis examines the 1985 to 1996 period, and seeks to determine how the transition from Communism impacted upon the military. It then attempts to explain why the Russian military did not stage a coup from 1992 to 1996, despite it being apparent that many personnel held grievances.

To explain the absence of a Russian military coup I focus on three key determinants that I believe are most important in determining whether the military intervenes in politics. These factors are the capacity to intervene, the disposition to intervene, and the opportunity to intervene. Within these broad determinants are various factors that I examine in the context of coups throughout this century to determine their importance. I then assess whether they were strong enough to have encouraged intervention in Russia.

I conclude that the collapse of Communism had a wide-ranging impact on the Soviet and Russian military, and that this was overwhelmingly negative. However, despite the grievances of personnel, I believe that a coup was not launched because the coup determinants did not encourage intervention. This is because the military lacked the capacity to intervene, did not have a strong interventionist disposition, and did not have the opportunity to intervene. These ultimately discouraged the military from staging a coup, and help to explain the military's political quiescence.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Regime transitions have a dramatic impact throughout the world and require in-depth study. As political scientists often study the continuities of politics, transitions provide an ideal opportunity to assess dramatic change. The changes that occur with transitions can have a far-reaching impact that warrants comprehensive study. At one level, the succession of a new regime can have a major impact on global relations. For instance, the new regime might aggressively promote its interests, which can lead to war. This is a particularly dangerous scenario if the new regime is nuclear armed. The regime might also change the balance of international power. This is shown by the 1917 Russian transition to Communism, a development that encouraged the Cold War. Similarly, the break-up of alliances and treaties can occur with transitions, as new regimes pursue their objectives, and renounce the agreements made by previous regimes. Apart from the security aspect, a transition can have a major impact on the global economy. For example, a transition can affect trade agreements, the supply of resources, and business confidence throughout the world.

A transition can likewise have a major impact on regional and domestic developments. A new regime might pursue and protect its interests aggressively, and this can have a major impact on regional stability and security. For example, after the 1949 transition to Communism in China the new regime believed that US forces fighting in Korea posed a threat and deployed its forces. This led to an escalation of the conflict. In addition, the transition can change the regional balance of power, and can encourage regional instability if the new regime cannot swiftly consolidate its power. Apart from the regional consequences, domestic politics can change significantly. The new regime might move from a democratic to a totalitarian system. This fundamentally alters the role of political structures and of the electorate. It can also fundamentally change the economic system, possibly from a capitalist to Communist system or vis-a visa. The new regime's policies can decisively impact on various groups like ethnic groups, as it reallocates power and resources. This can lead to civil war, and influence regional and global security.

In addition to the general consequences of transitions, changes can have a major impact on the military. Transitional changes can be wide-ranging and can alter significantly the military's

purpose, its performance, and composition. Transitional changes might include those to the roles of the military, the level of support the military receives, and the size of the military. These changes are examined in greater depth below. The potential for such change increases the difficulty of applying a theoretical framework to transitions. This is because the dynamic nature of transitions can swiftly make redundant the propositions that the framework is based upon. This is particularly likely when the framework pre-dates the transition. This is because the context within which the framework was developed can differ significantly to the context within which the military operates during the transition. Transitions thus can significantly reduce the accuracy of existing frameworks, and those developed during the transition that cannot adequately explain the continuing change.

Militaries are not isolated from modern civilian society. Although a military might strive to maintain a division between itself and civilian society, and might achieve a degree of isolation, it is unlikely that personnel can be entirely isolated. There are many avenues by which societal attitudes can reach personnel. These include the right of personnel to take leave and their access to the media, particularly in the modern information age. Interaction with the military is particularly likely when it is deployed among civilians. Isolation can also be difficult to ensure when the military is drawn from the draft, as this facilitates the systematic intake of civilians and civilian attitudes. Many scholars have argued that although the level of civil-military contact might vary, the military and society are inter-connected.[1] Samuel Huntington also argued that the military might influence the outcome of a regime transition according to whether it supported the existing regime, the new regime, or remained inactive.[2]

This lack of isolation is evident when various militaries are examined. Divisions can be particularly weak when the military has traditionally been recruited through conscription, and been assigned roles not strictly related to the protection of the state from security threats. Illustrative of such weak divisions is the Israel Defence Force. The Israeli military has been

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[1] Amos Perlmutter, *The Military And Politics In Modern Times: On Professionals Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p21. See also p281. With regard to other scholars see: Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p234; and Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services And Society* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), p1

[2] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p150.

manned predominantly by conscripts and has been deployed domestically.[3] It also shows that civil-military interaction is influenced by the security environment.[4] Similarly, Communist militaries have traditionally been closely associated with civilian society because of their domestic roles, dependence on conscripts, and close relationship with the civilian elite. Bruce Porter argued "Communist armies are influenced by the same social forces affecting their country as a whole."[5] Moreover it is clear that militaries externally oriented, and not recruited through conscription, are not isolated from civilian society. John Gates concluded that officers of the US army had traditionally not been isolated from civilian influences, or from political concerns.[6]

This lack of isolation is very important because it follows that the military will not be able to avoid transitional changes that occur throughout society. A transition can have a wide-ranging impact on all facets of the military. This is particularly likely when the new regime believes that changes are required to ensure that the military is loyal, and conforms to its policies. Indeed a new military might replace the existing military, as occurred after the transition to Communism in Russia. Here the Imperial Army was replaced by the Communist Workers and Peasants Red Army (Red Army). In line with this, the military's composition can change with the re-assignment of personnel according to the new regime's goals. The 1917 transition is again relevant as the new regime moved to guarantee the military's loyalty, and replaced officers closely associated with the Tsar Nicholas II. Similarly, the new regime's goals and perceptions will influence the operations that the military is assigned, and its level of support. This might lead to the military being externally, or domestically deployed, depending on the threat perceptions of the new leaders. The changes that impact on the military are significant because it can be the largest and most effective institution. It also has the ability to directly influence the outcome of domestic developments by deploying its forces. Indeed the

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[3] With regard to the traditional characteristics of the Israeli Defence Forces see Stuart Cohen, "The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a "People's Army" to a "Professional Military"-Causes and Implications," *Armed Forces and Society* (*AFS*) 21, no.2 (Winter 1995): pp237-54.

[4] Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," *AFS* 22, no.3 (Spring 1996): p412.

[5] Bruce Porter, *Red Armies In Crisis*, Creating The Post-Communist Order, with a forward by Stephen Sestanovich, (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), pXIII. With regard to the structure of Communist civil-military relations see also Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civilian-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *The American Political Science Review* (*APSR*) 76, no.4 (December 1982): pp778-89; and Eva Busza, "Transition and Civil-Military Relations in Poland and Russia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (*CPCS*) 29, no.2 (June 1996): pp172-4.

[6] John Gates, "The "New" Military Professionalism," *AFS* 11, no.3 (Spring 1985): p433.

military's actions can have a direct impact on a global scale, particularly if it controls nuclear weapons.

The potential impact of a transition is clearly shown by the Russian transition to Communism. The fall of Communism had similarly dramatic effects. The structure of the civil-military relationship changed after the October 1917 revolution, as the Bolsheviks rather than the Tsar headed the civil-military structure, they established controls to ensure the military's loyalty. The most important of these was the use of commissars, or political officers, to monitor personnel and to promote Communism. Changes to the composition of the military occurred too. By 1930 ex-Tsarist officers comprised only 10.6 percent of officers, and 56.6 percent belonged to the Communist party and Komsomol (Young Communist League), up from 20 percent in 1920.[7] Similarly, major changes occurred to the military's cohesion and size. The transition had a disastrous impact on cohesion as divisions arose along political, rank, and regional lines.[8] With regard to the military's size, the Red Army was established by decree in January 1918 and replaced the Imperial army. However few volunteered to serve and mass mobilisation was initiated. Thus, the army grew rapidly from 520,160 personnel in January 1919, to 5.5 million in October 1920.[9] Moves were also made to increase the expertise of personnel, the principles of training Red Commanders being laid down in February 1918.

Contemporary Transitions and the Military

I shall now focus on the more specific effects that a transition might have on the military, and shall use the 1989 fall of Communism in East Europe to illustrate these effects. I shall first examine the potential impact of a transition on the structure of the civil-military relationship, followed by the impact on the military's roles. These are examined first because the impact on these has potentially the most wide-ranging consequences. The impact on the military budget and perception of the military is then examined. Accompanying the assessment of changes in civilian perceptions is an examination of military morale, as they are closely related. Finally, I shall focus on changes to the military's cohesion, size, and expertise. The East European transitions are particularly important because they represent a defining moment in

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[7] Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1979), Table 6, p49.
[8] John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military-political History 1918-1941* (London: Macmillan and Co Ltd; New York: St Martin's Press, 1962), pp3-22.
[9] Ibid., General Appendix, p763.

international security, as they brought to an end the East-West division of Europe. This had a significant impact on global security, as it encouraged the demise of the Cold War. The transitions also led to the emergence of new security challenges, such as those presented by the break-up of states. Apart from the global repercussions they led to dramatic domestic changes, as political systems moved toward democracy, and free-market principles were adopted.

Structure of the civil-military relationship

Transitional changes to the structure of the civil-military relationship will have a potentially significant impact on both the new regime and the military. This structure provides the framework within which civilian and military leaders inter-act, and decisions are made. The civil-military structure is important for two key reasons. First, the structure directly determines the level of control the new regime has over the military. This is because the effectiveness of the control methods used to monitor personnel will play a key role in determining the degree of control leaders can exercise. The extent of this control will in turn influence the strength of the new regime, as it shapes its ability to survive within the transitional security environment. For example, if control is tenuous it is harder for the new regime to ensure that its orders are obeyed. The degree of control will also have an important impact on the military, as the level of control directly shapes the military's influence and independence relative to the new regime. Furthermore, the new regime's decisions, made in accordance with its goals and security perceptions and passed on via this structure, can impact on all facets of the military. The impact of such changes and the military response play an important role in determining whether the civil-military relationship is one of cooperation, or one of conflict.

The structure of the civil-military relationship can change with a regime transition. The structure of the relationship will ultimately be influenced as transitions entail changes to the state leadership. The relationship between control structures and the previous regime is particularly important. If control structures are closely associated with the previous regime, it is more likely that they will change as the new leaders realign military loyalty. Eva Busza argued that transitional changes could disturb the civil-military relationship. This was because the methods which civilians use to maintain their control are closely linked to the operation of

the existing political and economic system.[10] Another key factor that is influential in determining the new regime's moves is the perception the new elite have toward whether they can control the military via the existing structure, and whether they are in a position to change it.

Past transitions illustrate the magnitude of potential change. The military's political role during the actual transition is likely to vary according to the state, as is shown by the East European transitions. Here the military roles ranged from actively facilitating the transition to inaction. For example, the Romanian military actively supported the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu. Contrasting this is Czechoslovakia. Here the military supported the Communist party. Indeed on the day before the regime fell, the supreme command publicly supported the party.[11]

Structural changes are primarily motivated by the new regime moving to ensure that the structure best accomplishes its goals and that its supremacy is guaranteed. In former Communist states the order of priorities for the new regimes has been similar. Reka Szemerkenyi argued that the 'first order reforms' involved moves to change the relationship between civilian and military officials, and the removal of both the Communist party's control and its presence within the military. Following this, 'second order reforms' were undertaken. These involved changes in the defence budget reflective of the boundary between civilian and military authority. 'Third order reforms' were then executed. These entailed adjustments in accordance with the new regime's priorities and to increase efficiency.[12]

The changes that occurred with the fall of Communism have been far-reaching. The close relationship between officers and Communist leaders, and the resultant suspicions of the new leaders, has encouraged these. Stephen Sestanovich argued that post-1985 political changes in Communist states led to a critical reassessment of the party-military relationship.[13] During these transitions the military's role as a Communist controlled institution changed as the new

[10] Busza, p174.
[11] Moscow Domestic Service, 24 November 1989, as carried by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Eastern Europe, quoted in Porter, *Red Armies*, p11.
[12] Reka Szemerkenyi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk*, ADELPHI Paper 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) December 1996), p7.
[13] Porter, *Red Armies*, pVII.

regime moved to take control.[14] This entailed the new leaders weakening military ties with the Communist party, and moving to limit the military's political role. Such moves ranged from gradual reform to a more swift removal of political organs within the military. In Bulgaria the military was slow to act and it was only in late 1990, nearly a year after the fall of Communism, that many senior officers openly supported the banning of political parties in the military. More dramatically, less than two weeks after the fall of Communism the Czechoslovak military announced that all references to the leading role of the party would be removed, and that personnel would no longer be indoctrinated with Marxism-Leninism. Moreover in December 1989 all Communist party organisations were abolished from the military. Thus, de-communisation of the military only took about 3 weeks.[15]

Similarly, post-Communist regimes made significant changes to the composition of the military through replacing high-ranking officers and defence ministry officials, as they sought to ensure military loyalty. In Czechoslovakia all high officers at the Ministry of National Defence were appointed in January or February 1990. By 1992 all Generals over the age of 60 had been forcibly retired. Similarly, moves were made to replace Communist personnel with civilians at the Ministry of Defence. By 1996, 30-40 percent of staff at the Czech Republic's Ministry of Defence were civilian, and the first post-Communist government in Hungary ensured that 4 of the 5 deputy state secretaries in the Ministry of Defence's consultative body were civilian.[16]

Institutional roles

A transition can impact on the military's roles with major consequences. The most fundamental change may be to the military's role to protect, and to promote the interests of the state, as the structure of the political system changes. Associated with this is the prospect of a fundamental change in the civilian elite's security goals, and the security environment. Such a change occurs as the new regime's goals change in accordance with its perceptions of the security environment. Apart from the security environment, the goals of new regimes will

[14] See Zoltan Barany, "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe," *Political Studies* XLI, no.4 (December 1993): p604; and Condoleezza Rice, "The Military Under Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 3, no.2 (April 1992): p35.

[15] See Dale Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Potential for Praetorianism," *Studies In Comparative Communism* XXV, no.2 (June 1992): p106; and Porter, *Red Armies*, p11.

[16] Szemerkenyi, p13.

differ from those of the old regime, at least to some degree, given the fundamental changes that occur with a transition. Such differences will entail a re-evaluation of the military's roles.

The impact of a transition on the military's roles is important for four reasons. First, the roles allocated to the military shape its structural characteristics; the military is often structured to optimise its ability to perform those tasks it is set. Second, the roles assigned influence the military's level of support, both in terms of its budget and public support. For example, when a new regime believes that the military is performing a role that is fundamental to its survival it is more likely to place a priority on supporting it. Similarly, the roles allocated impact on public support. This is shown by the potential variation in support of a military assigned the role of policing the population, and one with the primary role of protecting the state from the threat posed by a widely vilified group. Third, the type and the level of expertise required by personnel will be influenced by the demands placed on them during a transition to perform their allocated roles. Finally, the military's roles influence the civil-military relationship, as change shapes the perception personnel have of the new regime.

Past transitions indicate that civilian goals and the security environment often change and that this can have a major impact on the military's roles. Huntington wrote that a challenge facing new leaders was that of redefining the roles and missions of the military to align them with the new environment within which they operate.[17] The changing of the security environment is shown by the collapse of Communism with the decline of the Cold War, and the move to counter the resultant security challenges like regional instability.[18] New regimes have sought to adapt to the new security environment, and to establish closer ties with their former adversaries when this corresponds with their goals. This has meant that the military's roles changed decisively. The former Warsaw Treaty Organisation militaries experienced a shift away from their focus on a war with the West to new roles involving humanitarian,

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[17] Samuel Huntington, "Recent Years Show Much Progress in Civil-Military Relations," (paper presented at Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy conference, place of conference not known, 13-14 March 1995), available from http://pdq2.usia.gov/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@..._VIEW=1&CQSUBMIT=VIEW&CQRETURN=&CQPAGE=1,Inter-net, accessed on 15 August 1998, p3 of 4.

[18] With regard to transitional challenges see Regina Karp "The challenge of transition," in *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*, ed. Regina Karp (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1993), pp 3-14. A summary of security policy changes in East Europe is also provided by Andrew Michta, *The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994).

peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement and observer missions.[19] For instance, the Hungarian military contributed a medical unit to the United Nation forces in the Persian Gulf during the 1990-1991 war. Similarly, many have moved to integrate themselves with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), given their greater focus on cooperation with the West. For example, the Hungarian military joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program in February 1994, and cut the size of the military and streamlined the command structure to comply with NATO requirements.[20]

Contrasting this, the military's roles often change when they fail to correspond with the new regime's goals. Developments in Central Europe are relevant as new regimes eliminated, or reduced, the military's many non-security roles originating from the Communist era. This is shown by the transition in Czechoslovakia. Whereas the Czechoslovak military in 1989 is estimated to have spent 10,000,000 hours undertaking economic work, in the Czech Republic non-military activities, with the exception of military aid during natural disasters, are forbidden.[21] The transitions also indicate how policy changes impact on how threats are addressed. This is shown by a move away from perceiving the military as an instrument of maintaining domestic law and order. The only legal ambiguity is in Slovakia where the military doctrine allows the use of the military to counter internal threats, in contrast to its Constitution.[22]

Budgetary support

Other fundamental changes to the military that can occur are those to the resources it is allocated. Though the consequences of such changes are not necessarily as far-reaching, they remain important. Budgetary support is important to the operation of the military as it influences the level of pay that personnel receive and their service conditions, the quantity and quality of equipment purchased, and the ability of the military to deploy its forces. Thus, the level of expenditure influences the military's capacity and the reaction of personnel to the new regime. The level of budgetary support for the military is evaluated within the structure

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[19] Institute of International Relations, *Democratic Control Over Security Policy and Armed Forces* (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 1995), p49, quoted in Szemerkenyi, p43.

[20] See Kitty McKinsey, "Hungary: The Military Strive To Comply With NATO Criteria," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) *Features*, 2 December 1997, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/12/F.RU.971202142825.htm Internet, accessed 23 January 1998, pp1-3 of 3.

[21] Szemerkenyi, p46.

[22] Ibid.

of the civil-military relationship, and will depend on the new regime's threat perceptions, priorities, and the resources available.

The fall of Communism clearly illustrates the factors that might impact on the new regime's evaluation of budgetary support. The poor state of the economy is one factor that might have a decisive impact, as military expenditure becomes a contentious issue. The Czechoslovak Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from US$123.1 billion in 1989, to US$98.02 billion in 1991, the Hungarian GDP fell from US$64.50 billion, to US$53.90, and the Polish GDP fell from US$172.8 billion, to US$102.40 billion.[23] This encouraged opposition to high defence expenditure. For instance, in 1991, 66 percent of Hungarians indicated that less should be spent on the military.[24]

It was in this context that defence expenditure declined. In 1989 Hungarian defence expenditure fell from US$1.81 billion, to US$1.24 billion in 1991, and Polish expenditure fell from US$3.23 billion in 1989, to US$1.93 billion in 1992.[25] This decline meant that arms procurement declined too. The number of Hungarian main battle tanks decreased from 1,516 in 1990, to 1,482 in 1991, and in Poland from 2,900 in 1990, to 2,850 in 1991.[26] Furthermore, transitions in the former Warsaw Treaty states show that changes to the actual resource allotment system can occur when new regimes link such changes with the need to adjust to the new security environment. For example, the states actively sought closer ties with the West by adopting similar budget systems.[27]

Popular support for the military and military morale

Popular support for the military and the morale of personnel are closely inter-connected. The civilian perception of the military is important because it can influence the morale of personnel, and in turn their self-confidence and their determination to counter a threat. Changes to the level of support might also influence the willingness of people to serve, as a high level of support can equate with a greater willingness to serve. This support in turn

[23] IISS, *The Military Balance 1991-1992* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1991), pp86-90; and IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-1993* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1992), pp74-80.
[24] Ferenc Molnar, *A Magyar Honvedseg Civil Kontrolljanak Helyzete es Lehetosegei* (Budapest: Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy, 1996), p16, quoted in Szemerkenyi, pp26-7.
[25] *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp86-90; and IISS, The *Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1993), pp81, 84.
[26] IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1990), pp47, 50-1; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp87, 89, 91.
[27] See Szemerkenyi, pp27-36.

influences the emphasis the military can place on entry requirements, and the credibility of its demands and grievances. Support is especially likely to change within the context of changes to the military's capacity, military actions during the transition, and its treatment by the new regime. This is shown by the possibly positive impact on support if the military facilitated a popular transition, and is held in gratitude by the new leaders and the general population. Similarly, the military's popularity will be influenced by the roles it is allocated by the new regime, and whether the new leaders seek to protect the integrity of the military.

Past transitions illustrate the impact that a transition can have on popular support. Most generally, the impact of the transition on the military's capacity can influence attitudes. The Czech military found it difficult to realign with the West and this, together with negative stereotypes, provided the background to a fall in support. The number of people who believed that the military had the public's support fell from 46 percent in 1991, to 22 percent in 1994.[28] The fall of Communism further indicates that the military's role in the transition can influence the level of support, as the Romanian military's active backing of a popular transition increased support.[29] Similarly, popular transitions to independence may influence attitudes, as the military becomes linked with this achievement. The Slovak military enjoyed a high level of support after independence was achieved in 1993, as support increased from 65 percent in March 1995, to 72 percent in January 1996.[30] Furthermore, a new regime's reforms can facilitate a change in the treatment of the military. This is shown by the greater freedom of the media in former Warsaw Treaty states leading to more critical coverage of the military. For example, polls of Polish officers supplied by the Ministry of Defence in 1996 indicated that 60 percent felt the media had a negative influence on the military's image.[31] This might indeed have influenced attitudes, as 41 percent of Poles in 1995 did not condemn the refusal to serve in the military.[32]

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[28] See Jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic: Transformation Of Military Progresses At Leisurely Pace," *RFE/RL Features*, 2 December 1997, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/12/F.RU.971202143035.html, Internet, accessed 23 January 1998, pp1-3 of 3; and *Democratic Control Over Security Policy*, p49, quoted in Szemerkenyi, Table 6, p57.

[29] See Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," p117.

[30] Interview with Colonel Vladimir Kmec, Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, May 1996, interview by Szemerkenyi, Szemerkenyi p55.

[31] Polish Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 1996, quoted in Szemerkenyi, pp61-2.

[32] Polish dailies, 11 and 14 August, quoted in Jakub Karpinski, "Opinion Poll Shows What Poles Condemn," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, Newsline System Search (NSS), available from http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/cgi-bin/friends/omri/select-rec.pl , Internet, (all subsequent reports are available here), 15 August 1995, accessed 18 March 1998. NSS reports are not provided with a no. or vol.

Associated with changes to the level of support are those to the level of morale. The state of morale is influenced by the new regime's goals as these determine the military's roles, and thus level of support. The East European transitions illustrate the potential for morale to change according to how the military is influenced by the new regime's goals. For instance, morale in the Czechoslovak military declined with the major changes like the fall in budgetary support.[33] Indeed only 29 percent of the public felt that the military had good morale and discipline in 1991, and this dropped to 18 percent in 1992.[34]

Military cohesion and size

A transition can also have a major impact on the cohesion and the size of the military. Most important is the military's cohesion, as changes that influence this can have a direct impact on the capacity of the military to perform the roles the new regime assigns it. The level of cohesion impacts upon the military's capacity because the threat of personnel refusing to obey orders can make the military hierarchy reluctant to undertake potentially divisive tasks. Changes to the level of cohesion might also have a major impact on the goals of the new regime, as they influence the decision-making process. For instance, signs of disunity can influence the roles assigned. Another potential consequence of a transition is a change in the military's size. Although the military's size does not necessarily equate with a greater capacity to operate, it can be influential. The military's size might influence the diversity and number of tasks that it can effectively perform, particularly those that are demanding on resources.

Transitions can impact on cohesion because of the dramatic nature of their impact on both civilians and personnel. A transition is likely to encourage divergent attitudes to arise over the new regime, and whether or not the transition should be supported. The goals of the new regime and the new security environment have the potential to cause serious divisions too. Changes in these areas can have an important impact on the roles assigned to the military, and the prospect arises of divisions among personnel. This is a particularly likely prospect if the military has no tradition of fulfilling roles that the new regime allocates. Moreover changes to the structure of the civil-military relationship can weaken the ability of the new leaders to ensure that the military unites behind civilian authority. This is especially likely if a new

[33] Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," p109.
[34] *Democratic Control*, p49, quoted in Szemerkenyi, Table 6, p57.

regime is unable to swiftly entrench itself, and the control structures are damaged or removed during the transition.

The impact on military cohesion is shown by the East European transitions. One dramatic result has been the fragmentation of Communist states and the military. This occurred to the Czechoslovak military, as it was divided between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Other divisions can also arise among personnel over the desirability of changes. For example, in the Czech Republic older officers tended to support left wing parties, as they blamed the post-1989 centre/right-oriented governments for the decline in support, whereas younger officers were more likely to support right wing parties.[35] Indeed Dale Herspring argued that the cumulative effect of the actions of the new regimes was "to undercut military cohesion and corporate identity."[36]

The effect of a transition on the military's size depends on the new regime's goals, and its perception of the security environment. Changes to the military's size are determined by the importance the new regime attaches to the military, and whether it perceives that the military's size best reflects its goals. Of direct relevance is the security environment. This is because changes to the size of the military will be influenced by the new regime's perception of threats. For example, the down-sizing of the military will be discouraged if the new regime believes that serious security threats exist which are best countered by the military. Moreover, transitional changes have the potential to determine the level of resources available. Changes to the composition of the state, and the human and material resources available to the new leaders, impact on the level of support they can provide the military.

Major changes occurred in East Europe as new regimes moved to ensure that the military complied with their goals and the roles they allocated. The decline of traditional threat perceptions, such as the perceived threat of the West, and economic constraints provided the context within which reductions occurred. For example, the Czechoslovak army declined from 148,600 personnel in 1989, to 87,300 in 1991.[37] It then fell from 72,000 in 1992, to 41,900 with the state's break-up and the birth of the Czech Republic's army.[38] The influence

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[35] Szemerkenyi, pp51-3.
[36] Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," p103.
[37] IISS, *The Military Balance 1989-1990* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1989), p46; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p86.
[38] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p74; and *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, p78.

of the new regime's goals and perception of security is again evident, as changes to the military's size were encouraged by the need to comply with transitional goals. For instance, Central European armies were restructured to be smaller and more professional in accordance with the goal of closer ties with NATO.[39] In contrast to such reductions are those changes that occur when a large military does not violate the new regime's goals. Such changes are evident in Romania where the army initially increased from 128,000 personnel in 1989, to 161,800 in 1991.[40] Herspring argued that this is attributable to the army's active support of the transition, the more important goal of removing Ceausescu rather than the Communist party, and the continued power of many who served the previous regime.[41]

Military expertise

Finally, a transition can impact on the level and the type of expertise the military requires. Most importantly, changes in the military's roles will necessitate changes in the expertise personnel require to effectively perform their tasks. Moreover, the new regime's perception of the military influences whether it wishes to replace officers with those it feels are more suitable. This will influence the level of expertise, as the removal of personnel because of their service under the previous regime may reduce experience. In line with this, changes in the level of budgetary support influence the level of expertise. This is because the changes influence the level of training that can be afforded.

In East Europe expertise became increasingly inadequate as the new regimes changed the level of expertise and the fields within which expertise was required. This is evident in Central Europe where expertise fell as skilled personnel left because of the loss of support.[42] For example, the Czech Republic lost 28,000 professional soldiers, mainly young officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), leaving 66.7 percent of personnel over 30.[43] Changes in the expertise needed to effectively meet the new regime's goals, and to operate within the transitional security environment, are also apparent. This is illustrated by a lack of fluency in English that hindered the Polish realignment with NATO.[44]

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[39] Szemerkenyi, p43.
[40] *The Military Balance 1989-1990*, p51; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p92.
[41] Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations," p117.
[42] Szemerkenyi, p47.
[43] Marie Vlahova and Stefan Sarvas, "Fostering Civil-Military Relations: The Case of the Czech Republic," (paper presented at a joint SOWI-Inter-University Seminar Conference, Strausberg, Germany, 8-12 June 1996), quoted in Szemerkenyi, p48.
[44] See Jan de Weydenthal and Bogdan Turek, "Poland: Language Problems Create Obstacles In NATO Preparations," *RFE/RL Features*, 2 December 1997, available from

More specifically, all these changes can impact on the likelihood of a coup, as I argue in the following chapter. The study of coups is important because the coup leaders might implement drastic policy changes, and an intervention might facilitate much opposition, and hence instability. Moreover coups might be aimed at overthrowing a new regime, thereby having a major impact on the outcome of the transition. The frequency and global nature of coups reinforce the importance of studying them. William Thompson calculated that 274 coups in 59 states occurred from 1946 to 1970.[45]

To summarise, I believe that a regime transition can have a major impact on the military. The most important changes are to the structure of the civil-military relationship and to the roles of the military. In addition, the level of support for the military, the morale of personnel, military cohesion and size, and the expertise of personnel are all likely to change.

Definitions and Hypotheses

As I have outlined the significance of regime transitions and their impact on the military I shall now define key terms that are used throughout this thesis and the hypotheses I shall evaluate.

- Regime: The structure that determines how the state is governed, policy is made and implemented, and the economy operates. Thus, the leaders, the process by which the leaders are chosen, the process by which policies are formulated and enacted, the structure of the economy, and the context within which the general population can and does express its attitudes are key components.

- Regime transition: A change in the above structure, that at least involves fundamental changes not just of individuals but the composition of the leaders and the structure which determines how the state is governed, and the way policy is made and implemented.

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http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/12/F.RU.971202142710.html, Internet, accessed 23 January 1998, p1 of 2.

[45] William Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers,* Comparative Politics Series volume 4 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc., 1973), pp6-7. Thompson defined a military coup as "the removal or the attempted removal of a state's chief executive by the regular armed forces through the use or the threat of force," p52.

- Coup: The removal or attempted removal of a state's chief executive by the use of or threat of violence, during which active service regular military personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the operation. The term 'military' relates to the armed services of the state, namely the army, air force, and navy. I focus on the military because although the overthrow of regimes might be committed by other armed forces, such as a militia, the military is most likely to have the means to stage a coup. The "large majority" of coups are staged by the military.[46] I assume throughout this thesis that the coup leaders wish to execute a successful coup.

- Successful coup: The removal by the use of or threat of violence of a state's chief executive, during which active service regular military personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the operation. The definition is based on the premise that the military, at least initially after removing a state's chief executive, will hold power. I do not place a time limit on how long the military holds power after removing the state's chief executive for two reasons. First, a time limit can be irrelevant, as the military might not wish to govern after removing a state's chief executive. Second, there is no consensus among scholars as to how long the military must exercise power before a coup can be defined as successful.[47]

- Intervention: The intervention in politics by the military, primarily via a coup.

Given the transitional impact on the military I have decided to assess its nature and how it influences the likelihood of a coup. It is in this context then that I assess the validity of four hypotheses.

1. A regime transition can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military.
   This impact can change the:
   - Structure of civil-military relationship
   - Military roles
   - Military support
   - Military morale
   - Military cohesion and size

[46] Harvey Kebschull, "Operation "Just Missed": Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts," *AFS* 20, no.4 (Summer 1994): p565.
[47] Ibid., pp566-7.

Military expertise (See model 1)

2. Various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup, and their importance can vary. These factors are detailed in the following chapter and in the order of their importance are:

   The capacity to intervene:

   Presence of potential coup leaders

   Participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites

   Participation of effectively armed and trained personnel

   Cohesion of the coup forces

   Number of personnel

   Military's mood

   The Disposition to intervene:

   Corporate interests

   Individual interests

   Class interests

   Particularistic interests

   Manifest destiny and national interest

   External actors

   The Opportunity to intervene:

   Regime attachment

   Civilian Dependence on the military and the domestic situation

   Military popularity

   Intervention inhibitors are derived from these three key factors and are:

   Acceptance of civilian supremacy

   Lack of capacity to intervene

   Lack of disposition to intervene

   Lack of opportunity to intervene

   Professionalism

3. A regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup.

4. A regime transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene.

The Soviet and Post-Soviet Transition

As I have outlined past transitions, I shall now focus on my case study, the transition from Communism that occurred in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The collapse of a superpower and the largest country in the world had profound repercussions on a global scale that require in-depth analysis. The collapse of the Soviet Union, an empire covering one-sixth of the world landmass, and the resultant emergence of the Russian Federation changed the fundamental structure of international relations. The Soviet Union had been one of the two superpowers that dominated the bipolar security system and with its demise the Cold War finally concluded, and a unipolar system dominated by the US emerged. This had a major impact on global security. The threat of a nuclear war between the superpowers declined and new security threats, such as instability in the post-Soviet states, had to be addressed. On a more regional level the Soviet changes facilitated the collapse of Communist regimes in East Europe. Indeed Mikhail Gorbachev believed that his reforms led to changes that constituted a "new revolution."[48]

The transition from Communism had a similarly spectacular impact on the Soviet Union. The Communist party that had seized power in 1917 lost power just as dramatically, as Gorbachev's reforms encouraged the rise of opposition to the party. This opposition became increasingly open, particularly in the Soviet republics where nationalism grew, and ultimately led to the party's loss of authority and the break-up of the Soviet Union. As the party's authority fell other major changes occurred too, such as the development of rival political parties and groups that I examine in chapter 7. Economic changes also occurred as Gorbachev's reforms dramatically moved the state-controlled economy toward a free-market. Few predicted that the Soviet Union would experience changes so wide-ranging.

The transition likewise provides an ideal opportunity to examine how a large military and the likelihood of a coup change. The case study is particularly interesting because the impact has been so spectacular. The military once most feared by the West has become incapable of winning a war against 11,000 to 12,000 Chechnyan rebels.[49] Furthermore, the dramatic nature of the transition provides an ideal opportunity to assess whether theoretical models formulated prior to transitions remain relevant. Similarly, the case study provides an opportunity to

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[48] Mikhail Gorbachev, *The August Coup: The Truth And The Lessons* (London: HarperCollins *Publishers*, 1991), p101.

[49] Timothy Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II. Military Activities 11-31 December 1994," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* (*JSMS*) 8, no. 2 (June 1995): p265.

examine why a coup might not be staged despite the grievances of personnel. Regardless of a coup's outcome, the potential for instability, and indeed civil war, is a threat to global security given Russia's size and nuclear capabilities. Likewise, a coup could have a major impact upon the global economy. For instance, doubts could arise over the continued availability of vital resources such as oil. Moreover many of the explanations for the failure of the military to intervene are inadequate. Indeed Kimberly Zisk argued in early 1993 that "with each passing day, the mystery of why there has not yet been a coup deepens."[50]

The importance of studying why the military did not intervene is clearly shown by the impact of the August 1991 coup. Although the coup failed, its impact was felt throughout the world. For instance, concern arose over who controlled the nuclear weapons, and states like the US desperately sought to understand what was happening.[51] Similarly, the coup prompted discussions on the implications for Western security. NATO Foreign Ministers held an emergency meeting during the coup to assess its implications, and Germany feared that the outbreak of a Soviet civil war could encourage troops stationed in Germany to desert and seek asylum.[52] Moreover the coup facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Communism was further discredited and Moscow was unable to prevent republics winning independence. The coup impacted upon the global economy too. This is shown by the dramatic plunge of financial markets throughout the world.[53] Indeed Gorbachev termed the event a "turning-point of history."[54] Likewise, Yeltsin wrote that "history will record the twentieth century essentially ended August 19 through 21, 1991." [55]

The fall of Communism and the Soviet Union conform to my definition of regime transitions primarily for three reasons. First, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Communist party General Secretary and Soviet President, lost power to Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President and a former

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[50] Kimberly Zisk, *Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia*, (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Centre at the Ohio State University, 1993), p8.

[51] "Where Was The Black Box?" *Time*, 138, no.35, 2 September 1991, p33. With regard to the US see Don Oberdorfer and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Aides Saw Coup Unraveling," *The Washington Post*, 23 August 1991, ppA21, A27.

[52] See Francine Kiefer, "Soviet Coup Prompts Rethinking Of Security Arrangements In Europe," Reuters, 23 August 1991; and *Financial Times*, 21 August 1991, p3, quoted in "Coup Against Gorbachev-Threat of Troop Desertion Worries Bonn," Reuters, 21 August 1991.

[53] Bill Jamieson, *Sunday Telegraph*, 25 August 1991, p33, quoted in "Harsh Economic Reality Lies Beyond The Coup," Reuters, 25 August 1991. With regard to the coup's impact upon the Russian economy see *Izvestia*, 26 August 1991, p1 quoted in "Brief Survey of the Economy Post-Coup," Reuters, 26 August 1991.

[54] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Gorbachev Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p626; and Gorbachev, *The August Coup*, p41. See also p31.

[55] Boris Yeltsin, *The View From The Kremlin*, translated by Catherine Fitzpatrick (London: HarperCollins *Publishers*, 1994), p41.

Communist. Second, the political system changed significantly from a one party Communist system to a multi-party system with competitive elections. Third, the party controlled economy changed significantly to a free market.

The time period focused upon is from the succession of Gorbachev in March 1985 to the second inauguration of Yeltsin in August 1996. This period is focused upon because it was after Gorbachev's succession that dramatic change occurred, and this continued during Yeltsin's first term. The time period includes the most important Soviet and Russian events in recent times. For example, the first competitive elections, the 1991 coup, the collapse of the Communist regime and Soviet Union, the 1993 parliamentary revolt, the Chechnyan war, and the Duma and presidential elections are included (see appendix 1). More specifically, I have divided the transition into two periods according to the dominant trend that is evident during the years. Thus, the first period I label is that from 1985 to 1991, as the decline and the collapse of the Communist party and the Soviet Union dominated. The second period is from 1992 to 1996 and is dominated by the development of the new post-Communist Russian regime. These trends are shown by my brief outline of Soviet and post-Soviet history below.

Likewise, I have placed my definition of coups into the Soviet and post-Soviet context. With regard to the attempt to seize power from the 18th to 21st of August 1991, this conforms to my definition of a coup. This is because it entailed an attempt to remove Gorbachev through the use of violence, and military personnel played a leading role in its planning and execution. However the attempt is not classified as a successful coup. This is because Gorbachev was not successfully removed, he remained the President and exercised the powers of this office immediately after the coup leaders were arrested. With regard to the post-Soviet period, I refer to a Russian military coup because the Soviet military ceased to exist after the emergence of the Russian Federation.

- Russian military coup: The removal or attempted removal of Yeltsin by the use of or threat of violence, during which active service military (Ministry of Defence) personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the operation. I use the term 'military' rather than 'armed forces' to avoid confusion, as there were numerous armed forces not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence.

- Successful Russian military coup: The removal of Yeltsin by the use of or threat of violence, during which active service military (Russian Ministry of Defence) personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the operation, and at least initially hold power in Russia.

I also use the term 'political quiescence' in the context of the Russian military, and this relates to the military's reluctance to intervene in politics, primarily through a coup.

The collapse of the Soviet Union: 1985 to 1991

I shall now outline key developments that occurred in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. It is important to have some knowledge of such developments because they impacted decisively on the military. They also provide the context within which the military's actions can be placed, and thus better understood. Gorbachev moved immediately to change the composition of the party leadership when he took office. By March 1986 the average age of full members of the Politburo was 59 compared to 67 in July 1983, and 39 percent of members had been first elected under Gorbachev.[56] As Gorbachev consolidated his position he initiated wide-ranging reforms. One such reform was the instigation of 'glasnost' (openness). This removed many of the restrictions on the media and freedom of speech. Gorbachev in January 1987 also called for greater participation in the party decision-making process through upgrading the role of party meetings and committees, and introduced competitive secret ballot elections for positions. He further called for the promotion of skilled non-party members into senior state positions. In addition, economic reforms were initiated, and Gorbachev placed greater importance on a more innovative and independent-minded approach to industrial management. Apart from these domestic changes Gorbachev sought to ease international tensions. He thus signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty in 1987.

Reforms accelerated as the Gorbachev era progressed and Communist authority declined. With the Nineteenth Party Conference of 1988 attempts were made to modernise the entire political system, within the framework of a one party state. In December 1988 the Supreme Soviet, the state parliament, adopted legislation for the establishment of a Congress of People's Deputies. This became part of a cumbrous two-tier legislature and parliamentary system that selected the members of the Supreme Soviet. Two of the Congress's three

[56] Ian Derbyshire, *Politics In The Soviet Union From Brezhnev To Gorbachev* (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd, 1987), Tables 3 and 4, pp40, 53.

chambers were chosen through competitive elections. These elections were held in March 1989 with 1,931 Communists and 319 non-Communists elected.[57] The first session of the Congress was held from May to June 1989 with vigorous debate, and legislation increasing religious and press freedoms was passed. However the economy continued to perform poorly and demands for freedom increased, particularly in the republics. It was in this context that Yeltsin, who had openly criticised members of the Communist party, won 89 percent of the vote in Moscow against the candidate of the old party system during the March 1989 elections.[58] Party conservatives also opposed greater reform and party splits became increasingly apparent.

Changes became more rapid from 1990, and the Communist party's authority was increasingly challenged. In early March, Russian Congress elections were held with fewer restrictions and democrats won 20 percent of the seats.[59] That same month Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution enshrining the Communist party's 'leading role' in politics was abolished, and though Gorbachev was elected Soviet President by Congress delegates his authority was increasingly challenged. In March 1991 a referendum asked whether the Soviet Union should be preserved "as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics," and in Russia people were asked if the President should be directly elected. Throughout the Soviet Union, 75.4 percent supported the preservation of the union. With regard to the supplementary question, 69.85 percent of Russians supported the direct election of the President.[60] The following month Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and leaders of the other republics agreed that a new union treaty was required that would provide the republics greater autonomy. This treaty was to be signed on the 20th of August. Yeltsin's winning of 57.3 percent of the vote in the first elections for the President of Russia held in June 1991 further illustrates the party's declining authority.[61] The following month he banned political parties from state organisations and enterprises.

It was against this background that the August 1991 coup was launched. I shall detail specific aspects of the intervention in the following chapters, but shall outline the event now given its

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[57] Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, second edition (London: Routledge, 1996), Appendix 2.1, p389.
[58] Ibid., p7.
[59] V. Vorotnikov, *Pravda*, 26 March 1990, p2, quoted in Sakwa, p7.
[60] *Izvestiya*, 26 March 1991, p2; *Pravda*, 27 March 1991, n.p.; and Mikhail Gorbachev, *Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit'* (Moscow: izd. 'Aprel'-85', 1995), pp148-9, all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.2, pp389-90. Because of the number of sources referred to by Sakwa in his appendixes on electoral results, I refer to the original sources when each appendix is first used before confining references to the appendix number and the page number.
[61] 'Soobshchenie tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi Komissii po vyboram Prezidenta RSFSR,' *Izvestiya*, 20 June 1991, no page (n.p.); *Pravda*, 20 June 1991, n.p., both quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.3, p390.

importance. The coup was launched on the 18th of August with the seizure and isolation of Gorbachev in the Crimea. With this achieved, coup participants demanded that Gorbachev sign a decree declaring a state of emergency or resign, but he refused. The coup leaders then announced that Gorbachev had been relieved of his duties, and that power was being transferred to Gennadii Yanaev, the Vice-President who headed a State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP). This Committee included Valentin Pavlov, the Prime Minister, Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Chairperson of the KGB (Committee of State Security), Boris Pugo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and Dmitri Yazov, the Minister of Defence. That day moves were made to control the media, and troops were deployed in Moscow to support the coup. However the coup leaders did not seize Yeltsin, who actively opposed the coup. Yeltsin and his supporters resided in the White House, the Parliament buildings in Moscow, and feared that the coup forces would attempt to seize the building. The coup leaders though swiftly became isolated and were reluctant to cause bloodshed, their arrest facilitating Gorbachev's return to Moscow on the 22nd.[62]

The 1991 coup facilitated the transition from Communism as its failure discredited the party institutions. Immediately after the coup Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary, and the USSR Supreme Soviet voted itself out of existence. Similarly, in October the KGB was abolished, and the following month Yeltsin banned the Communist party in Russia and signed decrees accelerating the transition to a market economy. The Communist party's decline facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. Republics declared themselves independent and in December the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus condemned the 1922 Union Treaty and signed the Belovezha Accords. These stated "the USSR as a subject of international law and as a geographical entity has ceased to exist" and announced the formation of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[63] This was to provide a framework through which former Soviet republics could cooperate. Following this, on 25th December the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic became the Russian Federation, and Gorbachev resigned as President. On 31st December 1991 the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist.

These developments had major repercussions for the military that I shall briefly outline to put them in the context of the above developments. The Soviet military was not isolated from Gorbachev's reforms as he sought to make the military more accountable. The military was

[62] For Gorbachev's account of the coup see Gorbachev, *The August Coup*. With regard to Yeltsin's account see Yeltsin, *The View*, pp41-103.

widely criticised for the first time, and the growing restlessness of Soviet republics led to a dramatic rise in draft evasion. In mid-1987 Gorbachev suddenly removed the top officers, and in December 1988 committed the Soviet Union to unilateral arms reductions and made major cuts to the military. This was despite growing opposition within the military, by 1989 his views had been abandoned by many senior officers. The magnitude of change is best shown by the severity of cuts to the number of military personnel. Whereas the transition to Communism led to a dramatic increase in the number of personnel, its fall led to an unprecedented decrease. For instance, the number of Soviet ground forces personnel fell from 1,995,000 in 1985, to 1,400,000 in 1991.[64] The severity of this cut is clearly apparent when it is compared to the cuts in East Europe from 1985 to 1991. Whereas the number of Soviet ground forces personnel fell by 29.8 percent, the average decline for the armies of the Warsaw Treaty was 17.3 percent.[65] It was within this context of dramatic change and growing civil-military tensions that officers supported the 1991 coup.

The consolidating of the new regime: 1992 to 1996

Major changes continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the transition from Communism progressed under Yeltsin. Yeltsin liberalised prices in January 1992 and in November the Constitutional Court, the court established to deal with the main questions regarding constitutionality, upheld Yeltsin's decrees banning the Communist party. The Court did however rule that rank-and-file organisations had the right to exist. The following year 7 out of 10 members of the CIS approved its charter, and a Coordinating and Consultative Committee was established to provide a rudimentary permanent executive body. However the tension between the parliamentary system of the Russian Congress and Supreme Soviet grew as parliament opposed Yeltsin's reforms. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Supreme Soviet speaker, attacked Yeltsin's economic reforms and relations became particularly tense after December 1992. During this month parliament refused to confirm Gyegor Gaidar as Yeltsin's Prime Minister, and Yeltsin called for a referendum in January 1993 to decide whether the president or parliament should hold power. Congress reacted by passing a Constitutional amendment banning any plebiscite that could lead to a vote of no confidence in any high state body, or which could lead to its dissolution before its term of office expired.

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[63] Sakwa, p23.
[64] IISS, *The Military Balance 1985-1986* (London: IISS, 1985), p22; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p37.
[65] This is based on the change in the number of personnel in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp22, 31-6; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp37, 84-93. All percentage calculations made by the author are rounded up one decimal point (eg. 25.55 becomes 25.6 and 25.66 becomes 25.7).

The first year of the new regime set the scene for the climax of tensions between Yeltsin and the parliament in 1993, as both fought over the path of change. In March 1993 parliament stripped Yeltsin of many of the powers he had been granted to implement economic reform, and the government was granted the right to submit legislation directly to the parliament, thus bypassing Yeltsin. The following month a referendum found that 58.7 percent of voters had confidence in Yeltsin and 53 percent approved of his socioeconomic policies.[66] Yeltsin interpreted these results as a renewed popular mandate and sought to speed up the transition from the Communist era political structures. Yeltsin suspended Alexander Rutskoi, the Vice-President, on 1st September, and dissolved the Supreme Soviet and the Congress on 21st September, their powers going to a new Federation Assembly. This assembly was to comprise of the Federation Council, the chamber that provides direct representation for the components of Russia, and the State Duma, the chamber that drafts and endorses laws and issues resolutions.[67] It was against this background that the parliament called for the masses to defend the White House, and on the 3rd of October violent demonstrations were superseded by an insurrection, which I refer to as the parliamentary revolt, or 1993 revolt.

The parliamentary revolt was the only real threat to the new regime's consolidation. Like the 1991 coup, I shall examine specific details of the event later so only outline it here. On the afternoon of October 3rd a pro-parliament crowd of 10,000 people overwhelmed the 5,000 police and Ministry of Interior personnel surrounding the White House. Rutskoi then ordered the crowd to form into fighting detachments and to storm the Moscow Mayor's office. Some 100 armed and up to 4,000 unarmed demonstrators also attacked the Ostankino Television Tower. Here they encountered strong resistance from members of the Interior Ministry. On the same day, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and deployed the military around the White House, where pro-parliament supporters led by Rutskoi and Khasbulatov had barricaded themselves. With the failure of the parliamentary forces to surrender military tanks were used to bombard the White House, and on the 4th of October the parliamentary forces

[66] *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 6 May 1993, n.p.; and *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no.21, 21 May 1993, p12, both quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.4, p391.
[67] See Sakwa, pp131-6.

surrendered. The revolt cost some 146 lives.[68] In economic terms the cost of repairing the White House was estimated at 60 billion roubles alone.[69]

Following the 1993 revolt the stage was set for the new regime to continue its consolidation. This involved holding elections to the new state Duma and a vote on a new Constitution. In October 1993 Yeltsin decreed that restrictions on land ownership be removed, and in December the first Duma elections under the new regime were held. The Liberal Democratic People's party (LDPR), led by the ultra-nationalist and anti-Yeltsin Vladimir Zhirinovsky, won the most votes during these elections, 22.92 percent, followed by Russia's Choice with 15.51 percent. The 1993 Constitution was also passed by 58.43 percent of the vote.[70] The Constitution defined the Russian Federation as a "democratic federative rule-of-law state," and gave much power to the head of state, the Russian President.[71] The Federation Council and the Duma met for the first time in January 1994, and that year Yeltsin commented that "Not a single other large country has known so many upheavals as we have in recent years."[72]

The most important event in 1994 in terms of its long-term consequences was the decision to invade the Chechnyan republic. The Chechnyan war was the first major war undertaken by the new regime, and was in line with post-Soviet threat perceptions. Under President Jokhar Dudayev Chechnya had declared itself independent in November 1991 despite Moscow's opposition. Yeltsin attempted to blockade the republic and cut it off from federal budget funds. However Dudayev remained in power and Yeltsin became increasingly impatient. The republic's growing instability, the need to control Chechnyan oil fields and pipelines, and the belief that the republic could be swiftly subdued, encouraged this impatience.[73] It was within this context that Russia was involved in a failed attempt to overthrow Dudayev in November 1994, and a full-scale invasion was launched that December. However the invasion swiftly turned into a drawn-out conflict. Indeed Chechnyan rebels in June 1995 attacked the Southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk, and in January 1996 attacked Kizlyar, a provincial centre in

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[68] Ibid., Appendix 1, p386. For a comprehensive study of the revolt see Alexander Buzgalin and Andrei Kolganov, *Bloody October In Moscow: Political Repression in the Name of Reform*, translated by Renfrey Clarke (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994).

[69] "Most Of Moscow's Dead Were Civilians-Minister," Reuters, 9 October 1993.

[70] *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 21 December 1993, p1; *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel.noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1, no.12, 1994, 1, no.12, (1994): pp34-8; *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p1; *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel.noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1, no.12 (1994): p67, all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.5, pp391-2.

[71] The Russian Constitution, quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 3, pp395, 395-429.

[72] Yeltsin, *The View*, p130.

[73] See Gall and Waal, pp103-72.

Dagestan. Fighting only ceased in late 1996 after an agreement was reached by which Russia and the republic would have 5 years to work out Chechnya's status. Some 50,000 civilians, at least 6,000 Russian troops, and 2,000 to 3,000 Chechnyan rebels were killed during the war.[74]

It was with the Chechnyan war raging, and growing concerns over the economy, that the consolidation of the new regime continued with the 1995 Duma elections, and the 1996 presidential elections. The second Duma elections were held in December 1995. The 1995 elections were similar to the preceding elections, as anti-Yeltsin attitudes are evident, however the popularity of parties had changed. The Communist party, led by Gennady Zyuganov, won the most support with 22.30 percent of the vote, followed by the LDPR with 11.18 percent.[75] The following year Yeltsin won the presidential elections. These competitive elections clearly contrast those held during the Soviet era. The first round of elections was held in June 1996 when Yeltsin won 35.28 percent, followed by Zyuganov with 32.03 percent, and retired General Alexander Lebed with 14.52 percent. As the Constitution stipulated that the successful candidate required over 50 percent of the vote a second round was held in July, after Lebed had exited to support Yeltsin. Yeltsin then won 53.82 percent of the vote, compared to 40.31 percent for Zyuganov, and was inaugurated for a second term in August 1996.[76]

These developments impacted on the military, and although I examine the effects of the transition on the military in-depth in chapter 4, I shall briefly outline the changes to put them into context. Yeltsin established the Russian Ministry of Defence in 1992 after it became clear that a unified military along Soviet lines was not feasible. The military was deployed by the new regime against the 1993 parliamentary revolt, a deployment in stark contrast to the minimal use of the military for domestic security before 1985, and against the Chechnyan rebels. The military's involvement in politics also increased relative to the Soviet era. The new regime continued to reform the military, and the resultant upheaval remained a source of contention. The dramatic nature of change is again shown by the reduction of the military's size. The number of ground force personnel declined from 1,400,000 in 1992, to 460,000 in

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[74] With regard to casualties see Gall and Waal, p360.

[75] *OMRI Daily Digest* no.249 Part 1, 27 December 1995, n.p.; *OMRI Daily Digest* no.1 Part 1, 2 January 1996, n.p.; ITAR-TASS, 22 December 1995; and *Moscow News* no.51, 29 December 1995, p2, all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.6, pp392-3.

[76] *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 22 June 1996, n.p., quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.7, p393. See also p394. Please note that I use the English name 'Alexander' rather than 'Aleksandr' when I refer to both Rutskoi and Lebed because Western scholars frequently use it.

1996. This represents a 67.1 percent decline, and means that there were over four times more personnel in 1985 relative to 1996. To put this in perspective the cuts elsewhere in Europe were much less severe. For example, the number of Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian personnel fell on average by 20.8 percent.[77]

Thesis Structure

The hypotheses can be placed into two broad categories: the study of regime transitions and the military, and the study of coups. With regard to transitions and the military, the theoretical framework focuses on six key areas where they can impact on the military (see model 1). These areas are derived from my study of past transitions and include the areas I have found to be most important, and most likely to experience change. The structure of the civil-military relationship and how this is impacted upon is most important and is thus assessed first. Second, and also important, the roles that the military performs and the impact of the transition on the allocation of these are examined. Third, I assess transitional changes to the military's level of budgetary support and popular support. Fourth and closely related, the impact of transitional changes on the morale of personnel is assessed. Fifth, transitional changes to the military's cohesion and size are examined. Finally, a transition's impact on the level of military expertise is studied.

Model 1: Potential Consequences of Regime Transition for Military



To explain why the military intervenes, and the impact of a transition on the likelihood of this, I examine three main determinants influencing the military, though these are not mutually

[77] IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-1993* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1992), pp70-82, 93; and IISS, *The*

exclusive. First, I assess whether the military has the capacity to intervene and to stage a coup. Second, I assess whether the military has the disposition to intervene. Third, I assess whether the military has the opportunity to intervene. These are in turn comprised of numerous factors that can both encourage and can discourage a coup. These factors are covered both in general and in the context of my case study. They range from whether there are potential coup leaders to the popularity of the regime. As I have already noted, I assume that the coup leaders will seek to stage a successful coup.

This thesis has a total of 8 chapters that examine the validity of my hypotheses. After the introduction outlines the importance of regime transitions and coups, chapter 2 examines the various factors that influence the military's decision to intervene. Following this, chapter 3 introduces the case study. It first provides an overview of the theoretical models that have dominated the study of Soviet civil-military relations by Western scholars before outlining civil-military relations from 1917 to 1985. The chapter then examines the state of the military before the transition, and the transition's impact from 1985 to 1991. Chapter 4 continues this assessment by examining the impact of the transition on the military from 1992 to 1996, and then argues that the threat of a Russian military coup was present. The following three chapters attempt to explain why the military did not intervene, despite the dramatic changes that occurred with the transition. Chapter 5 examines whether the military had the capacity to intervene, and chapter 6 examines whether the military had the disposition to intervene. Chapter 7 then examines the third coup determinant, whether the military had the opportunity to intervene. Finally, chapter 8 summarises my conclusions and provides a brief epilogue that updates the thesis to April 1999.

Sources

I have utilised a wide-range of resources. Information has been obtained from various sources that include newspapers, magazines, the radio, television, and the Internet. I have also obtained material via information services like Reuters and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In addition, I have accessed archival material from various Internet sites, such as the Jamestown Foundation, and electronic sources like *The New York Times* on CD-ROM. Apart from these sources I have used many periodicals and journals, particularly *Armed Forces and Society* and the *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*. Similarly, I have used numerous books.

Military Balance 1996-1997 (London: Oxford University for the IISS, 1996), pp82-95, 114.

When possible, I have used statistics, including those gathered from my own sampling, to support my arguments. Finally, I have conducted interviews, and have conferred with officials and scholars.

Conclusions

This thesis examines how regime transitions impact on the military and, more specifically, how this impact influences the likelihood of a coup. Transitions involve fundamental changes in the composition of the regime and the structure that determine how the state is governed, and policy is made and implemented. With regard to coups, these involve the removal or attempted removal of a state's chief executive by the use of or threat of violence, during which active service regular military personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the operation. To examine the impact of a transition on the military key areas are assessed. These relate to the structure of the civil-military relationship and the military's roles, support and morale, cohesion and size, and expertise. Turning to the case study, the study of the fall of Communism and its impact on the Soviet and post-Soviet military is important. The transition is divided into two main periods: the fall of Communism from 1985 to 1991 and the consolidation of the new regime from 1992 to 1996.

CHAPTER II
THE STUDY OF COUPS

This chapter outlines the factors that might encourage or discourage a coup. The chapter first justifies the use of S.E. Finer's work before using it as a guide to study factors that might encourage intervention.[1] Finer believed that the military had political advantages over civilians, and argued that its capacity, its disposition, and its opportunity to intervene shaped the likelihood of its intervention in politics. This chapter is based on the belief that coup leaders will take into account the likelihood of their success before acting. I believe that the capacity to intervene is closely interlinked with the military's mood, and that corporate and individual self-interests, are the most important coup determinants. I shall then examine other factors that shape the disposition to intervene before assessing those that determine if the military has the opportunity to intervene. Finally, potential coup inhibitors are identified. Of fundamental importance is the acceptance of civilian supremacy. This is encouraged by the military's inability to intervene, lack of a disposition to intervene, and the lack of an opportunity to intervene. These increase the perceived risk involved in intervening.

This theoretical framework is utilised because I believe that it facilitates a comprehensive and valid study of why the military intervenes. This is for four reasons. First, the framework clearly distinguishes between the capacity, the disposition, and the opportunity to intervene, and the factors that can inhibit intervention. This is important because all the factors influence whether a coup is staged. If the opportunity to intervene is present, but the disposition absent, a coup is less likely, as personnel will lack the motives to exploit the opportunity. Likewise, if the disposition to intervene develops without an opportunity, personnel might be discouraged from acting if they feel the regime is too strong to be overthrown. The framework thus allows an accurate study of both the occurrence and absence of coups. Second, the framework takes into account key factors often identified by scholars as determining the likelihood of a coup. Third, the framework allows the categorising of similar factors under sub-headings, ensuring clarity and facilitating their critique. I should note however, that the very nature of studying an event which might occur because of a multitude of factors means that they do not necessarily fit precisely into one part of the coup equation. Fourth, the importance of Finer's

[1] See S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p23. Italics are original. Another edition was published in 1988. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military*

framework, from which my framework derives fundamental components, is widely recognised by scholars.[2]

The Man on Horseback

Finer defined an intervention by the military in politics as the "*constrained substitution of their own* [the military's] *policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities*," and argued that there were four levels of military intervention.[3] These were:

1. Influence through the normal constitutional channels, and collusion, or competition, with the civilian authorities.
2. Blackmail through collusion, or competition, with the civilian authorities, intimidation of the civilian authorities, and threats of non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities.
3. Displacement of the civilian leaders and their replacement with other civilians through threats of non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities, failure to defend the civilian authorities against violence, and violence by the military itself.
4. Supplantment of the civilian leaders with military leaders through threats of non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities, the failure to defend the civilian authorities against violence, and violence by the military.[4]

Of most relevance here are levels three and four, as here the coup is one of the methods used by the military to remove civilian leaders.

Capacity to intervene

Finer believed that military intervention was "a product of two sets of forces-the capacity and propensity of the military to intervene, and conditions in the society in which it operates."[5]

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in Politics, second enlarged edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988). This edition used the same framework to examine interventions with minor changes.

[2] See Finer, second edition, p231; Claude Wech and Arthur Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations* (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, A division of the Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California, 1974), p266; Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, "Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits," *AFS* 19, no.1 (Fall 1992): p8; Edmonds, pp5, 74-6; Bruce Farcau, *The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power*. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Books, 1994), pp5-6; Gregor Ferguson, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Manual* (Dorset: Arms and Armour Press Ltd, 1987), p11. Donald Horowitz provides a brief history of the study of coups. David Horowitz, *Coup Theories And Officers' Motives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp3-15.

[3] Finer, p23.

Finer initially characterised the military as having three "massive political advantages over civilian organizations."[6] These were a superior organisation derived from its centralisation of control, strong discipline, and elaborate communication system that encouraged a strong esprit de corps, and contempt for civilians. The military also had virtues such as bravery, which won sympathy and mystique, and a near monopoly over weaponry.[7] Finer though argued that the size and firepower of the military had no impact upon whether a coup succeeded or failed, as a low number of personnel could successfully take power. Finer also concluded that a divided military was most likely to intervene as factions sought to counter, and to emulate, those that had seized power, and as the regime established by the divided military faced challenges from other factions. [8]

However Finer wrote that the military had political weaknesses. First, the military was technically unable to govern developed societies. Second, in those societies that were developed the military lacked the right to govern, as it was not widely recognised as the lawful and rightful government.[9] Thus, when the military "breaches the existing political order" it would be forced to claim a "moral authority for its actions."[10]

Disposition to intervene

The disposition to intervene was encouraged by three broad motives or factors, and by the military's mood. However Finer first assessed the motives that might inhibit intervention. Finer argued that the most obvious inhibitor was the absence of motives.[11] Military professionalism was then assessed, and Finer argued that this was an inadequate inhibitor if the principle of civilian supremacy was not accepted.[12] This principle was the "truly effective check."[13] Other potential inhibitors included the fear that military capacity would be harmed by the intervention, the fear of a civil war, and the fear of the consequences for both themselves and the military if the intervention failed.[14] Turning to the motives that might

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[4] Ibid., p140. See also pp86-7, 140-63.
[5] Finer, second edition, p224. Please note that the esprit de corps of the military and civilian respect for the institution are both examined in the context of the military's mood. This is because I believe that the morale and prestige of personnel is directly linked to their self-perception and whether this is high or low.
[6] Finer, p6.
[7] Ibid., pp6, 6-13.
[8] Finer, second edition, pp225-30.
[9] Finer, pp14-20.
[10] Ibid., p20.
[11] Ibid., p23.
[12] Ibid., p30.
[13] Ibid., p30.
[14] Ibid., pp30-2.

encourage intervention, these were the manifest destiny, the belief that the military was the guardian of the national interest, the national interest itself, and sectional interests based on class, region, the military institution, or the individual. With regard to the military's mood, if it was one of "self importance," or "morbidly high," the likelihood of intervention increased.

The motives disposing the military to intervene according to Finer were:

1. Manifest destiny. Finer derived this term from the writing of President Betancourt on the 1948 coup in Venezuela. Here Betancourt commented that the office of the Chief of Staff sought support by claiming the coup was being staged in accordance with the "*manifest destiny*," the "*providential mission of the soldiers as saviours of their countries.*"[15] According to Finer, the validity of this claim was derived from three factors. First, soldiers were purportedly apolitical, and their sole purpose was to defend the state. Second, the military was closely associated with sovereignty and independence. Third, Finer wrote that the military's esprit de corps was based upon the supposed national values and virtues. Thus, personnel were indoctrinated with nationalism supportive of the belief that it was their duty to 'save' the state when necessary.[16]

2. National interest. As the military accepted that its manifest destiny was to intervene, personnel developed a "special and indeed unique identification with the 'national interest." This provided the incentive for the military to fulfil its manifest destiny and to intervene. [17] Finer argued that the military's actions were likely to be influenced by its own concept of the national interest.[18] However he cast doubt on whether the military would actually be motivated to intervene to protect the national interest. Finer argued that after a coup the military often reneged on its promises to promote electoral rights and public liberties.[19] He concluded that "very often it [the military] acts primarily if not wholly not for the national interest at all, but rather out of a desire to protect or extend its privileges as a peculiar corporation."[20]

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[15] Romulo Betancourt, *Venezuela: Politica y Petroleo* (Mexico: no publisher, 1956), pp468-70 quoted in Finer, p32. Italics are original.
[16] Finer, pp33-4.
[17] Ibid., p35.
[18] Ibid., p38.
[19] Ibid., p37.
[20] Ibid., p39. See also second edition, pp235-6.

3. Sectional interest. Four broad interests were identified by Finer:

- Class interest: Here the military supported the civilian government when it was derived from the same class, and acted against it when derived from a different and hostile class. Finer wrote that according to this approach most of the military's political activities are "totally incomprehensible." This was because interventions had been staged both for and against the same classes. However class interests in certain cases had been influential in shaping the military's political actions.[21] He rejected the argument that it was the sole motive.[22]
- Regional (particularistic) interest. When the officer corps was predominantly from one region or developed special ties with one region this might motivate intervention.[23]
- Corporate self-interest of the military. The military's desire to protect its autonomy was "one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for intervention." In its "defensive form" the military insisted that it alone should control issues, such as recruitment and equipment. In a more "aggressive form" the military could demand control over all matters affecting it.[24] In 1981 he wrote that the corporate interest "is clearly a powerful and frequent motivation for military intervention."[25]
- Individual self-interest. Finer identified the material interests of the officers as a potential motive for political involvement. These interests might include the desire for influence, higher pay, and easier promotion.[26]

Finer believed that the military's motives were often a mixture of the above, and varied according to each case.[27]

Finer next argued that the military's mood influenced its disposition to intervene. Though this was more difficult to establish, Finer argued that one element was always present: the military's awareness of its special and separate identity. According to Finer, to this only two factors often needed to be added to encourage intervention: the sense that there was nothing

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[21] Ibid., p40. See also second edition, p234.
[22] Finer, second edition, p232.
[23] Finer, p43. Finer now uses the term 'particularistic' to take into account ethnic and confessional particularisms. Finer, second edition, p231. The author to assess both region and ethnicity thus uses this term.
[24] Ibid., p47.
[25] Finer, second edition, p240. See also pp236-9.
[26] Finer, pp56-7.
[27] Ibid., pp58-60.

that could stop it from having whatever it wished, and a grievance.[28] Finer identified two moods that might encourage intervention:

1. The "self-important" military. Here personnel had a good, though not excessive, opinion of themselves relative to that they held of the government or civilians, and may take action when they feel humiliated by the government.[29]
2. Armies with a "morbidly high self-esteem." This was more extreme as personnel believed they were inherently superior to civilians. Again, perceived affronts to their pride were likely to create resentment, though in this case they were more likely to motivate intervention.[30]

Opportunity to intervene

Finer also argued that the opportunity to intervene shaped how, when, and possibly whether intervention occurred.[31] Finer wrote that "on the whole" an intervention will not occur if there is the opportunity but not disposition to intervene.[32] However Finer believed that the military might still intervene without a disposition. For instance, the military might intervene after "much prodding and pushing" and an invitation by the regime.[33] Finer argued that the opportunity to intervene depended on the situation that civilian leaders faced, and the level of "political culture." With regard to the situation Finer defined three broad types:

1. Increased civilian dependence on the military. This dependence might result from its indispensability to the state's foreign policy, for instance in war,[34] or because of the domestic situation.

2. The domestic situation. Three key situations were identified, the first being an "overt crisis." During such a crisis "rival political forces have arisen willing and able to use violence, which are so equally matched that no government can rely on support from any single one without drawing on itself the full violence of the rest."[35] When this occurred "a country is effectively in a state of potential or even incipient civil war."[36] Second, a "latent crisis" might

[28] Ibid., p61.
[29] Ibid., p63.
[30] Ibid., p67.
[31] Finer, p71.
[32] Ibid., p83.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., pp72-5.
[35] Ibid., p75.
[36] Ibid.

exist. This was more common, and developed when a political or social minority hated by the masses governed. As the civilian leaders were "Faced by a consensus of indifference or active hatred, often expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations, murders or *jacqueries*," they became dependent on the military, which then became their "master."[37] Third, a "power vacuum" might exist whereby there was an absence of organised political movements of any strength and little political opinion, though this was rare in industrialised societies. In such circumstances there was nothing to prevent the military from intervening. [38]

3. The popularity of the military. Here the military's popularity and prestige assisted in the taking of power. This was particularly the case when the civilian government was discredited by weaknesses, such as inefficiency and corruption.[39]

Finer argued that the level of "political culture," the degree of attachment to civilian institutions, was connected to the domestic conditions, and that its level influenced the type of military intervention.[40] Finer believed that there were four levels of "political culture." To assess the level of culture Finer posed three questions:

> 1. Does there exist a wide public approval of the procedures for transferring power, and a corresponding belief that no exercise of power in breach of these procedures is legitimate?
> 2. Does there exist a wide public recognition as to who or what constitutes the sovereign authority, and a corresponding belief that no other persons or centre of power is legitimate or duty-worthy?
> 3. Is the public proportionately large and well mobilised into private associations? i.e. do we find cohesive churches, industrial associations and firms, labour unions, and political parties?[41]

According to Finer, the answers to these questions determined the level of military intervention. When the answers to all three of the questions was affirmative, the "political culture" was high. An intervention then "would be regarded as a wholly unwarrantable intrusion" and such states had a "*mature political culture.*"[42] Finer argued that the level of

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[37] Ibid., pp77-8. The term 'jacqueries' is derived from the collective name given to the French peasantry by the privileged classes and applies to the 14th century peasantry rebellion in France.
[38] Ibid., pp79-80.
[39] Ibid., pp80-3.
[40] With regard to this connection see pp84-5.
[41] Ibid., pp87-8. Finer in 1981 reduced the number of questions to two in 1981 to simplify the framework by combining both questions one and two. Finer, second edition, p245. However I have used the three questions to ensure that each is clearly examined and related to both transitions and the occurrence of coups.
[42] Ibid., p88. Italics are original.

"political culture" influenced the degree of military intervention in politics.[43] With regard to the second level, or developed "political culture," civil institutions were highly developed, the public large and well-organised, and civil procedures and public authorities entrenched. However the legitimacy of the process for the transferral of political power, and the question of "who or what should constitute the sovereign authority are both in dispute."[44] Finer termed this a "developed political culture." This meant that the typical level of intervention ranged from military influence on politicians to blackmail. However coups were "rare, brief and unsuccessful."[45]

Contrasting these two cultures were those of the low and minimal type. The prevalence of a "low political culture" meant that opposition to an intervention would not be strong, as the public was "relatively narrow and weakly organized, [and] where the institutions and procedures of the regime are in dispute also."[46] The military's intervention here might include the overturning of governments, and the installing of others or their permanent supplanting.[47] Finally, in those states with a "low political culture" the public had little political awareness and was poorly organised. Finer wrote that the characteristic of such states was "not that there are 'no people able and willing to hold political ideas' or to act from 'political conviction,' but that they are so few and so scattered as to be altogether negligible when political issues are to be decided. These issues are decided by force or threat of force."[48] Here the supplanting of civilians can occur.[49]

In summary, Finer argued that a military's capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene determined its likelihood of intervention in politics. The military's advantages over civilian institutions because of its strong organisation, positive image, and control of weaponry influenced its capacity. The manifest destiny, the national interest, the sectional interests, and the mood shaped the disposition. With regard to the opportunity, the degree of civilian reliance upon the military, the domestic situation, the military's popularity, and the "political culture" were important.

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[43] Ibid., p139.
[44] Ibid., p88.
[45] Ibid., p90. See also pp90-109.
[46] Ibid., p89.
[47] Ibid., p110. Finer in 1981 stressed that a low or minimal culture does not automatically mean that the military will intervene. Finer, second edition, p248.
[48] Finer, p130.

Modifying Finer's Framework

Although Finer's framework helps scholars to understand military interventions, it has a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed. With regard to the capacity to intervene, I believe that Finer's arguments need to be modified and expanded. This is because the type of personnel involved in a coup, their cohesion, and to a lesser extent their number is important and needs to be adequately examined. Finer's assessment of the military's mood also needs to be expanded to clearly take into account the influence that negative self-perceptions among personnel have in discouraging coups. The mood is important because the self-perceptions of personnel influence whether they believe that the military has the capacity to intervene. It follows then that when the self-perceptions of personnel decline to the extent that they doubt their own capabilities to successfully stage a coup, the threat of a coup declines. This is the result of personnel lacking the confidence that they can successfully stage an operation as complex as a coup, and because they lack the necessary confidence to take the many risks involved. A dramatic fall also is likely to increase negative perceptions of the military, and thus the probability that civilians will actively oppose intervention. This is important when personnel are unsure of themselves and the viability of a coup, as it further weakens their resolve, particularly when they do not wish to risk causing civilian casualties and instability.

Finer's study of the disposition to intervene likewise needs to be modified. I believe that the factors that can encourage the disposition to intervene should be ranked according to their influence. This better indicates the importance of factors, and ultimately facilitates the study of why the military intervenes. In line with this, I have labelled factors as primary or secondary according to their influence in coups. This means that primary factors are more likely to have a major influence on the decision to intervene relative to secondary factors. The division into primary and secondary factors is undertaken through examining the factors that have encouraged past coups. Statistics on the factors that encourage coups are particularly important, as they help estimate the importance of the factors. The statistics have been gathered from surveys of past coups. Apart from these factors, I believe that Finer's framework needs to be modified to better assess the corporate grievances of the military. This is because they often play an important role in motivating intervention. Similarly, Finer's work needs to be modified to specifically assess the role external actors (foreign states and

[49] Ibid., p139.

organisations) can have in determining the likelihood of a coup. This is because these actors can influence the decision to intervene.

Finer's study of the opportunity to intervene is also problematic. The term "political culture" is controversial and assessing its role is difficult. The practicality of using Finer's framework here is called into question because of three fundamental weaknesses. First, the term is controversial because defining exactly what makes up a 'culture' is challenging. Finer's use of the term presents even more problems. His use of the term implies that some cultures are more advanced than others according to how they comply with his criteria. Second, it is unlikely that a case study will fit exactly into his framework. For instance, a society might have the characteristics of both a "developed" and a "low level of political culture." Third, actually finding the evidence to accurately ascertain the level of culture according to Finer's questions can be difficult. However this third weakness is not specific to Finer's work, as a lack of quality evidence is a problem that can face any approach given the difficult nature of predicting the public's reaction to a coup.

Finer's criteria is also open to critique, as grading the level of cultures is very problematic. Its use to assess the level of culture can be misleading. For instance, there might be strong public approval of the procedures for transferring power but these procedures may not actually be important in determining who holds power. Illustrative of this is the rigging of elections or restricting of electoral candidates to members of one party. Indeed the characteristics of a "mature" or "developed" level of culture might actually facilitate a coup. This is because well-established and strong organisations might sympathise with a coup. Another key problem is that the strength of the organisation is often not as important in influencing its response to a coup, as its depth of commitment to the regime. For example, an organisation might have limited numbers but members more willing to actively oppose a coup relative to larger and better-established organisations. Transitional developments are particularly relevant here, as new institutions might emerge with the new political framework but suffer from weaknesses that limit their power. Furthermore, support for the regime must be assessed relative to other regimes. This is because although the regime might not be strongly supported, the alternatives may receive even less support. Thus, democracy might not be particularly supported but nor might a coup be supported, if a military dictatorship is even less supported.

Having recognised that the term "political culture" is very controversial, and that Finer's work has weaknesses, I shall not use the term and will modify his framework. I believe that the term "political culture" should be replaced by the term 'regime attachment.' This indicates that I am referring foremost to the level of support for the regime and that I am not arguing that one culture is better than another. Of fundamental importance too is Finer's recognition that the context within which regime attachment is examined is critical. Finer correctly examined the level of support for both the power transferral procedures relative to their violation, and the level of recognition of who, or what, constitutes the sovereign authority. This is undertaken within the context of whether another person, or group, is believed to be more legitimate, or duty-worthy. This is critical to the provision of an accurate assessment of the level of support for the regime. For instance, the level of support for the procedures used to transfer power might be minimal but high relative to the level of support for a procedural violation like a coup. Of direct relevance here is Adam Przeworski's argument that the level of support for a regime might be minimal but the population may not believe that there is a viable alternative.[50] Similarly, the legitimacy of the regime leader's actions might be questioned but his or her legitimacy may be high relative to others. Here Finer correctly recognised that there can be an important difference between the level of support for the leader, and attitudes toward their legitimacy. This is important because people can detest a leader but still recognise, at least relative to others, that he or she legitimately holds power.

I also believe that with modifications weaknesses of Finer's framework are addressed. First, the procedures used for the transferral of power can be initially examined to assess whether they are actually important in deciding who holds power. This determines whether the level of regime attachment to them is an accurate indicator of the public's response to intervention. Second, an examination of the strength of private organisations needs to be followed by an assessment of how such organisations will respond to a coup. This assessment can be based on the attitudes and actions of the organisations, and facilitates a more accurate evaluation of regime attachment by extending the focus beyond the strength of private organisations. This is particularly important because I believe that the organisation's depth of commitment to the regime can be most important, and modify Finer's framework accordingly. More specifically, the study of transitions requires that the level of regime attachment be assessed before the

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[50] Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, with a forward by Abraham Lowenthal, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp51-6.

transition to gauge its impact. Because the military is not completely isolated from society comparisons of military and civilian attitudes are also helpful.

To correct the weaknesses I believe exist in Finer's work I shall now present a modified framework. This framework examines the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene and factors that might inhibit a coup. Within this framework I have re-ordered and moved arguments to better reflect their significance. This is best shown by my categorising of motives according to whether they are important, and thus primary factors, or not important, whereby they are secondary. I have also expanded on those that I believe are important, brought attention to other potential factors, and qualified Finer's arguments when they are problematic. Of particular importance with regard to my framework is its division into two sections. This is because I first examine factors that can determine whether the military intervenes before those factors that can inhibit intervention. I have done this to better distinguish between these two types of factors, and to ensure that those factors that encourage intervention are not examined at the expense of inhibitors. Therefore, when Finer's work on inhibitors is particularly relevant it appears in this second section. I have also sought to link factors with transitions and to present the work of other scholars. This prevents a reliance on the work of one scholar, Finer, developed over 30 years ago. [51]

Capacity to intervene

The capacity to intervene is a fundamental requirement for the military to stage a coup. Although the military may have both the opportunity and disposition to intervene, it can still be discouraged from intervening. This is because the military might perceive itself neither able to successfully overcome the numerous hazards of staging a coup or, if it seeks to govern, of governing.[52] Effectively, the military must believe that it has the capacity to defeat, or successfully intimidate the regime's key leaders and supporters. Likewise, it must be able to seize strategic sites necessary for the successful excising of power, and be able to act swiftly to guarantee surprise, and to minimise organised opposition. Therefore, I believe that the

[51] Although the second edition of *The Man on Horseback* was published in 1988 the main text was only updated to 1981. Appendix I was originally published in 1985 and examined the retreat from power of military regimes. Appendix II and III listed military interventions from 1958-73, and Appendix IV listed the proportion of military interventions from 1958 to 73 by region. Finally, Appendix V and VI examined the relationship between per capita income and interventions from 1958 to 1973.

[52] Challenges facing military governments are examined when the national interest is examined because they are of direct interest when assessing if the military intervenes to protect or promote the national interest, at least when equated with protecting or promoting civilian living conditions. See chapter 2, pp59-60.

military's mood is directly relevant and it is examined here, though I accept that it can influence the disposition too.

In line with these changes, I do not examine other factors in accordance with Finer's framework when I believe that they are better assessed elsewhere. I do not examine the military's esprit de corps here because I assess the role that military self-perceptions have on the willingness to intervene within the context of the military's mood, given their influence. I also refer to the military's technical ability to govern in the context of its mood. This is because the decision to intervene is determined by whether or not personnel are confident that they can successfully intervene, and possibly govern. Similarly, the military's popularity or legitimacy to govern is not examined here because they are addressed in the context of the opportunity to intervene. This is because civilian perceptions of the military directly impact on how the public reacts to a coup, and thus influence whether there is the opportunity to intervene.

Of fundamental importance to the military's capacity is the type of personnel involved, their cohesion, and to a lesser extent their number. As the presence of these factors strengthen the military's capacity to successfully seize power they are coup conducive. Primarily, the likelihood of success will be enhanced by the active participation of personnel who are:

- Leaders. Of most importance here is the presence of figures willing to lead a coup who are both popular with the personnel, and who have the ability to lead an intervention.
- Strategically located. The participation of officers commanding personnel located near key sites will increase the speed, and thus the surprise with which the operation can be staged. This is demoralising for the regime. As key supporters and strategic sites are swiftly captured, the regime is isolated from the means of communicating with loyalists, and it is forced to rely on personnel whose deployment may take precious time.
- Effectively armed and trained. The participation of army personnel is important given they are most likely to have the heavy weaponry required to seize strategic sites, to enforce a state of emergency, and to have expertise in fighting in urban areas. In addition, the participation of elite units will facilitate a swift operation, and they have the potential to discourage opposition given their presumed high level of readiness and expertise.

The cohesion and number of the likely active coup participants will also influence the probability of the military perceiving itself capable of intervening.

- Cohesion of forces. Although a threat to military cohesion may become a coup grievance, and military factions may encourage the repetitive staging of coups, the cohesion of the forces expected to execute the coup will influence the ability of the coup leaders to swiftly and effectively seize power. For example, the unwillingness of personnel to risk civilian casualties and indeed a civil war, despite their orders, and their opposition to intervention, increases the likelihood of failure. The active involvement of key members from each of the services will further discourage the perception that the coup is being staged to advance the interests of one service over those of another. The capabilities of the coup leaders will also be increased by this involvement. Therefore, if a lack of cohesion is perceived, potential coup leaders may feel that intervention is too hazardous. This is particularly relevant given the impact that a transition can have on cohesion.

- Number of personnel. This is not as important as the cohesion of the coup forces, as a limited number of skilled and well led personnel might be able to stage a successful coup. Indeed it is advantageous to limit the number of personnel involved in the planning of the coup to ensure secrecy. However the more personnel involved in the execution of the coup, if effectively coordinated, the more likely the operation can be swiftly staged. This is because of the necessity to seize a number of sites like radio and television stations, important members of the new regime, and to counter those loyal to the new regime.

The level of influence the above factors have in determining if the military has the capacity to successfully intervene is based, to a large degree, on the characteristics of both the forces loyal to the regime, and the state itself. If the forces loyal to the regime are poorly led, are not located close to strategic sites, and lack expertise and firepower, the capacity of the coup force will not have to be as great. Similarly, the size of the state and consequent number of sites that must be taken to seize power influences the capacity required. Turning to the level of cohesion and the number of coup participants, I believe that these also need to be assessed relative to the regime and the state. For example, the importance of cohesive and large coup forces is dependent on the cohesion and the number of regime loyalists they need to overcome. The size of the state is important too, as the more sites that must be seized the greater is the need for the coup forces to be cohesive and large. Closely associated with this is the way the military

believes the general public will react to a coup. This is because the level of public resistance the military expects will influence whether it perceives that it has the capacity to successfully intervene.

The potential role of the above factors is recognised by various scholars. Farcau argued that the size of the coup forces; their firepower; the location of the coup forces; their mobility and self-sufficiency; their readiness and training; their cohesiveness; and their special skills were important.[53] Likewise, Eric Nordlinger argued that successful coup leaders require the active participation of strategically located mid-level commanders. This is because these troop commanders are the highest-ranked officers who have "face-to-face contact" with the soldiers.[54] Similarly, he argued that a sufficient number of personnel to simultaneously seize key personalities and sites, along with speed and coordination, are important.[55] The need for such participation is reinforced by the need to seize a large number of targets in modern states, ranging from the seizure of key structures to that of prominent politicians.[56]

Similarly, scholars have examined the impact of a lack of the above qualities. The failure of previous coups illustrates the role of inadequate military support, and the failure to act swiftly and effectively.[57] Thompson found that only 37 percent of coups involving grievances derived from perceived threats to sub-organisational cliques were successful from 1946 to 1970, and that a mere 4 percent of coups throughout the world were encouraged by the coup-makers perceiving a threat to the military's unity.[58] Similarly, research into African coups indicates that cohesion is an important feature of militaries that stage coups.[59] As Rosemary O'Kane argued, loyal personnel reverse most defeated coups, which she defined broadly as the execution of an illegal strategy for overthrowing the government.[60] Indeed a control mechanism available to the regime is the manipulation of the military through preventing

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[53] Farcau, pp48-54.
[54] Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers In Politics: Military Coups And Governments* (Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977), p102.
[55] Ibid., pp103-7. For in-depth analyses of staging coups see Ferguson; Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook* (London: Penguin Press, 1968); and Farcau, pp41-143.
[56] See Farcau, pp75-97. See also Ferguson, pp49-55, 70-5, 83-110; and Luttwak.
[57] See Farcau, pp145-64; Ferguson, pp123-5; and Kebschull, pp570-5.
[58] Thompson, pp51, 13.
[59] Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater, and Pat McGowan, "Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960-1982," *APSR* 78, no.3 (September 1984): pp634-5.
[60] Rosemary O'Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups*, (Aldershot, Hants: Avebury Gower Publishing Comp Ltd, 1987), p35. With regard to her coup definition see p37.

stable internal factions. This ensures that at least some personnel support the regime.[61] However past coups also show that a large number of participants is not always a necessity, and that their failure is not inevitably linked to a lack of participants.[62] Indeed a limited number of participants, at least during the planning stage, can ensure secrecy.[63]

I have already argued that the factors that influence whether a coup is staged do not necessarily fit precisely into one category, and the military's mood demonstrates this. The mood of the military is vital in examining the capacity to intervene, as it is the personnel themselves who ultimately decide whether or not they are capable of intervening. The two mood types are examined here together. This is because they are essentially based upon the perception that the military is superior to civilian institutions, and both have the potential to motivate intervention. Threats to the military's prestige have the potential to create discontent. This is encouraged by the importance personnel place on honour, their tendency to stress their supremacy over civilians, and the impact of poor prestige upon morale and the military's influence. According to Thompson, a threat to the military's honour encouraged 6 percent of coups worldwide and 86 percent of coups that involved this grievance were successful.[64]

Scholars have argued that the military's mood is comprised of various components. Morris Janowitz identified four components of the mood in new nations. First, personnel had a strong nationalistic attitude and second, a strong sense of Puritanism was held with corruption and decadence being opposed. Third, there was agreement that collective public enterprises represent the means of achieving social, political, and economic change. Finally, and most importantly, they had an attitude of "antipolitics" whereby civilian political leaders were not trusted.[65] This attitude is vital given it is likely to weaken anti-intervention traditions, and to provide a basis for the manifest destiny and a perception of supremacy over civilians. Indeed

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[61] See Farcau, pp190-1. See also David Rapoport, "The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality, and Impotence," in *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernising Societies*, ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp259-60.

[62] See Claude Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality," in *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, ed. Claude Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), p26; Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp21-2; Finer, second edition, p224-5; and Kebschull, p572.

[63] See Finer, second edition, p226.

[64] Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp13, 16, 51. See also Edmonds, p100.

[65] Morris Janowitz, "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations," in *Garrisons and Government: Politics and the Military in New States*, ed. Wilson McWilliams (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), pp74-75. See also Nordlinger, pp56-8, 122.

Henri Barkey wrote that the military in removing a government was asserting its belief it can perform a government's functions better than civilians could.[66]

This mood is derived from various sources. Primarily, as the military's expertise and capabilities increase, and become more diverse, the confidence that it could govern is likely to grow stronger. In addition, the military might be inclined to perceive the problems of governing as minimal, and thus can downplay its technical inadequacies with regard to its ability to govern. Conducive to this is: the expectation that if the military's formal and proper procedures are followed problems will be solved; the leadership's expectation that orders will be swiftly executed; an overly positive assessment of the utility of force; and a negative view of politicians, particularly those in government.[67] In turn these views are encouraged by the military's regimented and hierarchical structure, and the importance placed upon force. Moreover if the military does not have close ties to the civilian leaders, it might not realise the difficulties the leaders encounter as they govern. A simplistic perception of governing is likely to encourage an interventionist mood, as personnel will be less tolerate of the regime and may wish to govern themselves, at least initially.

Transitions have the potential to encourage an interventionist mood. First, the new regime may be perceived as not acknowledging or downplaying the military's capabilities. Second, transitional instability and civilian disunity can reinforce the positive perception personnel have of themselves versus civilians. This is most likely if the transition, at least initially, has a minimal impact upon the capabilities of personnel, and if the transition is to democracy, as decisive action can be hindered by the need to take into account a divided electorate. Third, it is likely that at least some members of the new regime will be inexperienced, and thus be prone to poor judgement. This can increase the military's disdain of civilian politicians and might encourage civilians to seek military intervention. Such developments equate with a high level of self-confidence, and thus a greater likelihood that personnel believe they have the capacity to intervene.

Various scholars have examined interventionist perceptions. Nordlinger wrote that the military was likely to use an achievement criterion in promotions, place an emphasis on rationality in the decision-making process, and a strictly hierarchical ordering of positions. This meant that

[66] Henri Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," *AFS* 16, no.2 (Winter 1990): p173.

personnel were likely to perceive themselves as highly competent and rational. This can lead to the problems associated with governing being under-estimated, as they believed that decisions based upon a managerial and technical criterion would swiftly solve problems.[68] Furthermore, military doubts regarding democracy have been identified. Constantine Danopoulos argued that democratic procedures may be viewed as "problematic" in their usefulness and applicability, given that militaries "thrive on the command and obey principle."[69]

As I have already noted, a fall in the self-perceptions of personnel to the degree that they doubt their own capabilities can discourage a coup. This is where Finer's framework needs to be modified to better take this into account. A dramatic fall is likely to reduce the confidence that personnel have in their capacity to successfully intervene, and negative perceptions of the military increase the probability that civilians will actively oppose a coup. This is important when personnel are unsure of themselves and the viability of a coup as it weakens their resolve, particularly when they must risk civilian casualties and widespread instability. Here the work of David Mendeloff is relevant. Mendeloff wrote that the level of confidence among personnel was directly related to their level of prestige.[70] Similarly, Donald Horowitz argued that civilian support for the military could contribute to officers having an "unshakeable belief in the rightness of their action," which encouraged them to stage a coup.[71] A high level of self-confidence is also important in order to intervene in the modern state. This is because of the complexity of governing a state with a large infrastructure and diverse economy. Finer thus argued that the complexity of the modern state ensured that the military increasingly lacked the technical skills to govern.[72]

Transitions and capacity

Past regime transitions provide evidence of the role that the above factors have on the likelihood of a coup, and its outcome. With regard to personnel, the Philippines is particularly relevant. The importance of strong leadership is shown by Criselda Yabes arguing that Gringo

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[67] I have used Nordlinger's work on the governing style of military regimes to help identify factors that can contribute to the military's mood. See Nordlinger, pp118-24.
[68] Nordlinger, pp43-47, 119-24; and Ulf Sundhaussen, "Military Withdrawal From Government Responsibility," *AFS* 10, no.4 (Summer 1984): pp555-6.
[69] Constantine Danopoulos, "Democratising the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe," *West European Politics* 14, no.4 (October 1991): p31.
[70] David Mendeloff, "Explaining Russian Military Quiescence: The "Paradox of Disintegration" and the Myth of a Military Coup," *CPCS* 27, no.3 (September 1994): pp238-9.
[71] Horowitz, *Coup Theories*, p189.

Honasan played a vital role in leading challenges to the new regime after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Yabes also wrote of the importance that strategically located personnel, the equipment available to coup conspirators, and their cohesion and number had in determining the outcome of interventions.[73] Herspring argued that the lack of cohesion among former Warsaw Treaty militaries prevented them from posing a real threat to the post-Communist regimes.[74] The influence that the level of self-confidence among personnel has in determining whether they intervene is also evident in former Communist militaries. For example, Herspring argued that the fall in morale among Albanian personnel discouraged them from intervening.[75]

In summary, the likelihood of intervention is influenced by whether coup leaders are present, and whether personnel strategically placed, effectively armed, and effectively trained are willing to actively support a coup. Likewise, the cohesion and size of the coup forces may play a role in deciding the outcome. Of vital importance too is the military's mood. This influences whether personnel believe that they have the capacity to intervene. Therefore, whether or not coup leaders believe that their forces have the above qualities should influence their decision to intervene.

Disposition

The disposition to intervene can be influenced by the presence of interventionist motives, the military's mood, and external actors. As I have already discussed the military's mood I shall focus here on motives and external actors. These are likely to be influenced by a transition, however their influence in deciding the probability of a coup varies. I believe that corporate and individual interests, and the military's mood, are most important. I thus label them primary factors. Those factors I believe are less important are then assessed and labelled secondary factors. These are the military's class and particularistic interests along with the manifest destiny, the national interest, and external actors.

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[72] Finer, pp14-17.

[73] Criselda Yabes, *The Boys From The Barracks: The Philippine Military After EDSA* (Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1991). With regard to strategically located personnel see pp167, 169. With regard to equipment see p53. Yabes wrote extensively on the divisions within the Philippine military.

[74] Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," pp105, 111, 121.

[75] Ibid., p105.

Primary Factors

Corporate interests

The violation of corporate interests is often the most influential coup grievance. This is because such a violation directly impacts upon the military's ability to successfully execute its primary role of ensuring national security, upon its ability to operate in the manner it wishes, and upon the conditions under which personnel operate. Such a violation will also have repercussions on individual interests. Indeed despite the civilian leaders seeking to address military concerns, the perception may persist that corporate interests are threatened and that a coup is necessary. Actions by a regime that may be perceived as threatening the military range from budgetary support increasing at an unsatisfactory rate, to the emergence of a rival armed force loyal solely to the civilian leaders.

The role of corporate grievances is widely recognised, and Finer's work needs to be expanded. According to Thompson, 23 percent of coups worldwide from 1946 to 1970 involved any corporate positional grievances (CPG). CPGs arose from perceived threats to the military's autonomy, hierarchy, monopoly over weaponry, cohesion, honour, and political position. In addition, Thompson calculated that 33 percent of coups worldwide involved corporate resource grievances (CRGs). There were four such grievance subtypes. First, dissatisfaction arose over pay, promotions, appointments, assignments, and/or retirement policies. Second, dissatisfaction arose from budget allocations, training facilities-policies, and/or inter-service favouritism. Third, dissatisfaction arose over general military policy and/or support for military operations during war, an insurgency, or to maintain order. Fourth, a combination of the above grievances developed.[76] Thompson calculated that 61 percent of coups encouraged by corporate factors succeeded.[77] Nordlinger also believed that corporate interests were influential.[78] Nordlinger wrote that officers could rationalise their actions by believing what was positive for the military was positive for the nation.[79] This perception is clearly associated with the manifest destiny. Nordlinger classified the corporate interests as follows:

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[76] Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp13-25. For more recent information see Finer, second edition, pp236-40 and Ferguson, pp18-9.
[77] Thompson, *The Grievances* p51.
[78] Nordlinger, p65.
[79] Ibid.

• Autonomy. Nordlinger claimed interference in the military's internal affairs was likely to encourage intervention and was frequently behind corporate motivated coups.[80] Thompson calculated that 8 percent of coups were encouraged by this grievance, of which 78 percent succeeded.[81] Personnel might feel regime interference, irrespective of its magnitude, is detrimental to corporate interests. Perceived interference might include attempts to influence promotions and to introduce politics as a criterion for promotion. This interference may lower professional competence and the self-image of the officer corps.[82] Given the probability that a new regime will seek to ensure its supremacy, perceived threats to the military's autonomy can arise during a transition.

• Absence of functional rivals and the survival of the military. This again can be one of the more influential corporate grievances. According to Thompson, 7 percent of CPG coups were encouraged worldwide by a perceived threat to the military's monopoly over weapons, and 56 percent succeeded.[83] Nordlinger argued that establishing a functional rival and threatening the military's survival can motivate intervention. These interests are closely related, as the creation or expansion of a civilian-controlled militia is perceived as a threat to both. This is because the military's adequacy and reliability as upholder of security is questioned, and the provision of responsibilities and support to perceived inferiors is insulting. Likewise, the military's political power and prestige declines with its weapon monopoly and the military is essentially told that it is replaceable.[84] As with autonomy, the military's responsibility for security and its survival may be threatened by a transition during which the new regime seeks to consolidate through establishing its own armed forces.

• Budgetary support. A reduction of the military's budget or refusal to increase support is a potential coup grievance. Nordlinger examined the role of discontent over budgetary support, and James Dolian argued that budgetary support often increased after a coup.[85] However

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[80] Ibid., pp71-5; and Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp12-4. See also Farcau, pp26-7; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p81; and Welch and Smith, p241.
[81] Thompson, *The Grievances,* Table 3, p13, and Table 17, p51.
[82] Nordlinger, p71.
[83] Thompson, *The Grievances,* Table 3, p13, and Table 17, p51. See also Anton Bebler, *Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali* (New York, Praeger, 1973), pp85-8, 110, quoted in Nordlinger, p76.
[84] Nordlinger p75-8; See also Farcau, p28; Finer, pp55-6; and Thompson, *The Grievances*, p15.
[85] Nordlinger, pp66-71. See also Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp20-5. With regard to James Dolian see his "The Military and the Allocation of National Resources: An Examination of Thirty-Four Sub-Sahara African Nations" (paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, New York, 14-17 March 1973, p19) quoted in Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military," p26; John Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process:*

Thompson found that only 3 percent of CRG coups worldwide were encouraged by disquiet over budgetary support, training arrangements, and inter-service favouritism. Of these 33 percent failed.[86] Interventions may occur regardless of increases, coups do not necessarily result in increased defence expenditure, and budget cuts may not encourage widespread discontent if conducted gradually and the regime's leadership is respected.[87] The new regime's economic performance is particularly relevant here, as economic problems place a greater stress on resources while high inflation reduces the military budget in real terms.

Although I do not believe that budgetary support alone is as important as the first two grievances, it's wider impact can be influential. For example, it is likely that the level of budgetary support will directly influence the level of pay. Thompson found that dissatisfaction over pay, promotions, appointments, assignments, and/or retirements accounted for 15 percent of CRG coups worldwide, the most frequent factor, though only 43 percent succeeded.[88] Nordlinger argued that the level of support determined the material well-being of officers, served as an indicator of the military's political power and prestige, and influenced the officers' perception of the military as a modern and professional organisation.[89]

Individual interest

Second to the corporate interests are the individual interests of personnel which play an influential role in motivating coups. The individual interests are closely associated with corporate interests, as both essentially originate from the same developments. For instance, although I assess the potential role that discontent over pay might have in the context of budgetary support, it is closely associated with the individual interests of personnel. These interests are influenced by a transition, and thus personnel might believe that they are being violated. For example, moves by the new regime to reduce the number of personnel, and to

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Ecuador, 1948-1966 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp121-5; and Finer, p56, second edition, p240.

[86] Thompson, *The Grievances,* Table 4, p19, and Table 17, p51.

[87] See Albert Michaels, "Background to a Coup: Civil-Military Relations in Twentieth Century Chile and the Overthrow of Salvadore Allende" (paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Buffalo, 1974) quoted in Nordlinger, p71; Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp20-2; Gary Zuk and William Thompson, "The Post-Coup Military Spending Question: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis," *APSR*, 76, no.1 (March 1982): pp60-74; Frank Wayman, *Military Involvement in Politics: A Casual Model*, International Studies Series volume 3 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc, 1975), p57; and Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp73, 80-1.

[88] Thompson, *The Grievances*, Table 4, p19, and Table 17, p51.

[89] Nordlinger, p68.

promote personnel on the basis of their political loyalty, are potential threats to individual interests.

Coup grievances among personnel might be derived from various individual interests. Perceived threats range from the lack of promotion to the violation of their living conditions, and, ultimately, to the threat of execution. For example, a regime may seek to reinforce its position by eliminating perceived enemies, and might prosecute those deemed responsible for actions considered criminal before and during the transition. Similarly, a new regime might use the military despite its lack of preparedness. Personal grievances may exist prior to a transition too, and may grow if the military supported the transition but feels that the new regime is not showing gratitude. The new regime itself will contribute to this grievance if it promises rewards it fails to deliver.

Scholars have also recognised the diversity of potential individual grievances. Individual interests that might weaken the loyalty of personnel to the regime include: political ambitions; demands for higher rank with more power and pay; and the conditions of work.[90] More specifically, moves by a new regime to punish personnel for their oppressive role under the previous regime are likely to cause discontent.[91] It has also been written that the military's active transitional role strengthens the claims that personal have to power.[92] Thus, they might feel particularly aggrieved if their hopes are unfulfilled. Coup leaders might believe too that their individual interests are threatened when a danger arises to their suborganisational clique, as the clique protects them and offers opportunities of patronage.[93]

Transitions and primary factors

Past transitions provide evidence of the grievances that might arise from perceived threats to corporate and individual interests. Discontent arose among former Warsaw Treaty militaries as they experienced drastic reductions in their budgets.[94] Past transitions also illustrate how individual grievances can arise. For example, concern in Nigeria grew over the promotion of

[90] See Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics*, p101; Farcau pp29-32; Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p149, quoted in Farcau, p31; and Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp18-20, 26-8.
[91] See Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, pp69-72. The issue of dealing with past human rights violations was also examined by Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp211-231.
[92] Welch, "Civilian Control of the military," p21.
[93] See Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp28-9. Factional loyalty was widespread in the Philippine military. See Francisco Nemenzo, "A Season Of Coups," *Diliman Review* 34 no.5 and 6 (1986): pp18-20.
[94] Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," p110.

officers by the new regime after the transition to independence.[95] Moves by the new regime to punish officers in the Philippines for their actions under Marcos caused discontent too.[96]

Secondary Factors

Class interest

Although a class interest might motivate the military to stage a coup it is generally not as influential as the above factors. At one level clearly identifying the class of the officer corps is not necessarily simple; they might not be of one dominant origin. Thus, accurately arguing that the transition's impact upon the class interest is the primary factor behind a coup, and that it had a disproportionate effect on one class, might be difficult. Associated with this, the approach assumes that classes are united, and thus can be the focus of coup grievances. In reality this is unlikely. The approach also assumes that personnel will place a priority upon loyalties established before they joined the military, rather than those built up among personnel, and their loyalty to the military itself. This is questionable given the importance the military places upon de-emphasising civilian life, and the intensive indoctrination of personnel. Also, members of the regime might not act according to their class origins once they become part of the political elite. Moreover, even if officers are of middle class origins, the class often associated with officers, the middle class's support of a coup is very debatable. This is because members of the middle class often actively oppose coups and military regimes. Finally, even if the class interest encourages a coup its role during the actual intervention is likely to be minimal given its military nature. Indeed class or particularistic grievances may actually hinder the staging of a coup through denying its leaders broad support.

The work of scholars highlights the problem of emphasising the class interest. Although a coup may benefit one class, it is unlikely that the prime motive is derived from assisting this class. Though the ruling class may benefit from a coup to maintain stability, this goal of preventing instability can also prompt the overthrow of the regime, and even a change of the status quo the military believes produces instability.[97] Indeed it is more probable that civilian parties will be the victims of a coup rather than the beneficiaries.[98] The initial problem of

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[95] Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis Of Authority & Revolt 1960-67* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp192, 246.
[96] Yabes, p64.
[97] Martin Needler, "Military Motivations In The Seizure Of Power," *Latin American Research Review* X, no.3 (Fall 1975): pp67-8.
[98] Thompson, *The Grievances,* p32.

establishing the class composition of the officer corps is recognised and the same applies to the role of the middle class in encouraging intervention.[99] The weakness of the middle class-military link is further illustrated by the possibility that a military of middle class origins adopts upper class behaviour when it seizes power.[100] Even if the class interest does encourage the coup, the operation is "planned, organized, and executed by the army and for the army, with little or no support from movements and classes." [101] Finally, Alfred Stepan wrote that although the middle class may have supported a coup, military violations of civil rights might reduce this support and lead it to challenge a military regime.[102] The middle class may actually be a major threat to the military's interests.[103]

Despite the likelihood that a class interest will not be the dominant factor behind a coup, it needs to be assessed because it can play a role. A class interest might be derived from either the family background of officers or the class they associate with. According to this argument, an intervention against a regime may result from the military's class interest being threatened. Thus, a transition's impact on the class interest is particularly relevant. For example, instability and economic problems which violate the military's class interest are theoretically likely to increase the probability of a coup. Similarly, whether members of the new regime are from a predominantly different class to that of the military, and whether this leads to policies violating its class interest, might influence the decision to intervene.

The class interest is recognised by various scholars who argue that the middle class is most frequently associated with coups. This is based upon the argument that officers generally originate from the middle class, and thus share its attitudes and seek to protect its interests.[104] Wilson McWilliams wrote that if recruitment was primarily from groups alienated from the general population, like a particular class, the military was more likely to place its loyalty here rather than with the state.[105] It is also argued that the military may act to ensure that the

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[99] See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp200, 300-304. See also Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, p10. With regard to the middle class and coups see Fitch, pp125-6; John Markoff and Silvio Baretta, "What We Don't Know About Coups: Observations on Recent South American Politics," *AFS* 12 no.2 (Winter 1986): pp208-12; Perlmutter, *The Military And Politics*, pp99-100; and Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p67.

[100] Jose Nunn, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz, *The Politics of Non Conformity in Latin America*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p85 quoted in O'Kane, p7.

[101] Perlmutter, *The Military And Politics*, p158. See also pp162-4.

[102] See Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp47-8.

[103] Ibid., p52.

[104] See Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp32-4; and Nordlinger, pp32-4, 82-5. For further information on the role of the class interest see the sources listed by Perlmutter, *The Military And Politics*, footnote 22, pp305-6.

[105] McWilliams, "Introduction," in *Garrisons and Government*, p38.

middle class can enter politics, and to protect this involvement. Huntington argued that the military was likely to support the middle class as it entered politics through staging a "breakthrough coup," and to protect this position through undertaking a "veto coup" when the lower classes posed a threat.[106] He also noted however that as the power of the middle class grew after democratisation, the "social basis" for staging a coup declined. This was because the class increasingly did not require the military's protection.[107] Possible transitional conditions like instability have also been identified as motivating a coup to restore order for the middle class.[108]

Particularistic interest

According to this approach coups are motivated by a regime threatening the regional and or ethnic interests of the conspirators. However, I believe that one should be cautious about stressing their influence. Factors that weaken the influence of these interests include the development of internal loyalties, which are likely to at least reduce pre-service loyalties. In fact the preservation of particularistic affiliations can hinder the development of a cohesive coup force. The level of support for the new regime might also outweigh the particularistic interests of personnel. This is particularly likely if the new regime acts to minimise particularistic grievances. This might be achieved by ensuring that there is no discrimination against the regional and ethnic groups closely associated with the military.

Scholars have also argued that the approach is problematic. According to Thompson, sectional groups that perceived their primordial or ethnic-regional interests were threatened staged only 3 percent of world coups, and of these 67 percent failed.[109] Horowitz wrote that it is often too simplistic to explain the staging of a coup in multi-ethnic states solely in terms of racial conflict.[110] Furthermore, even where ethnicity influenced the decision to stage a coup its role may be unclear. This is shown by Andrew Scobell's study of ethnicity and the May 1987 coup

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[106] Huntington, *Political Order*, p222. See also pp201-2.
[107] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p235.
[108] See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p27.
[109] See Thompson, *The Grievances,* Table 8, p30, and Table 17, p51.
[110] Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p472, quoted in Andrew Scobell, "Politics, Professionalism, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis of the 1987 Military Coup in Fiji," *Comparative Politics* 26, no.2 (January 1994): p192.

in Fiji.[111] Robin Luckham also noted that internal military bonds between personnel of different origins were strong, even after the Nigerian coups.[112]

However particularistic interests might play a role, and hence should be recognised. The origins of officers and the composition of the military is important here, and a transition can impact upon these. Theoretically, the impact of a transition will depend upon whether there is a regional and ethnic basis of the new regime, whether this differs from that of the military, and whether particularistic interests are thus threatened because of the regime's actions. For instance, the new regime might favour personnel of one region or ethnicity. This might lead to these personnel being promoted more rapidly or to better positions, and the new regime seeking to alter the military's composition in their favour. Such moves are likely to encourage resentment among those who experience discrimination. The impact will also be shaped by the strength of regional and ethnic attachments held by personnel, and by whether these are stronger than attachments to the new regime.

Though particularistic interests might not be very influential there presence within the military is likely, as no military is completely isolated from civilian society. It is certainly inaccurate to argue that the socialisation of personnel eradicates all pre-service loyalties. This is illustrated by the military's reflection of ethnic and regional divisions in society.[113] Likewise, the potential over-representation of officers from specific regions has been identified in influencing the staging of coups.[114]

Manifest destiny and national interest

The manifest destiny and the national interest are combined here because of their ties and common origins. When the military develops the belief that it has the duty (the manifest destiny) to intervene, this is essentially based upon the perception that it is the state's guardian. Thus, scholars have argued that if the manifest destiny exists, the military will believe its duty is to intervene when it perceives the national interest is threatened. Furthermore, both are tied to the close association the military has with independence and sovereignty. As transitions can

[111] See Scobell, pp192-3.
[112] Luckham, p180.
[113] See Nordlinger, pp39-42.
[114] With regard to regional over-representation see Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp37-40. With regard to the role of regional differences in coups see Rory Ewins, *Colour, Class, and Custom, The Literature of the 1987 Fiji Coup* (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1992), pp33-5. See also Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing The Occurrence Of Military Coups D'Etat In Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research* 4, no.3 (1967): p232.

have far-reaching consequences, the manifest destiny and the military's perception of the national interest can be influenced. For example, the repercussions of a transition might include an economic downturn. Theoretically, such developments could motivate intervention because personnel might believe that their impact threatens the national interest.

It is difficult to assess the role of this interest but I believe that it is unlikely to be a major motive. Defining the national interest is difficult, especially as it is the military's perception of the interest that is of greatest importance, and this varies. Nor do I believe that personnel often intervene primarily because they believe that it is their manifest destiny to protect the national interest, particularly when this is equated with protecting and promoting civilian interests. Statistical evidence supplied by scholars like Thompson indicates that corporate and individual grievances are more influential. Second, coup leaders often renege on their promises to solve the problems that the state is experiencing. Third, a coup is likely to have some adverse impact on the national interest and this is clear to personnel, given the impact of past coups. Opposition to a coup, at least in the long term, is likely to develop and threaten stability. Indeed civil war and the fragmentation of the state are possible. This is particularly likely during transitions as dramatic change will not be met with a consensus of opinion, and military action against the new regime might thus be divisive. Fourth, coups can have a negative impact on the military, as it becomes divided on political issues and its focus on politics diverts attention away from combat readiness. This is particularly relevant because I support Finer's argument that the perception personnel have of the national interest is often derived from the belief that the military is closely associated with the state. Thus, what is positive for the military is positive for the state. Finally, military regimes are unlikely to perform as well as civilian regimes in dealing with problems where the military has little expertise, such as fighting poverty. These last factors however are only relevant if the military recognises that it is unlikely to be able to provide better governance, and that its own interests will be threatened by intervention.

Scholars have discussed the problems of explaining coups according to the manifest destiny and national interest. According to Thompson, only 8 percent of coups worldwide were motivated by the conspirators attempting to correct the injustices and abuses of the political and economic systems, and 32 percent failed.[115] Furthermore, Thompson found that only 8

[115] Thompson, *The Grievances*, p44-45, Table 17, p51. See also Nordlinger, pp85-6 and Fitch, p83.

percent of coups were staged to maintain public order.[116] Fitch argued that the military often defined the national interest largely in terms of its own interests, and he used the 1963 coup in Ecuador to illustrate this.[117] Moreover, the military's duty to protect the state from the danger of other militaries is threatened by its active involvement in politics. This can be influential when the military recognises this and believes that security threats exist. For instance, David Rapoport found that militaries heavily involved in politics often performed poorly in combat.[118] The time period within which many coups occur places further doubt on whether the military intervenes to safeguard the national interest. Coups often occur before an election, thus denying people the opportunity to vote out a regime that is considered to be unsuitable by the people.[119]

Military regimes themselves are unlikely to perform better than civilian regimes. This is important when the military recognises its inadequacies as a ruler, and does not aim to hand over power to civilians once it has intervened. Finer argued that only in exceptional cases and for brief periods can the military govern without civilian collaboration, as it lacked both the capacity and moral right to govern in a modern state.[120] For example, the likelihood of future coups increases, at least in the short term, if a successful coup has been staged.[121] A military regime's characteristics are difficult to align with the national interest, however it is defined. Such regimes are more likely to lack legitimacy, use coercion more often, suffer more violence, be less responsive to popular demands, and less likely to undertake progressive economic changes.[122] The negative impact of military regimes on the economy is widely documented, as with the fallacy that the military modernises the economy and political system.[123] Military regimes are often as corrupt as the civilian regimes they replace too.[124] Nordlinger also demonstrated that the average life expectancy of military governments was five years shorter than that of civilian regimes, military leaders most frequently leaving power voluntarily because of the numerous problems they faced in attempting to govern. Such

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[116] Thompson, *The Grievances*, p45.
[117] Fitch, pp119-21.
[118] Rapoport, p269-72. See also pp272-3.
[119] See Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp36-9; and Fossum, p234.
[120] Finer, pp14-22.
[121] See John Londregan and Keith Poole, "Poverty, The Coup Trap, And The Seizure Of Executive Power," *World Politics* XLII, no.2 (January 1990), pp152, 163, 175; Huntington, *Political Order*, pp204-8; Ferguson, p194; and Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp32-9.
[122] Thompson, *The Grievances*, p51. See also O'Kane, pp7-9.
[123] With regard to the economic impact of military regimes see Richard Lagos and Oscar Rufatt, "Military Government And Real Wages In Chile: A Note," *Latin American Research Review* X, no.2 (Summer 1975): p145. With regard to their modernising role see O'Kane, pp7-9.
[124] See Nordlinger, pp88, 126-8.

problems can range from the loss of prestige that results from public discontent, to the fall in cohesion as conflict occurs over government objectives and decisions.[125]

Despite the limited influence of the manifest destiny and national interest they can influence the decision to intervene, and hence should be assessed. Various factors are likely to encourage the development of the manifest destiny, and national interest motive. A military's tradition of relative isolation from society might encourage personnel to perceive themselves as neutral guardians of the state, whereas they believe that civilian politicians are motivated by personal gain. Carina Perelli wrote that civil-military boundaries encouraged the belief that the military was the "moral reservoir of the nation," with its monopoly over legitimate violence and belief it was the "embodiment of the nation."[126] An acceptance of the manifest destiny may also be encouraged by the positive roles some scholars attributed to the military.[127]

Scholars have likewise examined the role of the national interest in motivating intervention. That officers believe this national interest exists and should guide the regime's actions is recognised.[128] Similarly, scholars have argued that this perception has the potential to motivate intervention.[129] Furthermore, there has been a progressive widening of the definition of national security, and thus national interest, officers believe must be upheld. Thus, the line between legitimate internal security activities and military interference in civil matters has become "blurred," as security threats like terrorism encouraged its internal deployment.[130] The exact components that motivate an intervention based upon the national interest are difficult to categorise, as they depend upon the military's perception. However scholars have argued that some factors are especially relevant. These include political corruption, the nation's prestige, and an internal or external war.[131] Additional factors, which when threatened may motivate intervention, include the state's territorial integrity, position in international alliances, internal stability, and external threats.[132] In the absence of a clear definition of a 'national crisis,' John Fitch wrote that adverse public opinions of a regime may act as a

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[125] Nordlinger, pp138-47. See also Huntington, *Political Order*, p242; Sundhaussen, pp545-9; and Welch and Smith, pp240-1.
[126] Carina Perelli, "From Counterrevolutionary Warfare To Political Awakening: The Uruguayan and Argentine Armed Forces in the 1970s," *AFS* 20, no.1 (Fall 1993): p29. See also Huntington, *Political Order*, pp225-8.
[127] See Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John Johnson, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp80-9.
[128] Nordlinger, pp58-60.
[129] See Luckham, pp286-7; Horowitz, *Coup Theories*, pp147-78, 182; and Welch and Smith, p239.
[130] Edmonds, p105.
[131] Ibid., Figure 1, p103.
[132] O'Donnell, Schmitter, p27. See also pp23-4. With regard to external threats see Perelli pp33-4.

surrogate for those officers who believe that they are protectors of the constitution.[133] A lack of regime legitimacy might arise from diverse developments ranging from the regime's illegal acts to its inability to solve problems.[134]

External actors

I believe that Finer's framework needs to be modified to specifically assess the role of external actors (foreign states and organisations). It is difficult to assess the role that external actors play in motivating coups because of the secretive nature of their involvement. However it is clear that they can influence whether a coup is staged. Their role can range from actively participating in the coup through to notifying potential coup plotters that they will not oppose intervention. There are two broad ways that the interests of external actors might be threatened, and they might be encouraged to support a coup. First, the regime might follow a foreign policy that is deemed threatening. For instance, new leaders might seek close relations with other regimes perceived to be enemies, or renege on the agreements and obligations of their predecessors. Second, a regime's domestic policies might violate the interests of actors. Violations may occur as new leaders act to regulate foreign businesses. A more extreme scenario is a new regime's moves to nationalise ventures despite the interests of foreigners. Other violations might involve the infringement of the rights of ethnic and religious groups who are influential in determining the actions of external actors. Supporting a coup against a regime perceived to be hostile can be more cost effective, both in monetary and human terms, than the actor having to deploy its own forces, which might be limited. Furthermore, providing covert assistance to coup forces is easier to keep confidential than overtly using force against a regime, thus reducing the potential of global repercussions.

Of particular relevance here is the work of Steven David. David argued that supporting a coup can be advantageous to external actors. This was because it could take minimal resources to assist groups seeking to overthrow their governments, and external actors had a strong interest in assisting those to power who were likely to closely align the state to the actor and its policies.[135] David categorised three levels of assistance. First, the actor provided advice and encouragement to the coup leaders. Second, the actor provided material support, such as

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[133] Fitch, pp111-116.

[134] With regard to the factors that encourage a loss of legitimacy see Nordlinger, pp92-9, 193-4; Luckham pp17-20, 32-3, 39, 201-2 and Fitch, pp80-5, 101-10. More specifically, with regard to the military's position when civilian leaders break the law see Kemp and Hudlin, pp13-9.

[135] Steven David, *Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p3.

money and weaponry. Third, the actor assisted the coup through deploying its own personnel. This deployment differs from an invasion because the number deployed is limited, and the operation is confined to the overthrow of the regime.[136]

David also argued that there were four categories of regimes particularly vulnerable to foreign-assisted coups. First, regimes dependent on the deployment of foreign personnel for their survival were vulnerable. Second, those regimes comprised of "relatively simple societies with a minimum of meaningful political participation and a maximum of political instability" were vulnerable. This was because only a limited number of individuals were likely to oppose a coup.[137] Third, neighbouring states involved in a conflict might support coups against another regime, as such operations require fewer resources than an invasion. Finally, regimes seeking to distance themselves from a major power without having removed its influence over the military risked a coup.[138] The role of external actors is shown by past coups. For instance, the US and Soviet Union were often involved in foreign coups.[139] More specifically, organisations like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have frequently been suspected of such involvement.[140]

However although external actors might influence the decision to intervene, I believe that they are rarely influential and therefore label them a secondary factor. It is unlikely that a military will have a relationship with an external actor strong enough to motivate it to stage a coup if the institution itself is not aggrieved. For instance, the military will be reluctant to risk becoming vulnerable to criticism that it is a 'puppet' of foreigners, and will be aware that the actor will expect favours in return, favours that the military might be reluctant to grant. Moreover, if the actor wishes the coup to succeed it must have both the capacity to play a decisive role, and be willing to do so without regard for the consequences. For example, the regime and its allies are likely to greet the actor's moves with hostility, and its efforts might be wasted because of the prospect of failure. Nor does the success of the coup guarantee that the actor will receive tangible benefits. This is because the military's leaders might be unwilling or unable to keep promises they made in return for assistance.

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[136] Ibid., pp140-5.
[137] Ibid., p145. With regard to a dependency on external actors and coups also see O'Kane, p93.
[138] Ibid., pp145-6.
[139] Ibid., pp16-105.
[140] See O'Kane, pp90-2.

The limited influence of external actors is shown by past coups. David found that from 1945 to mid-1985 foreign involvement was significant in supporting only 6.7 percent of the coups staged in the Third World.[141] More recently, Yekutiel Gershoni argued that the decline of the Cold War reduced the level of external support provided to African coup conspirators by the superpowers.[142] Furthermore, O'Kane found that coups were rare even in states where the interests of external actors were violated and they had personnel deployed there.[143] Another possible weakness of stressing the role of external actors is that the military might actually be discouraged from intervening by such actors. This is because its attention is drawn away from domestic issues if it perceives an external actor poses a threat.[144] More specifically, the success of external actors appears to be limited. David wrote that American and Soviet efforts were often unsuccessful, and that foreign support had little impact on the success rate of coups.[145] These efforts also illustrated the numerous problems facing actors.[146]

Transitions and secondary factors

Past transitions provide evidence of the limited role secondary factors might have in motivating coups. Of direct relevance are the Philippine and Romanian transitions. This is because the military played an active role in both of these transitions to democracy from unpopular and discredited regimes. However evidence suggests that it is too simplistic to argue that the militaries united behind the transitions in the national interest. Indeed in the Philippines personnel apparently had intended to establish a military led regime.[147] Finally, I have found no evidence to indicate that external actors have played a vital role in motivating coups against the new regimes I examined.

Overall, it is likely that a variety of grievances will motivate a coup, and it is simplistic to argue that personnel will stage such a potentially hazardous operation because of one motive. A range of grievances is especially likely if the coup members are not all of the same social background, do not have the same rank, and are not from the same service. As Farcau

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[141] David, p2.
[142] Yekutiel Gershoni, "The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in Sub-Saharan Africa, *AFS* 23, no.2 (Winter 1996): pp240-3.
[143] O'Kane, pp91, 87-9.
[144] This has been noted by Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p252.
[145] David, pp61 and 92. With regard to the US and Soviet efforts see David, p148.
[146] Ibid., pp88-9, 97-9.
[147] With regard to the Philippines see Nemenzo, p20. With regard to Romania see Porter, *Red Armies*, pp23-4.

concluded, "any single explanation for a phenomenon as complex as a coup d'etat will be less than satisfactory."[148]

In summary, the disposition to intervene is shaped by the military's sectional interests, the military's mood, and external actors. I previously examined the military's mood in the context of the capacity to intervene, and thus focused on sectional interests and external actors here. All of these are likely to be influenced by a transition but primary factors are most important. These are the corporate and individual interests of the military, and the previously examined mood of the military. Though class and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and the national interest, and external actors might influence whether an intervention occurs, I believe that they are unlikely to be important.

Opportunity

Opportunity is another important factor determining whether an intervention occurs. The opportunity to intervene is determined by the level of "political culture," civilian reliance on the military, and the military's popularity. That the civilian reaction might influence the outcome of a coup is shown by the research of Amos Perlmutter who studied coups in the Middle East from 1936 to 1969. Perlmutter found that no coup that received mass public support failed, and 80 percent that received civilian support succeeded. This compared with 40 percent of those that received no support succeeding.[149] As with the disposition, a transition is likely to impact upon the opportunity to intervene, and thus the likelihood of a coup, as negative developments like instability can occur.

However I believe that the opportunity to intervene is not as important as the capacity or disposition. This is because a military determined to intervene and unconcerned with the prospect of causing civilian casualties will act regardless of the prospect of opposition. The prospect of the military being determined to seize power regardless of casualties is graphically illustrated by O'Kane's research. This indicated that of the 134 successful coups she recorded from 1950 to 1985, only 36 were bloodless.[150] Moreover, the military might actually 'manufacture' the conditions to intervene. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka is

[148] Farcau, p33. See also Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp10, 11.
[149] Amos Perlmutter, "The Arab Elite," *World Politics* XXII, no.2 (January 1970): p292. With regard to the influence of public opinion also see Fitch, pp111-6.
[150] O'Kane, p3.

alleged to have had links to the protesters that caused instability prior to the May 1987 coup in Fiji.[151]

Political culture/regime attachment

Having recognised that the term "political culture" is very controversial and that Finer's work has weaknesses I shall use the term 'regime attachment.' This indicates that I am referring foremost to the level of support for the regime, and that I am not arguing that one culture is better than another. Although the level of regime attachment might not have a decisive impact on whether or not the military decides to intervene, I believe that it does influence the decision. Assuming that the coup leaders are rational decision-makers, the hazards associated with intervening against a popular regime will influence them. This is primarily because the coup leaders must be sure that the military will obey its orders, and that personnel will be willing to use violence against civilians. This is a key question given that personnel are not isolated from societal attitudes, and that cohesion is a determinant of the capacity to intervene. The degree of violence also influences the credibility of military claims that it is acting in the national interest. Thus, when the loyalty of personnel is doubtful coup leaders will be more reluctant to intervene because of the greater perceived risk involved.

The influence that the level of regime attachment can have on the outcome of coups is shown by the work of scholars. David argued that a lack of "meaningful political participation," and "weak public commitment to civilian institutions," provided the pre-conditions for the many coups experienced by Third World states.[152] Similarly, Edward Luttwak wrote that coups were possible when civilians were politically passive and did not have a close relationship with the civilian leadership. This was because there would be little opposition and he argued that was "the key to the victory of the *coup*."[153] I believe that this can be the case, but would qualify his statement by arguing that the influence of civilian opposition ultimately depends on whether the military is willing to inflict civilian casualties when it intervenes. Statistics also indicate that in at least some regions the level of public opposition can have an important impact on the outcome of a coup. Thompson found that 71 percent of successful Latin American coups from 1946 to 1970 met minimal or no resistance.[154] Moreover, Farcau argued that the presence of

[151] Ewins, p36.
[152] William Thompson, "Systemic Change And The Latin American Coup," *Comparative Political Studies* 7, no.4 (January 1975): p453. With regard to David see pp9-13. See also Farcau, p34.
[153] Luttwak, p33. Italics are original. See also pp29-35.
[154] Thompson, "Systemic Change," p452. See also Nordlinger, p100.

large numbers of civilians restricted the firepower available to the coup forces. This was because the use of heavy firepower against civilians was rare, and it was more common to "see the bulk of the armed forces alienated by the indiscriminate use of heavy firepower."[155] Coups have also failed when their leaders have been unwilling to act ruthlessly against active opposition, and when civilians do not rally behind them.[156] Scholars further note the potential impact of specific groups. Luttwak wrote that "even one well-organized demonstration, or well-timed strike, could pose a serious threat to the *coup*" and that the potential actions of religious groups, political parties and trade unions must be recognised when a coup is planned.[157]

Civilian dependence and the domestic situation

Civilian dependence and the domestic situation are closely related to the level of regime attachment. This is because a lack of attachment increases the likelihood of a regime becoming dependent on the military, and the level of attachment is influenced by the domestic situation. Civilian dependence on the military ultimately increases the ease with which the institution can intervene, the position of the military becoming stronger at the expense of the civilian leaders. The level of dependence is influenced by the civilian security perceptions with both external and internal threats potentially encouraging a reliance on the military. Moreover the developments that encourage greater civilian dependence on the military also have the potential to discourage a high level of attachment to the regime. This is because the regime's involvement in a costly and unpopular war, and inability to prevent serious domestic problems, will discourage a strong level of regime attachment.

With regard to Finer's framework I believe that three issues need to be addressed. First, civilian dependence on the military because of an external threat like a foreign war should be examined after the domestic situation. This is because the impact of a war on the opportunity is largely determined by the resultant changes in the domestic situation. The link between the military staging coups during a war is also more debatable relative to the domestic situation. This argument is supported by the research of scholars. Egil Fossum found that the number of coups in Latin America was lower from 1940 to 1945 than during any other six-year period

[155] Farcau, p137.
[156] With regard to the failure of coups because of a lack of ruthlessness see Kebschull, pp573-4. For information on the role that minimal civilian backing of a coup can have see Kathleen Collihan and Constantine Danopoulos, "Coup d'Etat Attempt in Trinidad: Its Causes and Failure," *AFS* 19, no.3 (Spring 1993), pp445-7. See also Farcau, pp157-8.
[157] Luttwak, p123. See also pp123-37. See also Ferguson, pp50-1.

between 1940 and 1966.[158] Second, the debatable role that instability can play in determining the likelihood of a coup should be recognised. This is because Finer associates protests and demonstrations, both potential sources of instability, with overt and latent crises that provide the opportunity to intervene. Though instability might facilitate a coup, evidence of the link between coups and instability is unclear. Although Fossum argued that nearly 61 percent of coups in Latin America from 1907 to 1966 occurred during times of public disorder, Thompson in his global study of coups from 1946 to 1970 found only 29 percent were associated with public disorders.[159] Indeed the doubt that exists over the instability-coup link supports my earlier argument that class and particularistic interests are not influential, as these are potential sources of instability. Third, countries are unlikely to comply exactly with Finer's framework with regard to the domestic situation. Thus, it should be recognised that a case study might have the characteristics of more than one such situation.

The developments that Finer associates with overt and latent crises have been recognised as increasing the opportunity to intervene. Approaches which focus upon the military being dragged into politics because of the weaknesses of the political leadership and socio-economic problems have been defined as identifying the 'pull' of regime vulnerability.[160] These essentially argue that a regime might fall because it has too few friends rather than too many enemies.[161] For instance, David argued that where a regime is dependent on the military to govern it is more likely to experience a coup.[162] Fitch also argued that a lack of public support for a regime influenced the likelihood of an intervention as the military risked unpopularity if it supported an unpopular regime.[163] Similarly, scholars have argued that personnel may resent a dependence on the military to preserve the regime and domestic security.[164] For example, personnel might resent their police duties, as they believe these harm their self-image.[165] Moreover, Sundhaussen argued that the likelihood of a coup increased if one had already been

[158] Fossum, Table 10, p237.
[159] Ibid., p234. With regard to Thompson see Thompson, "Explanations of the Military Coup," pp156-7, quoted in Thompson, *The Grievances*, p45.
[160] Thompson, *The Grievances*, p5.
[161] Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp14-50, quoted in Farcau, p34.
[162] David, p13.
[163] See Fitch, pp111-6
[164] See Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, pp419-20; Welch and Smith, pp237-8, and Needler, "Military Motivations," p70; and Luckham pp248-50.
[165] Welch and Smith, p237.

staged. This was because the crisis that motivated the first coup may remain and indeed be worsening under civilian control.[166]

Various factors might encourage the development of a domestic situation characteristic of a "latent" or "overt crisis." Most importantly, when the level of attachment to the regime is low relative to other regimes this can encourage people to believe that there is a viable alternative. This not only reduces the likelihood that a coup will be opposed, but also increases the probability the regime leaders will be actively challenged. A wide-range of factors can encourage this lack of attachment to the regime. Legitimacy is particularly relevant as this directly influences the level of regime attachment, and the willingness to directly challenge the authority of the civilian leaders. Apart from this legitimacy which I have already examined, William Kornhauser identified factors that encouraged a popular revolt similar to those that could encourage intervention. These were: an inept and incompetent government; a government inaccessible to the general population; a corrupt and self-seeking government; and an arbitrary government that acted offhand and was indifferent to popular expectations.[167] Though negative economic developments do not necessarily result in a coup, and interventions can occur when there is economic growth, research indicates that coups often occur during periods of economic trouble.[168] With regard to discontent arising despite economic growth, of direct relevance is the theory that a "revolutionary gap" can emerge between the expectations of people and the regime's capability to meet their demands.[169] O'Kane also wrote that economic backwardness was an inadequate explanation for coups because of their occurrence in relatively wealthy states. She proposed that the degree of reliance on the export of primary goods, and thus vulnerability to global changes, was more important.[170] Moreover, economic

[166] Sundhaussen, p555. See also Londregan and Poole, p165-67. Robert Putnam also breifly assesses the impact of past interventions. See Robert Putnam, "Towards Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics* XX, no.1 (October 1967): pp83-110.

[167] William Kornhauser, "Rebellion And Political Development," in Harry Eckstein, *Internal War* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p143, quoted in Edmond, p104. See also Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); and Claude Welch and Mavis Taintor, *Revolution and Political Change* (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1972).

[168] See Perelli, pp31-2; Luttwak, p28; Welch and Smith, p247; Fossum pp230-1, 236-7; Nordlinger, pp88-90; and Londregan and Poole, p151.

[169] See James Davis, 'Toward a theory of revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27, no.1, (February 1962), pp5-18, quoted in Rod Hague, Martin Harrop, and Shaun Breslin, *Comparative Government And Politics*, third edition, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), p73.

[170] O'Kane, pp43-79.

problems directly impact on the military's corporate self-interests as, apart from the impact on budgetary support, military business interests can be violated. [171]

Apart from "overt" and "latent crises," there is the prospect of "power vacuums." Although today it is unlikely that there will be no strong political organisation or any political opinion, a fall in the authority of the civilian leaders can occur, and can facilitate a coup. This is particularly likely when a transition occurs, because of the wide-ranging societal changes that impact on the state's infrastructure, and can increase the level of civilian dependency and weaken regime attachment. This concurs with my argument that the level of regime attachment influences the ease with which the military can intervene. The presence of organised political groups but absence of the political structures required to translate their demands into policy can also be problematic. This is especially relevant to transitions where existing structures have weakened or fallen and new structures are inadequate. Huntington argued that an intervention was part of the increasing mobilisation of all groups, which occurred with modernisation. If specialised political institutions, particularly modern parties, were inadequate goal transmitters for social groups, such groups became highly politicised as they pressured the political elite. This was because the intermediary institutions that would collect and contain popular demands were non-existent. Thus, each group utilised the means it had to fulfil its demands, the military's being the coup. [172]

Finally, civilian dependence might arise from a regime's involvement in a war given combat is the ultimate test of the military. This dependence could facilitate a coup, but I have already argued that its importance is largely derived from its impact on the domestic situation. The level of dependence is based on the extent to which the regime is reliant on the expertise and resources of the military in executing its war aims, and on the magnitude of the war. The role of external threats in increasing civilian dependence, and thus military influence in politics, is shown by past wars. Huntington detailed the growing power of the American military during the Cold War, and Peter Karsten updated this argument to include the Vietnam and Gulf

[171] See Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, pp82-6. For more information on the military-industrial complex see Samuel Huntington, *Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp361-7; and Edmonds, pp161-85.

[172] Huntington, *Political Order*, p196. See also Robert Jackman, "The Predictability of Coups d'etat: A Model with African Data," *APSR* 72, no.4 (December 1978): p1273.

wars.[173] Although it has been argued that the presence of a clear external threat reduces the likelihood of intervention, as the military is pre-occupied with countering this threat, the evidence I have presented indicates that coups do not cease with the out-break of war. Similarly, Farcau cast doubt on the argument that when the military was busy fighting a war it would not intervene.[174]

Military popularity

I believe that the military's popularity is important because it directly impacts on the self-perceptions of personnel, and on whether their mood is interventionist. Assuming that people distinguish between the regime and the military, the level of popularity to a large degree is dependent on the level of regime attachment and the domestic situation. This is because a low level of attachment, and negative domestic developments, can increase the popularity of the military relative to the regime. The perceived, rather than actual level of popularity is of key importance here. This perception is important, as the military is capable of misreading its popularity and thus feeling confident that its intervention will be widely supported, even when the opposite is true. Various factors may contribute to the military's popularity. Apart from the support the military might receive because of its close association with sovereignty, past victories, and emphasis on valued attributes like loyalty and bravery, a transition can have a positive impact. Assuming that the military's cohesion and expertise are not seriously eroded by a transition, at least initially, it may be seen as a source of strong and stable leadership. This perception is encouraged by a new regime that becomes unpopular because of its decisions, and its inability to deal with transitional problems.

Scholars have also recognised the role that military popularity can play in facilitating intervention. N. Yefimov wrote that when society was unstable people looked to the military to restore order, this being "perfectly natural" given it was the best organised and equipped institution for such a task.[175] Indeed Thompson argued that a coup might be encouraged by opposition parties or disgruntled politicians.[176] Stepan also argued that the potential for intervention increased when the unity of the governing elite declined. This was because the

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[173] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp315-344; and Peter Karsten, "The Coup d'Etat and Civilian Control of the Military in Competitive Democracies," in *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy*, ed. John Lovell and David Albright (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), p157.
[174] Farcau, p198.
[175] N. Yefimov, *The Army, Society, Reform*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1995, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/ad1027.txt, Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, p7 of 12.
[176] Thompson, *The Grievances*, pp31-2.

elite might seek to increase their power by deploying the military, and civilians may reject this and call for personnel to assist.[177]

Transitions and the opportunity

Past transitions provide evidence of the role that the above situations can play in facilitating intervention. The impact of external threat perceptions on civil-military relations is shown to some extent by the Chinese experiences. Here the involvement of the new regime in the Korean war and the increased importance of the military led to moves to institutionalise professionalism, and led to civil-military conflict.[178] With regard to the domestic situation, of direct relevance is the increased power of the military in Yugoslavia as it began to disintegrate in 1991. The military became increasingly involved in politics as violence escalated and the civilian leaders proved to be incapable of preventing the disintegration of the state.[179] Similarly, in the Philippines opposition to the new regime's actions toward Communist insurgents encouraged military discontent. [180] However the Philippines also shows that the national interest is often not important to coup conspirators. Yabes wrote that the threat of Communism was merely an excuse used by the leaders of the January 1987 revolt against the new regime.[181] She also wrote that officers sought to provoke instability for personal gain, and moves against the new regime were encouraged by a belief that civilian opposition would be minimal.[182] Finally, one of the consequences of widespread unpopularity, a fall in morale, is evident among the former Warsaw Treaty militaries. I have already described the impact of this in the context of the military's mood.

In summary, the opportunity to intervene is an important coup determinant but its influence does not match that of the capacity or disposition to intervene. If the military is capable and is determined to intervene, civilian opposition will not deter it. When the military is wary of causing civilian casualties, I believe that the level of regime attachment is the most important determinant of the opportunity. With regard to civilian dependence, the domestic situation is more important than the dependency that occurs because of a war. Finally, the level of

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[177] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p80.
[178] See Ellis Joffe, *Party And Army: Professionalism And Political Control In The Chinese Officer Corps 1949-1964*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 19 (Harvard: East Asian Research Center Harvard University, 1965).
[179] See Robin Remington, "The Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition," in *Civil-Military Relations In The Soviet And Yugoslav Successor States*, ed. Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, with a forward by Philippe Schmitter, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Ltd, A division of HarperCollins *Publishers*, 1996), pp164-5.
[180] Yabes, pp23-4, 43.
[181] Ibid., p57.
[182] Ibid., p44.

popularity is closely associated with the above two factors, as the level of regime attachment and the regime's performance directly influence the level of military popularity. This popularity is important because of its close relationship to the military's mood. The opportunity is likely to be influenced by a transition.

Intervention inhibitors

Intervention inhibitors are those factors that might discourage the military from intervention. These inhibitors are primarily derived from various factors that can inhibit the development of the above coup determinants. Thus, when these factors are strong the military can be denied the capacity to intervene and lack both the disposition and opportunity. Inhibitors should be assessed to more accurately explain why coups occur. This is because they can influence in various ways the likelihood of intervention, ways that otherwise could be neglected and could make it more difficult to understand why intervention does not occur. For instance, the military might have many grievances but these are effectively countered by the regime's moves to ensure that it lacks the capacity to intervene. This means that despite the military's grievances a coup might not eventuate. A new regime might also employ various means to reduce the military's grievances or effectively counter them. Moreover, Finer argued that given the military's organisational attributes and control over weapons the key question was "not why this [the military] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them."[183] This is indeed a question that should be addressed. Furthermore, the study of why the military does not intervene is often neglected; a problem recognised by scholars.[184] Because of this, I put forward here factors that might discourage intervention, and these are then examined in the context of the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene when I assess the case study.

Acceptance of civilian supremacy

The acceptance of civilian supremacy is the fundamental inhibitor. The military is very unlikely to stage a coup if the supremacy of the civilian leaders is accepted, and their removal is deemed intolerable. I believe that the military must clearly link its acceptance of civilian supremacy with the regime's leaders. This is important because it prevents the military from obeying the orders of civilians who are not the legitimate leaders, and who might use the institution to challenge the regime. I thus concur with Finer who argued that a "Firm

[183] Finer, p6.
[184] See Finer, p23 and Karsten, pp154-5.

acceptance of civilian supremacy" was the "truly effective check."[185] The strength of this supremacy is associated with the level of attachment to the regime among personnel, and partly determines whether or not the military has an interventionist disposition. This principle of civilian control according to Kemp and Hudlin has two components. First, an acceptance that the civilians are the policy makers while the military implements the policy, and second, that the civilian leaders decide where this line between policy-making and implementation is drawn.[186]

Factors behind the Acceptance of Civilian Supremacy:

Lack of capacity to intervene

As I believe that the capacity to intervene is a basic requirement for the military to stage a coup, it logically follows that when the institution does not perceive itself to have this capacity it will be less inclined to act. The type, cohesion, and number of coup participants relative to regime loyalists and the number of strategic sites will determine this capacity. Of importance too is whether the military perceives that opposition to a coup will be strong or weak, and thus the level of capacity it needs. To ensure that the military does not perceive itself capable of staging a successful coup the civilian leaders might increase the difficulty of seizing power. For instance the regime can ensure that loyal well-trained and equipped personnel are located close to strategic sites. Similarly, the regime can appoint scapegoats in order to prevent the military from uniting against the civilian leaders. In extreme cases the regime might also eliminate the military altogether if it fears that the threat it poses is greater than the security threats it is required to counter.

Likewise, an interventionist mood may be countered. The regime might ensure that it is seen as respecting the military, perhaps through publicly acknowledging its importance. However in tandem with this, the military and public may be made aware of the military's inadequacies, especially as they apply to politics, the negative consequences of intervening, and the benefits of the regime's rule. More specifically, a new regime can seek to win over the military by addressing the grievances it held under the previous regime. Though less important, secondary grievances can also be addressed. For instance, the regime can attempt to limit violations of the class and particularistic interests most associated with the military.

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[185] Finer, p30.
[186] Kemp and Hudlin, pp8-9.

Scholars have recognised the various methods that might be used by a regime to increase the difficulty of intervening. Of particular interest is the work of Farcau who has examined the means by which civilian leaders can counter a coup. Farcau argued that civilians might "divide and rule" through balancing competing military factions off against one another, and might ensure that powerful well-equipped units are deployed within the capital.[187] Civilians may reinforce this by securing strategic sites like communication centres, and by ensuring that such sites are replicated to increase the difficulty of seizing power.[188] Similarly, Farcau believed that civilian leaders could reduce the military's capacity by ensuring that no one unit was powerful enough to overthrow them.[189] Finally, Farcau argued that the military might be eliminated altogether in extreme cases.[190]

Lack of disposition to intervene

This is a very important and obvious inhibitor. A regime can ensure that it does not violate those interests that are considered vital by both the military and individual personnel. This might be achieved through gauging the opinion of the military and 'sweetening' controversial decisions. For instance, a regime might reduce military expenditure but accompany this with the promotion of leading officers. Allowing military involvement in the decision-making process on relevant issues may also discourage greater political participation through satisfying its needs and convincing it that supporting the regime best serves its interests. Less importantly, secondary motives might be countered. For example, a regime might endeavour to ensure that its policies do not violate the class and particularistic interests held dearly by personnel.

Scholars have written of the ways that an interventionist disposition can be prevented. A civil-military relationship of cooperation is most important. Rebecca Schiff wrote that intervention is deterred by a concordance relationship between the military, political elite, and citizenry. Here an agreement is reached on the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style (the military's external and internal manifestations).[191] Both positive and negative incentives might also be

[187] Farcau, pp190-2.
[188] Ibid., pp191-4.
[189] Ibid., pp192-3.
[190] Ibid., pp195-6.
[191] Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *AFS* 22, no.1 (Fall 1995): pp8-9, 14-6.

used to strengthen civilian supremacy, as they reinforce the attitude that it is in the military's interests to obey.[192] These incentives are particularly influential when personnel decide whether it is in their own individual interest to intervene, as they directly affect them. Positive incentives are essentially those which keep personnel content. Such incentives include the provision of adequate support, and promotion of loyal officers. Farcau wrote that bribing key officers may ensure their loyalty, and Huntington argued that a new regime should ensure the living standards of personnel are adequate, provide new equipment, and identify the regime with the military by praising and supporting it.[193] Negative methods might be utilised too. These focus on forcing personnel into submission rather than winning support, and reinforce the risk of intervention. A regime may carefully monitor the military and act swiftly if plotting is discovered. Negative methods range from various types of punishments and sanctions, like demotions, and the reduction of budgetary support, to the more extreme execution of personnel.[194]

I believe that a combination of these incentives best discourages an interventionist disposition. This is because a reliance on positive incentives will require concessions that might not guarantee the military's loyalty, and could encourage the military to support the highest bidder.[195] A new regime may also be unable to supply positive incentives if it is committed to rewarding other groups that facilitated the transition, and there are more pressing demands for resources. Solely using negative incentives can be problematic too. For instance, a military that continually experiences or is threatened with negative incentives might come to see intervention as a plausible alternative. A regime may also lack the capability to effectively police the military, and may find morally repugnant extreme measures such as executions.

Lack of opportunity to intervene

The lack of an opportunity will discourage intervention, however I believe that its influence is limited if the military is determined to intervene. A regime needs to ensure that the level of regime attachment is strong, and that developments do not necessitate a dependency on the military. This is ultimately determined by the regime's performance as the successful and legitimate exercising of power will restrict discontent. At the most basic level the regime needs to ensure that its right to govern and its decisions are accepted as legal, its actions are

[192] Busza, p172.
[193] Farcau, p195; and Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp252-3.
[194] Busza, p172.
[195] See Rapoport, pp262-4.

not detested to the point that widespread demonstrations occur, and living conditions for the majority are not harsh enough to prompt support for intervention. This is particularly important for a new regime, as it must solidify its hold on power. With regard to the level of support for the military, the regime might also actively seek to guarantee that this is not superior to its own by limiting military glorification and ensuring that its prestige is not founded upon past political roles. Various scholars have recognised the methods by which a regime can limit the opportunity to intervene. Perlmutter wrote that a legitimate and popular regime "will be able to mobilize popular support and defeat any such move," and further wrote that a "stable, sustaining, and institutionalized civilian regime can hardly succumb to military pressure and rule." [196] Similarly, Farcau argued that "the only secure defense of a regime against a coup is the establishment of stable institutions and, more importantly, the kind of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people and the world that makes a coup impossible."[197]

Perceived risk of intervention

The perceived risk of intervention is derived from all three of the above factors and its importance will depend on the military's disposition and mood. This is because if the military is determined to intervene, and its mood is such that it believes the risk of intervention can be successfully overcome, the military will still stage a coup regardless of the degree of risk. Of particular relevance are the negative incentives that I outlined above, as a new regime can use these to reinforce the risks of intervention.

There are three broad risks that a coup force might face. The influence of all three of these risks depends on whether personnel believe that they have the capacity to successfully intervene and hold power. First, coup participants face the risk of failing to seize the necessary strategic sites and to defeat or intimidate opposition. This risk of failure might be higher during the immediate transitional period if euphoria over the previous regime's fall remains, and disillusionment in the new regime's performance is yet to develop. The potential for further problems increases when a coup occurs in a large modern state. This is because of the many strategic sites, and the large number of coup participants that are likely to be required. This also makes it more difficult to maintain secrecy and coordination. Second, there is the risk that the regime will punish the coup supporters that survived the failed intervention, and more generally the military as an institution. Here negative incentives are most relevant and a

[196] Perlmutter, *The Military And Politics*, pp34, 281.
[197] Farcau, p198.

new regime's punishment of coup leaders can range from demotion to death. Third, even if the coup leaders successfully seize power, the risk remains. If the military attempts to govern it might face challenges, and the threat remains that coup supporters will be punished once the military, or those that it placed in power, are removed.

Various scholars have acknowledged the risk involved in staging a coup, and during the aftermath of a failed attempt. The failure of many coups clearly illustrates the risk involved. Gavin Kennedy found that 50 percent of 284 coups from 1945 to 1972 failed.[198] Nordlinger also argued that around 80 percent of all coup attempts were "fairly risky enterprises," and that there were many reasons why a coup might fail. These ranged from the conspirators being discovered planning the intervention to their failure to seize strategic sites.[199] The risk of failure is increased by the many important decisions that need to be made by the coup leaders before intervening. For example, Farcau wrote that the timing, logistics, and teams deployed would all be vital in determining the coup's outcome.[200]

Moreover, the repercussions of staging a failed coup are serious, as with the problems a military regime might experience. Harvey Kebschull argued that the price of failure was high and the punishment of coup participants was usually swift and harsh. [201] Apart from the risk that a coup will fail, scholars have argued that the military faces additional problems if it actually succeeds in taking power. These problems have already been examined in the context of the national interest. However I believe that this risk is less important because the military might not seek to govern after a coup. [202]

Professionalism

It has been argued that professionalism inhibits intervention, essentially because of the apolitical nature of the professional military. Scholars have argued that this professionalism will prevent the military from intervening in politics, even during periods of upheaval. However I believe that military professionalism is unlikely, at least alone, to inhibit intervention and that it might actually encourage a coup.

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[198] Gavin Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (New York: Scribner's, 1974), pp337-44, quoted in Nordlinger, p101. See also Nordlinger, p101 and Kebschull, pp568-9.
[199] Nordlinger, p102. See also p100.
[200] Farcau, pp125-135.
[201] Kebschull, pp575-7.

Various scholars have argued that professionalism inhibits a coup. Huntington is the chief proponent of this approach.[203] Huntington believed that military professionalism had three key components. First, professional officers were experts in the "management of violence," which required their total concentration.[204] Second, professional officers were responsible for the military security of society whose political agent, the state, determined their actions and they could only provide advice on security.[205] Third, professional officers had a sense of corporateness, whereby they shared a sense of "organic unity" and perceived themselves as a group apart from laymen.[206] This meant that the professional military was "politically sterile and neutral."[207] He further argued that professional values, beliefs, and attitudes "normally approximate a conservative military outlook that recognises the limited functions of the military and is compatible with civilian control."[208] More specifically, scholars have argued that professionalism inhibits the military from intervening during a transition. Porter argued that when a regime is undergoing a crisis, professionalism "will normally preclude military coups from occurring, or at least from succeeding, and limit army involvement in politics."[209] Likewise, Sestanovich wrote that the transitions from Communism are indicative of professionalism, discouraging intervention because it would violate "the veneer of independent professionalism."[210]

However I believe that professionalism is unlikely to inhibit a coup. Huntington was incorrect when he argued that the professional military was apolitical. I have already argued that no military is completely isolated from societal attitudes and that these impact on the attitudes of personnel. This ultimately ensures that the military is aware of political developments and that it will take a stance on such developments, particularly when personnel believe that the issues are of direct concern. Moreover the qualities Huntington attributed to professionalism can actually encourage intervention. A high level of expertise increases the capacity of the military to intervene, and increases the likelihood of the institution believing that it is superior to

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[202] See pp26-7. With regard to military regimes also see Nordlinger, pp121-9; Finer, pp167-75 and second edition, pp257-79; and Robert Hanneman, "Military's Role in Political Regimes," *AFS* 12, no.1 (Fall 1985): pp36-4.
[203] See Finer, p24; and Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *AFS* 23, no.2 (Winter 1996): p158.
[204] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p11. See also pp11-6.
[205] Ibid., pp14-6.
[206] Ibid., p10.
[207] Ibid., p84.
[208] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p243.
[209] Porter, *Red Armies*, pXIII.

civilians, thus encouraging an interventionist mood. Professional personnel may also feel that their distinct interests cannot be met by the regime, and that only they are competent to make decisions on issues that affect them. This mood is particularly important during transitions, as a new regime might be unpopular because of transitional problems. Professional personnel may also act if they believe civilians threaten their expertise. For instance, the level of training allowed by the regime's budgetary support might be perceived to be inadequate. Similarly, I associate a high level of corporateness with a high level of cohesion, which I have already argued increases the military's capacity to intervene. Moreover, a high level of corporateness might encourage intervention by uniting personnel in their grievances and producing stronger bonds of loyalty to the military than the regime. Again this is particularly relevant to transitions, as the new regime and civil-military relations might be weak.

Many scholars have expressed doubt over the role of professionalism as an inhibitor. Of particular relevance is the work of Finer, given this thesis is based on a modified version of his framework. Finer argued that the "whole weakness" of Huntington's work was his "very special definition of professionalism."[211] Finer further argued that the nature of professionalism, as defined by Huntington, "often thrusts the military into collision with the civil authorities."[212] This argument is based on three key points. First, the consciousness of personnel that they are members of a profession might encourage them to perceive themselves as servants of the state rather than the government. Second, because personnel are specialists in their field they might feel that they alone are best able to make decisions relating to their institution. This might result in civil-military conflict. Moreover, Finer wrote that the military might seek to establish security, as the institution perceives it, again raising the prospect of civil-military conflict.[213] Third, personnel may resent domestic duties, as they believe that their professional role is to ensure security from external threats. [214]

Other scholars also recognise the weaknesses associated with the argument that professionalism inhibits intervention. Scholars have put forward broader definitions of professionalism wherein the military is not apolitical. For example, Stepan argued that a more recent development was 'new professionalism' and that militaries in Latin America have the

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[210] Ibid., pVIII.
[211] Finer, p25.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid., pp26-7.
[214] Ibid., p27.

characteristics of this 'new professionalism.' These characteristics include a military having highly interrelated political and military skills, an unrestricted scope of action, a domestic focus, and a stance on politics.[215] Similarly, William Odom wrote that the apolitical military was a "mythical convention."[216] Moreover, Huntington later accepted that in every society military personnel became politically active in order to promote their interests.[217] Nordlinger also wrote that the expertise of professional personnel was likely to increase their disdain for a regime that cannot govern effectively, and Perlmutter wrote that professionals strive to maximise their autonomy and that this might encourage political involvement.[218] Perlmutter further argued that it took the skill and knowledge of professional officers to stage a coup and replace the civilian authorities.[219]

External actors

The role of external actors is examined last because their influence on the coup leaders can be very limited. This is particularly the case when the military is determined to intervene despite the actions of external actors. For example, the coup leaders might feel that their interests are threatened to such a degree that their only alternative is intervention. Likewise, a military that is not dependent on an actor is unlikely to be decisively influenced. This is because an actor is less likely to be able to pressure the military, perhaps through threatening to reduce the supply of arms. David found that foreign involvement played a significant role in suppressing only 3.9 percent of Third World coups from 1945 to mid-1985.[220] Past coups illustrate the limited role that external actors can have. O'Kane acknowledges that coups have occurred even in states where foreign troops are based.[221] Similarly, David classified the US as having mixed success in deterring Third World coups and its attempts to suppress them as being of limited success.[222] Though the Soviet Union was more successful, coups still occurred in Third World States that had pro-Soviet leaders.[223]

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[215] Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Politics, and Future* ed. Alfred Stepan, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p52. It should be noted however that scholars doubt whether this 'new professionalism' is a recent development. See John Gates, pp427-36.

[216] William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, ed. Dale Herspring, Ivan Volgyes, (Boulder, Folkestone: Westview Press Ltd, Dawson, 1978), p35.

[217] Huntington, *Political Order*, p194.

[218] Perlmutter, *The Military And Politics*, pp2-3.

[219] Ibid., p13.

[220] David, p2.

[221] Ibid., p90.

[222] David, pp34-43.

[223] Ibid., pp84-92.

However external actors can influence whether a coup occurs and thus should be assessed. An external actor can play a key role if it makes clear to the military that it is strongly opposed to intervention, it is capable of acting swiftly and decisively, and the military that threatens intervention is dependent on the actor. If this is the case the military will have to balance carefully the risks of intervention, and might decide that the risk of retribution and the denial of support outweigh the benefits of intervention. Numerous options are available to the actor and will vary according to its willingness and ability to inhibit a coup. Most dramatically, an actor might deploy its forces to actively resist a coup. Less dramatically, an actor may warn the military that a coup will not be tolerated and punitive measures will be taken against coup forces. For instance, cooperation with the military might be reduced along with the provision of resources. The role of external actors is recognised by various scholars. Huntington argued that actors can have a significant role in helping a democratic regime to consolidate.[224] More specifically, O'Kane wrote that the presence of foreign troops can be an obstacle for coup plotters as they might actively support the regime.[225]

Transitions and inhibitors

The potential role of inhibitors is evident when past transitions are examined. First, the military's lack of capacity to intervene and its role in discouraging intervention is shown by the fall in cohesion experienced by former Warsaw Treaty militaries, and the inhibiting nature of this fall. Second, characteristics of a weak disposition are illustrated by former Warsaw Treaty militaries. This is because a strong interventionist mood was discouraged by a fall in morale among personnel. Third, with regard to the opportunity it is evident from the former Warsaw Treaty states that negative developments, such as economic difficulties, can be experienced during transitions. However it is also evident that new regimes have actively sought to minimise their dependency on the military by removing its domestic roles.[226] These all contributed to a high risk of intervening. With regard to professionalism, the former Warsaw Treaty states have attempted to increase the level of professionalism, as defined by Huntington. However there is little evidence to suggest that such moves have reduced the military's involvement in politics.[227] Finally, the Philippines provides a dramatic example of an external actor playing a decisive role in preventing a successful coup. Here the US use of

[224] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp273-4.
[225] O'Kane, pp85-6.
[226] Szemerkenyi, p46.
[227] Ibid., pp40-2.

aircraft to intimidate the coup forces was important in saving the new regime from a 1989 coup.

In summary, an acceptance of civilian supremacy by the military is the fundamental inhibitor to its intervention. This acceptance is primarily derived from a military's lack of capacity, disposition, and opportunity. These three factors then contribute to the high risk of intervening. An external actor can play an important role but this is rare, and I do not believe that professionalism, as defined by Huntington, is an effective inhibitor.

Conclusions

This chapter provides a theoretical framework to explain whether the military will intervene in politics; the coup being the intervention method studied. The framework presented by Finer is first outlined. Finer defined intervention by the military in politics as the substitution of its own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognised civilian authorities and argued that there were four levels of military intervention. These ranged from influencing the civilians to the removal of the civilian leaders.

Finer believed that the capacity and propensity of the military to intervene, and the conditions within which the military operates, cause military intervention. Finer initially wrote that the military has political advantages over civilians before arguing that the disposition to intervene was encouraged by three broad motives and the military's mood. These motives are the manifest destiny, the belief that the military is the guardian of the national interest, the national interest itself, and sectional interests based on class, region, ethnicity, the military institution, or the individual. With regard to the military's mood, if it is one of "self-importance" or "morbidly high" the likelihood of intervention increases. Finer then argued that the opportunity to intervene shaped how, when, and possibly whether intervention occurred. Here the level of civilian dependency on the military because of a war and the domestic situation was important. Of particular relevance were those domestic situations where there was an "overt" or "latent" crisis, or "power vacuum." The level of "political culture" was also important as this influenced the level of military intervention. Finer labeled four levels of culture: mature; developed; low; and minimal.

To correct the weaknesses I believe exist in Finer's work I then presented a modified version of the above framework. This framework examines the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene and factors that might inhibit a coup (see model 2). It should be noted, though, that the categories are not mutually exclusive. With regard to the capacity to intervene, I believe that the military must believe itself capable of defeating, or successfully intimidating, the regime's leaders and supporters, seizing strategic sites, and acting swiftly to guarantee surprise and minimise organised opposition. The likelihood of success is enhanced by the active participation of personnel who have leadership skills, are strategically located, and are effectively armed and trained. Similarly, the cohesion and number of active coup participants, relative to the regime's forces and the size of the state, influences the likelihood of the military perceiving itself capable of intervening. Transitions are relevant here because of their impact on the military; they can reduce its capacity to intervene.

Closely associated with the military's capacity, and indeed disposition, is the military's mood. The self-perceptions of personnel will determine whether they believe that they have the capacity to intervene. Threats to the military's prestige have the potential to create discontent and this might arise during a transition. For instance, the new regime may be perceived as not acknowledging the military's capabilities. However I believe that Finer's work needs to be expanded to better take into account the influence that negative self-perceptions among personnel have in discouraging coups. This is because when the self-perceptions of military personnel decline to the extent that they doubt their own capabilities, the threat of a coup can decline. This is the result of personnel lacking the confidence that they can successfully stage such a risky and complex operation. This is particularly important when they must risk civilian casualties, and widespread instability. Another vital determinant is the military's disposition. Here I believe that there are two main types of factors: primary factors that are often influential in encouraging intervention and secondary factors that are less influential. Assessing the primary factors first, the violation of corporate interests is the most influential coup grievance. This is chiefly because such a violation directly impacts upon the military's ability to successfully protect national security, its ability to operate in the manner it wishes, and the conditions under which personnel operate. Actions by a regime that may be perceived as threatening the military range from grievances arising over the violation of autonomy to the presence of a rival armed force that threatens the military's monopoly over weaponry. Given the probability that a new regime will seek to ensure its supremacy and will make decisions in

Model 2: Factors that can determine the likelihood of a coup



accordance with its own perceptions rather than those of the previous regime, the potential for corporate grievances is real. Individual interests are also very important and are closely associated with corporate interests. These again are likely to be impacted upon by a transition because of its potentially wide-ranging consequences. Perceived threats range from the lack of promotion opportunities to the threat of execution.

Apart from these factors are those that often have a limited influence, the secondary factors. First, I doubt whether the class interest is important. Theoretically, intervention may result from the military's class interest being threatened, and thus by a transition's impact on the class interest. However evidence indicates that the influence of the interest is limited and this approach is problematic. Second, I believe that the particularistic interest is unlikely to be influential. Nor do I believe that the third factor, the manifest destiny and national interest, are important. Finally, though external actors might influence whether a coup occurs, their role is unlikely to be significant. The limited role of these factors is evident when past coups are examined.

The opportunity to intervene is another important coup determinant but its influence does not match that of the capacity or disposition to intervene. This is because if the military is capable and determined to intervene civilian opposition will not deter it. Assuming that the military is wary of causing civilian casualties, I believe that the level of regime attachment is the most important determinant of the opportunity. I have used this term rather than "political culture" because it is less problematic. The level of regime attachment is important because the hazards associated with intervening against a popular regime will influence coup leaders. This is because military leaders must be sure that troops will obey their orders and be willing to use violence against civilians. With regard to war and the domestic situation, both can facilitate intervention. However I believe that the influence of a war will be largely determined by its domestic impact, because of increased civilian dependence. The level of support is closely associated with the above two factors, because the level of regime attachment and the regime's performance directly influence the level of military popularity. I believe that support of the military is important because of its close relationship to the military's mood. All three factors are likely to be influenced by a transition.

Finally, I believe that intervention might not occur if the above factors are countered by what I term intervention inhibitors. To accurately explain the occurrence of coups those factors that

can discourage intervention need to be carefully assessed. This is important because factors not only can encourage a coup but can also reduce the military's capacity and disposition to intervene, and the opportunity to intervene. Thus, even though the military might have grievances a coup might not eventuate. Regardless of the military's capacity, disposition, and opportunity, it will not stage a coup if the supremacy of the civilian leaders is accepted and their removal deemed intolerable. The acceptance of civilian supremacy is primarily derived from a military's lack of capacity, disposition, and opportunity. Various methods might be used by a regime to ensure that these factors do not encourage intervention. For instance a regime might utilise positive and negative incentives. Inhibitors combine to determine the risk of intervening. An external actor can play an important role but this is rare and I do not believe that professionalism, as defined by Huntington, is an effective inhibitor. Indeed I believe that the qualities Huntington attributed to professionals might actually encourage intervention.

The following chapter introduces the case study. This chapter first summarises the models that have dominated the Western study of Soviet civil-military relations before describing Soviet civil-military relations from 1917 to 1985 in the context of these models. Following this, the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition are described. Here the structure of the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of military budgetary support, the level of popular support for the military and the closely related level of morale among personnel, the cohesion and size of the military, and military expertise are assessed. These characteristics are then examined in the context of the transition's first period, the decline of the Communist regime from 1985 to 1991.

CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET REGIME TRANSITION AND THE MILITARY: 1985-1991

This chapter introduces the case study through examining the characteristics of the Soviet military before and during the transition from Communism. I shall first provide a brief overview of the dominant theoretical models used by Western scholars to examine the Soviet civil-military relationship, as these facilitate a better understanding of the relationship.[1] The relationship prior to the initiation of the transition by Gorbachev is then briefly described within the context of the dominant theoretical models. Following this, the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition are described. Here the structure of the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of military budgetary support, the level of popular support for the military and the closely related level of morale among personnel, the cohesion and size of the military, and military expertise are assessed. These characteristics are then examined in the context of the transition's first phase, essentially the decline of the Communist regime from 1985 to 1991. Therefore, hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is evaluated here in the context of the 1985 to 1991 period.

Theoretical Overview

To better understand developments in the Soviet civil-military relationship the major theoretical models of Western scholars are first presented in chronological order. Though I do not examine the structure of the civil-military relationship in exact accordance with these models, outlining the history of civil-military interaction in the context of these models is important. This is because they have shaped the study of this interaction. The three dominant models described here are the conflict, participatory, and symbiotic models. Various scholars have recognised these three models, and their dominance over the Western study of Soviet civil-military relations.[2]

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[1] When referring to the civil-military relationship in this chapter it is within the context of the relationship between the Communist party leadership and the military leadership. Similarly, when I refer to the Communist regime it relates to the regime led by the Communist party.

[2] See Roman Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," in *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers Ltd, 1982), p232; William Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," *Problems of Communism* XXXIX, no.3 (May-June 1990): pp69-70; Timothy Colton, "Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union," in *Soldiers And The*

Conflict model

Roman Kolkowicz (1967) argued that conflict within the Soviet civil-military relationship was inevitable. Kolkowicz argued that the relationship was cyclical and repetitive as rises and falls occurred in the party's authority. He further argued that "the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviet military is essentially conflict-prone and thus presents a perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state."[3] "The contradictoriness and incompatibility of certain basic characteristics of the military and the features that the Party would have it exhibit" encouraged this conflict (see table 1).[4] Kolkowicz argued that the incompatibility of the party and military led to a range of conflicts, and that the party employed various methods to control the military. First, positive measures were used which involved the granting of socioeconomic privileges, political cooptation and agreement to military demands. Second, prophylactic measures were used which entailed the indoctrination and supervision of personnel. Third, negative measures were used, including intimidation and coercion.[5]

Table 1: Contradictory and Incompatible Military and Party Traits According to Kolkowicz

Natural Military Traits	*Traits Desired by the Party*
Elitism	Egalitarianism
Professional autonomy	Subordination to ideology
Nationalism	Proletarian internationalism
Detachment from society	Involvement with society
Heroic symbolism	Anonymity

Source: Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, p21

Apart from the dynamics of the civil-military relationship, Kolkowicz described the party's control of the military and the developments in the relationship within the context of conflict.[6] He then examined the impact of technology on the relationship and the military's role in

Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations From Brezhnev To Gorbachev ed. Timothy Colton and Thane Gustafson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp12-4; and Thomas Nichols, *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p25.

[3] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military and the Communist Party* A Westview Encore Edition (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985), p11, Appendix B, pp370-1.

[4] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p21. See also pp20-8.

[5] Ibid., pp28-30.

politics.[7] With regard to this political role, Kolkowicz argued that the military's freedom was increasing. Various factors contributed to the military's increased freedom. These ranged from the transformation of the officer corps into a "group of more sophisticated, self-assured young specialists," to the importance of "mutual understanding" because of the Soviet Union's extensive political-military commitments.[8] Kolkowicz then argued that party-military tension also increased. He attributed this tension to the military's dissatisfaction "with those détente-motivated foreign policies and consumer-oriented domestic policies that threaten its basic institutional interests."[9] Kolkowicz later wrote that although a coup was unlikely, party dependence on the military was increasing, and the military could play the leading political role. This could occur if there was a "systemic crisis of legitimacy, succession, internal disruptions, or external threat."[10]

Symbiotic model

William Odom (1973) emphasised civil-military cooperation and the lack of a military threat to civilian supremacy. Odom questioned the conflict model and presented a model Thomas Nicholas labelled the "*symbiotic model.*"[11] Odom wrote that although some civil-military disagreements arose they were "against a background of broad pragmatic consensus."[12] Moreover Odom questioned the assumptions made by Kolkowicz. Odom did not believe that the military was an interest group, and questioned whether party and military values differed.[13] He further conceptualised the military on the basis of his assumption that "the marshals and generals are left to act as executants--executants of only a few aspects of the vast and complex process required by the Soviet military posture."[14] Odom believed that the military was an administrative arm of the party rather than a separate and competing institution, the party-military relationship had symbiotic aspects in domestic politics, and the military was a political institution.[15] Even if the military did become involved in a political power struggle, he argued that it would not be a "serious contender for power" because it

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[6] Ibid., pp36-306.
[7] Ibid., pp309-49.
[8] Ibid., p345.
[9] Ibid., p348.
[10] Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention," p134.
[11] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p28.
[12] Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique" in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*. ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Ltd, 1978), p32. See also p33.
[13] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp28-9.
[14] Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p44.
[15] Ibid., pp41-4.

would not be united.[16] Odom concluded that the military had a subordinated role and would refrain from taking power "even when that power falls temporarily within reach during a succession struggle."[17]

Participatory model

Timothy Colton (1979) argued that the civil-military relationship was one of both conflict and cooperation, but even during the worst conflict members of the party and military continued to cooperate. Colton believed that military participation in politics had two distinct dimensions, the scope of issues concerning the military, and the means it used in politics.[18] This model emphasised the inter-action between party and military. Although neither gained absolute domination, the sovereign power of the party was accepted. Colton thus downplayed the level of conflict between the party and military.[19] Colton further wrote that the Main Political Administration (MPA) was the unrivalled "party's military voice," though he questioned it's ability to effectively monitor the military. This was because of the administration's close relationship with the military.[20]

With regard to the military's political role, Colton argued that the military's role was limited to intramilitary issues, or to providing the civilian leadership with expert advice regarding institutional questions. He further argued that "there has been no movement in the direction of military rule."[21] Colton believed that only on internal military issues and through official prerogatives and sanctions did most officers participate in politics, and no officers used force.[22] To explain the military's political quiescence, Colton first argued that those factors that might encourage greater participation in politics, such as prior military interventions, did not apply to the Soviet Union.[23] Colton then argued that political intervention was unlikely. This was because "party policies on most institutional issues and at most times have indeed been consistent with the apparent preferences of most officers."[24] For instance, the ideological

[16] Ibid., p46.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Colton, *Commissars*, pp231-49.
[19] Ibid., pp221-78.
[20] Ibid., pp9, 85-112. Colton wrote that the MPA's role changed from one of political control over the military to one of administration and control. The specific duties of the MPA were described as the political education of the army and mobilising personnel. Colton, *Commissars*, pp37-42, 68-81. However other scholars wrote of the MPA primarily in the context of its political control. See Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp84-6.
[21] Colton, *Commissars*, p249.
[22] Ibid., Figure 2, p243.
[23] Ibid., pp250-2.
[24] Ibid., p259.

beliefs of officers, their material interests, their status interests, and their professional interests were maintained and promoted by the party.[25]

In summary, three theoretical models dominated the Western study of Soviet civil-military relations. First, the conflict model stressed the conflict prone nature of the civil-military relationship and the military's potential threat to the party. Second, the symbiotic model emphasised civil-military cooperation and claimed that the party's supremacy was strong. Finally, according to the participatory model the relationship was one of conflict and cooperation, but party supremacy was not threatened.

Soviet Civil-Military Relations: 1917-1985

The Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. Though originally distrustful of a standing professional army, this was overcome by the need during the civil war to defeat the White armies. Vladimir Lenin signed the decree that established the Red Army in January 1918, to be led by Leon Trotsky, the Commissar for War. Early controversies included whether the army should be truly revolutionary and should be based on ideology, or a professional army independent from ideology. The army ultimately came to have characteristics of both, with the use of former Imperial army officers called 'military specialists.'[26] Civil-military relations were further shaped by the implementation of the commissar system. The first party organisation for political work in the military was the Military Organisation of the Central Committee. Commissars, or political officers, were widely deployed with the introduction of 'military specialists,' and their role was formalised as "the direct political organ of Soviet power in the army" in April 1918. [27] The following year dual command was established whereby commissars counter-signed orders, and in May 1919 the MPA was established. The commissar system was controversial, as support and opposition to the system arose.[28] Colton wrote that the system had weaknesses, as the loyalty of commissars was not beyond doubt.[29] Indeed Kolkowicz argued that from the civil war the potential for civil-military tension arose, as the Communist military personnel had "tasted power and status."[30] Additional moves to

[25] Ibid., pp259-75.
[26] See Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp38-47. With regard to 'military specialists' see Erickson, *Soviet High Command*, p40.
[27] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p82.
[28] See Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp81-2.
[29] Colton, *Commissars*, pp38-9.
[30] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p43.

ensure party control occurred after the civil war. The subordination of the MPA to the party was strengthened and its role of controlling the military reaffirmed.

After the death of Lenin in 1924, civil-military relations were dominated by the moves of Joseph Stalin to assert his authority. Key figures like Trotsky were replaced and political controls increased, with limited military opposition. [31] For instance, in May 1927 it was directed that political disputes between commanders and political assistants be referred to higher political rather than military organs. By the late 1920s branch departments of the MPA had been established in air, naval, and armoured units. Party control was further increased during the 1930s. By January 1934, over 25 percent of personnel were party members, and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) reinforced party control.[32] Odom argued that such developments did not lead to conflict because the divisions into "purely a uniformed faction versus others" did not arise.[33]

However the most dramatic developments during the 1930s were the purges. Arrests began in 1936 and after a reshuffle of the high command in early 1937 the 'great purge' began. Those arrested were accused of belonging to an "intra-army opposition group."[34] However both the military and party control methods were affected as the MPA was also ruthlessly purged.[35] Colton argued that there were no stark divisions between "an army seeking autonomy and a Party seeking hegemony and control."[36] Opposition again was minimal, as officers remained loyal.[37] In addition, dual command was re-established in May 1937. By 1938 Nichols argued that "there was no one who could even begin to challenge Stalin's military authority on any grounds."[38] After the purges the repression of the military continued but conciliatory moves, such as those aimed at encouraging professionalism, were made.[39] According to Kolkowicz, the purge and earlier developments illustrated "the cyclical pattern of Party-military

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[31] With regard to the limited nature of opposition see Colton, *Commissars*, p46.
[32] With regard to party membership see Colton, *Commissars*, Table 2, p17. For information on the establishment of the NKVD see Erickson, *Soviet High Command*, pp375-8.
[33] William Odom, "Smashing an Icon: The Soviet Military Today," *The National Interest*, no vol. or no., (Fall 1990): pp63-4.
[34] "O tak nazyvaemoi 'vnutriarmeiskoi oppozitsii' 1928 goda," *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, March 1991, p85, quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p47.
[35] See Erickson, *Soviet High Command*, pp504-6; and Colton, *Commissars*, pp136-51.
[36] Colton, "Perspectives," p119.
[37] See Colton, *Commissars*, pp139, 150-1, 276-7.
[38] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p48.
[39] For information on conciliatory moves see Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp62-4.

relations." This was because the military had grown in influence during Stalin's moves to industrialise the Soviet Union and the party's hegemony thus needed to be reasserted.[40]

The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 impacted directly upon the civil-military relationship. Initially party control was stressed as moves were made, such as the reinstatement of the dual command system removed in 1940, to strengthen its authority over the military. Control was then loosened again to raise the morale of personnel.[41] However as the external threat receded party control was re-emphasised and by 1944 to 1945 the party-political organs again were active. Indeed Kolkowicz argued that "the officer corps was beginning once more to feel the heavy hand of the dictator."[42] Kolkowicz further argued that relations between commissars and commanders were often tense during the war, whereas Colton wrote of their cooperation.[43]

Stalin dominated civil-military relations until his death in 1953, after which Nikita Khrushchev took power. According to Kolkowicz, the cycle of civil-military relations continued during this period. This involved party control increasing as threats declined, but as problems developed moves were taken to reconcile with officers.[44] After Germany's defeat Stalin took steps to reinforce his authority. These included the demotion of Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Stalin's chief military aide. However during Stalin's last years conciliatory moves were made, which Kolkowicz argued occurred to ensure its neutrality during a forthcoming purge.[45] Stalin's death impacted greatly upon the civil-military relationship given his wide-ranging powers. Although Khrushchev might have sought to have a similar degree of control over the military, Nichols argued that he was not willing to use Stalin's methods, thus losing control of the institution. [46] In turn, Kolkowicz argued that "the military's own interests and values emerged into the open."[47]

Of particular interest here is the rise and fall of Zhukov, as much debate has occurred over his swift removal. By 1955, Zhukov was the Minister of Defence, and the following year he became the first career officer to sit on the Presidium or Politburo. Zhukov's influence further

[40] Ibid., p56. See also pp57-61.
[41] Ibid., pp64-8.
[42] Ibid., p70. See also pp71-5.
[43] Ibid., pp229-231; and Colton, *Commissars*, pp152-74.
[44] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p71. Kolkowicz summarised this relationship pattern in Appendix B, pp370-71.
[45] Ibid., p76.
[46] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p58.

increased when he actively supported Khrushchev against his opponents when they attempted to remove the General Secretary from office in June 1957.[48] However the following October Zhukov was removed. Kolkowicz explained the dramatic fall of Zhukov in the context of civil-military conflict, claiming he challenged the powerful role of political controls in the military.[49] Contrasting this, Colton de-emphasised civil-military conflict and rejected the party claims against Zhukov, one being that the Marshal sought to remove the party from power.[50]

From the removal of Zhukov to his own fall, Khrushchev's actions set the stage for civil-military relations. Kolkowicz wrote that after Zhukov's fall the military "again had to submit to the dreary catechisms of Marxism-Leninism," and that reform of the party control structure was aimed at strengthening party supremacy. [51] Kolkowicz argued that in turn military discontent arose. However Colton argued that evidence suggested there was little direct opposition to the Marshal's removal, and that the party control organs and military cooperated after the incident.[52] During his final years Khrushchev sought to reform the military by reducing the conventional forces in accordance with the importance he placed on missile forces.[53] Kolkowicz argued that these moves, strengthened by discontent over issues like the role of the political organs, encouraged greater civil-military tension.[54] Indeed he wrote that the military might have placed direct or indirect pressure for Khrushchev to be removed in October 1964. [55] However Colton again downplayed civil-military conflict. Colton argued that the military and MPA took a similar stance on Khrushchev.[56] Odom also rejected the notion that the civil-military relationship was a "real or potential cleavage in the Soviet political system" after outlining the Khrushchev period.[57]

The accession of Leonid Brezhnev is widely recognised to have led to a reduction in civil-military tensions, at least initially. Colton wrote that Khrushchev's fall removed "a thorn in the military's flesh," and even Kolkowicz accepted that the military "quietly tolerated" initial

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[47] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p344.
[48] See Colton, *Commissars*, pp176-8.
[49] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp120-35.
[50] Colton, *Commissars*, pp175-95.
[51] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p135. See also p138.
[52] Ibid., pp142-5; and Colton, *Commissars*, pp193-5.
[53] See Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp150-3.
[54] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp150-73, 282-300.
[55] Ibid., p289.
[56] Colton, *Commissars*, pp200, 207.
[57] Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p34.

statements ensuring continuity in domestic policies by the new leadership.[58] Closer relations were encouraged by the greater efforts made by the party to promote and protect the military's institutional interests. Thus, civil-military relations from the second half of the 1960s to the first half of the 1970s have been characterised as a "*Golden Age*" during which party decisions favoured the military.[59] Zhukov was returned to his post as Chief of the General Staff, budgetary support was high, and the military enjoyed much influence over the making of national security policy.[60] However relations changed as the party placed less emphasis on external security threats and actively sought to strengthen its control during the second half of the 1970s. For example, Dmitrii Ustinov, who had been more sympathetic to Brezhnev's foreign policies, replaced Defence Minister Andrei Grechko in 1976.[61] Odom though, in 1978, argued that military intervention was hardly likely and Colton the following year wrote that relations were "remarkably free of direct conflict."[62]

During Brezhnev's final years and the years immediately prior to Gorbachev's accession civil-military tensions grew as the party's support of the military fell, at least relative to the "golden age." However there is disagreement over the severity of these tensions. Colton argued that from the mid-1960s to early 1980s the relationship was one of "relative stability and harmony."[63] Even Kolkowicz in 1982 argued that the military and party leaders had reached a "workable *modus vivendi*."[64] Though the invasion of Afghanistan was not a source of civil-military conflict evidence indicates that tensions did increase, at least to some degree.[65] This is shown by the conflict between the party and Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff. Ogarkov openly opposed the party and expressed concern that the military's strength was threatened. This encouraged the party to strengthen its control over the military through moving to ensure that MPA officers were loyal to the party. [66] The accession of Iurii Andropov as General Secretary with the death of Brezhnev in November 1982 had

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[58] Colton, "Perspectives," p25; and Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p301. See also Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p92.
[59] Colton, "Perspectives," p25. Italics are original. See also p26.
[60] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp93-100.
[61] See Bruce Parrott, in "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, pp54-62; Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp110-3; and Jeremy Azrael, "The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986," in *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union, Russian and Soviet History 1500-1991* ed. Alexander Dallin (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1992), pp167-72.
[62] Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p48; and Colton, *Commissars*, p285.
[63] Colton, "Civil-Military Relations In The Mid-1980s," in *The Gorbachev Era*, ed. Alexander Dallin and Condoleeza Rice (Stanford, California: Stanford Alumni Association, 1987), p110.
[64] Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory," p246. Italics are original.
[65] With regard to the Afghanistan invasion and civil-military relations see Bruce Porter, "The Military Abroad: Internal Consequences of External, Expansion," in Colton and Gustafson, pp305-16. More generally, with regard to civil-military tensions from 1980 to 1984 see Parrott, "Political Change," p62.
[66] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp119-24; and Azrael, pp172-83.

little impact on this relationship as strains continued to be evident. Andropov continued to place less emphasis on the military than enjoyed during the "golden age" and he sought to further strengthen the party's position. With the death of Andropov in February 1984 Konstantin Chernenko took power and was not swayed by military concerns, such as the emphasis that Ogarkov placed on the US threat. Thus, tensions remained evident during Chernenko's brief tenure. The most dramatic development was the re-assignment of Ogarkov in September 1984. [67] Chernenko died in February 1985, and scholars disagree over the military's influence when Gorbachev took power in March.[68]

It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to authoritatively assess the validity of the above models but I shall comment on them briefly. Before this however, it must first be recognised that because of the complexity of Soviet civil-military relations the models cannot accurately explain every development. After examining civil-military relations during the 1920s, Dale Herspring argued that all three models had weaknesses and strengths. For instance, the conflict model better explained the tensions that developed between party officials and 'military specialists.' However the participatory model better explained the initial debate over whether a standing army or militia be established. This was because the military and party ultimately cooperated but tensions did arise.[69] Second, the time period within which the model was first presented must be considered, because it will have been influenced by the state of the civil-military relationship at that time. This is clearly shown by the conflict and symbiotic models. The conflict model was published when the purge and Zhukov's fall were still relatively recent, whereas the symbiotic model was published during the "golden age."

I believe that the participatory model appears to best explain developments in the Soviet civil-military relationship from 1917 to 1985. This is primarily because Colton clearly wrote of the various degrees of military involvement in politics, and those factors that influenced its political quiescence. Second, many of his arguments are particularly relevant in light of the transition. These are examined when I assess the 1985 to 1991 period. Third, the relationship was not one of inevitable conflict or cooperation. Finally, various scholars who have examined Soviet civil-military relations in greater depth concluded that the model was the

[67] For information on the civil-military relationship under Andropov and Chernenko see Azrael, pp188-99; and Parrott, pp69-75.
[68] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p128; and Parrott, p75.
[69] Dale Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp55-71, 21-36. See also pp3-20, 37-54.

most valid of the three. For example, Thane Gustafson argued that the model considered a broader range of civil-military dealings, distinguished between civil-military issues, and between the variations of military involvement and participation.[70]

On the Eve of Transition: 1985

I shall now examine the military on the eve of the transition initiated by Gorbachev. This study is in accordance with the framework I presented in the introduction. The structure of the Soviet civil-military relationship, and the military's roles are first examined. The above models that dominated the study of Soviet civil-military relations are further assessed in the context of civil-military developments during the transition. However the structure of the relationship is assessed via the penetration model I outline below. This is because I believe that this model best facilitates an accurate assessment of the structure of the relationship. The level of budgetary support for the military, the public perception of the military, and the closely related morale of the personnel are then examined. Finally, the military's size and cohesion, and the expertise of personnel are assessed.

Structure of the civil-military relationship

To examine the structure of the Soviet civil-military relationship I shall use the penetration model put forward by Nordlinger. According to this model "Civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by penetrating the armed forces with political ideas (if not fully developed ideologies) and political personnel."[71] These political ideas were promoted throughout the military, and "The resulting congruity between the political ideas of civilians and officers consequently removes a potential source of conflict between them."[72] Political conformity is also rewarded because political ideas are a significant determinant of promotion.[73] Nordlinger further argued that the regime made "extensive use of controls, surveillance, and punishment."[74] These controls involved the deployment of political officers throughout the military. Their political responsibilities often take precedence over military officers, and might include the use of a secret police force along with its informers too.[75]

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[70] Thane Gustafson, "Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, p336. See also pp334-40.
[71] Nordlinger, p15.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

Nordlinger argued that this model of civil-military relations was very powerful. This was because in "its fully developed form" it approximated with a "congruence of civilian and military beliefs."[76] Even "where conflicts of political ideas and interests do arise, the civilians enjoy extensive resources for surveillance and control."[77] However there are two potential problems that might hinder the establishment of this model. First, Nordlinger argued that the actual implementation of the model can be "inordinately risky," though this problem "loses much of its significance under the unusual circumstances of a weak, newly created army."[78] Second, the regime must have a "single locus of power" rather than "competing centres of power." This was because the model required that the military be penetrated by "a single set of political ideas and controls," or military divisions and internal conflict would be encouraged.[79]

This model is used to examine the structure of the Soviet civil-military structure because it avoids some of the problems that are apparent when one assesses the three Soviet models. The model is not relevant sorely to the study of the Soviet Union like the previous models but is applicable to the study of other Communist civil-military relations, as they all have the characteristics of this model. Indeed Nordlinger wrote, "it is among the Communist regimes that the penetration model has been applied in its most fully developed form."[80] This also helps the model accommodate transitional developments. This is because it is not premised on a specific group governing, a particularly important point because of the decline of the Communist party.

In addition, I believe that the key assumptions of the penetration model are correct. Most importantly, the model recognises that the characteristics of the regime will influence the civilian controls that can be successfully implemented. This is particularly relevant to the study of regime transitions and the military because a transition in the regime will impact on the military. Moreover the Soviet Union conforms with Nordlinger's argument that a weak military is more susceptible to penetration. Similarly, I believe that Nordlinger is correct, at least within the context of the Communist transitions, to argue that the model is very powerful

[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., p17.
[78] Ibid. See also p18.
[79] Ibid., p18.
[80] Ibid., p15. See also pp17-8.

and that a coup, particularly a successful one, in a state that has fully implemented the structure is unlikely. Only the military in Romania used force to actively support the civilian initiated transition.[81] Finally, though Nordlinger argued that in its "fully developed form" it approximates with a "congruence of civilian military beliefs," he then wrote that conflict could arise. As I believe both cooperation and conflict occurred between the Communist party and Soviet military, this is in line with my support of the participatory model.

Soviet civil-military relations were dominated by the interaction that occurred between the Communist party and the military, and clearly had many of the characteristics of the penetration model. This is primarily shown by the penetration of the military by the Communist party that ensured its supremacy until the party's power monopoly had declined, again in line with Nordlinger's argument that a "single locus of power" was necessary. The party clearly made extensive use of control methods that involved the penetration of the military. First, the Communist ideology was widely promoted throughout the military. The MPA was the main political organ used to ensure party control, and although Colton doubted its effectiveness to monitor the military it is characteristic of a penetration model (see table 2). The administration carried out the political education of the army. Its principal focus was the promotion of Communism among rank-and-file personnel and NCOs.[82] The MPA was subordinate to both the Ministry of Defence and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On average, it appears that military personnel spent 8.6 hours a week attending classes on political subjects and on ideological indoctrination, though its effectiveness is doubtful.[83]

Second, the promotion of party membership is evident. In 1977, over 90 percent of officers belonged to the party or the Komsomol, the Young Communist League that was primarily aimed at rank and file personnel and NCOs.[84] Indeed at the beginning of Gorbachev's rein, 78 percent of the officer corps and 100 percent of those higher-ranked belonged to the party.[85] Moreover military personnel belonged to the party hierarchy. From 1925 to 1976 the military made up on average 7.4 percent of the Central Committee, the party's sovereign body

[81] See Barany, Table 1, p603.
[82] *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 27 October 1977, n.p., quoted in Colton, *Commissars*, pp58-112.
[83] Richard Gabriel, *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*, Contributions In Political Science Number 44 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), p190.
[84] Colton, *Commissars*, Table 6, p49. See also pp16-23, 48-57.
[85] Robert Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup: Departization and Decentralization," *AFS* 19, no. 1 (Fall 1992): p28.

between party congresses.[86] In 1978, 25 percent of Politburo members had military-related work experience and in 1981, 7 military personnel belonged to the regional party bodies.[87] The military also appears to have influenced politics. Kolkowicz argued that the military helped Khrushchev take power, and Bruce Parrott argued that the military later helped Brezhnev consolidate his power.[88] However in February 1985 the military had neither a civilian or professional military representative within the Politburo, and Parrott argued that it had little influence over the successions of either Chernenko or Gorbachev.[89]

Table 2: The Roles of the MPA 1986

Roles of Main Political Administration (MPA) in 1986 (dual standing as Party Central Committee department and agency of the Ministry of Defence)
• debate and codify ideological/philosophical principles in Soviet doctrine (philosophy of war and ideological principles of international politics
• oversee ideological education of both enlisted men and officers
• probably some role in military personnel decisions

Source: Rice, "The Development of Soviet Military Power," in *The Gorbachev Era*, Figure 2, p125

Third, political considerations could influence promotions and demotions. This is illustrated by the political considerations that appear to have influenced Brezhnev's decision to promote Ogarkov to the position of Chief of the General Staff, and is indicative of a positive incentive being utilised to promote loyalty. The Marshal was believed to be more sympathetic to the views of the party leaders.[90] The same also applies to the removal of high-ranking officers from positions because the party doubted their loyalty. This is again shown by Ogarkov's career. Here scholars like Jeremy Azrael have strongly argued that his removal was encouraged by party fears that it would not be able to prevent the controversial Marshal from being promoted to replace Ustinov, whose health was failing.[91] Former officers also wrote of the influence that the party could have in determining promotions at lower levels.[92]

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[86] Colton, *Commissars*, Table 5, p27.
[87] Parrott, pp75-6. With regard to the regional bodies see Parrott, Table 2.1, p76.
[88] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp105-14; and Parrott, pp51-4.
[89] Parrott, pp72-3, 75.
[90] Parrott, p60. See also Azrael, pp172-4.
[91] Azrael, pp34-5. See also Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p123; and Parrott, p74.
[92] Viktor Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, forward by General Sir John Hackett (London: Grafton Books, 1984), p405.

Fourth, it is clear that the party deployed secret police to reinforce its control. This might be termed a negative incentive. Kolkowicz, Odom, and Colton all recognised that the secret police were active in the Soviet military.[93] Secret police were first deployed in the military in 1918 and remained active throughout the Soviet period. This was because the KGB placed personnel within the military who belonged to their Special Departments (SDs), or Osobye otdely. A key task of these SDs was the political surveillance of the military. According to Soviet law this involved them investigating cases of treason, terrorism, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and other state crimes involving the military.[94] The SDs were also alleged to have participated in Zhukov's fall.[95] In 1984 it was estimated that there was one SD officer for every 600 men.[96] This excludes the number of agents and informants, in the 1960s it was estimated that 3 percent of ground and air personnel were informants.[97] Debate surrounds the actual effectiveness of the KGB during the Soviet period. Colton argued that the role of the secret police declined after Stalin as its power and size fell. Kolkowicz likewise argued that the reduction of the secret police encouraged "significant departures from the oppressive conditions of the past." [98] Contrasting this, Knight argued that the KGB played a major role in maintaining party control.[99] The accounts of former Soviet personnel also indicate that the KGB was respected and feared.[100]

The establishment of the penetration model in the Soviet Union was facilitated by two factors. First, the party actively moved to incorporate the control methods characteristic of the penetration model when the Red Army was small and weak. This is shown by my previous examination of the civil-military relationship that briefly covers the formative years of the

[93] Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p89; Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p47; and Colton, *Commissars*, pp225-6.
[94] *Osnovy sovetskogo voennogo zakonodatelstva*, ed. A.G. Gorny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966) pp311-20, 387-9, *Voennoe zakonodatelstvo I pravovoe vospitanie voinov*, ed. A.G. Gorny et al. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983) pp117-23, 200, both quoted in Amy Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments In The Soviet Armed Forces," *Orbis* 28, no.2 (Summer 1984): p274.
[95] Evdokia Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (New York: Praeger, 1956) p99, quoted in Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," footnote 34, p268.
[96] Aleksei Myagkov, *Inside the KGB*, (Richmond, Surrey: Foreign Affairs Publishing House, 1976), p26, quoted in Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p269; and IISS, *The Military Balance 1983-1984*, (London: IISS, 1983), pp11-8.
[97] V.P. Artemiev, "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Military Review* no vol. or no. (September 1963): p22, quoted in Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p276.
[98] Colton, *Commissars*, pp226-7; and Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, p335.
[99] Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p280.
[100] Viktor Suvorov, *The Liberators: Inside The Soviet Army* (London: New English Library, 1983), pp72-3, 200-4, 218-22; and Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, p45.

military. Second, and particularly relevant here, the Communist party was the sole and dominant source of power.

Power over the military was held by the Politburo with the General Secretary as party leader and Commander-in-Chief. The General Secretary executed his power over the military primarily through the Defence Council, a joint political-military committee he chaired (see model 3). The Defence Council set the broad policy direction with national government, primarily the Supreme Soviet, legalising top-level party decisions. With regard to the daily running of the military, responsibility lay with the Ministry of Defence. This entailed the ministry officially participating in defence planning, directing research and development, and directing matters relating to human resources like combat training. The Defence Minister in turn had three deputies, the most important being the Chief of the General Staff. This is because he was the immediate superior of the Soviet service chiefs, and had enormous power in determining the structure and content of Soviet force posture and doctrine (the roles of the party and military leadership are outlined in table 3).[101]

Model 3: Basic Structure of Soviet Civil-Military relationship 1985



Institutional roles

The primary role of the Soviet military was to implement Communist party security and foreign policies, and to ensure the party's protection (see table 3). During the Soviet period this entailed the military having a predominantly external focus, playing the key role during the Cold War in countering the perceived military threat posed by the West. This argument is supported by the deployment of Soviet forces, and the perceptions held by both the civilian and military leadership. The military did have internal or domestic roles, its political role the most important. However the military's internal security role was minimal.

[101] Condoleeza Rice, "The Development Of Soviet Military Power," in *The Gorbachev Era*, pp121-8; and Ellen Jones, *Red Army And Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp1-30.

Table 3: Military Responsibilities of Communist Party and the General Staff 1986

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (socio-political side of military doctrine) • decides when, where and against whom to use military forces • allocates resources to defence through role in setting budget priorities • approves major weapons programs • approves any changes in military doctrine • develops Soviet arms control positions on basis of options and assessment of military and other advisers • approves major personnel decisions in military
General Staff (military-technical side of military doctrine) • debates impact of changes in military technology on doctrine, strategy and tactics • develops overall combined-arms (all service) strategy for Soviet armed forces • decides composition of Soviet force posture • primary military advisors to party on major issues • wartime "nerve centre" for direction and planning of military operations • gathers military intelligence

Source: Rice, "The Development of Soviet Military Power," in *The Gorbachev Era*, Figure 2, p125.

The primacy of the military's role as protector and promoter of the Communist party's interests is widely evident. The Soviet military had been established for the defence of the party led regime, a role encouraged by the history of invasion, the fear of aggression, and the importance of the military in maintaining dominance over East Europe. [102] The party leaders also recognised the importance of the military in providing security.[103] However, in accordance with the increasing need to limit defence expenditure from the late 1970s, party leaders stressed that superpower cooperation rather than military strength by itself would ensure security.[104] After the Second World War the dominant perceived threat was that posed by the US and this determined the deployment of the military. Grechko spoke of this threat in

[102] See Kolkowicz, *Soviet Military*, pp18, 36-47; David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet Policy," *Daedalus* 109, no.4 (Fall 1980): pp14-8, quoted in *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union*, ed. Alexander Dallin, pp96-100; and Harriet Scott and William Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1979), pp56-9.
[103] See Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose," pp16-8, 24-9 in *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union*, ed. Dallin, pp98-100, 106-111.
[104] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp108-29.

1972 when he instructed officers that the armies of the US and its allies "are being prepared with a consideration of using the element of surprise in unleashing war."[105]

The military was deployed accordingly. Combat-ready forces were deployed in sensitive strategic regions like the Baltic States and in East Europe. Furthermore, the military was deployed throughout the world to both counter the West and to promote Soviet security interests.[106] Grechko in 1974 declared that:

> At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.[107]

The primacy of the military's external focus and the presence of internal security forces under the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and KGB, which totalled 600,000 personnel in 1985, meant that the military's internal security role was minimal.[108] Although the military did have internal roles, such as its active involvement in the economy, the only publicised use of the military in upholding internal security after Stalin was in 1962. That year personnel were used to put down a strike in Novocherkassk.[109]

Budgetary support

Although it is difficult to accurately assess the level of defence expenditure it is clear that the level was high. Defence expenditure grew rapidly during the "golden age" as the economy grew, and Brezhnev sought to reduce civil-military tensions.[110] The CIA estimated that the allocation of resources to the military increased by about 4 percent per year from 1965 to 1975. After 1976 the annual level of growth was 2 percent and it was essentially flat by the

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[105] A.A. Grechko, *Na Strazhe Miro i Stroitel'stva Kommunizm* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972), p53, quoted in Harriet Scott and William Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p82, quoted in Michael McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms: Russian-American Military-to-Military Contacts Since 1992," *JSMS* 9, no.4 (December 1996): pp749-50.

[106] This global role is shown by Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp285-297.

[107] A.A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Problems of History of the CPSU*, translated by FBIS, no vol or no. May 1974, n.p., quoted in Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces*, p57.

[108] IISS, *The Military Balance 1985-1986* (London: IISS, 1985), p30.

[109] See Colton, *Commissars*, pp247-8, 251. For information on Novocherkassk see chapter 7.

[110] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp93-6.

1982 to 1984 period.[111] This decline in the growth of expenditure occurred as the economy declined and concerns arose over the possibility of internal unrest, but expenditure remained high.[112] The official defence budget in 1985 was 19,063 billion roubles (see table 4). This meant that by 1985 military spending as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 16.1 percent, an estimated US$241,500 million.[113] The acquirement of weaponry was thus immense. Nichols argued that the military had essentially been provided a "blank financial and theoretical check."[114] However it should be noted that this level of support failed to ensure a high level of living standards for personnel, particularly for non-officers. Lieutenants received 20 times as much pay as Privates whereas in the US it was only four times higher.[115]

Table 4: The Defence Budget and Expenditure according to Soviet Published Data 1985-1991

Years	Official Soviet defence budget in billions of roubles	Defence expenditure US$ million (1985 prices and exchange rates)	Percentage of GDP
1985	19,063	241,500	16.1
1990	70,500	127,638	14.2
1991	96,560	91,631	11.1

Source: *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p18; and *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p92, Comparisons Of Defence Expenditure And Military Manpower 1985-1991 Table, p218. Figures from 1986 to 1989 are excluded because they were inconsistent.

Popular support for the military and morale

Support for the military was generally high with officers enjoying high status and conscription at least tolerated. This level of support is shown by the Communist party's official stance, and by surveys of civilians and conscripts. The party's financial support of the military is

[111] U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1984* (Washington DC: GPO, 1984), p23 quoted in Colton and Gustafson, p129; and "The Soviet Economy under a New Leader," (paper prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for submission to the Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 19 March 1986), p8, quoted in Colton and Gustafson, p129.

[112] "Survey: Perestroika," *The Economist*, Survey no vol. and no. 28 April 1990, p5 quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p103. With regard to the increasing concerns of the civilian leadership see Parrott, pp62-3.

[113] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, Comparisons Of Defence Expenditure And Military Manpower 1985-1991 Table, p218.

[114] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p95. See also John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined-Arms Concept," *Strategic Review* no vol. or no. (Winter 1977): p39, quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p96.

indicative of the high level of support too. Various factors contributed to the support of the military and its officers. These included the party's active promotion of the military and the material comforts that officers enjoyed. However, enlisted soldiers enjoyed less public support because of the more negative attitudes towards compulsory service. These attitudes arose against a background of the harsh military life they faced, and the negative perceptions that would have entered civilian society when conscripts left the military. As both the level of support and living conditions varied greatly between officers and soldiers, it is predictable that their morale varied, officers appearing to have a high level relative to soldiers.

I believe that officers enjoyed a high status before Gorbachev and that most people at least tolerated conscription. The Communist party officially and openly praised the military. For example, in Gorbachev's March 1985 valedictory he referred to "our glorious Armed Forces."[116] With regard to officers there is much evidence to indicate that many envied their position and they belonged to at least the middle class. A 1968 to 1970 survey of rural school children conducted in four oblasts (regions) found that officers were ranked either second, third, or fourth out of 15 professions.[117] In another survey during the early 1970s, Kiev high school graduates ranked officers sixth to eighth out of forty occupations for a career.[118] Surveys also indicated that although the prestige of the officer corps declined immediately prior to Gorbachev taking power, officer careers remained attractive to young people. A survey of 40 occupations published in 1979 found that an officer's career ranked in sixth to eighth place, and another survey published in 1986 found that officer careers were still attractive despite having declined relative to other occupations.[119] Thus, admittance to officer

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[115] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p86.

[116] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi I stati*, 2 (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1987), p132, quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p133.

[117] A. F. Tarasov et al., "Professional orientation of rural school-age youth," quoted in *Opyt sotsial'noekonomicheskogo izucheniya professional'noy orientatsii sel'skoy molodezhi* (Rostov-Na-Donu: Gosudarstvennyy Pedagogicheskiy Institut), 1974, pp25-81. Quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p82.

[118] V.F. Chernovolenko et al., *Prestizh professiy i problemy sotsialno-professiona'lnoy orientatsii molodezhi, Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya* (Kiev: Maukova Dumka, 1979), pp203-4. Quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p82.

[119] V.F. Chernovolenko et al., *Prestizh professii i problemy sotsialno-professionalnoi orientatsii molodezhi: opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1979), pp203-4, quoted in Ellen Jones, "Social Change and Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, p263. With regard to the 1986 survey see V. Kovalevskii, "A Profession that Society Needs," *Slovo lektora* no.8, 1986, pp18-22, quoted in Jones, "Social Change," p263. See also Jones, *Red Army*, pp82-5.

schools was competitive. A 1973 poll of students in the Orel found that 8 percent intended to enter a military school, but only 3 percent were selected.[120]

With regard to conscription, attitudes appear to have been less positive but service was at least tolerated. Both civilians and conscripts accepted military service, and there was at least an interest in service among many. Although few soldiers indicated that their families strongly endorsed conscription only 6.2 percent told Richard Gabriel (1980) that their families were unhappy with them serving, and 76.1 percent said that they were resigned to their service.[121] The good treatment of soldiers by most civilians further indicates an acceptance of service. Gabriel found that 81.4 percent of former Soviet soldiers believed that "most civilians treat soldiers well when the soldier is away from base."[122] Conscripts likewise appear to have at least grudgingly accepted their service. Gabriel found that 88.5 percent of soldiers indicated that their friends tolerated conscription because it could not be avoided.[123] Moreover at least an interest in service is evident. A 1975 survey found that 78 percent of enlisted personnel were serving with "great interest."[124] Additional survey findings published in 1980 found that 58 percent of draftees from 18 to 19 years of age were serving with "great interest." They also indicate that although only 29.5 percent on average of older draftees were serving with this interest, the majority understood "the social significance, necessity, and importance of military service."[125] It was within this context that draft evasion was rare. It is estimated that not more than 12 percent of individuals avoided service in the active or reserve services.[126]

Support for the military was widely promoted by the Communist party. The party's stance was no doubt encouraged by the important role assigned to the military as protector from external threats, and by the military's political influence, both of which have been discussed.

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[120] L. I. Shishkina, "Some data on the orientation of Orel students toward work and education," in *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya professional'noy orientatsii molodezhi* (Moscow: Institute for Sociological Research, 1975), pp78-83, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p83.

[121] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p39. Gabriel questioned 134 former Soviet personnel. Of these 66 served in the army, 12 in the air force, 13 in the navy, 6 in the Strategic Rocket Forces, 17 in air defence, 20 in the construction troops, 2 in the border guards, and 1 in 'other.' Of these 52.2 percent were soldiers or privates, 26.5 percent were Non Commissioned Officers, 2.7 percent were warrant officers, and 17.7 percent were officers. With regard to their period of service, 4.4 percent served before World War II, 21.2 percent served during the war and immediate post war years, 18.6 percent served from 1953-7, 11.5 percent served from 1958-63, and 44.2 percent served from 1964 to 78 (11.5 percent served from 1973 to 78). Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp6-13.

[122] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p69.

[123] Ibid., p40.

[124] Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, p108.

[125] N. Yefimov and Yu Deryugin, "Ways to increase the effectiveness of military-patriotic socialization of youth," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniye*, no.1 (1980), pp60-6, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, Table 6.1, p153.

[126] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p36.

Indicative of the party's support is its emphasis on maintaining military values and a strong military, along with the importance of service.[127] For example, a 1970 survey found that the level of media coverage of officers ranked 10th out of 54 professions.[128] Apart from the official promotion of the military, other factors contributed to the public support of officers and tolerance of conscription. For instance, the 'Great Patriotic War' (the Second World War) and the army's apparent contribution to the economy encouraged positive perceptions.[129] More specifically, the status of officers was no doubt encouraged by their privileged material position. An officer received about one-third more pay than he would normally receive in civilian society for the application of similar skills and qualifications.[130] Pensions, the accessibility of goods and services, and paid vacations were favourable relative to civilian positions too.[131]

Despite the support of the military and acceptance of service, I believe that the perception of conscription was more negative because conditions of service were harsh. This also impacted on civilians. Conscripts re-entered civilian life with at least some negative perceptions of the military. Whereas the pay of officers was relatively high, 77 percent of soldiers told Gabriel that their pay was inadequate. Likewise, although 50 percent of officers indicated that their housing conditions were adequate or better than civilian dwellings, with soldiers this declined to 39 percent.[132] Soldiers not only left with negative perceptions of their officers, as I argue later, they also left with the realisation that their superiors occupied a comfortable place in the military. Only 22.1 percent of soldiers indicated to Gabriel that officers shared their hardships.[133] Conscripts left with negative perceptions of the benefits of service too. Gabriel found that only 27.4 percent of conscripts believed that they "got anything good" out of their service.[134] Even the Soviet press accepted that not all left with favourable impressions.[135] To put this in perspective, US personnel in the aftermath of the disastrous Vietnam war appear to

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[127] William Odom, "The "Militarization" of Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism* 25, no.5 (September-October 1976): pp34-51. See also Porter, "Military Abroad," pp321-6.

[128] A. Korbut, "The treatment of professions in mass communications," in *Sotsiologicheskiye problemy obshchestvennogo mneniya sredstv massovoy informatsii* (Moscow: Institute for Sociological Research, 1975), pp117-19, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p85.

[129] See C.J. Dick, *The Current State Of The Russian Army And Its Possible Implications For Politics*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, June 1993 available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d58, Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, p1 of 7.

[130] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p49. See also Colton, *Commissars*, pp261-6; and Jones, *Red Army*, pp83-5.

[131] Jones, *Red Army*, pp83-4.

[132] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp55, 63-4.

[133] Ibid., p93.

[134] Ibid., p42.

[135] Jones, *Red Army*, p170.

have had a more favourable perception of military service too. A 1979 survey of American army personnel ranked from Sergeant through to Private found that 57 percent did not feel that they were accomplishing nothing as soldiers.[136] Apart from this, families lost the help and money that their children could bring in, and service could actually cost money. For example, 61.1 percent of soldiers indicated that their families had to send them money so that they could get by.[137] Indeed the Soviet press often wrote of soldiers becoming a financial burden on their families.[138]

In accordance with their more favourable position, morale among officers appears to have been high relative to morale among conscripts. Colton argued that officers were content with their positions. This was because the party promoted and protected their ideological interests like national unity and prestige, material interests, status interests, and professional interests such as career mobility.[139] More specifically, Gabriel found that officers had high self-opinions in various areas. No less than 70 percent of officers holding combat positions felt that they would be "good men to go into combat with," and 75 percent believed that they set a good example for their soldiers.[140] Similarly, officers rated their unit's combat ability highly. Gabriel found that 55 percent of officers felt that their units would perform "very well" or "fairly well" in combat, compared to 40.4 percent of soldiers. [141] More dramatically, the rate of suicide among officers appears to have been lower than that among soldiers. According to Gabriel, 16.2 percent of soldiers indicated that stories of suicide were very common or common with only 28.3 percent saying that these could involve officers.[142] Finally, officers were pleased enough with their positions to actively seek long term military careers. Gabriel found that 88.5 percent of soldiers' felt that officers were more interested in their own careers than in their troops, and 92.8 percent saw officers as overly ambitious.[143]

However the morale of soldiers appears to have been lower and in line with the lower level of support and harsher conditions. Gabriel (1980) found that 93.1 percent of soldiers believed

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[136] Stephen Westbrook, "The Alienated Soldier: Legàcy of Our Society." Army no vol. or no. (December 1979): p18, quoted in Richard Gabriel, *The Antagonists: A Comparative Assessment of the Soviet and American Soldier*, Contributions in Military History Number 34, with a forward by Sam Nunn, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), p47.
[137] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p56.
[138] *Bloknot agitatora*, no.12 June 1971, n.p., quoted in Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p56.
[139] See Colton, *Commissars*, pp257-75.
[140] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp101, 92.
[141] Ibid., p216.
[142] Gabriel, *Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book*, Contributions In Political Science Number 44 (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1980), Tables 85, 87, pp118-19.

that their officers were worried about the unit's morale. This appears to be higher than the poor morale evident in the US military during the last years of the Vietnam war. In 1971, 75.8 percent of US soldiers had indicated that their officers were concerned about morale.[144] Gabriel found that 69.9 percent of Soviet soldiers believed that their superiors were concerned with the frequency of absence without leave (AWOL) among soldiers.[145] Similarly, soldiers deserted from the military. Although Gabriel found that soldiers generally indicated that stories of soldiers deserting were uncommon, 23.9 percent believed that such stories were very common or common.[146] Discontent is also indicative of negative perceptions being held by personnel. For example, 36 percent of soldiers told Gabriel that they had witnessed assaults on officers.[147] Furthermore, though the extent of drunkenness is disputed, it appears to have been a serious problem, particularly among lowered ranked personnel. For instance, drunkenness among NCOs appears to have been higher than among officers.[148] During the costly Afghanistan war, poor morale became increasingly widespread among troops.[149]

Cohesion and size

To assess the level of Soviet military cohesion I shall focus on five relationships that largely determined institutional cohesion. Thus, the relationship between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic groups are assessed. Most importantly, I believe that inter-service conflict was not serious, though their co-ordination in combat had deficiencies. This is because the generally high level of support for the military meant that all the services were treated well. When party moves were believed to threaten institutional interests, cohesion appears to have been further strengthened. Similarly, though it is evident that officers could hold negative opinions of each other, they also held positive opinions of fellow officers, and on key security issues remained united. However relations between military personnel and political officers, and between officers and their soldiers, appear to have been strained. This is shown by the negative opinions that arose between each group, particularly officers and soldiers. Finally, despite ethnic discrimination there is little strong evidence to establish that conflict between ethnic groups was a serious problem. Turning to the military's size, it is clear that the institution was massive by any

[143] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp108, 112.
[144] Gabriel, *The Antagonists*, Table 3, p102.
[145] Ibid., p160.
[146] Ibid., pp172-3.
[147] Ibid., p167.
[148] Ibid., p155.

standard. This ultimately resulted from the important position of the military and its high level of support.

First, inter-service rivalry appears not to have threatened cohesion. This was encouraged by the better ability of a united military to protect and to promote its interests, along with the party's high support of all the services, at least during the "golden age." Inter-service unity also conformed with the importance attached to the military's role as an instrument of national integration. Though tensions did arise during the Khrushchev era because of the greater emphasis placed on the rocket forces, the services ultimately united against the General Secretary when he reduced the military's size and de-emphasised the threat of the US.[150] Similarly, the decision to invade Afghanistan appears not to have been divisive within the General Staff, because even those officers that might have opposed the invasion continued to serve in high office during the war.[151] The General Staff included members from the various services, and their future promotion was dependent on their effectiveness here rather than their promotion of the interests of individual services. More dramatically, the need to improve the effectiveness of combat operations in Afghanistan encouraged moves to solve those problems with inter-service cooperation and co-ordination that did arise.[152]

Second, poor cohesion appears not to have been a serious problem among officers. Conflict no doubt did occur between officers, however this does not appear to have seriously eroded cohesion. Despite animosities, only 10.5 percent of officers indicated to Gabriel that the quality of their fellow officers was poor or very poor.[153] Nor were commanding officers willing to characterise their fellow officers as selfish.[154] Furthermore, on key issues officers remained united. Parrott argued that officers were generally united during debates over national security and ultimately united behind party decisions even when disliked, at least under Brezhnev.[155] More specifically, officers were united in sharing many of Ogarkov's main concerns, such as on the decline of resource allocation to the military.[156] Indeed

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[149] Olivier Roy, *The Lessons of the Soviet Afghan War Adelphi Paper 259* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, Summer 1991), p52.
[150] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp64-76.
[151] Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp306-7.
[152] Dennis Marshall-Hasdell, *Soviet Military Reform and the Afghanistan Experience-Military Lessons*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, December 1993, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/afghan.txt, Internet, accessed 22 March 1997, pp24-5 of 40.
[153] Gabriel, *Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book*, Table 163, p163.
[154] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p94.
[155] See Parrott, pp60-1.
[156] Azrael, p180. See also Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p124.

Kolkowicz wrote that officers had a "firm sense of solidarity" on interests that affected their core interests.[157] Gabriel argued that cohesion was reinforced by the stability of the officer corps. This was because assignment rotations were limited, officers generally served for the long term, and conformity was stressed.[158] The importance of conformity is shown by the resentment that arose among senior officers when Ogarkov opposed them as a military representative at the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I talks.[159] Colton also wrote that societal groups, a potential source of divisiveness, had little impact on the military because politics was not characterised by "open contention among private groups."[160]

Third, relations between political and military personnel appear to have been more problematic. The nature of the civil-military relationship depends largely on the Soviet model utilised. Overall however, I believe that relations between individual political and military personnel immediately before the transition were not very strong. This is in line with the monitoring role and power of political officers over military personnel. The accounts of former military officers indicate that political officers placed much pressure on personnel to act in accordance with the party directives, and thus were not well liked.[161] In fact Viktor Suvorov, a former army officer, claimed that political officers were reluctant to monitor the personnel during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 because "it would be so easy to get killed by accident."[162] The work of political officers was also widely perceived in negative terms and discouraged close relations. In Gabriel's survey of soldiers only 20.4 percent believed that political and indoctrination classes were important to making a good soldier.[163] Similarly, only 8 percent of soldiers and 16.7 percent of enlisted commanders regarded Marxism-Leninism as an important combat motivator.[164]

However I do not believe that relations reached a crisis level. First, a dislike of political officers did not necessarily equate with a rejection of the party. Carey Schofield in her study

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[157] Roman Kolkowicz, "The Military," in *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, ed. H. Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p137, quoted in Colton, *Commissars*, p224. See also Zhores Medvedev, *Andropov* (New York: Norton, 1983), p106, quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p13.
[158] See Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp93-6.
[159] With regard to this resentment see Azrael, p172.
[160] Colton, *Commissars*, pp250-1.
[161] Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, pp402-5. See also Carey Schofield, *The Russian Elite: Inside Spetsnaz And The Airborne Forces* (London: Greenhill Books, 1993), p47.
[162] Suvorov, *Liberators*, p260.
[163] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p190.
[164] Ibid., pp190-1. See also Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat: Inside The Soviet Military Machine* (London: Hutchinson and Co Ltd, 1983), p45; and Yitzhak Tarasulo, "A Profile Of the Soviet Soldier," *AFS* 11, no.2 (Winter 1985): pp230-1.

of the airborne forces argued that many officers, at least during the 1970s, accepted the "truth of the Party's fundamental teachings." This was despite the belief that political officers "often talked embarrassing rubbish" and doubts over their efficiency.[165] Second, personnel appear to have been resigned to the fact that political officers were active in the military. Suvorov wrote that both he and his superiors accepted that the party would influence the promotion of military officers because of the party's power.[166] Suvorov further wrote that it was widely accepted that if political officers detected disloyalty to the party their personal safety was at risk.[167] Third, many senior officers in the military hierarchy actually supported the political officers. John Lepingwell argued that senior officers in the military's leadership supported the work of political officers because they promoted patriotism.[168] Similarly, Chris Donnelly argued that many unit commanders accepted political officers because they could be used to undertake other tasks.[169] The Soviet press also wrote of the cooperation between political and military officers.[170] Finally, although the work of political officers was deemed unimportant, many personnel actually enjoyed the indoctrination classes, though not because of their ideological content. Andrew Cockburn found that personnel believed that indoctrination classes offered them the chance to relax.[171]

Fourth, a salient division existed between officers and lower-ranked personnel. Gabriel (1980) found that 77.7 percent of soldiers and 87.5 percent of NCOs believed that their officers "never developed close ties with their men."[172] Another 80 percent of soldiers indicated that officers "drew too strong a line between himself and his men" or were "too distant." To put this in perspective, in 1971, 54.2 percent of American soldiers said that the line between officers and soldiers was too strong, and that officers were too distant.[173] More dramatically, officers were unable to prevent soldiers deployed against the 1962 Novocherkassk strike from fraternising with protesters.[174] This division was encouraged by the negative perceptions both officers and their subordinates held of each other. For instance, I have already argued that it was widely felt among soldiers that their officers were more concerned about their own

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[165] Schofield, p47.
[166] Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, p405.
[167] Suvorov, *Liberators*, pp218-22.
[168] John Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations And The August Coup," *World Politics* 44 (July 1992): p547.
[169] Chris Donnelly, "The Soviet Soldier: Behaviour, Performance, Effectiveness," in *Soviet Military Power And Performance*, ed. John Erickson and E. Feuchtwanger (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979), pp124-5.
[170] Jones, *Red Army*, pp140-1.
[171] Cockburn, p45.
[172] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p97. See also pp95-9, 184-9, 195-208; and Cockburn, pp50, 52-4.
[173] Gabriel, *The Antagonists*, Table 3, p102.

careers than their men. Moreover, Gabriel found that only 19.5 percent of soldiers felt that their officers were competent.[175] The poor quality of officers and their reluctance to listen to their men also caused tensions in Afghanistan.[176] I have also noted that soldiers believed that officers did not experience the same level of hardship. Likewise, Suvorov wrote that officers held the soldiers in low esteem and would not socialise with them.[177] This is supported by Gabriel's survey that found that 71.7 percent of soldiers believed that their superiors showed no interest in them.[178] Indeed officers doubted the loyalty of their soldiers and feared for their own safety. For example, officers during the invasion of Czechoslovakia were afraid that their soldiers might harm them.[179]

Finally, ethnic divisions are apparent within the military as ethnic discrimination occurred. By the early 1980s a typical regiment contained 20-30 different nationalities, and in 1985, 45.3 percent of draftees were Russian speakers.[180] Deborah Ball found during a survey of former Soviet personnel who served before 1985 that 89.7 percent of the officer corps were Slavic and 69.4 percent Russian.[181] Though there is debate over whether the military had a negative or positive impact on ethnic relations it is clear that discrimination did occur.[182] In Gabriel's survey 69 percent indicated that ethnic discrimination occurred.[183] Ethnic tensions became particularly evident during the Afghanistan war, as Central Asian conscripts assisted the mujaheddin.[184]

I believe that ethnic tensions resulted from the growing diversity of personnel and the racism of many Slav and Russian personnel, but constraints prevented such tension from becoming a serious problem. The growing diversity of personnel facilitated tension. Their different customs and attitudes could encourage suspicions, and the inability to speak Russian discouraged inter-group communication. Racism is also evident. Cockburn interviewed

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[174] See chapter 5, pp246-7.
[175] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p100. See also pp155-7; and Cockburn, pp52-6.
[176] Schofield, pp91-5.
[177] Suvorov, *Liberators*, pp86-7.
[178] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p202.
[179] Cockburn, p50.
[180] No author, *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military,* no publisher or date, available from gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d56, Internet, accessed 13 March 1996, p5, Table 2, p23 of 24. See also Jones, *Red Army*, pp180-209.
[181] Deborah Ball, "Ethnic Conflict, Unit Performance, and the Soviet Armed Forces," *AFS* 20, no.2 (Winter 1994): pp245-6. See also Cockburn, pp47-8; and Tarasulo, pp229-30.
[182] With regard to this debate see Ball, "Ethnic Conflict," pp242-4.
[183] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p72.
[184] Cockburn, p114; and John Kohan, "A "One-Dimensional World Power," *Time* 123, no.8, 20 February 1984, p25.

former Soviet personnel, and his work published in 1983 indicated that many Russians were derogative when discussing non-Russians.[185] Overall though, Ball concluded that the military did not exacerbate ethnic tensions, as her data did not demonstrate a strong link between ethnicity and the conflict that occurred between personnel.[186] Ethnic barriers were overcome too. Many friendships developed between various ethnic groups as personnel shared conditions, and the military actively promoted ethnic harmony. Figures published in 1980 indicated that 50 percent of friendships between personnel during the initial months of service were based on shared ethnic and regional origins. However by the end of service 60-65 percent were based on personal interests or the tenure of service.[187]

Overall, I believe that cohesion was adequate. Although it is clear internal divisions did arise, of particular concern being that between officers and lower-ranked personnel, I do not believe that they threatened to fragment the military. This is because the military did not show any prospect of fragmenting and disobeying the party's directives or orders from superiors in the Ministry of Defence. Though I have argued that civil-military tensions did arise, these tensions did not lead to personnel challenging the party's authority by force. Gabriel found that 87.8 percent of soldiers believed that their officers "stuck to the letter of their superiors," and 76.2 percent believed that officers would "hesitate to take actions in the absence of instructions from their superiors."[188] Another 42.8 percent of soldiers believed that officers would not stand up for their men when dealing with their superiors. To put this in perspective, in 1971, 21.5 percent of American soldiers believed that their officers would not stand up for them when dealing with their superiors. [189] Soldiers also continued to follow orders irrespective of their validity. This is most clearly shown by the obeying of orders in Afghanistan despite the soldiers themselves having serious doubts about their soundness.[190]

With regard to the military's size, by any standard it was massive. This is clearly illustrated by the large number of personnel. During the immediate years prior to Gorbachev the military's size had increased and by July 1985, the total number of personnel in the five main

[185] Cockburn, pp49-50. See also Suvorov, *Liberators*, pp261-3.
[186] Ball, "Ethnic Conflict," pp250, 252.
[187] V. kovalev, *Sotsialisticheskiy voinskiy kollektiv. Sotsiologicheskiy ocherk* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1980), p140, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p194.
[188] Gabriel, *The Antagonists*, pp100-101.
[189] Ibid., Table 3, p102. Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p106.
[190] Schofield, pp61-2.

services was 3,980,000, compared to 3,450,000 personnel in 1983 (see table 5).[191] The largest of the five main services was the army, with over 1.9 million personnel, followed by the air defence and the air force. Overall, the number of personnel in the key services increased by 18.1 percent from 1983 to 1985, the largest increase occurring in the air force (see table 5). The massive size of the military is also shown by its quantity of conventional weaponry relative to the US. The Soviets in 1985 had over three times the number of tanks compared to the US.[192] Thus, at least with regards to size, the military was a formidable force. This was in accordance with the substantial resources allocated to the military and with its importance in Soviet society.

Table 5: Number of Soviet Personnel in Key Services 1983-1985

Years	Army (personnel number)	Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)	Navy	Air Defence	Air Force
1983	1,800,000	325,000	460,000	500,000	365,000
1984	1,840,000	415,000	490,000	370,000	400,000
1985	1,995,000*	300,000	480,000	635,000	570,000
1983-1985 percentage change	+10.8	-7.7	+4.3	+27	+56.2

Source: *The Military Balance 1983-1984*, pp14-8; *The Military Balance 1984-1985*, IISS, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), pp17-21: and *The Military Balance 1985 –1986*, pp21-4.

- The 1983-1985 percentage figures are rounded up.

* From 1985 the IISS referred to the ground forces rather than the army.

Expertise

Overall, I believe that the level of expertise among personnel was not high. This is most graphically illustrated by the problematic combat performance of the military during the period. For instance, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia appears to have been poorly organised and executed.[193] Similarly, the military experienced problems when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Here many problems were encountered by the military and personnel, including members of the elite airborne forces, failed to show a high level of expertise.[194] I

[191] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp21-4, 170-3; and *The Military Balance 1983-1984*, p125.
[192] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp8, 22.
[193] See Cockburn, pp112-3; and Suvorov, *Liberators*, pp184-280.
[194] See Marshall-Hasdell; and Cockburn, pp113-4, 172-3. With regard to the airborne forces see Schofield, pp61-95.

believe that two factors are most important in explaining this inadequacy. First, the military lacked combat experience after the Second World War, at least relative to the US. The 1956 invasion of Hungary, and the later invasion of Czechoslovakia, were not strongly resisted by their militaries, and by 1985 only 4.1 percent of Soviet personnel were stationed outside the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty states.[195] Moreover involvement in Afghanistan peaked in 1985 at only 2.1 percent of Soviet forces.[196] In contrast, over 21 percent of US forces were deployed in Vietnam during 1970.[197] Second, the quality of combat training is debatable. Personnel cheated on combat performance tests, exercises were strictly choreographed, and the expenditure of ammunition restricted.[198] Gabriel also found that the majority of soldiers did not rank their combat abilities highly and that they did not believe that their training was of a high quality. Gabriel calculated that soldiers on average rated the quality of their training at 4.8 out of 10, and officers rated it 5.8.[199]

In summary, this section presents five key arguments. Most importantly, the civil-military structure best resembled Nordlinger's penetration model, and was based on the Communist party's authority. Second, and also important, the Soviet military's primary role was to act as executor of the Communist party's policies and as its protector, primarily from external threats. Third, with regard to the military's support, the level of budgetary support and popular support were generally positive. However morale differed according to rank, officers having a higher level of morale relative to those lower-ranked. Fourth, cohesion was not defective to the point of threatening the central command structure. Finally, the military's expertise was not very high. Overall, I believe that the military in 1985 held a privileged position in Soviet society and that it was a powerful institution.

The fall of the Soviet Union: The Gorbachev Regime, 1985-1991

The collapse of both the Communist system and the Soviet Union itself in December 1991 was the outcome of many developments. These developments chiefly occurred after Gorbachev became the General Secretary in March 1985. Gorbachev initiated a wide-range of reforms that reverberated throughout the Soviet Union. One of the institutions most dramatically hit by these reforms was the military.

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[195] With regard to forces abroad see Porter, "The Military Abroad," p294.
[196] Porter, "The Military Abroad," p294.
[197] Ibid.
[198] See Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, p383; Cockburn, pp161-76; and Tarasulo, p227.
[199] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p222.

Structure of the civil-military relationship

Transitional changes to the Soviet structure of civil-military relations had a significant impact. The fundamental change here involved the weakening of the Communist party, the opposite to the 1917 transition to Communism. This is clearly shown by the changes that occurred to the control methods, which characterised the Soviet penetration model. These involved the restructuring of the MPA in accordance with the goal of reducing, and ultimately removing, the central role played by the Communist party. Similarly, party membership became less important, and was then discouraged by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Such developments occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and implement policy changes. A key indicator of the fall of Communist party control is the military's greater political role during the 1985 to 1991 period. However characteristics of the penetration model remained when Gorbachev believed that they strengthened his position and increased his control over the military. These are thus examined after the above developments. Here the continuing role that politics could play in influencing promotions, and the retaining of secret police to monitor personnel is important. The relationship is finally assessed according to the three Soviet theoretical models. I believe that the usefulness of these models became increasingly limited during this period. This is because they were based on the supremacy of the Communist party and this declined and ultimately collapsed during this period.

It is clear that the Communist party's control over the military via penetration changed and declined under Gorbachev. Major structural changes occurred to the MPA after the Soviet Constitution was amended in March 1990 to allow the establishment of alternative political parties. During the 28th party congress in July 1990 both the military and MPA leaders accepted that the administration required re-structuring. Gorbachev in late 1990 and early 1991 also transferred the MPA from party to Ministry of Defence jurisdiction, and officially removed its responsibility for Communist work. Its new duties included the promoting of state policy and military patriotic education.[200] However the MPA remained close to the Communist party and was abolished in August 1991 after the failed coup. The following month a Ministry of Defence order was passed which aimed to establish a non-partisan and professional military.[201] Party membership also declined among personnel, as they no longer

[200] During this period Gorbachev also renamed it the Military-Political Administration of the Ministry of Defence. I continue to use 'MPA' to maintain consistency.

[201] See Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," pp545-6; and Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup," pp29-30, 40-1.

believed it helped their careers and they became disillusioned with the party. By July 1991 an estimated 70 percent of officers were members of the Communist party, compared to 78 percent in 1985.[202] Lower membership levels occurred particularly among junior officers. [203] The increasing split between senior and junior officers over their attachment to Communism is assessed when I discuss military cohesion.

The Communist party's position at the head of the civil-military relationship finally collapsed during late 1991. During the final month of 1991 the civil-military structure dramatically changed, as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed and the civil-military structure fell with the Soviet Union. The agreement in early December 1991 to create the CIS meant that the issue of military control became significant and the military advocated a centralised structure of control preserving its unity. The first attempt to establish a legal system of civilian control occurred on December 21 when CIS leaders opted for a decentralised structure that gave greater control of the ground forces to the republics. Despite this, the Russian leadership was recognised as the 'de facto locus' of supreme civilian authority, at least according to the military. This was because Russia was internationally recognised as the "continuer state" of the Soviet Union for most treaty obligations and bore most of the costs of maintaining the military.[204] However the disposition of and jurisdiction over conventional forces rapidly began to devolve to the republics, and on December 31st the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist.

These developments occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and to promote his policies. Although the military was united against Gorbachev, it is clear that tension arose over his policies and he faced opposition from military and political officers. These tensions arose over various issues ranging from arms control to the introduction of glasnost into military affairs. Much has been written on this period and it is clear that Gorbachev actively sought to strengthen his position as Commander-in-Chief, and to ensure that his policy changes were executed.[205] For instance, Gorbachev moved to eradicate the military's monopoly over defence expertise by increasing the role of civilians. This encouraged civil-

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[202] Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup," p28.
[203] Stephen Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed," *International Security* 16, no.4 (Winter 1991/92): p13.
[204] Brian Davenport, "Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Soviet State: "Loose Coupling" Uncoupled? *AFS* 21, no.2 (Winter 1995): p183.
[205] See Parrott, pp75-89; and Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp130-236.

military tension. [206] Changes also occurred against the background of Yeltsin, first as Chairperson of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet and later as Russian President, battling with Gorbachev over the military's loyalty. For example, after Yeltsin's election as Russian President in June 1991 Gorbachev ordered that Military Councils, which oversaw military activities in MDs (Military Districts), be subordinated to the Soviet President rather than the Central Committee of the party. Yeltsin countered this in July when he issued an edict banning the Communist party from the military, and though the military leadership refused to implement this, some units moved to dismantle party organisations.[207]

Of particular relevance here is the opposition that Gorbachev faced from the MPA. Many officers of the MPA opposed Gorbachev's actions or did little to counter criticism. For example, opposition to Gorbachev's new political thinking arose among MPA academies.[208] More specifically, Colonel General Dmitrii Volkogonov, the Deputy MPA Chief, was a vocal opponent of Gorbachev.[209] The MPA also proved to be an ineffective control mechanism during the later years and this is shown by the 1991 coup. Here MPA officers supported intervention, and John Lepingwell argued that the administration's leadership was "reportedly more willing to support the coup than was the regular military."[210] Though Colonel General Victor Novozhilov, the Commander of the Far East MD, opposed the coup, his MPA Deputy Commander distributed documents of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP).[211] Similarly, General Konstantin Kobets, head of Russia's State Defence Committee and a coup opponent, accused the Strategic Rocket Forces' (SRF) political officers of actively supporting the coup.[212]

The decline of Communist party control is shown by the military's increasingly open involvement in politics. The key factors that encouraged this greater involvement are

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[206] See Parrott, pp79-81; Davenport, pp179-181; and Edward Warner III, "New thinking and old realities in Soviet defence policy," *Survival* XXXI, no.1 (January/February 1989): pp18-20.

[207] See Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Military Rule Russia?" *Security Studies* 2, no.1 (Autumn 1992): pp54; and Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after," pp33-4.

[208] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp227-30. See also pp147-8, 164, 173-6, 180-1, 203.

[209] See Ibid., pp135-6, 155-9, 198-203.

[210] Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p564.

[211] *Le Monde*, 5 September 1991, p5, as carried by "General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt," FBIS-SOV, 6 September 1991, pp59-60, quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," pp564-5.

[212] Konstantin Kobets, interview by *Moskovskiy novosti*, no.35, 1991, p4, quoted in James Brusstar and Ellen Jones, *The Russian Military's Role In Politics*, *McNair Paper 34*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, January 1995, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/m34cont.html, accessed 1 December 1997, "Notes," available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34tan.html#25, footnote 30, p2 of 4. Subsequent references to the chapters of this document have different universal resource locaters and these are provided.

examined in the following chapters because they are important in explaining the military's unwillingness to intervene under Yeltsin. By the late 1980s various, political groups like the All-Army Officer's Assembly had emerged within the military.[213] The military also became increasingly active in electoral politics. This is shown by the spring 1989 elections for the Congress of People's Deputies, a new institution designed to be an active law-making body, where 82 officers were elected.[214] Furthermore, 3 senior active duty officers were among the serious candidates who campaigned in the 1991 Russian presidential election.[215] Indeed whereas in 1989, 11,900 active duty personnel held elective office throughout the Soviet Union, by early 1991 there were 1,004 soldiers holding elective office in the Leningrad region alone.[216] Scholars also argued that the political influence of at least some officers grew. For instance, Michael Desch argued that officers pressured Gorbachev over issues ranging from arms control to clamping down on the Baltic States.[217] Most dramatic though is the involvement of personnel in the 1991 coup, which I describe in the following chapter. In addition, the military influenced the outcome of the leadership struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who ultimately resigned as Soviet President on December 25, 1991. Both sought to win over the military.[218] This struggle occurred after the 1991 coup as Yeltsin issued decrees that increased his power over the military at the expense of Gorbachev's authority.

However characteristics of the Communist penetration model remained throughout this era when they conformed to Gorbachev's desire to undertake his reforms, and to maintain control. It is evident that politics could continue to influence the promotion and removal of officers. Nichols argued that Gorbachev in mid-1987 replaced the Minister of Defence, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, with Yazov, and in December 1988 he promoted Colonel General Mikhail Moiseev to Chief of Staff, to strengthen his position.[219] Soviet politics could also influence MPA

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[213] See Richard Spence, "The Military in the "New Russia," in Danopoulos and Zirker, pp23-4.
[214] Yang Zhong, "The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the August Coup," *AFS* 19 no.1 (Fall 1992): p54. See also pp51-6.
[215] Zhong, "The Transformation," p56.
[216] Colonel General Aleksandr Lizichev, *Put' peremen. Vremya deistvii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989), p238; and *Krasnaya zvezda* (*KZ*) 31 January 1991, n.p., both quoted in Robert Barylski, *The Soldier In Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p55.
[217] See Michael Desch, "Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev But Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 16 no.4 (December 1993): pp463-4. For information on military political involvement also see Busza, p180.
[218] See Tsypkin, "Will the Military," pp51-5. With regard to the military support for Yeltsin see William Safire, "Gorby Invites a Deluge," *NYT*, 12 December 1991, p23; and Thomas Friedman, "Soviet Military Attends Yeltsin's Talks With Baker," *NYT*, 17 December 1991, pp1, 8, all quoted in Desch, p467.
[219] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp184-5, 211-2. More generally, see Dale Herspring, "The Soviet military and change," *Survival* XXXI no.4 (July/August 1989): pp325-6; and Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp232-6.

leadership changes. For example, Volkogonov was reassigned in 1988 to the Military History Institute.[220] The secret police also remained active within the military to ensure loyalty to Gorbachev. The number of military ground force personnel declined by 29.8 percent from 1985 to 1991, but the number of KGB personnel declined by only 8 percent and numbered 230,000 in 1991.[221] Indeed after the 1989 withdrawal from Afghanistan members of the airborne forces were placed under the operational control of the KGB, and military personnel remained suspicious of those they felt were agents.[222] Gorbachev also used the KGB to monitor his rivals.[223] As internal instability increased, the KGB in December 1990 was given the authority to take steps to ensure the smooth functioning of the armed forces. Although the KGB was officially abolished in October 1991 it was replaced by five separate organisations.

With regard to the KGB's abolishment in October 1991 and subsequent restructuring, this occurred in the months immediately after the 1991 coup. High-ranking KGB officers actively supported the coup. Of particular importance here is Kryuchkov, a prominent coup leader. According to Sergey Stepashin, the chairperson of the state investigation of KGB activities, materials from two secret meetings held by the coup plotters in August 1991 implicated the KGB head as one of the main planners.[224] Immediately after Gorbachev left for his Foros dacha in the Crimea on August 6 the KGB head ordered KGB officials to make detailed drafts analysing the possibilities of enacting a state of emergency and its impact. Furthermore, it was Kryuchkov who notified the other coup plotters that the time had come to act, and KGB troops were used to isolate and surround Gorbachev's dacha.[225] Yeltsin himself wrote that Kryuchkov was the "most dangerous of the conspirators," and that the KGB "the driving force" behind the coup.[226] However evidence indicates that lower-level officers opposed intervention. The KGB Alpha unit allegedly refused to obey orders to storm the parliament buildings that Yeltsin occupied.[227] KGB personnel also reportedly leaked the plan to arrest

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[220] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p202.
[221] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp22, 30; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp37, 45.
[222] Schofield, pp135, 138.
[223] Ponomarev Commission Report, no publisher or date, pp105-7, quoted in Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1996), p16.
[224] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 10 September 1991, as quoted in Stephen Miller, "The Soviet Coup and the Benefits of Breakdown," *Orbis* 36, no.1 (Winter 1992): p72.
[225] See R.J. Milnor-Beard, *Colonels in the Crimea: The Role of the Soviet Military in the August Coup*, no date (n.d.), available from http://www.is.rhodes.edu/Modus_Vivendi/Modus1997/Paper/_5.html, Internet, accessed 6 June 1998, pp1-4 of 23.
[226] Yeltsin, *The View*, pp71-2.
[227] Michael Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order," *The Washington Post*, 28 August 1991, pA18. I have use the term 'allegedly' because later reports offer conflicting accounts of the units actions. See Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks*, p23.

Yeltsin and current and former KGB officers claimed that they opposed the coup. Likewise, during the coup a reporter phoned the KGB headquarters and was told that "We're all for El'tsin [Yeltsin] here!"[228]

These developments impacted on the validity of the three Soviet civil-military models. Indeed the developments encouraged scholars to update their work. For instance, Odom in 1990 argued that although some senior officers had opposed Gorbachev's reforms, "the officer corps has accepted party and military discipline and made no effort to resist as an institution."[229] It is difficult to accurately assess the models in light of the developments during the Gorbachev era because of their wide-reaching and diverse nature. In fact Colton in 1989 wrote that none of the models "can at this point be treated as more than a hypothesis needing proper development and testing."[230] Furthermore, Herspring concluded that no single model would suffice in explaining civil-military relations under Gorbachev. This was for four reasons. First, there were too many variables for one paradigm to include all of them. Second, the high rate of change complicated matters. Third, a particular point in time was taken and universalised by the scholars, as Kolkowicz did with the conflict that occurred under Khrushchev. Finally, the models superimposed Western concepts on the Soviet Union. For example, Kolkowicz, after examining the US military, assumed that increased technology would strengthen the autonomy of the Soviet military. [231]

Overall, I believe that none of the three models provides a flawless explanation of transitional civil-military relations. The conflict model obviously is relevant because civil-military tensions did arise, and ultimately encouraged some personnel to support the 1991 coup. Other aspects of the model are also relevant. I believe that within the context of the Gorbachev era, Kolkowicz was partially right to assert that military and party traits opposed each other. It is clear that many personnel resented the military's growing internal role and that others, especially junior officers, opposed Communist activities in the military. However the model has imperfections. Most basically, it is very simplistic to argue that tensions led to a situation whereby the party and military were clearly opponents. Of direct relevance here is the failure of the 1991 coup leaders to unite the military behind their intervention. The neutrality of most

[228] Iain Elliot, "Three Days in August: On-the-Spot Impressions," *RFE/RL Report on the USSR*, 6 September 1991, p65. See also Miller, "The Soviet Coup," pp73-4.
[229] Odom, "Smashing an Icon," p69.
[230] Colton, "Perspectives," p32.
[231] Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, pp188-9. See also pp75-163; and Gustafson, "Conclusions," p334-40.

personnel and the active support some gave to Yeltsin illustrates this. The "natural traits" also do not necessarily correspond with reality. Senior officers, at least initially, sought to retain Communism whereas Gorbachev moved against it. This contradicts Kolkowicz's argument that subordination to an ideology was a party trait in conflict with the military's desire for professional autonomy.

With regard to the participatory model, I believe that this is most useful but also has flaws. I believe that at least some of Colton's arguments are particularly relevant in light of the transition and the 1991 coup. Colton envisaged a "full-scale intervention" if "a reformist civilian leadership embarking [ed] upon policies of ideological revision, military demobilization, shifting of investment priorities, and accommodation with foreign adversaries such as would alarm military leaders."[232] Though the military did not unite behind the 1991 coup, key members were actively involved, and this was encouraged by factors he identified. Colton's examination of the military's political quiescence is also useful. Colton argued that the civilian leaders can encourage political involvement and this certainly is applicable.[233] This is clearly shown by civilian leaders of the 1991 coup seeking to use military power to overthrow Gorbachev. However I do not believe that the model can accurately explain the dramatic upheavals experienced during the transition. For instance, I do not believe that the model forecast the level of civil-military conflict that arose under Gorbachev. Colton admitted in 1989, "it is not difficult to find developments in civil-military relations under Mikhail Gorbachev suggestive of Model I [the conflict model]."[234]

Finally, the symbiotic model has both strengths and weaknesses. The model does have some features I believe are valid. For instance, Odom correctly argued that the military would become involved in a political crisis during which it would become divided. This argument is particularly relevant in light of the 1991 coup. However I believe that the model has fundamental flaws which hinder its suitability for the study of the period. Most importantly, the model places too much stress on the cooperation between the party and the military. This is because of the increased tensions that are evident after the "golden age," and are especially evident under Gorbachev. More specifically, it is clear that conflict between the party leadership and military leadership arose over issues where Odom argued party-military attitudes were similar. For example, Odom argued that the party and military were in a

[232] Colton, *Commissars*, p288.
[233] Ibid., pp250-2.

"conservative union" with regard to moves in East Europe toward political and economic liberalisation.[235] However during the transition conflict arose between Gorbachev and military leaders over moves to grant East Europe greater freedom, and the resultant fall of Communism.

Institutional roles

I have already argued that the main role of the Soviet military had traditionally been to implement the Communist party security and foreign policies and ultimately to ensure the party's protection. This did not change under Gorbachev, in the sense that as General Secretary he continued to deploy the military in accordance with his threat perceptions. However the orientation of the military changed substantially. This change was from an external anti-West focus to an internal role to meet internal threats, and to correspond with Gorbachev's greater emphasis on Soviet-West cooperation. Indicative of the move away from the traditional external anti-West focus is the decline of the military's external deployments and increased Soviet-US military cooperation. After outlining this reorientation of the military I shall examine the factors that played an important role in encouraging this change. Here the General Secretary's threat perceptions, his realisation that the Soviet Union faced various problems that required a change in foreign policy, and the military's influence are assessed. More specifically, internal developments were increasingly seen as posing serious threats. For instance, the fall of the Communist party's authority and the policies of 'glasnost' (openness) and 'perestroika' (reconstruction or rebuilding) facilitated nationalism and ethnic tensions. This is shown by the increasingly active role the military played within the Soviet Union.

It is clear that Gorbachev downplayed the military's role of countering the external threat posed by the West during much of this period. Gorbachev often stressed the importance of strong Soviet-US relations and his actions reflected this, despite some tension arising over Gorbachev's 'hardline' approach towards republican nationalism and separatism from 1990 to 1991. Gorbachev in April 1985 declared that past Soviet-US cooperation showed that "the most reasonable [path] is to find the way leading to the smoothing of relations, [and] to build bridges of cooperation, but to build them from both sides."[236] Thus, Gorbachev in April 1985 announced a moratorium on the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, in January 1986

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[234] Colton, "Perspectives," pp31-2.
[235] Odom, "The Party-Military Connection," p33.
[236] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, 2 (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1987), p171, quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p140.

called for a nuclear free world by the year 2000, and provided diplomatic support for the US during the 1990-1991 Gulf war. Major bilateral arms control agreements like the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty were also signed, and by 1991 Soviet personnel were participating in two United Nation's peacekeeping operations. Similarly, Soviet-US military cooperation increased and included greater contact between senior Soviet and US officers.[237] In line with this, senior officers like Sokolov were at least initially more conciliatory towards the West.[238] Forces abroad declined in accordance with Gorbachev's policies. Whereas in 1985, 219,810 were deployed outside of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty states, by 1991 they numbered around 22,375, excluding peacekeepers.[239]

Changes to the threat perceptions of the party leaders encouraged these developments. Of vital importance is the decline of the closed and secretive nature of military and defence decision-making. This is important because it encouraged the emergence of new theories and ideas regarding the military's roles. Gorbachev encouraged debate on issues related to security, and he actively sought to increase the policy input of civilians, a process begun by Brezhnev.[240] Gorbachev proposed a series of concepts that formed his 'new political thinking.' These included a greater emphasis on the military's defensive rather than offensive role, improving relations with the West, and less emphasis on the military contribution to security. In 1986 Gorbachev said that "The guaranteeing of security ever more appears as a political problem, and it can be resolved only by political means."[241] Furthermore, Gorbachev countered the more pessimistic threat perceptions held by many officers. In 1986 he rebutted military warnings about American advanced weaponry and the threat posed by the US military-industrial complex.[242] At least some members of the military hierarchy recognised the need for greater Soviet-US cooperation too. For example, Admiral William Crowe, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Sergei Akhromeev, Soviet Chief of the General

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[237] See McCarthy, pp750-2.
[238] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp134-5.
[239] *The Military Balance 1985-86*, p30, *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p45. This excludes UN peacekeeping forces. See also Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp297-8.
[240] For further information see Parrott, pp67-9, 75-92.
[241] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* 3 (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1987), p245 quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p145. For information on the 'new political thinking' see Christoph Bluth, *New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy*, Chatham House Papers (London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1990); Seweryn Bialer, "New Thinking' and Soviet foreign policy," *Survival* XXX, no.4 (July/August 1988): pp291-309; Warner III, pp13-33; and Stephen Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* 13, no.2 (Fall 1988): pp124-61.
[242] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp145-6.

Staff, formed a close friendship.[243] This is in marked contrast to the military's offensive orientation before Gorbachev when Grechko, the Minister of Defence, had declared the military "supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear."[244]

Gorbachev's perceptions were in turn encouraged by his realisation that many problems faced the Soviet Union, and that change was vital. Nichols argued that Gorbachev "inherited a state and a society that was, by his own admission, in precarious condition."[245] Gorbachev realised that the emphasis on the military was causing a substantial drain on resources. In 1985 defence and fixed defence investment was absorbing 45 percent of Soviet output, twice the average Western rates.[246] This drain was particularly serious because of the poor performance of the economy. This is shown by the deceleration of Gross National Product (GNP). Although it grew by 5.3 percent per year from 1966 to 1970, by the 1980 to 1985 period it was 2.4 percent, falling further to 2.3 percent from 1986 to 1988.[247] By 1988 there were increasing food shortages and inflation. These developments encouraged Gorbachev to seek to re-allocate resources to civilian industry, and to promote the production of consumer goods.[248] Gorbachev also faced other issues, such as the growing Soviet inability to keep up with technological advances. Accompanying these issues was Gorbachev's willingness to act outside of the ideological conventions that had traditionally restricted the actions of the General Secretary.[249]

Contrasting the overall decline of the military's role in protecting and promoting Soviet interests vis-à-vis the West was the dramatic increase in the emphasis that Gorbachev placed on its internal security role. Though the number of personnel involved in internal operations might not have rivalled the forces deployed outside of the Soviet Union at their 1985 peak, the number clearly increased. In December 1986 the military intervened in Alma Ata and again in

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[243] William Crowe Junior, "A Communist, a Patriot, a Soldier," *Time* 138, no.10, 9 September 1991, p38; Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (London: Simon and Schuster Ltd, 1991), p40.
[244] A.A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Problems of History of the CPSU*, May 1974, translated by FBIS, quoted in Scott and Scott, *Armed Forces*, p57.
[245] Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p131.
[246] Arthur Alexander, "Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition," RAND R-3821-USDP, June 1990, p5, quoted in Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p128.
[247] US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev Changes Course*, 14 April 1989, Table B-4, p41, quoted in Robert Campbell, "Resource Stringency and Civil-Military Resource Allocation," in Colton and Gustafson, p129.
[248] See Campbell, pp143-52.
[249] Meyer, "Sources and Prospects," p129. Meyer examined the factors behind Gorbachev's policies. See pp124-63.

Tbilisi during April 1989. This intervention in Tbilisi caused much controversy as civilians were killed.[250] The military was deployed in the Caucasus and Moldavia during 1990, and that year General Boris Gromov became Deputy Minister of Interior and established special units to deal with internal security with the use of military resources.[251] In fact in December 1990, Gorbachev issued a presidential decree. This condemned republics for undermining the military, and gave the Ministry of Defence and the KGB the authority to ensure the military's smooth functioning.[252] Later that month Gorbachev said that the military was "the most important bulwark" ensuring "internal and external security."[253] Likewise, in January 1991, the Kremlin announced that army personnel would be deployed on the streets of the main cities with MVD forces. It was then announced in February that the number of patrols would increase from 1,740 to 2,636 and involve over 12,000 troops.[254] This increasing reliance on the military by the late winter of 1990-1991 encouraged fears that Gorbachev was considering establishing a dictatorship based upon the military's power.[255]

The internal deployment of the military was encouraged by the growing threat that the Soviet Union would fragment as ethnic and regional nationalism increased. Challenges to Moscow's authority became increasingly direct as Gorbachev moved to restructure the political system. In October 1988 Latvia declared sovereignty with Estonia following suit in November. Further declarations occurred in 1989 as both Lithuania and Azerbaydzhan declared themselves sovereign. During 1989 organisations like RUKh in Ukraine became active in demanding a larger role for the republics in policy-making. Most other republics followed the Baltic example the following year. Tensions increased as such developments occurred. The harassment and threatening of Russians and other non-native residents increased substantially in Central Asia, the Baltics, Moldavia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.[256] William Jackson also argued that nationalism increased throughout the Soviet Union. This was because

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[250] See Condoleezza Rice, "The Military Under Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 3, no.2 (April 1992): p40; and Brian Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising," *Survival* 36, no.1 (Spring 1994): p6.

[251] With regard to military deployments see Porter, *Red Armies*, pp49-55. For information on the internal role of the airborne forces see Schofield, pp179-206.

[252] *KZ*, 2 December 1990, n.p., quoted in Gerard Holden, *The Road to the Coup: Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Crisis*, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Reports no.23, September 1991, p16.

[253] *Izvestia*, 18 December 1990, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "The Case for a Coup: Gorbachev or the Generals?' *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no.2, 11 January 1991, p4.

[254] *New York Times*, 5-6 February 1991, n.p.; and *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no no., 5 February 1991, both quoted in Porter, *Red Armies*, p54.

[255] Porter, *Red Armies*, p54. See also Foye, "The Case for a Coup," pp4-5.

[256] William Jackson, "*Russia after the Crisis* Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," *Orbis* 38, no.1 (Winter 1994): pp4-5.

dissatisfaction over the progress of 'perestroika' grew, doubts grew over the authority of the Communist party, and policies that threatened the position of minority ethnic groups were encouraged by political and economic concerns.[257] It is evident that these developments influenced Gorbachev's decision to deploy personnel. In August 1990 he told officers that it was "our *mutual* responsibility" to prevent internal developments from bringing the Soviet Union to the "brink of disaster," and that this might require "radical measures."[258]

These developments caused concern in the military and senior officers placed increasing pressure on Gorbachev to act. Most generally, though many personnel opposed their use to uphold internal security, it is evident that personnel in the final year of the Soviet Union opposed its demise. In the March 1991 referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union, 90 percent in military precincts voted for its preservation.[259] Of particular concern to senior officers was the impact on its resources that the union's fragmentation would have, as republics sought to increase their power over conscripts. The military leadership denounced these moves and indicated that the use of force to quell ethnic disturbances was possible.[260] It was against this background that Gorbachev took an increasingly hard-line stance from 1990 to 1991. This is shown by the decision of both civilian and military leaders to send Valentin Varennikov, Deputy Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces, to Lithuania.[261]

Budgetary support

Although the military had traditionally enjoyed a generous level of budgetary support, the transition from Communism saw this change. Under Gorbachev the level of budgetary support declined in real terms. This was in accordance with the re-orientation of the military away from its global role of protecting and promoting the Communist party's interests. Gorbachev was faced with various factors that discouraged a high level of defence expenditure and these are described after the level of expenditure is assessed. For instance, I have already discussed the increasingly inadequate performance of the economy and

[257] Jackson, "Imperial Temptations," p4.
[258] *KZ*, 19 August 1990, n.p., quoted in Porter, *Red Armies*, p50. Italics are original.
[259] "Report by USSR Referendum Central Commission On Results of 17 March 1991 USSR Referendum," *Pravda*, 27 March 1991, pp1-2, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Union Treaty," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34mil.html, p1 of 2.
[260] With regard to developments in the republics and the military see Holden, pp19-28; Brusstar and Jones, "The Military's Response To The USSR's Center-Periphery Crisis," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34the.html, pp1-3 of 3; Meyer, "How the Threat," pp21-7; and Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after," pp34-5, 36-43.

Gorbachev's threat perceptions. However in addition, Gorbachev did not have the close ties to the military that might have made him more susceptible to its demands. The level of funds allocated to the military became progressively more controversial as 'glasnost' made the issue more open, and resources were increasingly needed elsewhere.

It is difficult to accurately assess the level of defence expenditure, but although the defence budget increased in terms of roubles, it appears to have fallen in real terms. The official defence budget in 1985 was 19,063 billion roubles and by 1991 it had increased to 96.560 billion (see table 4). However inflation increased dramatically from -1.6 percent in 1985, to 41 percent in 1990, and 89 percent in 1991.[262] Soviet published data, which is likely to underestimate expenditure, indicates that in 1985 defence expenditure was US$241,500 million, by 1991 it was $91,631 million in 1985 prices and exchange rates. This meant that defence expenditure had declined from 16.1 percent of the GDP to 11.1 percent (see table 4). The actual severity of cuts is debatable as Soviet figures are of dubious accuracy and estimates vary. However I believe that cuts, at least in real terms, did occur. US intelligence calculated that the cuts in real terms during 1989 and 1990 were between four and five percent.[263] The military hierarchy also publicly denounced cuts. In September 1989 Yazov claimed that it was wrong "to try to make reduction of defense expenditures the sole means to liquidate the budget deficit and resolve all of today's social problems."[264] Similarly, the increasingly harsh conditions personnel faced, and the cuts to the military's size all correspond with budget cuts. The production of key weapons declined too. The production of main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, bombers, fighter aircraft, submarines, and inter-continental ballistic missiles from 1990 to 1991 declined on average by 31.4 percent.[265]

The state of the economy, Gorbachev's personal position, the growing openness of defence appropriation, and the growing strain on resources encouraged this decline in real terms. I have already discussed the poor state of the economy and it is clear that this was influential. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister, claimed in mid-1990 that "in squandering a quarter of our budget on military expenditures, we ruined the country. If things went on like

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[261] Porter, *Red Armies*, p53. See also Porter, *Red Armies*, pp49-55.
[262] IISS, *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, p33; *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p36; and *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, p98.
[263] *Soviet Military Power* (Washington DC: Department of Defence, n.d.), p34 quoted in Porter, *Red Armies* p45. See also David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," *International Security* 14, no.3 (Winter 1989/1990): pp8-13; and Porter, *Red Armies*, pp42-6.
[264] *Izvestia*, 16 September 1989, n.p., quoted in Porter, *Red Armies*, p43.

this, we would have no need for defense, as a ruined country and an impoverished people have no need for an army."[266] It is also apparent that Gorbachev's more optimistic threat perceptions encouraged reductions. In January 1989 Gorbachev declared that "A preliminary study shows that we could cut them [defence expenditures] without weakening our state's security or its defense potential."[267] Apart from the economy, Gorbachev also took power without strong links to the military and at least initially did not seek to identify himself with officers. Gorbachev had little experience in security affairs, having only entered the Politburo in 1980, and did not seek to develop a reputation of military experience like his predecessors.[268] Competition for resources increased too. Gorbachev attached increasing importance to the manufacturing of civilian machines and the military-industrial complex was under increasing pressure to produce civilian goods.[269] Likewise, although the number of military personnel declined substantially, the number of personnel belonging to paramilitary forces, such as the KGB and the MVD, declined only slightly. They declined from 675,000 in 1985 to 580,000 in 1991.[270]

Popular support for the military

The military had traditionally been officially highly regarded, and officers enjoyed a high status among civilians, though military service was less positively perceived. However under Gorbachev the perception of the military, officers, and military service declined. This decline is evident at the highest level, as Gorbachev was increasingly willing to publicly reprimand the military. Likewise, fewer civilians showed an interest in joining the officer corps, the evasion of conscription became rampant, and personnel faced an increasingly hostile public. Hostility manifested itself in both verbal and physical attacks on personnel. This fall in support was encouraged by two key factors. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev discouraged a high level of support for the military. This is because military opposition to Gorbachev's policies encouraged moves against the military, and more open discussion of the military and its problems was allowed under the new General Secretary. Second, it became evident that the military was failing to perform its allocated roles. The roles themselves were

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[265] IISS, *The Military Balance 1996-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1996), Table 4, p110.
[266] M. Dobbs, "Ligachev assails Soviet radicalism," *The Washington Post*, 4 July 1990, pA27, quoted in Robert Arnett, "The Soviet Debate over the future of the Armed Forces," *Defense Analysis* 7, no.2/3 (1991): p283.
[267] "Narashchivat'intellektual'nyi potentsial perestroiki," *Pravda*, 8 January 1989, p2, quoted in Holloway, "State, Society," p10.
[268] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, p132; and Parrott, p76.
[269] Campbell, pp144-6.
[270] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p30; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p114.

also unpopular among many. Here the military's publicised failures in Afghanistan and controversial operations within the Soviet Union are of particular interest.

Evidence of the increasingly negative perception of the military is widespread. At the highest level party leaders openly attacked the military. This is illustrated by Gorbachev's reaction to the military's failure to prevent Matthias Rust from violating Soviet airspace and landing his small plane in Red Square during May 1987. Gorbachev commented that this event demonstrated the presence of "powerful" negative phenomena in the military and declared that there must be no doubt about the military's ability to defend the country.[271] Indeed Parrott wrote that the severity of Gorbachev's chastising of the military had not been seen in decades.[272] Other high-ranking party officials also attacked the military. For example, when Shevardnadze resigned in December 1990 he criticised "boys in colonel's epaulets," and said that he could not reconcile himself "with what is happening in my country."[273]

A fall in support is likewise evident among the general public, particularly during the later years. This is best shown by the absence of widespread support for the 1991 coup in chapter 7. Apart from this, there is much evidence of increasingly hostile attitudes. Soviet newspapers increasingly published stories detailing the hostile reception many Afghanistan veterans received.[274] Opinion polls further indicate that many civilians did not support the military. Gabriel (1980) found that 6.2 percent of soldiers indicated that their families were not happy with them serving, in 1990, 31 percent indicated this.[275] Another poll in December 1989 found that 14 percent did not trust the military, by October 1991 this was 36 percent.[276] A 1990 survey actually found one in seven civilians believed that the army was no longer needed.[277] Political candidates like General Al'bert Makashov also received little support in the 1991 Russian presidential election.[278]

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[271] *Pravda*, 26 June 1987, n.p., quoted in Parrott, p84.
[272] Parrott, p84.
[273] Porter, *Red Armies*, p53.
[274] Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp326-9.
[275] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p39; and *Voennyy Vestnik*, January 1991, p30, quoted in *Crisis in the Former Soviet Military*, p3.
[276] *Moscow News*, no no., March 1989, n.p.; *Moscow New* no no., August 1989, n.p.; *Moscow News* no no. December 1989, n.p.; *Moscow News* no no. March 1990, n.p.; *Moscow News*, no no. 3-10 June, p9; *Izvestiia*, July 1990, n.p.; *Izvestiia*, 29 November 1990, n.p.; *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, October 1990, n.p.; *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, December 1990, n.p.; and *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 24 January 1991, n.p., all quoted in Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: shaping a post-Soviet future* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Table 10.1, p186. For a summary of anti-military sentiments see Meyer, "How the coup," 18; and Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," pp59-60.
[277] *Voennyy Vestnik*, January 1991, p30 quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p3.
[278] *RFE/RL Daily Report* no.113, 17 June 1991, quoted in Tsypkin, "Will the Military," p54.

Moreover people were increasingly willing to avoid the draft and to actually physically attack personnel. Before Gorbachev the number of individuals who escaped active or reserve service is estimated to have not exceeded 12 percent, and Gabriel found that 88.5 percent of young men believed that service was unavoidable. [279] However under Gorbachev draft evasion became rampant. By the spring of 1991 on average the draft in the republics was only around 68.3 percent fulfilled.[280] Indeed whereas in 1988 a survey found that 81 percent of young men were prepared to defend their country, by 1990 this had declined to 59 percent.[281] Similarly, in 1975, 78 percent of enlisted personnel expressed a "great interest" in serving, by 1990 this was only 12 percent.[282] It was within this context that the number of applications for many officer schools declined. Rather than the tough competition for places at officer schools before Gorbachev, the Transbaykal MD had a shortfall of 54 percent of student numbers in 1989.[283] Physical attacks on personnel also became a major issue as civilians directly vented their rage. For example, serious crime against personnel increased, civilians killed 85 officers in 1989 and in the first quarter of 1990, 21 were murdered and a further 189 injured.[284] This is a dramatic development given that 81.4 percent of soldiers who served before 1979 indicated to Gabriel that most civilians treated them well.[285]

The decline of the military's image can essentially be attributed to two key factors. First and most importantly, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev encouraged and facilitated a decline in the level of support. Military opposition to Gorbachev's 'new thinking' led to civilian counter-attacks against the military, and efforts to accelerate 'perestroika' were accompanied by attacks on military recalcitrance and inefficiency.[286] Accompanying these developments was the emergence of 'glasnost,' which facilitated the growth of negative attitudes. 'Glasnost' facilitated a marked increase in media coverage of issues relating to society-military interaction, especially those controversial. The media mentioned army activities and military

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[279] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp36, 40.
[280] *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, Table 1, p22. See also Porter, *Red Armies*, pp39-42; Holloway, "State, Society," pp15-6; and Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after," pp35-6.
[281] *Voennyy Vestnik*, January 1991, p30, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p3.
[282] Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, p108.
[283] Lieutenant Colonel V Kovalev, "Less and Less Praporshchiks," *KZ*, 5 February 1991, p1, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p7.
[284] *KZ*, 13 June 1990, p1 quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p7.
[285] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p69.
[286] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp150-5, 167-9. See also Parrott, pp79-89.

themes 142 times in 1983, by 1989 such mentions numbered 560.[287] Thus, military problems, such as dedovschina (the brutal bullying of new recruits), were publicised, and groups like the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers emerged to challenge the military.[288]

Second, the military's roles under Gorbachev and its ability to perform these successfully was influential. This is because of the impact these roles had on the perception of the military. The roles allocated to the military led to conflict between the military and civilians, a development bound to encourage negative perceptions. Here the military's internal deployment caused disquiet, especially given the increasing nationalism of non-Russians and the bloody results of the military's deployment.[289] One survey in December 1989 found that even when protest was accompanied by a threat of violence or force the majority of people opposed the use of the army. Even when protest disrupted the life of people or paralysed a city, a significant minority did not support the use of the army (see tables 6A and 6B). Similarly, although high-ranking officers might have supported moves to suppress ethnic groups, personnel who carried out such operations spoke of the popular hatred they encountered.[290]

Table 6A: Protest and the use of the Soviet Army 1989

People were asked: "What should be the authorities' position regarding protests if the protest is accompanied by a threat of violence or force?"

Authorities response:	Respondent's opinion: (percentage)
Not interfere	3
Engage in dialogue with its organisers	43
Intervene using militsia and army	45
Can't say	10

[287] Yang Zhong, "Civil-Military Relations in Changing Communist Societies: A Comparative Study of China and the Soviet Union," *Studies In Comparative Communism* XXIV, no.1 (March 1991): Table 5, p88. See also Zhong, "The Transformation," pp60-5.

[288] See Holloway, "State, Society," pp13-5; and Herspring, "The Soviet Military Reshapes in Response to Malaise," *Orbis* 35, no.2 (Spring 1991): pp183-4. With regard to the emergence of groups see Scott McMichael, "Service in the Armed Forces-Dangerous Duty?" *Janes Intelligence Review* (*JIR*) 3, no.11 (November 1991): p512, quoted in Danopoulos and Zirker, p25.

[289] See Dick, *The Current State Of The Russian Army*, pp2-3. For first-hand accounts of the controversy of the internal security role see Schofield, pp183-6, 191-7.

[290] See Schofield, pp184-5.

Table 6B: Protest and the use of the Soviet Army 1989

People were asked: "What should be the authorities' position regarding protests if the protest disrupts the normal life of people or paralyses a city?"

Authorities response:	Respondent's opinion: (percentage)
Not interfere	2
Engage in dialogue with its organisers	31
Intervene using militsia and army	57
Can't say	11

This survey was carried out in December 1989 and involved 2521 respondents. Source: *OmvTs*, no.9, 1990, VTsIOM all union survey, quoted in Matthew Wyman, "Russian Political Culture: Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys," *Journal of Communist Studies* 10, no.1 (March 1994): Table 24, p50.

Another role which was conducive to negative attitudes was the military's deployment in Afghanistan. This role became increasingly controversial as the military failed to achieve a clear victory despite the costs, both in material and human terms. I have already noted that Afghanistan war veterans were increasingly vilified, but in addition to this there was a general 'backlash' against the military after its withdrawal in 1989. This is shown by the increasing doubt that newspapers cast over the decision to invade.[291] In early 1986 Gorbachev himself referred to the war as a "bloody stump."[292] The military's negative image was reinforced by its seemingly insatiable demands for resources, despite the economic difficulties, particularly as information about defence expenditure was declassified.

Morale

In line with the poor level of support for the military, low morale was a widespread problem. Evidence of the serious lack of morale includes surveys of personnel, the exodus of large numbers of personnel from the military, and perhaps most graphically, the increased frequency of suicides. I attribute this decline in morale to the negative impact of the transition upon the military. This is fundamentally because the military moved from being a well-supported institution with close ties to the party elite and Soviet power, to one undertaking increasingly unpopular roles, and one facing the collapse of the party and empire it was sworn to defend. More specifically, the conditions of service for personnel became increasingly intolerable. This is an important source of disillusionment given at least officers had

[291] Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp318-20.
[292] Schofield, p108.

traditionally received favourable treatment. Such poor conditions included the lack of sufficient accommodation for personnel, and the increasingly inadequate level of military pay.

Though morale among conscripts had traditionally been low, evidence indicates that their morale declined further, along with that of the once highly motivated officers. The opinions and actions of personnel that increasingly showed a sense of pessimism and despair best illustrate this trend. Indicative of this is a 1990 survey where only 40 percent of officers rated their job as satisfactory.[293] By January 1992, one poll of 2,500 officers found that 95 percent were demoralised.[294] An increasing number of officers left the corps too. From 1988 to 1990, 3 percent of the officer corps were released at their own request.[295] These developments contrast the importance officers had previously placed on their military careers, as I have already noted that most soldiers complained to Gabriel (1980) that officers placed their careers above their men. Most graphically, the number of suicides by personnel increased. In June 1991, an estimated 4,000 committed suicide annually, up from perhaps 3,000 during the 1970s.[296] Desertion also increased. Gabriel (1980) found that only 23.9 percent of soldiers believed that stories of soldiers deserting were very common or common.[297] However in 1990 it was reported that 1,188 had deserted from the Transcaucasus MD alone. [298]

I attribute this decline in morale to the negative impact of the transition upon the military. The decline occurred as the military moved from being a well-supported and elite institution, to one increasingly viewed in negative terms. It was also facing the collapse of the party and empire it was sworn to defend. This is shown by the negative impact on morale that the decline of Soviet power and fragmentation of the Soviet Empire had on many. The military withdrawals to many personnel were humiliating and perceived to be detrimental to security.[299] The withdrawals caused numerous problems, such as the lack of proper accommodation I examine below. The simultaneous withdrawal from the Third World had a

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[293] Colonel G. Kal'chenko, "How does Military Service Rate?" *Voennyy Vestnik*, August 1990, pp33-4, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p6.
[294] A. Putko, "Moods in the Army Worry the Military Themselves," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 February 1992, p2 and *KZ*, 22 January 1992, n.p., both quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p15.
[295] Colonel General A. Mironov, interviewed by Captain First Class A. Turchenko, *KZ*, 22 August 1991, p2, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p6.
[296] See *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p3; and Boris Segal, 'The Incidence of Suicide," quoted in Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p126.
[297] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p172.
[298] *KZ*, 15 March 1990, p1 quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p2.
[299] See Schofield, pp189-90.

similar impact.[300] Such withdrawals starkly contrasted the glorious advances and expansion of the Soviet military in previous times. Accompanying this decline was the discrediting of the Communist ideology. Although I believe that many personnel, particularly soldiers, did not have a close bond of loyalty to Communism it is clear that many senior officers became disillusioned. For instance, Akhromeev, the former Chief of the General Staff, committed suicide after the 1991 coup. Akhromeev wrote in a last letter "its very depressing to be told that everything you have worked for and fought for over 50 years is wrong."[301]

The conditions of service for personnel also became increasingly intolerable, especially for officers accustomed to favourable treatment. Although many personnel had always experienced some degree of hardship, it is evident that conditions deteriorated under Gorbachev. The withdrawal of forces to the Soviet Union placed great strain on accommodation and led to shortages. In January 1989, an estimated 170,500 military families were without housing in the Soviet Union, and by September 1991, 292,000 officers and NCO families were without housing.[302] Moreover the standard of accommodation for those personnel that were not homeless was substandard. In mid-1990 an estimated 74,000 officers lived in accommodation so substandard that it rivalled the worst slums in the West.[303] This contrasts Gabriel's survey of personnel who served before 1979 that found 50 percent of officers believed that their accommodation was adequate or better than civilian housing.[304] Such conditions no doubt facilitated the rise of heath problems, as from 1980 to 1990 nervous, and psychiatric disorders among draftees increased by 50 percent and internal diseases by 38 percent.[305] Inadequate military pay also became an increasingly controversial issue. Whereas Soviet officers had traditionally been well paid, in 1990 it was claimed that bus drivers earned more than Majors or Lieutenant Colonels.[306] Finally, the reduction of the military meant that many personnel had to take forced retirement without either the skill to find civilian work or an adequate pension.

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[300] Tsypkin, "Will the Military," pp44-5.
[301] Crowe, p38.
[302] Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev, *KZ*, 1 February 1990, p2, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p9; and *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p9.
[303] Colonel A. Fedurin, "Our Defenders Need Defending," *Aviatsiya I kosmonavtika*, June 1990, p38, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p9.
[304] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p65.
[305] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 1990, n.p., quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p4.
[306] Captain A Grin,' "Profession Without a Future," *Voennyy Vestnik*, February 1990, n.p., quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p9.

Cohesion and size

The military changed dramatically during this period. The changes essentially occurred because of the repercussions of Gorbachev's reforms. These changes are important as they affected the military's ability to fulfil its allocated roles, both through determining the quantity of resources available and the ability to effectively use these resources. The military was negatively influenced as its cohesion and size declined. Examining cohesion, the emergence of salient divisions in the five relationships that largely shaped institutional cohesion clearly is indicative of a decline. More specifically, the relationship between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic groups is assessed. After this assessment the factors that contributed to this lack of cohesion are outlined. I believe that cohesion fell because of the divisive developments that occurred throughout the Soviet Union. For instance, controversy over the military's position in politics, and domestic turmoil such as the growing nationalism of the Soviet republics, were divisive.

Inter-service and officer cohesion declined under Gorbachev to the point of open conflict. This lack of cohesion is best shown by the 1991 coup where both the services and officers took different positions. The degree of service cohesion is in stark contrast to that before 1985 when the services united in opposition to Khrushchev's moves to restructure the military, and when officers were generally united during debates over national security. The most salient division that arose involved the services and their officers over whether to support or oppose intervention. Although the chiefs of the airborne forces, the air force, and SRF actively opposed the coup, the chiefs of ground forces and air defence forces supported intervention.[307] Most however appear to have remained neutral during the intervention like the Commander of the Leningrad MD.[308] Colonel General Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the head of the air force promoted to Defence Minister after the coup, perhaps best summed up the lack of cohesion. The Colonel General claimed that the members of the General Staff were reluctant to openly state their stance on the coup to one another because they rarely socialised and did not trust one another. Shaposhnikov commented "I think if we [the General Staff] had had a human atmosphere in our headquarters, may be we could have shared opinions with each other, but... such things never happened." Therefore, he exchanged only a few guarded comments with an

[307] See Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The August 1991 Coup," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34tar.html, pp1-2.
[308] Meyer, "How the Threat," p30.

Admiral as he left the meeting.[309] The lack of cohesion is further shown by the replacement of 9 of the 17 members of the Defence Ministry Collegium after the coup.[310] Correspondingly, divisions occurred between officers of different rank. An army intelligence officer who defected to Yeltsin during the coup said, "Most middle officers are democrats. But the generals are another story."[311] Other officers like Lieutenants also concluded that the coup was illegal.[312]

Reform and the changes to the military's role also eroded unity. Services like the navy, SRF, air force, and air defence forces, which required skilled personnel and were relatively small in size, supported moves from conscription to volunteers. However the ground forces, with the exception of the airborne forces, supported the continued use of conscripts. Mikhail Tsypkin argued that the ground forces with their lower skill requirements and their large size, which made a reliance on volunteers unrealistic, encouraged this.[313] Similarly, the air force and navy were in conflict with the ground forces over the lessons that could be drawn from the 1990-1991 Gulf war.[314] An increasingly divisive debate also developed over the proposed and actual changes to the military. Evidence of this includes the divergent attitudes among personnel on institutional reform and the military's internal role.[315] The military's increased political role exacerbated divisions too.[316]

Further instances of conflict between officers are also evident. Fundamental and public disagreements between senior officers and those in junior and middle positions occurred. This conflict manifested itself in junior officers increasingly seeking redress via politics rather than through the military hierarchy.[317] This contrasts the respect, at least in public, shown by officers to their superiors before Gorbachev. For instance, officers would ignore the mistakes

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[309] Fred Hiatt, "Soviet Generals Feared Each Other During Coup," *Washington Post*, 13 September 1991, pA30.
[310] Stephen Foye, "Personnel Changes in the Soviet High Command," *Report on the USSR*, 3, 27 September 1991, n.p., quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p562.
[311] Bill Keller, "The Soviet Crisis: Sporadic Mutinies Rack Soviet Army," *NYT* Ondisc (CD-ROM), ProQuest, 21 August 1991, pA1.
[312] Ibid.
[313] Tsypkin, "Will the military," p49. An exception to the stance of the ground forces was the airborne forces.
[314] Stephen Blank, "New Strategists Who Demand the Old Economy," *Orbis* 36, no.3 (Summer 1992): pp366-71.
[315] See Porter, *Red Armies*, pp60-5; Desch, pp461-2; and Meyer, "How the Threat," p11. For information on divisions over 'new political thinking' see R. Philips and Jeffrey Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense," *International Security* 13 no.2 (Fall 1988): pp164-78. With regard to divisions over the military's internal role see Zhong, "The Transformation," p57.
[316] See Meyer, "How the Threat," pp27-31; Zhong, "The Transformation," pp55-7; and Tsypkin, "Will the Military," p48.
[317] See Meyer, "How the Threat," pp11, 19-20. Meyer defined junior officers as Lieutenants through to Majors, middle officers as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, and senior officers as Generals.

made by their superiors irrespective of their magnitude.[318] The feeling among junior officers that their superiors were not interested in the increasing problems that they faced, the issue of separatism, and reforms encouraged such conflict.[319] Indeed one 1990 poll of officers found that one third believed that their commanders behaved toward their subordinates in a rude, arrogant, and disrespectful way.[320] Moreover, officers had divergent political attitudes, as junior officers generally supported reformist democrats but senior officers continued to support the Communist party. An analysis of the 1989 voting patterns among military People's Deputies in the Russian legislature showed that over 50 percent of junior and middle officers voted for Democratic Russia. However over 50 percent of senior officers voted for the Communist party.[321] Correspondingly, in 1990, 82 percent of senior officers in the legislature voted against Democratic Russia. However 63 percent of middle officers and 73 percent of junior officers voted for Democratic Russia.[322] Finally, splits between officers arose over the desirability of withdrawals from East Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union.[323]

Under Gorbachev, the division between personnel and political officers widened. I have argued that high-ranking officers continued to strongly support the Communist party relative to lower-ranked officers. This encouraged greater animosity between political officers and those officers not part of the military hierarchy. For instance, the high command defended the continued role of the political organs because they felt they maintained stability.[324] However by the later Gorbachev years even high-ranking officers recognised the need to reform the political organs. For example, Akhromeev in early 1990 said that as a multi-party political system developed it would not be possible to have a variety of parties exist in the military, and hence "I think the Armed Forces will become a nonpartisan organization."[325] Similarly, when political officers in the Kaliningrad region circulated petitions calling for Yeltsin's removal as head of the Russian parliament it appears that most junior officers refused to sign

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[318] See Suvorov, *The Liberators*, pp155-7.
[319] Meyer, "How the Threat,"pp19-20, 26, 28. See also Desch, p462.
[320] Colonel MP Bolshakov, "One Man Command (Russ: Yedinonachaliye) and collegiality," *Voyennaya Mysl*, September 1990, pp2-10, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p8.
[321] "Narod i nomenklatura-yediny," *Argumenty y facty* no.29 (21 July 1990): p2, quoted in Meyer, "How the Threat," Figure 1, p29.
[322] Julia Wishnevsky, "The Two Sides of the Barricades in Russian Politics Today," *Report on the USSR*, 24 August 1990, p17, quoted in Tsypkin, "Will the Military," p48.
[323] See Desch, pp460-1.
[324] *KZ*, 10 February 1990, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The Soviet Military Reshapes," p189.
[325] *Asahi shimbun*, 8 March 1990, n.p., carried by "Akhromeyev Comments on Unified Germany, Asia," FBIS: Soviet Union, 21 March 1990, (Annex), quoted in Herspring, "The Soviet Military Reshapes," p189.

them.[326] However the 1991 coup is the most dramatic example of the deterioration of ties as most personnel refused to actively support it despite the MPA's support, and after the coup the military leadership moved to disband the organisation. This relationship developed against a background of growing opposition to the Communist party's role in the military. According to a 1990 poll of officers taken by the MPA, and thus likely to overstate support for the Communist party, at most 45 percent of officers supported the party.[327]

With regard to relations between soldiers and officers, these remained tense. The continued animosity between officers and soldiers is most clearly shown by the 1991 coup, during which many soldiers indicated that they would disobey their officers if ordered to fire their weapons at civilians. I cover this in-depth when I focus on the military's mood so will only briefly outline this unwillingness here. For instance, when one soldier near Red Square was asked if he would follow an order to shoot at civilians he answered "No, I will not."[328] Similarly, Yeltsin wrote that an attack on the White House would have required shooting "the pride and hope of Russia right in the face." However "Obviously, the army could not do this."[329] This unwillingness was encouraged by the negative perception of officers among soldiers. Conscripts called their officers "jackals" and one former paratrooper wrote immediately after the coup "it's very bad for novices [to the military] ...They get the thick end of everything."[330]

Ethnic divisions also grew with the growing separatism and nationalism in the republics. Though the number of Russian speaking conscripts increased during the last years of Gorbachev's rule because of widespread draft evasion, from 1985 to 1989 the number of Russian speakers drafted in the spring intake averaged only 43.2 percent.[331] The increasing presence of diverse customs, and an inability to communicate in an institution where racism was evident, occurred against a background of increased ethnic volatility in the republics. Ethnic tensions were thus encouraged, particularly given the military did not move to effectively counter these problems. In 1989, up to 80 percent of officers had not been taught

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[326] "Another Anonymous Appeal For Signatures," *Moscow News*, no.5, 2-10 February 1991, p2, quoted in Meyer, "How the threat," footnote 18, p13.
[327] "Chto pokazalo anketirovaniye," *KZ*, 26 July 1990, p4, quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations, p556.
[328] Keller, "The Soviet Crisis," pA1.
[329] Yeltsin, *The View*, p99.
[330] *The Independent*, 22 August 1991, p6, quoted in Brian Moynahan "The Soviet Coup- Red Army Discontent Was At Heart Of Attempted Coup," in Reuters, 22 August 1991.
[331] Table 2, in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p23.

how to control relations between different ethnic groups.[332] Although Ball had earlier found no strong link between ethnicity and conflict between personnel, under Gorbachev it is apparent that ethnicity did play an increasingly important role in motivating conflict. In 1989, 20 percent of all crimes in the military and 40-70 percent of serious breaches of discipline were caused by ethnic tensions.[333] Furthermore, in May 1990 it was reported that 80 percent of all criminal hazing incidents in one unit were ethnically based, a figure dramatically higher than that a year before.[334] These figures indicate that tensions increased under Gorbachev. This is because 31.9 percent of soldiers told Gabriel (1980) that ethnic discrimination was not common.[335] Similarly, figures published in 1980 indicated that by the end of service 60-65 percent of friendships between personnel were not based on shared ethnic and regional origins.[336]

Overall, I believe that cohesion fell during the Gorbachev period. Although divisions did exist prior to Gorbachev these became increasingly salient and this is most clearly shown by the 1991 coup. Falls occurred with regard to inter-service, officer, and military and political officer cohesion. In addition, the division between officers and soldiers remained stark. It was against this background that General Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defence Minister, declared that the Russian leadership had taken control of an army "that was practically unmanageable."[337] Similarly, scholars expressed their concern over the potential fragmentation of the military.[338]

A significant decline also occurred in the number of personnel during this period. The reduction of the military resulted primarily from the new policies of the party leadership, and developments in the Soviet Union. Changes occurred in accordance with Gorbachev's downplaying of the threat posed by the West, and his recognition that military expenditure needed to be reduced because of the lack of economic growth. Apart from these two points that I have already assessed, the reduction of the military occurred against a background of

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[332] "Internatsional'nomy vospitaniyu-bol'she partiynogo vnimaniya," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* no.5, 1989, p8, quoted in Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, p118.
[333] Colonel O A Bel'kov, "Light and Shades of Relations Between the Nationalities," *Armiya*, no no., October 1991, p42, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p4.
[334] *Argumenty i fakty* no.8, May 1990, n.p., quoted in Porter, *Red Armies*, p38.
[335] Gabriel , *Red Legions*, p72.
[336] V. Kovalev, p140, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p194.
[337] Russian TV, 28 February 1993, quoted in Lepingwell, "Restructuring the Russian Military," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no.25, 18 June 1993, p17 quoted in Pavel Baev, *The Russian Army In A Time Of Troubles* (Oslo: Peace Research Institute; London: Sage Publishers Ltd, 1996), p38.
[338] Porter, *Red Armies*, p93.

growing public interest in restructuring the military, and an emphasis among officers on qualitative rather than quantitative factors in modern warfare. Moreover, in practical terms it became increasingly difficult to maintain the size of the military as central control over the republics decreased, thereby reducing the number of potential draftees, and draft evasion grew.

It is clear that the number of personnel declined dramatically under Gorbachev. This contrasts the enlargement of the military after the 1917 transition to Communism. From 1983 to 1985 the number of personnel in the key services increased on average by 18 percent. However from 1985 to 1991 they declined by 26.6 percent (see tables 4 and 7 and graph 1). In terms of the percentage of personnel, the size of the SRF declined the most as it fell by 45.3 percent. The number of Soviet ground force personnel fell from 1985 to 1991 by 29.8 percent, navy personnel by 6.3 percent, and air force personnel by 26.3 percent. To put this in perspective, the number of ground force personnel in the Warsaw Treaty states fell by an average of 12.1 percent, navy personnel by 9.1 percent, and air force personnel by 17.7 percent.[339] The Soviet services lost the largest number of personnel in 1989 when 350,000 lost their positions (see table 7). This is largely because of the sweeping reductions to the ground forces that occurred after Gorbachev in 1988 pledged to unilaterally reduce the military. Apart from 1989, reductions were most severe in 1986, largely because of the cuts to the air defence service. Contrasting this, in 1987 the number of personnel actually increased, mainly because of the moves to strengthen the air defence service, perhaps because of the Rust episode that year (see table 7). In addition, further reforms of the military's size and other changes, like reducing its dependence on conscripts, were increasingly contemplated.[340]

The growing realisation that cuts were required and the impracticality of maintaining the military in its current state is widely evident. Under Gorbachev the restructuring of the military became an increasingly public issue. Apart from Gorbachev's moves to reduce the military civilians like V.L. Lapygin, Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defence and State Security, called for military reform.[341] Indeed by the later years military leaders recognised that restructuring was required. In November 1990 the Ministry of Defence announced a 10-year draft reform plan that called for the reduction of the armed forces by an

[339] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp31-6; and *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp84-93.
[340] See Arnett, "The Soviet Debate," pp277-97.
[341] "Glasnost'i gosudarstvennaia bezopasnost'," *Izvestiia*, 26 June 1989, p2, quoted in Holloway, "State, society," pp17-8.

Table 7: Number of Soviet Personnel in Key Military Services 1985-1991

Years	Ground Forces (Number of personnel)	SRF	Navy	Air Defence	Air Force
1985	1,995,000	300,000	480,000	635,000	570,000
1986	1,991,000	298,000	451,000	371,000	453,000
1987	2,000,000	298,000	477,000	520,000	454,000
1988	1,900,000	298,000	458,000	520,000	444,000
1989	1,596,000	287,000	437,000	502,000	448,000
1990	1,473,000	260,000	410,000	500,000	420,000
1991	1,400,000	164,000	450,000	475,000	420,000
1985-1991 percentage change	-29.8	-45.3	-6.3	-25.2	-26.3

Sources: *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp21-24; IISS, *Military Balance 1986-1987* (London: IISS, 1987), pp36-9; IISS, *Military Balance 1987-1988*, (London: IISS, 1988), pp33-7; *Military Balance 1988-1989*, pp33-6; *Military Balance 1989-1990*, pp32-5; *Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp34-6; and *Military Balance 1991-1992*, pp36-8. The percentage change figures are rounded up.

estimated 560,000-760,000 by the end of 1995. [342] Members of the military also realised that modern warfare required high quality forces rather than large but poor quality forces. Colonel General Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff, in early 1989 commented that "the future of the armed forces must be conditioned by qualitative parameters, not quantitative ones."[343] More specifically, the limited change to the size of the navy occurred against a background of strenuous opposition from the service, whereas Gorbachev had taken steps immediately after taking power to reduce the influence of the SRF.[344] Finally, in practical terms it became increasingly difficult to maintain the size of the military, as central control

[342]USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, "USSR Ministry of Defense draft military reform concept," *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik* no.48, November 1990, pp5-10, quoted in Arnett, "The Soviet Debate," p279. With regard to structural reform also see John Lepingwell, "Towards a Post-Soviet Army," *Orbis* 36, no.1 (Winter 1992): pp93-102; and Jacob Kipp, "The Soviet Ground Forces between Repression and Reform," *Defense Analysis* 7, no.2/3 (1991): pp216-24.

[343] M. Moiseyev, "S pozitsiy oboronitel'noy doktriny," *KZ*, 10 February 1989, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The Soviet military and Change," p323.

[344] See Nichols, *Sacred Cause*, pp219-21, 142-5.

Graph 1: Number of Soviet and Russian Military Personnel 1983-1996



Source: See Tables 5, 7, and 9, pp116, 144, 178.

over the republics decreased and draft evasion grew. For example, in October 1990 the Armenian Supreme Soviet suspended the All-Union law on compulsory military service. Similarly, it became increasingly difficult to obtain suitable draftees. In Leningrad during 1988, 3,000 draftees were rejected as unfit for service, by 1990 the number had increased by 50 percent.[345]

Expertise

Finally, the military continued to lack the expertise that was needed to successfully execute the operations that its roles entailed, and expertise actually declined. The military's performance in Afghanistan and within the Soviet Union itself is indicative of this inadequacy. I have already examined many of the factors that contributed to this lack of expertise. However I believe that three factors are most important in explaining this inadequacy and these are described after the level of expertise is assessed. First, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. This is shown by the use of the military to uphold domestic security despite its inexperience here. Second, personnel of a high quality increasingly left without being replaced by qualified personnel. Third, the quality and quantity of training fell. This is indicated by surveys of personnel during this period.

The Afghanistan war and the military's deployment in the Soviet Union show that the military lacked the expertise it needed. With regard to the Afghanistan war, the military remained unable to achieve a clear victory. In the last major offensive launched in 1987 the Soviets encountered many difficulties in fighting the mujaheddin, and the guerrillas had taken back the territory they lost within a month.[346] Dennis Marshall-Hasdell after assessing the military concluded "many of the basic problems" of fighting in Afghanistan "were never fully addressed."[347] With regard to the military's internal deployment, inadequate expertise is best shown when I assess the level of expertise during the 1991 coup in my study of the military's capacity to intervene. Likewise, the military proved itself to be incapable of avoiding controversy and civilian casualties when meeting internal threats. This is illustrated by the military's actions in Tbilisi. Furthermore, surveys of personnel indicate that expertise had declined. In a June 1990 survey, only 6 percent of soldiers on average believed that the combat skills in their units were good. Although officers had more positive opinions, none

[345] Major General A Obukhov, "The State of Military Conscription in Leningrad," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1991, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet military*, p4.
[346] See Schofield, pp116-25.
[347] Marshall-Hasdell, p37.

believed that the level of combat skill was excellent, and on average only 46 percent believed that their combat skills were good.[348] This compares with 40.4 percent of soldiers, and 58.4 percent of commanding officers, telling Gabriel (1980) that their units would perform well or very well in combat.[349]

Most importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not prepared. This is best illustrated by its domestic performance, particularly during the 1991 coup, which I examine later. Apart from this, experienced personnel left without being suitably replaced. A 1989 survey found that 90 percent of the officers leaving the military were considered excellent or good, and 210 junior officers in the Kiev MD alone applied for a discharge in the first eight months of 1991, compared to 200 throughout 1990.[350] This problem was compounded by the lack of suitable replacements, a problem I have already noted. Moreover, the inability to fulfil draft quotas meant that quality standards had to be reduced. Whereas in 1988, 2.2 percent of the Leningrad call-up had failed to complete their secondary education, this had increased to 13 percent by 1990.[351] This contrasts the increase in qualifications held by personnel before Gorbachev.[352] Similarly, I have already noted that the number of draftees speaking Russian fell from 1985 to 1989 and this is likely to have hindered training. This is because the Russian language was used in the training and instructing of personnel. Finally, the quality and quantity of training fell. One 1990 survey of high-ranking officers found that on average 56.5 percent indicated that they believed training had worsened since 1980.[353] The quantity of training likewise declined. In the above survey over 88.5 percent indicated that their combat training was not being completed.[354] More specifically, in the late 1970s Soviet air force pilots flew 100 hours per year, in 1991 they flew only 20-25 hours.[355]

[348] *Voennyy Vestnik*, June 1990, p43, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p24.
[349] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p216.
[350] S S'yedin and V Mukhin, "Officers request Discharge into the Reserve," *Argument I Fakty*, 13 April 1990, p1; and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 August 1991, both quoted in *The Crisis In The Former Soviet Military* p7.
[351] Major General A Obukhov, "The State of Military Conscription in Leningrad," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1991, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet military*, p5.
[352] See Jones, *Red Army*, pp57-63.
[353] *Voennyy Vestnik*, June 1990, p43, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, Table 3, p23-4.
[354] Ibid.
[355] Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1979*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1978), p112, quoted in Joshua Epstein, *Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p108; and "Reforma varmii: orientiry dla voennoy pressy," *KZ*, 25 May 1993, n.p., quoted in Dale Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 28, no.2 (June 1995): p170.

In summary, from 1985 to 1991 major changes occurred which affected the military. Most importantly, the structure of the civil-military relationship changed. Although characteristics of the penetration model remained, the central role played by the Communist party and its control structures declined. One outcome of this was the military's increased political activity. Of the Soviet models, I believe that the participatory model appears to best explain these developments, but all three are problematic. Of importance too are the changes to the institutional roles that occurred, as the military became increasingly focused on domestic security. Popular support of the military and budgetary support also declined. This in turn reduced morale. Cohesion and size declined too. Finally, the military's expertise remained inadequate and actually worsened.

Conclusions

This chapter introduces the case study through examining the characteristics of the Soviet military before and during the transition from Communism. The chapter first provides a brief overview of the dominant theoretical models used by Western scholars to examine the Soviet civil-military relationship. This is to facilitate a better understanding of the relationship. Here three models are most important. First, Kolkowicz's conflict model stressed the conflict prone nature of the civil-military relationship and the military's potential threat to the party. Second, the symbiotic model put forward by Odom emphasised civil-military cooperation and the strength of the party's supremacy. Finally, according to Colton's participatory model the relationship was one of conflict and cooperation. I believe that the participatory model is most useful in assessing the Soviet civil-military relationship from 1917 to 1985. This is mainly because Colton clearly wrote of the various degrees of military involvement in politics, and those factors that influenced its political quiescence. Second, I believe that many of his arguments are particularly relevant in light of the transition. Third, the relationship was not one of inevitable conflict or cooperation. Finally, various scholars who have examined Soviet civil-military relations in greater depth concluded that the model is the most valid.

I then examined the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition. Most importantly, I believe that the Soviet civil-military structure best resembles Nordlinger's penetration model and was based on the Communist party's authority. This model is used to examine the Soviet civil-military structure namely because it is not confined to the case study, and it avoids some of the problems that the three previous models have. Soviet civil-military

relations are characteristic of a penetration model. This is shown by the penetration of the institution by the Communist party that ensured its supremacy, the military not directly threatening the civilian leaders until the 1991 coup. Second, the Soviet military's primary role was to protect and promote the interests of the Communist party. This involved the military being externally focused and countering the perceived security threat posed by the West.

Third, the level of budgetary support and official support of the military were both positive. However popular perceptions differed according to rank. Thus, officers had a higher level of morale relative to soldiers. Fourth, cohesion was not defective to the point of threatening the central command structure. Here I examined five key institutional relationships and found that, except for a salient division between officers and soldiers, cohesion appears to have been adequate. Apart from this, although tensions are certain to have existed, relations between the services, officers, military personnel and political officers, and the various ethnic groups that made up the military were not seriously threatened by conflict. Finally, I believe that the military's expertise was inadequate. Most indicative of this are the military's experiences in the Afghanistan war. Overall, I believe that the military held a privileged position in Soviet society and that it was a powerful institution.

I next examined how the transition from Communism impacted on the military. Most importantly, changes to the structure of the civil-military relationship had a significant impact. The fundamental change here involved the weakening of the Communist party and changes to its control methods that had characterised the penetration model. Correspondingly, Communist party membership became less important and then was discouraged. These changes occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and implement policy changes. A key indicator of the decline of the party's authority is the military's greater political role during the 1985 to 1991 period. However characteristics of the penetration model remained when Gorbachev deemed them useful to his quest for greater control. Here the continuing role that politics could play in influencing promotions and the retaining of secret police are particularly relevant. I again believe that the three Soviet models are problematic but that the participatory model appears to remain most valid.

With regard to the military's roles, these did not change in the sense that the General Secretary retained the power to deploy the military. However the orientation of the military changed substantially from an external anti-West focus to an internal role and to correspond

with Gorbachev's greater emphasis on Soviet-West cooperation. More specifically, domestic developments were increasingly seen as posing serious threats, which in turn were met with military deployment. For instance, the fall of the Communist party's authority and the policy of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' facilitated ethnic tensions, that in turn promoted grievances and separatist aspirations.

Dramatic reductions to budgetary support, popular support, and military morale all occurred under Gorbachev. The real level of budgetary support changed in accordance with the re-orientation of the military. Various factors discouraged defence expenditure. These included the inadequate performance of the economy and Gorbachev's perceptions, namely that the military global role should be reduced. The perception of the military, officers, and military service also declined. This decline is evident at the highest level and among the civilian population, as fewer were willing to serve and personnel even were physically attacked. Two key factors encouraged this fall of support. First and most importantly, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev encouraged and facilitated a decline in the level of support. Second, it became evident that the military was failing to perform its allocated roles and the roles themselves were unpopular among many. Accompanying this, and the increasingly harsh conditions personnel faced, a decline in morale is evident. Opinion surveys indicated that pessimism among personnel increased and this equated with problems like desertion. More graphically, the frequency of suicide increased.

The cohesion and size of the military changed dramatically under Gorbachev, but expertise remained inadequate. Changes essentially occurred because of the repercussions of Gorbachev's reforms. Examining the military's cohesion, the emergence of salient divisions clearly indicates that a decline occurred, and this is reflective of the divisions that emerged throughout the Soviet Union. More specifically, the relationship between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic groups was assessed. Here further tensions emerged as divergent views were held of the transitional changes, of the actions of one another, and of the responsibility for problems that personnel experienced. With regard to its size, this decline is clear given the numerical decline of personnel. This reflected the different priorities of the party leaders and the impact of their reforms on the human resources available. Finally, the military continued to lack the expertise that was needed to successfully execute the operations that its roles entailed. This is best shown by the military's performance in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Three factors

explain this inadequacy. First, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Second, personnel of a high quality left without being replaced by similarly qualified personnel. Third, the quality and quantity of training fell.

Therefore, I believe that in the context of the Soviet transition from Communism hypothesis one is valid. According to hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military. This is because the transition changed the structure of the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, military morale, and cohesion and size. Likewise, the expertise of personnel changed. It is equally clear that this change was overwhelmingly negative.

The following chapter continues to assess hypothesis one but within the context of the 1992 to 1996 period. During this period the new regime led by Yeltsin governed as the Communist regime had collapsed. The examination of this period is via the framework used here. The chapter then assesses whether there was a threat that the military would stage a coup. To identify this threat I briefly document the threats of force made by military personnel against the new regime, and then examine relevant opinions publicised during this period. This shows that the threat was recognised and deemed serious enough to warrant discussion. The brief outline of the coup threat provides the context within which hypotheses two to four are evaluated. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. These factors are detailed in the introduction. With regard to hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene.

CHAPTER IV

THE REGIME TRANSITION, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY, AND THE THREAT OF A COUP: 1992-1996

This chapter examines the second stage of the transition from Communism before briefly outlining the threat of a military coup during this period. The main section of the chapter entails an assessment of the military under the new regime led by Yeltsin. During this period the impact of the collapse of both the Soviet Union and Communist ideology reverberated throughout the Russian Federation. The military was changed by these dramatic events and this impact is examined according to the framework I have developed. Thus, the structure of the civil-military relationship and the military's roles are first outlined. Budget and popular support for the military is then examined. Following this, military cohesion and size are assessed. Finally, the military's expertise is evaluated. After the transition's impact on the military is assessed I outline the threat posed to the new regime by a coup. Here I briefly document the threats of force made by military personnel against the new regime, and then examine relevant opinions publicised during this period. These show that the coup threat was recognised and deemed serious enough to warrant discussion.

Therefore, hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is evaluated here during the changes from 1992 to 1996. The outlining of the coup threat provides the context within which hypotheses two to four are evaluated in the following chapters. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. These factors are listed in the introduction. With regard to hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four a regime transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene.

The Regime Transition and the Military: 1992-1996

Structure of the civil-military relationship

The transitional impact upon the structure of the civil-military relationship remains of greatest importance, as it directly affects the strength of civilian control and the decisions of the

civilian leaders. This ultimately determines how the military operates. The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regime had a major impact upon the structure of the civil-military relationship. Two key trends are evident during this period. First, moves were made to re-build the structure to reflect the post-Soviet environment, an environment in which the traditional civilian leadership was now absent. This meant that the structure needed to be based on the new Yeltsin led regime controlling the Russian military, as opposed to the now defunct Communist party controlling the Soviet military.[1] This is illustrated by developments during the immediate post-Soviet period. Second, despite the structural changes that occurred, characteristics of the penetration model remained. Of most relevance here is the continued promotion of a political ideology, and the presence of secret police to maintain surveillance over the military. This reflected the aim of the new regime's leaders to establish personal control over the military, thereby strengthening their own political positions. After the changes to the structure and the continued characteristics of the penetration model are outlined, I shall assess the validity of the three models that traditionally dominated the Western study of Soviet civil-military relations. These are the conflict, participatory, and symbiotic models. Given the dramatically altered nature of the civil-military structure, I believe that the usefulness of these models became ever more doubtful.

The development of the Russian military occurred after the collapse of the Soviet military and it became apparent that a unified military mirroring the former institution could not be maintained. Yeltsin continued to seek a unified military and pledged that Russia would establish its own military only after and if all the remaining republics did so. However as inter-republic tensions hindered moves to retain a unified military of the CIS, Yeltsin decreed the formation of the Russian Defence Ministry in March 1992 and initially named himself Defence Minister. The following month, Grachev, and Andrei Kokoshin, a civilian academic and renowned security analyst, were named as the first Deputy Defence Ministers. This move was encouraged by the goal of balancing the military's concerns and the demands by reformers that a civilian Defence Minister be appointed.[2] These developments laid the foundations for the establishment of the Russian military. The Russian Armed Forces were formally established on 7 May 1992 with Yeltsin naming himself Commander-in-Chief and

[1] When referring to the civil-military relationship in this chapter it is within the context of the relationship between the new regime led by Yeltsin and the Russian military. This is because of the decline and ultimate collapse of the Communist regime and Soviet military.

[2] Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no.33, 21 August 1992, p7.

providing Grachev immediate and temporary control. This was followed later that month by Grachev being made the permanent Defence Minister, a move which caused tension between Yeltsin and the parliament over the power to promote officers to high positions.[3] The move to a Russian military continued in June 1993 when control over nuclear weapons was moved to the Russian Ministry of Defence from the CIS Supreme Commander, whose office was abolished.

The post-Soviet structure of the civil-military relationship was headed by the Russian President rather than the Communist party (see model 4). According to the 1993 Constitution, the President of the Russian Federation forms and heads the Security Council, approves the military doctrine, appoints and removes the military high command, and is the supreme Commander-in-Chief.[4] The Security Council was the main military and political body controlling the defence establishment, and had the power to issue orders to the heads of ministries and local governing bodies. It also controlled the activities of organisations involved in the implementation of its decisions.[5] However the council did experience problems, such as insufficient staff, that hindered its role. [6] Indeed in late July 1996 some of its powers went to a newly established Defence Council that was chaired by Yeltsin, and made decisions on military structures, and on key questions such as the defence of Russia.[7]

Model 4: Basic Structure of the Russian Civil-Military Relationship July 1996



[3] For additional information on the structural changes see Davenport, pp183-7.
[4] The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Articles 83-87, quoted in Sakwa, pp414-5.
[5] For information on the Security Council see Sakwa, pp145-6; and Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," in *State Building And Military Power In Russia And The New States Of Eurasia*, The International Politics Of Eurasia Vol. 5, ed. Bruce Parrott (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 1995), pp15-6.
[6] See Valerrii Manilov, *Syn Otechestva* no.49, December 1993, p4 quoted in David Albright "Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Ukraine," quoted in Lovell and Albright, p37.
[7] See *The Defence Council Of The Russian Federation*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, March 1997, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c95.txt, Internet, accessed 1 August 1998, pp1-6 of 6.

The Ministry of Defence was responsible for developing and implementing military, technical, and personnel policy. With regard to the Prime Minister and the State Duma, the lower house of the bicameral Federal Assembly established by the 1993 Constitution, influence could be asserted over defence policy via the control of budgets and the Duma's Defence Committee.[8]

I believe that President Yeltsin clearly headed the civil-military structure despite military influence and insubordination. This is shown by developments under the new regime. Yeltsin was in control during the 1993 parliamentary revolt and dominated the decision-making process with regard to the 1994 invasion of Chechnya, as I argue in the following chapters. I believe that the military ultimately accepted Yeltsin's right to govern. This is most clearly shown by the lack of military support for the parliamentary revolt, and by the absence of a coup. I again examine this reluctance to directly challenge Yeltsin in later chapters when the disposition to intervene is assessed. Yeltsin also actively moved to widen his powers. Indicative of this is the draft defence law passed by the Duma in October 1995. In accordance with article IV, the President only needed to notify the legislature that he intended to declare war, mobilise the military, and introduce martial law. The President could also launch a nuclear strike without approval from the legislature.[9] Moreover, Yeltsin in early 1995 contemplated removing the General Staff and having the military report directly to him.

Yeltsin also actively sought to limit the role of other members of the new regime and the role of the legislature. With regard to members of the new regime, of relevance here are the moves to limit the Prime Minister's role. The Russian Constitution initially made the Minister of Defence subordinate to the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers; however, Yeltsin decreed that the Minister of Defence was directly subordinate to the President and did not have to report to the Prime Minister. Turning to the legislature, with the 1992 Law on Defence the legislature failed to gain authority over the confirmation of the Defence Minister and his Deputies. The 1993 Constitution and a Presidential Decree further weakened the

[8] For information on the Federal Assembly-parliament see The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Articles 94-109, quoted in Sakwa, pp417-21.

[9] Stephen Blank, (paper presented at the Clingandael, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Ebenhaus conference on the OSCE Code of Military-Political Conduct, The Hague, December 10-12, 1995) available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c88, Internet, accessed 22 March 1997, p4 of 15.

authority of the legislature.[10] Moreover, only 11 of 128 budget lines in the Ministry of Defence's annual budget request were available to parliamentary scrutiny.[11] Yeltsin acted with little regard of the legislature. Yeltsin did not formally consult the Duma before sending a peacekeeping force to the former Yugoslavia in 1994, and the same year there was no communication with the Duma before the invasion of Chechnya. More recently, some moves have been made to widen civilian oversight. For instance, in May 1996, The Law on Defence was passed. This meant that for the deployment of personnel for "other than their primary purpose" the consent of the Federation Council, the upper house of the parliament, was required.[12] However, as is clear, such moves are not consistent with the main trend.

Penetration methods of control were realigned during this period to enhance the President's authority. Though the monopoly of one ideology had been broken, loyalty to Yeltsin was promoted through the continued penetration of the military. For instance, the Department of Military Politics in the Presidential Chief of Staff's Office was established to politically 'screen' personnel from division command level up. Similarly, the Main Personnel Directorate (MPD), the successor of the MPA, operated during this period. By late 1993 it employed 20 Generals, compared to the 345 employed by the MPA before the 1991 coup.[13] This was another organisation used by Yeltsin to promote support for the new regime. When many personnel supported Zhirinovsky, leader of the LDPR, during the 1993 Duma elections, it faced restructuring.[14] In line with the move to competitive elections, the new regime also used penetration methods to win electoral support. This is shown by the 1996 presidential elections. In March 1996, Grachev ordered that all officers spend 4 to 6 hours studying Yeltsin's State of the Federation speech, and military academies were instructed to insert it in their curriculum. Similarly, personnel were assembled to listen to Yeltsin supporters and the official Ministry of Defence press promoted Yeltsin daily. As the military and associated

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[10] For information on the lack of legislative oversight see Alexander Belkin and James Brusstar, *A Military in Charge of Itself: Civilian Control is a Russian Myth*, no.50, Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, October 1995, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum50.html, Internet, accessed 1 February 1998, pp1-6 of 6.

[11] Vladimir Averchev, "The Chechnya War and a Crisis of Russian Statehood," (paper presented at the III Annual Conference on Russian Defence Decision-Making, War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy', Monterey, CA., 7-8 November 1995, p5) quoted in Blank, conference paper, p2.

[12] Laura Belin, "Duma Passes Law On Defense," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, NSS, Internet, 25 April 1996, accessed 14 April 1998.

[13] Stephen Foye, "Defense Personnel Directorate To Be Reduced," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 4 January 1994, accessed 15 April 1998; and Colonel O. Valdykin, "Iz Moskvy: Komissiya zavershaet rabotu," *KZ*, 20 November 1991, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p137.

[14] See Thomas Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" Zhirinovsky and the Russian Armed Forces," *AFS* 21, no.3 (Spring 1995): p330; and *The Independent*, 31 December 1993, p1, quoted in Christopher Bellamy, "Political Commissars Get Their Marching Orders," Reuters, 31 December 1993.

military-industrial complex had a potential 40 million voters this was critical.[15] Likewise, the secret police remained active, the KGB's monitoring role was simply taken over by other organisations. The largest internal security organisation was the Federal Security Service (FSB). The service by early 1997 had a formal strength of 76,000 personnel and an extensive network of informers.[16] More specifically, the Ministry of Security continued to control the personnel of the Special Departments (SDs) tasked with monitoring the military. Airborne personnel throughout 1992 and 1993 told Carey Schofield that their activities had increased.[17] Likewise, figures popular with personnel, such as Lebed, were closely monitored. Indeed two officers were arrested in the Trans-Dniester Republic during late 1995, allegedly to obtain evidence on Lebed for the new regime.[18]

The military remained politically active, especially relative to the pre-Gorbachev period, as Communist control structures collapsed or were restructured.[19] Although the political activism of most personnel was confined to voting and very few sought to directly challenge the new regime, as I argue later, it is clear that the military was politically active.[20] This is most dramatically shown by the parliamentary revolt, during which a minimal number of personnel challenged Yeltsin's authority. The military as an institution defeated the revolt. This event clearly indicates Yeltsin's willingness to use the military to protect his position and override its reluctance to act. Apart from this, during the 1993 elections, 25 active duty servicemen and officers along with 2 semi-retired officers in single member districts or on party lists stood for office, and 9 were elected.[21] In the 1995 elections military personnel again were candidates. The Ministry of Defence alone sponsored 123 officers, of which it sought to win the election

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[15] Timothy Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections: Dissatisfaction Continues to Grow in the Armed Forces," *JSMS* 9, no.3 (September 1996): p541.

[16] See "Heirs to the KGB," *IISS Strategic Comments* 3, no.2, March 1997, p1. For more information on the various security forces see Timothy Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions in the Russian Army," *Orbis*, 39, no.4 (Fall 1995): pp534-6; Mark Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces-a city's balance of power," *JIR* 9 no.2 (February 1997): pp51-4; and Jacob Kipp, "Military Pluralism And The Dilemma Of Russian Military Professionalism: Implications For Civil-Military Relations," (paper presented at the Strategic Conference: Russia Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 22-25 April 1997), Attachment to E-mail from Jacob Kipp (KIPPJ@LEAV-EMH1.ARMY.MIL) . to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 4 November 1997, pp6-19 of 27.

[17] Schofield, pp238-9.

[18] *Pravda Weekly* no.5, 1995, n.p., quoted in "Federal Security Service Searching for Evidence Against Lebed," *Analytica Moscow: Politica Weekly Press Summary Electronic mail version* 2 no.37, 23-9 September 1995. See also Timothy Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p527.

[19] I examine in detail the degree of political activity among personnel and the factors that shaped the military's political stance in the following chapters

[20] For an overview of the military's political role see Brusstar and Jones, "How Can The Military's Role Be Explained?" *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34how.html, pp1-2 of 2.

[21] Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp329-30.

of 35. However Grachev failed miserably, as only 3 of his candidates were elected in districts. In total, 19 military officers (8 active and 11 retired) entered the Duma, with 13 winning districts and 6 entering the Duma through party lists.[22] Personnel also were involved in various groups that were politically active despite legislation against such involvement. For example, the Ministry of Justice officially registered at least 20 officers' organisations.[23]

During this period the three theoretical models of Soviet civil-military relations became ever more redundant. This is fundamentally because all three were based on the relationship between the now defunct Soviet military and ruling Communist party. The conflict model remained relevant in the context that much conflict did occur. However the military did not unite against the regime. This should become clear in the following chapters, where I argue that the military did not unite behind an opponent of Yeltsin or become predisposed to using force against him. Nor was the conflict that did arise a result of contradictory and incompatible military and party traits given the party had fallen from power. Turning to the participatory model, both conflict and cooperation occurred and personnel were reluctant to become politically active beyond voting. This largely concurred with Colton's argument that although officers were politically active this activity was restricted to official prerogatives and sanctions. However Colton also envisaged a "full-scale intervention" if "a reformist civilian leadership embarking [ed] upon policies of ideological revision, military demobilization, shifting of investment priorities, and accommodation with foreign adversaries such as would alarm military leaders."[24] Despite these developments the military did not intervene against Yeltsin. Finally, it is clear that the military was not the obedient bureaucracy Odom described, again in the context of its relationship with the now defunct Communist party.[25]

Institutional roles

During the 1992-1996 period the roles allocated to the military continued to differ from those before 1985, as further changes were made by the new regime. These changes again are significant as they had a wide-ranging impact upon the military. The dramatic nature of post-Soviet changes is illustrated by the moves to deploy military forces to accomplish goals

[22] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp534-6, 541-2.
[23] Mendeloff, p233.
[24] Colton, *Commissars*, p288.
[25] For a more in-depth evaluation of the models in the context of post-Soviet experiences see Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, pp153-79. Herspring concluded that no model explained civil-military relations after Gorbachev. This was because the military's poor cohesion ensured that relations remained in flux and the lack of

substantially different from those during the Cold War. Whereas the 1917 transition to Communism meant that the military became the instrument of the Communist party and protector of the Soviet Union, the opposite occurred after 1991. Under Yeltsin the military's traditional roles were replaced by commitments to Russia and the CIS, as perceived by the President. The Soviet collapse also meant that the military's role in meeting security challenges derived from ethnic and separatist tensions was expanded, as forces were now deployed to protect Russians in the 'near abroad,' the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Accompanying this change was the continued absence of the military's predominant external and anti-West role before Gorbachev. Having outlined these changes, I shall argue that developments occurred in accordance with the priorities and threat perceptions of the new regime.

Transitional developments are indicative of these role changes. Initial moves were made to re-allocate the military roles in accordance with Yeltsin's perception of Russian and CIS interests with the May 1992 appearance of the draft military doctrine. This draft made no reference to Marxist ideology, and identified Russia's primary political goal in a war as defending Russian sovereignty and territory, along with that of its CIS allies.[26] 'The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation' were approved in November 1993. These provisions identified the expansion of military blocs and alliances as a potential military danger, but concluded that "the main danger" was now posed by local wars and armed conflicts.[27] The provisions further stated that "the main objective" of the military was to "localize a seat of tension and terminate military operations at the earliest possible stage."[28] The internal role of the military also remained important and continued to 'overshadow' its pre-1985 anti-West and externally oriented role. The military's domestic deployment was limited compared to the number externally deployed before the reorientation. Forces in Afghanistan peaked at 118,000 in 1986, whereas in the Chechnyan region they peaked at

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clarity over the process of national security decision-making. Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, pp189-90.

[26] See Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no.40, 9 October 1992, pp45-50.

[27] Raymond Garthoff, "Russian Military Doctrine And Deployments," in *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States Of Eurasia*, ed. Bruce Parrott, p58. See also p57. For additional information see Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," RFE/RL *Research Report* 2, no.46, 19 November 1993, pp44-50.

[28] Garthoff, pp58-9.

65,000 in 1996. [29] Yet it is clear that the role became more important relative to its anti-West role. Forces outside of Russia and the 'near abroad' (excluding peacekeepers) peaked at 11,365 in 1992.[30] The military's internal role was again formally recognised as the 'Basic Provisions' identified a number of potential internal security threats. The main one was the "illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out using armed violence."[31] Two events under Yeltsin most clearly illustrate this domestic role. First, the military was deployed against the supporters of the parliamentary revolt who barricaded themselves in the White House. The military's role in the revolt is examined in later chapters.

Second, in December 1994 the military invaded Chechnya. Chechnya had declared itself independent in 1991 under President Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General. Russia opposed independence and established an economic blockade, but economic activity continued. After the failure of various attempts to remove Dudayev, including an attack on the capital Grozny involving Russian personnel in November 1994, the republic was invaded.[32] The resultant war continued until late 1996 when a peace agreement was signed. The conflict cost at least 6,000 soldiers their lives with another 50,000 civilians killed.[33] Apart from this campaign, personnel were also used to enforce the law and collect taxes. In mid-1995, 23,000 army and interior personnel were assigned to Moscow to help ensure security in the capital.[34]

These developments were accompanied by the dramatic emergence of the military's security role within the 'near abroad.' The 1993 'Basic Provisions' referred to the 'near abroad,' and stated that a source of military danger was "the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states."[35] The most visible sign of this new role is the Russian military's increased deployment in the 'near abroad' for

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[29] *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, p46; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p115. The Chechnyan figure is derived from the number of personnel in the North Caucasus MD.
[30] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p101.
[31] Garthoff, p58.
[32] For an in-depth examination of the Chechnyan war see Carlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal, *Chechnya: A Small Victorious War* (London: Pan Books, 1997). For a more specific examination of the invasion see Andei Raevsky, "Russian Military Performance in Chechnya: An initial evaluation," *JSMS* 8, no.4 (December 1995): pp681-90.
[33] Gall and Waal, p360.
[34] Interfax, 21 June 1995, quoted in Stephen Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation And Russian Democracy*, 17 August 1995, available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs95/ruslegis/ruslegis.txt, Internet, accessed 26 June 1998, p9 of 31.
[35] Garthoff, p57.

'peacekeeping' operations, the diplomatic framework for this role being established through the CIS.[36] Although the forces deployed in the 'near abroad' declined significantly as withdrawals from the republics were executed, Russian forces remained stationed in the region throughout this period. For instance, in 1992 personnel numbered over 231,000, by 1996 they numbered around 18,400.[37] A particularly publicised example of the military's 'peacekeeping' role in the 'near abroad' is the 1992 deployment of the 14th Army in Moldavia in support of the pro-Russian Trans-Dniester Republic.[38] This is well known because its Commander from 1992 to 1995 was Colonel Lebed who was willing to dispute the wisdom of his orders and use force to make peace between the warring factions.[39]

Contrasting these roles, the military's anti-West and externally oriented role before Gorbachev remained limited. Although Russian foreign policy became more assertive, relative to the immediate post-Soviet period, during this time the military's primary role did not revert back to that of the Cold War. This is shown by the continued decline in the military's traditional deployments. Forces deployed outside of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty states (excluding peacekeepers) in 1991 numbered over 20,275, by 1992 the number outside of Russia and the former Soviet republics was around 11,365. By 1996 this had declined further to 2,160.[40] In line with this, military cooperation with the West increased. Whereas in 1991 Soviet personnel were deployed in two United Nation peacekeeping operations and numbered around 20, by 1992 they numbered 1,011 and were deployed in four such operations. This had increased further by 1996 to over 2,000 personnel in nine operations.[41] Despite some problems, Russian and Western military cooperation increased

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[36] The Russian definition of peacekeeping is much wider than that used in the West, including activities that would be termed enforcement operations or counter insurgency in the West.
[37] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, pp100-101; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p115.
[38] For information on the military's deployment in the 'near abroad' and 'peacekeeping' see Frank Umbach, "The Role and Influence of the Military Establishment in Russia's Foreign and Security Policies in the Yeltsin Era," *JSMS* 9, no.3 (September 1996): pp467-500; M.J. Orr, *The Russian Army And Peacekeeping*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, June 1994, available from gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/a97mjo.txt, Internet, accessed 13 March 1996, pp1-10 of 10; and Baev, pp127-49. For accounts of the military's deployment in the 'near abroad' by personnel see Schofield, pp231-54.
[39] See S. Simonsen, "Going His Own Way: A Profile of General Aleksandr Lebed," *JSMS* 8, no.3 (September 1995): pp529-34.
[40] *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p45; *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p101; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p119.
[41] Ibid.

too, and forces were re-deployed from the Western borders.[42] With regard to greater military cooperation, this included joint Russian and American exercises like 'Peacekeeper 94.'

As with the Gorbachev period, these role changes were essentially motivated by the new regime's perceptions of security and evaluation of transitional developments. This is shown by the post-Soviet threat perceptions that shaped the 'Basic Provisions.' The provisions put forward by the Ministry of Defence de-emphasised the military's role of meeting the external threat posed by the West, and fighting in a world nuclear or conventional war.[43] Contrasting this, the threat posed by the violation of Russian rights in the 'near abroad' was recognised by the 1992 draft military doctrine and 'Basic Provisions.'[44] Transitional developments also influenced the military's roles. The use of personnel to collect taxes was encouraged by the failure of the taxation system, and widespread crime that were deemed to warrant drastic action.[45]

More specifically, the influence of the new regime's threat perceptions is shown by the military's role in the 'near abroad.' This role was motivated by post-Soviet conflict and the consequent perceived threat to Russian interests. For instance, by the spring of 1992 only two of the 23 borders separating former Soviet republics were not contested.[46] Yeltsin's perceptions are again important, as during debate over Russian policy toward the 'near abroad' in 1992 he criticised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' preoccupation with the West. A result of this was the move to more closely assess foreign policy and military interests here.[47] Influential in encouraging military deployments to meet threats was the promotion and protection of Russian interests and security, as perceived by the civilian and military leadership.[48] The importance of the 'near abroad' was reinforced by the goal of re-integrating the post-Soviet region and the Russian military's role in policy-making. The military

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[42] See McCarthy, pp743-78; Baev, pp90-100; and Richard Staar, "Beyond the Unipolar Moment," *Orbis* 40, no.3 (Summer 1996): pp375-80.
[43] See Garthoff, p57; and Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," p47. With regard to the 1992 draft doctrine see Scott Michael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no.40, 9 October 1992, p45.
[44] See Garthoff, p57.
[45] With regard to the use of personnel as police see Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Proposes That Army Aid in Crime Fighting," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 3 June 1993, accessed 27 April 1998.
[46] Schofield, p231.
[47] John Lepingwell, "Yeltsin's Calls For Tougher Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no.44, 6 November 1992, p17, quoted in John Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad," *Survival* 36, no.3 (Autumn 1994): p73.
[48] See Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy," pp70-82; and Umbach, pp475-9.

ultimately sought to establish a united military.[49] Finally, the military's role was facilitated by the vulnerability of former Soviet republics.[50]

Contrasting these developments was the continued downplaying of traditional threat perceptions that prevented a return of the military's anti-West role. Here again the security perceptions of the new regime are vital. Changes occurred against a background of generally close relations between Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton.[51] Correspondingly, though many officers continued to be suspicious of the US the military hierarchy did not view the superpower as a threat on a comparable scale to during the Cold War. Grachev characterised 'Peacekeeper 94' as a move toward cooperation and in 1993, 67 percent of officers considered that the main threat to Russia's security came from inside rather than outside the state. [52] This contrasts the strong anti-American sentiments of officers during the Cold War. The decline of the anti-West role was further encouraged by the importance placed on positive relations. In fact the new regime employed private American advisers close to the Clinton administration to help win Yeltsin's re-election in 1996.[53]

Budgetary support

Support for the military continued to be limited, relative to the pre-transitional period. In roubles the budget increased but it failed to keep pace with high inflation, and thus in real terms decreased significantly. Though expenditure remained high relative to other countries, and it is difficult to determine the exact level of expenditure because of conflicting estimates, it is apparent that the military's budget in real terms declined. Changes in the real level of budgetary support occurred in accordance with the continued downplaying of the military's external role. After I have covered the level of expenditure I shall outline the main factors behind this. Most importantly, resources became increasingly unavailable because of the economic situation and the many demands placed on the economy. Furthermore, even the support that was granted did not necessarily reach the personnel most in need, as corruption was rampant.

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[49] See Umbach, pp481-8. With regard to the military's role in policy making also see Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," pp22-4; and "Your policy or mine?" *The Economist* 329, no.7835, 30 October 1993, pp55, 58.

[50] Umbach, pp488-9.

[51] With regard to the President's view of Clinton see Yeltsin, *The View*, p136.

[52] Vladimir Gondusov and Nikolay Goncharov, untitled radio broadcast, n.d., carried by Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian, 1249 GMT, 7 September 1994, in "Grachev speaks to Secretary Perry from Totskoye Exercises," FBIS, London, UK 071502Z September 1994, quoted in McCarthy, p761; and Alexander Zhilin, "If the War Comes Tomorrow," *Moskovskie Novosti* no.2, 9-16 January 1994, quoted in Baev, footnote 49, p23.

It is clear that the defence budget in roubles increased, but in real terms declined under the new regime. It remains difficult to compare Soviet and Russian defence budgets because of the problematical nature of obtaining accurate information during the Soviet era, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and conflicting figures. With regard to roubles, the official defence budget increased from 901 million roubles in 1992, to 80,185 million in 1996 (see table 8 and graph 2). However in real terms a decline occurred because of high inflation. Inflation is estimated to have averaged 583.1 percent from 1992 to 1996.[54] The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that Russian defence expenditure was $US146 billion in 1992. By 1996 this had declined to an estimated $73 billion (see table 8). To put this in perspective, US defence expenditure fell from $US286.1 billion in 1992, to $266.4 billion in 1996.[55] The IISS in 1994 calculated that in real terms official military expenditure might have declined by 40 percent from 1989 to 1994.[56] The IISS further estimated in 1996 that after 1992 the real decrease in military expenditure had been about 45 percent.[57] Cuts encouraged Grachev to declare in 1994 that "We must frankly ask ourselves the question-do we need an army? If so, it is a sin to keep it in poverty and half-starved."[58] These comments were echoed by his successor, Colonel General Igor Rodionov. Rodionov in 1996 stated that "The day starts and ends in searching for money for the army."[59] The severing of power to the Strategic Nuclear Missile Command Centre in September 1994 because electricity bills had not been paid further shows this fall in support. Similarly, the procurement of weaponry declined sharply.[60] Only 775 main battle tanks and 2,030 infantry fighting vehicles were produced from 1992 to 1996, compared to 850 tanks and 3,000 infantry fighting vehicles in 1991 alone.[61]

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[53] See Michael Kramer, "Rescuing Boris," *Time*, no vol. or no., 15 July 1996, pp19-27.
[54] IISS, *The Military Balance 1994-1995* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1994), p111; IISS, *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, (London: Oxford University for the IISS, 1995), p113; *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p113; and IISS, *The Military Balance 1998-1999* (London, Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998) p108. With regard to the growth of the defence budget see *The Military Balance 1998-1999*, Table 14, p105.
[55] *The Military Balance* 1996-*1997*, Table 5, p21. The figures refer to the national budget defence function outlay.
[56] *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, p281.
[57] *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p107.
[58] Steven Erlanger, "Russia's Army Seen As Failing Chechnya Test," *NYT* Ondisc, 25 December 1994, p1.
[59] JR Orr, *The Current State Of The Russian Armed Forces*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, n.d., available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d60.txt, Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, p6 of 18.
[60] See Benjamin Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no.2 (March/April 1995): pp88-9.
[61] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, in IISS, *The Military Balance 1998-1999* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998), Table 15, p106.

Table 8: Official Russian Defence Budget and Military Expenditure 1992-1996

Years	Official total defence budget in millions of roubles	Military expenditure US$ billion IISS estimates	Percentage of GDP IISS estimates
1992	901	146	12
1993	3,116	114	9
1994	40,626	101	9
1995	59,379	86	8
1996	80,185	73	7

The rouble figures are based on official Russian information and the US figures are IISS estimates. Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1998-1999* (London, Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998) Table 14, p105.

This trend was essentially a result of the numerous demands placed on the increasingly limited resources available. The key transitional problem that facilitated this trend was the economy's poor performance, which denied the new regime the resources required to adequately fund the military. Though I believe that living conditions were not too extreme for the majority of civilians, it is clear that serious economic problems were experienced.[62] Between 1990 and 1995 GDP fell by some 50 percent, compared to a cumulative fall of around 31 percent in US GNP during the depression.[63] This occurred against a background of resources being lost with the Soviet Union's collapse and an increasing inability to collect taxes. Russia lost 10 percent of the Soviet Union's oil and 20 percent of its natural gas.[64] Similarly, in 1994 only 36 percent of budgeted revenue was received by the Ministry of Finance because of widespread tax revenue shortfalls. [65] Financial strains were worsened by the diversification of the military's roles after 1985, and it continued to incur the high costs of performing its internal security roles. This is clearly shown by the costs incurred during the Chechnyan war, costs that were not met with an adequate increase in support.[66] Furthermore, other armed forces deprived the military of resources. Though paramilitary forces declined from 520,000 in 1992 they still numbered 352,000 in 1996, a decline of 32.3 percent whereas

[62] With regard to the seriousness of living conditions see chapter 7, pp330-2.
[63] Sakwa, p236. See also pp231-54.
[64] Sakwa, pp30-1.
[65] *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, p109.
[66] See *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp108-9.

Graph 2: IISS Estimates of Russian Military Expenditure in Real Terms 1992-1996



Source: Table 8, p165.

the military services declined by an average of 48 percent.[67] Finally, the allocation of resources to the military did not guarantee that those most in need received it. The high level of corruption diverted many resources away from their intended destinies, such as the construction of military housing.[68]

Popular support for the military

As under Gorbachev, the general perception of the military, officers, and military service remained negative under Yeltsin. This contrasted the pre-1985 period when the military had been highly regarded and officers enjoyed a high status among civilians. Though there was some support of the military, negative perceptions are again evident at the highest levels. Public denouncements of the military by the civilian leaders continued despite the new regime taking power. A lack of support among the general public is also evident. This is illustrated by the hostile attitudes many civilians showed toward the military. This hostility is apparent when surveys of the period are examined. Problems that had become increasingly serious under Gorbachev remained evident under Yeltsin too. For instance, draft evasion and a lack of interest in serving remained. I attribute this negative trend to the same key factors that encouraged negative perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Second, the new roles allocated to the military and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions.

Evidence of the negative perception of the military is widespread. At the highest level the leaders of the new regime openly attacked the military. Yeltsin's televised meeting with the military after Chechnyan rebels seized the Russian town of Kizlyar in January 1996 dramatically shows this. During this meeting Yeltsin furiously attacked those present for allowing the seizure and declared "We have received another blow. How should we understand you, generals? Playing with toys, are you?"[69] Limited support is likewise evident among the general public, and this is indicated by the hostile attitudes among many civilians. I examine civilian attitudes toward the military in-depth when I examine whether an opportunity for a coup arose, but will briefly outline the negative attitudes that appear to have

[67] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p101; *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p119.

[68] See C.J. Dick, *A Bear Without Claws: The Russian Army in the Nineties*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1996, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c89.txt, Internet, accessed 11 March 1996, p6 of 8; and Alexander Zhilin, "Corruption Keeps Generals In Line," *Jamestown Prism* no vol, no no., 22 September 1995, available from http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/russia_/rusmil7.txt, Internet, accessed 18 August 1998, pp1-8 of 8.

increased under Yeltsin. Overall, 41 percent of civilians in a survey conducted soon after Yeltsin took power did not indicate that they had any confidence in the military and personnel themselves were clearly aware of their lack of support.[70] A 1992 poll found that 50 percent of officers believed that their relations with the local population had worsened since 1991, and more than one third believed that relations with local political authorities and the local mass media had become strained.[71] In 1994, only 11 percent of mid-level and senior officers believed that officers enjoyed popular respect and only 4 percent stated that General level officers were respected.[72] Indeed officers in Chelyabinsk during 1992 were ordered to wear civilian clothes to work to reduce the likelihood of attack.

In addition, it is apparent that many civilians were reluctant to serve and many personnel sought to leave the military. Before Gorbachev evasion was rare, but draft evasion remained a serious problem under Yeltsin. In 1989, 2,800 avoided the draft in Russia and by 1994, 27,500 avoided the spring call-up.[73] In the spring of 1996, 26,000 avoided the draft.[74] Of those that were drafted in 1995, fewer than 12 percent indicated that they were pleased to serve whereas in 1986 the percentage was 63 percent and in 1975, 78 percent.[75] The low number of applicants for officer schools exacerbated this problem. Before Gorbachev competition for entry was intense. However in 1989 there were 1.9 applicants for each place and this had declined to 1.6 by 1994.[76] Moreover over 50 percent of applicants left before they were commissioned.[77]

The negative perception of the military was facilitated and encouraged by the new regime's leaders. The decline of the military's image can essentially be attributed to the same two factors that encouraged similar perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by

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[69] Gall and Waal, p289.
[70] Mark Rhodes, "Political Attitudes in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no.3, 15 January 1993, p42, quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p166.
[71] V. Mukhin, "God posle 'putcha'. Chem zhivet armiia?" *Armiia* no.18, 1992, p48, quoted in Mendeloff, p239.
[72] James Brusstar and Ellen Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, *National Defence University Strategic Forum*, *Number 15*, Institute For National Strategic Studies, January 1994 (sic 1995), available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum 15.html, Internet, accessed 10 December 1997, p1 of 5.
[73] N. Yefimov, *The Army, Society, Reform*. Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1995, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/ad1027.txt, Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, p5 of 12.
[74] O. Falichev, "Call-Up-96: Who Will Stand Under the Colours," *KZ*, 11 April 1996, p1, quoted in Orr, *The Current State*, p3. See also Thomas, "Fault Lines," p540.
[75] *Moskva*, no.10, n.d., n.p., quoted in "Russians Don't Want to Serve in Army," *Jamestown Monitor* 1, no.44, 3 July 1995, available from http://www. Jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/044_018.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998; and Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, p108.
[76] V. kokhukhovskiy, "We Are Looking For Talented Youths, *KZ*, 4 January 1996, p2, quoted in Orr, *The Current State*, p6.

Gorbachev meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Most evident of this is the publicising of the military's corruption and its poor performance in Chechnya. Grachev was nicknamed "Pasha Mercedes" because of his corruption, and was named "Russia's Most Incompetent Commander" by the press because of the disastrous Chechnyan campaign.[78] Another result of the political liberalism instigated by Gorbachev was the increasingly organised and active protests by groups. For example, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers sought better conditions for draftees and played a leading role protesting against the Chechnyan war.[79]

Second, the new roles allocated to the military and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions. Of greatest importance was the invasion of Chechnya, the unpopularity of the operation, and resultant problems that reinforced negative perceptions. Indicative of Russian attitudes is a December 1994 poll that found only slightly over 20 percent supported the invasion and anti-war protests occurred throughout the war.[80] Likewise, the military's role during the 1993 parliamentary revolt lacked popular support, as I argue when the military's opportunity to intervene is assessed. [81] Finally, the deployment of personnel in the former Soviet republics reinforced negative perceptions, as they were increasingly viewed as occupiers.[82] By March 1994, 107 soldiers had been killed and a further 193 wounded in 'peacekeeping' operations.[83] Thus, the negative perception of the military was again derived from the close association of the military with the discredited Communist party, and the general decline of military capability.[84]

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[77] Dick, *A Bear*, p5.
[78] Kevin Fedarko, "The Red-Army Blues," *Time* no vol., no. 49, 5 December 1994, p24. With regard to Chechnya see *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, p1, quoted in James Jackson, "Fighting The Press," *Time*, no vol. or no., 23 January 1995, p20.
[79] See Brenda Vallance, *Shaping Society's Demands: Russian Soldiers' Mothers And Military Reform*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, December 1996, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c91.txt, Internet, accessed 18 May 1997, pp1-14 of 14.
[80] With regard to the 1994 poll see Julia Wishnevsky, "Invasion Of Chechnya Unpopular In Russia," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 12 December 1994, accessed 6 April 1998. For information on anti-war protests see Wishnevsky, "Anti-War Demo In Moscow," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 3 May 1996, accessed 6 April 1998.
[81] See chapter 7, p328.
[82] Dick, *The Current State*, p3.
[83] Orr, *The Russian Army and Peacekeeping*, p1.
[84] For a summary of the decline in the perception of the military see Serge Schmemann, "Russia's Military: A Shrivelled And Volatile Legacy," *NYT* Ondisc, 28 November 1993, section 1, pp1, 6-7.

Morale

As is to be expected with the low level of support for the military, poor morale among personnel was widespread. The unwillingness of most soldiers to serve, as evident after the 1917 revolution, and the continued exodus of large numbers of officers illustrate this. Most graphically however, the frequency of suicide among personnel increased. After outlining the level of morale, I shall examine the factors behind the widespread pessimism. I again attribute the decline in morale to the negative impact of the transition upon the military, and believe that the contrast of this with the traditionally high level of support the military enjoyed exacerbated the decline. More specifically, I believe that the decline occurred as many personnel were pessimistic about their future, the military continued to lack support, undertook unpopular roles, and faced the collapse of the empire it was sworn to defend. I also believe that although many personnel showed little attachment to the Communist ideology, at least some grieved its demise because of their indoctrination during the Soviet period.

A lack of morale is widely evident. Indeed Yeltsin in 1992 claimed that "The demoralization of a once well-organized military machine in certain military combined units is going so far that there is a potential threat both to Russian society and to the Army itself."[85] The widespread lack of morale is shown by the pessimistic perceptions of many personnel and their resultant actions. The majority of conscripts in 1980 at least recognised the importance of military service. However in surveys during 1994 nearly 70 percent of conscripts believed that military service was unnecessary, and 35 percent indicated that they were ready to emigrate from their 'motherland.' The surveys also found that every second conscript thought that concepts like military duty, honour, and patriotism were values that no longer had any meaning.[86] Similarly, officers continued to leave the military in large numbers. By August 1991 up to 27,000 officers under the age of 30 had resigned from the military. However over 75,000 under 30 left from 1992 to 1994.[87] Pessimism was present among even elite personnel.[88] It was against this background that suicide rates increased. Whereas suicides accounted for 21.9 percent of deaths in the military during 1991, for the first 7 months of

[85] "Predsezdovskie khlopoty vlastey," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 November 1992, pp1-2 carried in FBIS, 25 November 1992, quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p168.
[86] Yefimov and Deryugin, pp60-6, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p153; and "Obshchestvo bolno bezdukhovnoctyu, Luchsee sredstvo ot etogo-patriotizm" *KZ*, 12 April 1994, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p174.
[87] Lieutenant Colonel S. Akhundzyanov, "Providing Social Justice," *Vennyy Vestnik*, August 1991, p22, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet military*, p7; and Dick, *A Bear*, p5. See also Yefimov, p2.
[88] Schofield, pp233-41, 245-7.

1992 the percentage was 28.1 percent.[89] Similarly, although desertion had once been rare, in 1993 an average of 120 conscripts deserted every week.[90]

This decline in morale is attributable to the negative impact of the transition upon the military. Most generally, many personnel were pessimistic about the turbulent changes that occurred with the transition. This is shown by 1994 survey findings. These indicate that only one in ten mid-level officers believed that production levels or living conditions would increase in the near future, and 82 percent predicted more unemployment. [91] It is also clear that the fall in support of the military had a serious impact on personnel. In 1992, 70 percent of officers indicated that the main reason for them leaving the military was the feeling that society did not recognise the social significance of their profession.[92] The military's unpopular and poorly organised roles also contributed to the lack of morale. This is best illustrated by the demoralising impact of the Chechnyan debacle. Veterans of the war recalled that "Many thought they would not get out [of Chechnya] alive."[93] Personnel operating elsewhere also suffered from poor morale because of their low pay and casualties. In 1994, 43 percent of 400 personnel deployed in Tajikistan indicated that they did not wish to serve. [94]

Poor service conditions further eroded morale. It is clear that poor service conditions continued to be a serious issue. In 1992, 78 percent of officers believed that the "material situation of military personnel compared to the rest of society is worsening."[95] Whereas Gabriel (1980) found that 50 percent of officers believed that their accommodation was adequate or better than civilian housing, in 1994 less than a quarter described their living conditions as good or very good.[96] Regardless of rank, personnel also faced long delays before they received any pay, which in turn did not match inflation. Though before Gorbachev the level of pay officers received was favourable relative to many civilians, and a

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[89] TRW Waters, *The New Russian Army One Year On*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 11 August 1993, available from gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d59, Internet, accessed 18 March 1996, p3 of 7. See also Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p174; and Doug Clarke, "Suicide A Problem In Military," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 10 July 1995, accessed 16 March 1998.

[90] Yu Deryugin, *Nedelya*, no.10, 1993, n.p., quoted in Dick, *The Current State*, p2.

[91] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p2.

[92] Waters, *The New Russian Army*, p4.

[93] Slava Naumov, interview by Gall, 10 October 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p210.

[94] *Armiya* no.8, no month, 1994, n.p., quoted in Orr, *The Russian Army And Peacekeeping*, p7. See also pp5-10; and *The Moscow Times*, 12 August 1997, n.p., quoted in Carlotta Gall, "Military Malaise Turns Peacekeeper To Killer," Reuters, 12 August 1997.

[95] F Makarov, V. Frolov, N. Miloradov, D. Osipov, "Na chto nadeiutsia ofitsery i praporshchiki?" *Armiia* no no., 21-22 November 1992, p24, quoted in Mendeloff, footnote 7, p229.

[96] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p2; and Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p65.

Platoon Commander's pay in 1990 was 5.5 times greater than the minimum living wage, by 1996 it was only 1.5 times greater.[97] Likewise, accommodation continued to be in short supply. In mid-1990 an estimated 74,000 officers lived in accommodation so substandard that it rivalled the worst slums in the West. By early 1996 an estimated 50,000 officers continued to live in slum conditions.[98] Indeed from June to December 1995 there were 20 reported malnutrition deaths among personnel, whereas before Gorbachev the majority of personnel told Gabriel (1980) that the amount of food was adequate.[99] Health problems remained widespread too. Indicative of this is the increase by 35 percent of internal diseases among soldiers from 1982 to 1994.[100] Other problems included the reduced job security for officers and their increased workload because of staff shortages.[101]

The collapse of both the Soviet superpower and Communist ideology hit morale too. Though I believe that most personnel accepted the demise of the Soviet Union and few believed that force should have been used to prevent its collapse, surveys indicated that many opposed its collapse. In 1994, 70 percent of mid-level and senior officers agreed that "the disintegration of the Soviet Union is a misfortune for our country."[102] Many personnel opposed the retreat from East Europe too, as the Soviet superpower status was lost along with territory, military bases, and equipment.[103] At least some personnel also mourned the loss of Communism, the ideology they had been sworn to protect. For instance, some airborne personnel indicated to Schofield that they grieved the party's loss. [104] Iuri Chernavin wrote that the fall of Communism, and the failure to replace it, meant that there was an absence of the "ideas and spiritual values which would make it possible to have a purposeful, instructive influence on servicemen."[105] However I do not believe that the fall of the ideology had a serious impact on

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[97] Jones, *Red Army*, p83. With regard to the pay of platoon officers see Orr, *The Current State*, p14. With regard to civilian and military incomes see chapter 6, p275.

[98] Fedurin, "Our Defenders Need Defending," quoted in *Crisis in the Former Soviet Military*, p9; and Dick, *A Bear*, p5. With regard to conditions also see Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pp165-7, 172-3; *Crisis In The Former Soviet military*, pp9-10; Mendeloff, pp228-9; and Orr, *The Current State*, pp7-10, 14.

[99] "Starving Soldiers Make Good Deserters," *Moscow News* no.9, 7-13 March 1996, p4; and Gabriel, *The Red Legions*, p50. For more information on service conditions see Robert Duggleby, "The Disintegration of the Russian Armed Forces," *JSMS* 11, no.2 (June 1998): pp7-10.

[100] Charles Dick, *The Russian Army: Present Plight and Future Prospects*, *Conflict Studies Centre Occasional Brief, no.31*, 1994, p3, quoted in Duggleby, p9.

[101] With regard to job security see Robert Arnett, "*Russia After the Crisis:* Can Civilians Control the Military?" *Orbis*, 38, no.1 (Winter 1994): p52; and Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pp174-5. For information on the workload of officers see Dick, *A Bear*, p6.

[102] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p4. With regard to the acceptance of the Soviet Union's collapse by most personnel see chapter 5, p208.

[103] See Schmemann, p1; and Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," p88.

[104] Schofield, pp233-4.

[105] Iuri Chernavin, "The Status of the Army in Russian Society," *JSMS* 9, no.4 (December 1996): p741.

many, particularly those not in senior positions. This is because I have already argued that many personnel did not strongly endorse the ideology. Moreover, in the following chapter I argue that the military did not unite behind any one figure or party.

Cohesion

Relations between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, and officers and soldiers remained problematic. I do not examine intra-military ethnic relations because when I evaluate whether ethnic interests could have motivated intervention I argue that such interests were not important. This is primarily because ethnic diversity declined substantially as the Soviet republics achieved independence.[106] The Chechnyan war is graphically illustrative of the lack of cohesion, as personnel were bitterly divided over the invasion's merits and cohesion was so poor that casualties from 'friendly fire' were high. Adding to these divisions were those that arose because of divergent opinions over restructuring the military, service conditions, and the continued debate over the place of politics in the military. Thus, the impact of the transition from Communism was similar to the divisive impact of the 1917 transition to Communism.

The lack of cohesion between the services and officers is most clearly shown by the Chechnyan war and the parliamentary revolt. As I examine the revolt, along with the failure of the military to unite behind one potential coup leader in the following chapter, I shall focus on Chechnya here. During this war a serious lack of cohesion among the services cost many casualties. There were frequent incidents where Russian soldiers fought each other. The attacks by the air force on Russian ground personnel most graphically illustrate this. A Deputy Commander of reconnaissance in Grozny later exclaimed that he most feared air and rocket attack from his own side.[107] Another Lieutenant commented that "I could never imagine our own military bombing us like this."[108] It is estimated that for every solder killed by the Chechnyans five died due to carelessness or to other reasons.[109] This costly lack of cohesion appears to have been primarily caused by the lack of prior joint-service training and, more

[106] See chapter 6, p288.
[107] Denis Fedulov, interview by Gall, 26 September 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p210. With regard to intra-army casualties see Gall and Waal, p207.
[108] Tom Post, "Gaping Wound," *The Bulletin*, 116, no.5954, 17 January 1995, p42.
[109] Charles Blandy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, quoted in Gall and Waal, p208.

specifically, poor pilot expertise and incompetent Generals.[110] Cohesion was low relative to the Afghanistan war. Here problems were evident but those with first-hand experience of both wars argued that at least personnel united to protect one another when they came under attack, and the services launched joint efforts to free Soviet prisoners. In Chechnya the opposite occurred.[111]

The war also highlights the salient divisions that developed between officers. For instance, officers fought over whether the invasion should have been launched, given the military's poor state and the use of force against civilians. This is in stark contrast to the apparent unity of the military when the decision to invade Afghanistan was made. I examine the reasons behind the opposition to the invasion more closely in the following chapter because they influenced the military's mood but will outline the intra-officer conflict here. Opposition to the invasion is clearly shown by the actions of Major General Ivan Babichev, Commander of the western-most group of the invasion force. In December 1994 he initially refused to advance against civilians in defiance of his orders.[112] Both Lebed and Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, First Deputy Commander of Land Forces, also actively opposed the invasion. Contrasting this, Grachev sought to ensure that the hierarchy's authority was not violated.[113] Other Generals stressed that orders had to be obeyed to ensure that the military, and the state, did not break-up. Colonel General Valentin Yakovlev wrote in January 1995 that "If you are ordered to go [to Chechnya], you must go and carry out the order you have been given."[114]

Additional divisions between the services developed because of moves to restructure the military. This was encouraged by the services seeking to avoid cuts. For instance, when Grachev moved to restructure the airborne forces and to place four air assault brigades under the ground forces the airborne forces objected. After Rodionov replaced Grachev in July 1996 he moved to reduce the airborne forces by 14,000 personnel and was met by widespread opposition. This led to the dismissal of the Airborne Commander after he publicly condemned the cuts. Opposition grew so strong that the new regime moved to prevent the restructuring.

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[110] Orr, *The Current State*, pp11-2; Oleg Blotsky, "Lessons Not Learned," *Time* no vol., no.7, 20 February 1995, pp26-7; and Gall and Waal, pp207-8. With regard to pilot expertise see Nelan, "Why It All Went So Very Wrong," p20. With regard to the Generals see Post, p42.

[111] Blotsky, "Lessons Not Learned," pp26-7.

[112] Lee Hockstader, "Russian General Says He Refuses to Attack," *Washington Post*, 17 December 1994, pA1, quoted in Lyle Goldstein, "Russian Civil-Military Relations in the Chechen War, December 1994-February 1995," *JSMS* 10, no.1 (March 1997): p110.

[113] See Goldstein, pp109-27.

Other services also opposed cuts in their size. For example, when moves were made to further cut the ground forces to 12 divisions in October 1996, Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, declared that such a cut was "simply unreal."[115] The various stances of the services encouraged Rodionov to comment that "Everybody says reform is needed, but not in my forces."[116] Contrasting this, services like the air force that realised Rodionov placed a priority on the maintenance of a modern air force supported reductions.

Other divisions encouraged poor officer cohesion too. First, hostility remained between high-ranking officers who enjoyed the support of the new regime and those lower-ranked who experienced more hardships, and resented their superiors' lack of action. This is shown by the widespread dislike of Grachev who was blamed for the military's plight and believed to be incompetent. In 1994, only 17 percent of officers said that they supported the Defence Minister, more than 50 percent did not trust him, and none indicated that Grachev was a role model for them.[117] The following year, 52 percent of 615 officers indicated that they had a negative opinion of Grachev.[118] Second, divisions arose between the military hierarchy and district commanders like Lebed. These divisions arose as support from the central command declined and resentment of the hierarchy increased. For instance, the Siberian Agreement linked the Siberian MD with the governor and regional leaders, as support from Moscow was inadequate.[119] Third, divisions occurred because of divergent political attitudes. It is apparent that no single politician could unite personnel, as I argue in the following chapter.

Cohesion between political officers and many military officers remained poor. Though the Soviet political organs had collapsed with the Communist party and the Soviet Union, they were restructured and then continued to monitor personnel. This caused resentment among many because of their spying, negative characteristics, and the view that they were rivals. For

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[114] Colonel General Valentin Yakovlev, "The State and the President Need Devoted Officers," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 8 February 1995, p5, quoted in Goldstein, p112.
[115] Michael Orr, *Rodionov and Reform*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, January 1997, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c92.txt, Internet, accessed 18 May 1997, p9 of 13.
[116] Orr, *Rodionov and Reform*, p8.
[117] *Argumenty i Fakty*, October 1994, n.p., *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 26 October 1994, 11 November 1994, n.p., all quoted in Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player In Moscow's Current Political Crisis," *European Security* 4, no.3 (Autumn 1995): p423, footnote 21, p434. With regard to opposition to Grachev also see chapter 6, pp267-8.
[118] Stephen Meyer, "The Devolution of Russian Military Power," *Current History* 94, no.594 (October 1995): p327.
[119] Thomas, "Fault Lines and factions," p537. More generally, see pp531-48.

instance, airborne officers commented that SD officers actively attempted to recruit "stool pigeons" and kept information on all personnel. They further complained of SD personnel "pointedly not saluting the commander, and taking pleasure in letting it be known that his orders had been countermanded."[120] Similarly, Stanislav Terekhov, head of the radical Officers' Union, complained that many officers belonging to the union had to conceal their political sympathies because they feared official retaliation.[121] Former high profile officers like Lebed were also under surveillance, as I have already noted. Another likely source of irritation was the better pay that personnel in the monitoring services received, and the perception that they were rivals for resources.[122]

Finally, relations between soldiers and officers remained tense. This is best shown by the Chechnyan war where many soldiers openly questioned their superiors given the disastrous nature of the campaign. For instance, soldiers conspired with local Ingusheti villagers near the Chechnyan border to sabotage their military vehicles so that they could not enter the republic. There are also at least two cases of members of the elite airborne forces surrendering to the rebels after being surrounded and becoming bitter that their superiors did not provide them adequate assistance. Instances of soldiers shooting their officers are recorded too, crimes that officers before Gorbachev had dreaded. Another indicator of the hostility between officers and soldiers is the unwillingness of soldiers to unite behind the candidates put forward by their superiors in the 1995 elections. This is shown by Grachev's failure to successfully promote his candidates among personnel: only 3 of his 123 candidates were elected. Apart from the Chechnyan war where many soldiers viewed their officers as incompetent, the harsh conditions personnel experienced, and the apparent inaction of their officers, discouraged harmonious relations. Indicative of such inaction is the failure of officers to prevent dedovschina. In 1994 it was estimated that a man entering the army had an 80 percent chance of being beaten up. To put this in perspective, 69.1 percent of soldiers indicated to Gabriel (1980) that experienced soldiers very often or often treated new recruits unfairly.[123]

Overall, I believe that intra-military relations were consistently worse than before 1985. This is shown by the conflict that occurred between the various groups within the military.

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[120] Schofield, p238.

[121] "Leader Says Army Backs Salvation Front," Interfax, 24 October 1992, carried by FBIS, Daily Report, October 1992, pp38-9, quoted in Mendeloff, footnote 27, p235.

[122] See Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," pp534-6. See also chapter 6, pp269-70.

[123] Dick, *The Russian Military: Present Plight and Future Prospects*, p3, quoted in Duggleby, p11; and Gabriel, *The Red Legions*, p73.

Grachev in 1994 exclaimed that the "real disintegration of the army" was possible, a view shared by scholars.[124]

Size

As with the level of cohesion, the transition led to a drastic decline in the number of personnel. This decline contrasts the enlargement of the military after the 1917 revolution and the ground forces were hardest hit. After outlining this decline via the use of statistics, I shall assess those factors that encouraged the trend. The decline accompanied the decline of the military's external role and the fall in budgetary support that occurred with the poor performance of the economy. In addition, it became increasingly difficulty to find those willing and able to serve. Of particular relevance here is the drop in the number of potential personnel because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the smaller population of Russia.

A dramatic decline in the size of the military is evident. Although there were 5.3 million personnel in the armed forces in 1985, and in 1991 they numbered 3.4 million, by 1996 there were 1.2 million.[125] The most significant decline occurred to the ground forces, as their number of personnel was more than halved by the new regime. Indeed the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in October 1996 declared cuts to the forces could be so severe as to threaten the "collapse of reforms."[126] The air force and air defence services experienced significant reductions too, though the number of air force personnel increased in 1996. The most severe cuts occurred during the regime's first years and the ground forces were nearly halved from 1992 to 1994. Even the SRF, to which the regime increasingly attached importance as a safeguard of security because of the decline of conventional combat capabilities, fell by 30.6 percent. From 1992 to 1996 the number of ground force personnel fell by 67.1 percent, navy personnel by 40.6 percent, and air force personnel by 51.7 percent (see table 9 and graph 1). To put this in perspective, in the former Warsaw Treaty states that remained unified the number of ground force personnel fell on average by 3.5 percent, navy personnel by 16.5 percent, and air force personnel increased by 21.6 percent.[127]

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[124] "Grachev Tells Duma: 'I am Clean Before the Army," Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 18 November 1994, carried by FBIS: Central Eurasia, 21 November 1994, p31, quoted in Herspring, 'The Russian Military: Three Years On," p178. With regard to scholars who shared this opinion see John Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating from Within?" *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no.25, 18 June 1993, p16.

[125] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p21; *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, p36; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p113.

[126] Orr, *Rodionov and Reform*, p9.

[127] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, pp70-83; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp82-96. The states examined were Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Table 9: Number of Russian Personnel in Key Military Services 1992-1996

Years	Ground forces (Number of personnel)	SRF	Navy	Air Defence	Air Force
1992	1,400,000	144,000	320,000	356,000	300,000
1993	1,000,000*	144,000	300,000	230,000	170,000
1994	780,000	114,000	295,000	205,000	170,000
1995	670,000	100,000	200,000	200,000	130,000
1996	460,000	100,000	190,000	175,000	145,000
1992-1996 percentage change	-67.1	-30.6	-40.6	-50.8	-51.7

Source: *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, pp93-101; *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, pp99-100; *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, pp111-14; *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, pp113-15; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp113-19.*From 1993 the IISS uses the term army rather than ground forces. The percentage change figures are rounded up.

As I have already argued, the decline in the number of personnel was in line with the lower importance attached to the military's traditional role of countering external threats, and the economic problems that restricted defence expenditure. Apart from these significant factors it became increasing impractical to maintain a large military. Most dramatically, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and failure to maintain a united military of the CIS reduced the number of potential servicemen. Whereas in 1985 there were 31 million men aged between 18 and 30, by 1996 there were only 15 million aged from 18 to 32.[128] In addition, declining health standards meant that where less than 10 percent of young men were exempted from service in 1987 on medical grounds, by 1996, 30 percent were exempted.[129] The obtaining of draft deferrals through bribery also became widespread. Thus, only 16 percent of the potential draft pool were liable for call-up by 1993.[130] As the ground forces were the most draining on human resources and the perception that a large-scale war with the West was increasingly out-dated, they experienced the most severe cuts. The draft pool was reduced further by the general reluctance to serve, as shown by draft evasion and desertion. The military also faced increased

[128] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p21 *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p113. See also Orr, *The Current State*, p2.
[129] O. Falichev, "Call-Up-96: Who Will Stand Under The Colours," *KZ*, 11 April 1996, p1, quoted in Orr, *The Current State*, p3.

competition from other armed forces like the MVD, and by 1996 the military received only two-thirds of the personnel recruited.[131] More specifically, the limited change to the SRF compared to the other services is indicative of the greater emphasis placed on nuclear weapons because of the decline in conventional combat capabilities. The 1993 'Basic Provisions' illustrate this greater emphasis. The provisions abandoned the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, and apparently reserved Russia the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack on its territory and allies.[132] Correspondingly, the military hierarchy placed an increased emphasis on highly manoeuvrable, technologically advanced, and well-trained forces rather than large yet inferior forces.[133]

Expertise

The inadequate level of expertise evident under Gorbachev remained and probably worsened. This lack of expertise is primarily shown by the lack of even a minimal level of skill during the single largest military operation during this period, the Chechnyan war. The lack of expertise continued to be caused by factors apparent before and during Gorbachev's rule, these being assessed after the level of expertise is evaluated. Most importantly, I believe that the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Second, quality personnel left without being replaced by qualified personnel. In line with this was the continued service of incompetent officers. This is a trend examined in the context of the disposition to intervene, as it is indicative of the regime's moves to win the loyalty of key officers.[134] Third, the quality of training fell even lower than the standard I believe prevailed before Gorbachev. Finally, both the new regime and military failed to move to improve the level of expertise.

The lack of expertise is graphically shown by the military's performance in Chechnya and I examine examples of poor expertise particularly relevant to the seizure of power in the following chapter. The lack of expertise and skill is evident at all levels. At the highest level Grachev failed to deploy infantry with the tanks that attacked Grozny. This was a fundamental mistake because tanks are vulnerable in urban areas without protective cover from infantry.

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[130] Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating," p13.
[131] Falichev, "Call-Up-96," p1, quoted in Orr, *The Current State*, p3. See also Thomas, "Fault Lines," p540.
[132] Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," p47.
[133] See Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas, "A Russian View of Future War: Theory and Direction," *JSMS* 9, no.3 (September 1996): pp501-18.
[134] See chapter 6, pp267-8.

Thus, at least 100 vehicles had been lost by early January 1995.[135] In fact Grachev had ridiculed the failed attempt to overthrow Dudayev in November 1994, exclaiming, "Where were the infantry? You must not send tanks in without infantry."[136] Grachev had further claimed before the invasion that Grozny could be taken in two hours by one parachute regiment.[137] Indeed Babichev told a visiting delegation from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe that "Our commanders in Moscow have let us down."[138] Lower down the chain of command poor expertise is also noticeable. One Tank Commander exclaimed that NCOs assigned to his units could not even turn the tank turrets.[139] With regard to soldiers, many could not accurately fire their weapons, knew little about fighting in urban areas, and often shot one another.[140] Expertise appears to have declined further under Yeltsin. For example, personnel learnt from their mistakes and improved their tactics in Afghanistan. However, in Chechnya personnel repeated the same mistakes.[141] Overall, by 1994 over half of mid and senior-level officers believed that Russia could not rebuff an aggressor. [142] Contrasting this, Gabriel (1980) found that 55 percent of officers felt that their units would perform "very well" or "fairly well" in combat. [143]

The lack of expertise continued to be caused by factors apparent before and during Gorbachev's rule. Most importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. This is most graphically evident at all levels of the Chechnyan campaign. For instance Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov, First Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces, was asked to take command of the invasion despite having played no part in planning it.[144] This inadequate preparation is evident throughout the military. Draftees were sent to Chechnya without knowledge of their role or proper training. Although conscripts underwent two months preparation before being sent to Afghanistan, in Chechnya soldiers were sent almost immediately after being drafted. Commanders lacked adequate maps of where they

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[135] Gall and Waal, p12.
[136] Ibid., p13.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Istvan Gyarmati, interview by Jorg Haskemeyer, Westdeutscher Rundfunk, ARD-TV, 4 July 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p14.
[139] Blotsky, p27.
[140] With regard to the incompetence shown during the campaign see Gall and Waal, pp9, 12-4, 177-82, 202-3, 207-11, 272; and Lester Grau, *Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny, National Defence University Strategic Forum,* Institute For National Strategic Studies, n.d., available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum38.html, Internet, accessed 10 November 1997, pp1-4 of 4.
[141] See Marshall-Hasdell, pp1-40; and Orr, *The Current State*, p12.
[142] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p1.
[143] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p216.
[144] Vorobyov, interview by Gall and Waal, 19 July 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p177.

were meant to advance. Nor were personnel given accurate information about their role. One Deputy Commander of a reconnaissance force exclaimed that "We thought there would be guards simply protecting the President [Dudayev]. It turned out the opposite: there was a whole army of Chehens [*sic*] there."[145]

Apart from the military's ill preparedness, experienced personnel continued to leave and training remained inadequate. With regard to the loss of experienced officers, most of the 154,687 officers who left from 1992 to 1994 were categorised as able, efficient, and forward thinking.[146] This loss of experience was a serious problem because the military found it very difficult to find able replacements. For instance, whereas 4.1 percent of military academy students were expelled in 1987 for failing to study, by 1993 13.4 percent were expelled.[147] Even the increased reliance on contract personnel did not solve the problem. Although the number of contract soldiers increased from 80,000 to 170,000 between 1994 and 1996, they included alcoholics, drug abusers, and the chronically ill.[148] Moreover training was inadequate. Semenov complained in October 1994 that the army was deteriorating to the level of a Third World army and had not held a single division-level exercise since 1992.[149] Similarly, though the number of hours flown annually by pilots increased from 20-25 hours in 1991, to 30-35 hours in 1993 their hours remained inadequate. They were only 50 percent of the hours required to maintain expertise and less than 40 percent of the time spent flying in the late 1970s.[150] Training was further hindered by the need of personnel to find additional work to survive and the heavy workloads of officers because of staff shortages.[151] Finally, the military continued to be an active participant in the economy, further reducing the opportunity to train.[152]

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[145] Slava naumov, interview by Gall, 10 October 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p210.
[146] Dick, *A Bear*, p5.
[147] "Molodye ofitsery segodiya kak nikogda nuzhdayutsya v pomoshchi starshukh. Polychat li oni ee?" *KZ*, 10 June 1994, quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p170.
[148] *The Military Balance 194-1995*, p112; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p114. With regard to the quality of contract soldiers see Orr, *The Current State*, p4.
[149] "Ground Forces in Critical State," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no no., 29 October 1994, quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p171.
[150] "Reforma varmii: orientiry dla voennoy pressy," *KZ*, 25 May 1993 quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three years On," p170; and Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1978) p112, quoted in Joshua Epstein, *Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p108. More generally, see Orr, *The Current State,* pp10-1; Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pp165, 170-1; Chernavin, pp734-5; and Dick, *A Bear*, pp6-7.
[151] See Orr, *The Current State*, p7.
[152] See Chernavin, pp735-6.

In summary, from 1992 to 1996 major changes to the military occurred. Most importantly, the structure of the civil-military relationship changed. Although characteristics of the penetration model remained, the Communist party no longer was instrumental. All three of the Soviet theoretical models became ever more redundant. With regard to the military's roles, they continued to reflect the changes that occurred under Gorbachev. More specifically, deployments in the 'near abroad' were an important development. Budgetary support in real terms and popular support for the military both declined further, and in turn reduced morale. Similarly, military cohesion, size and expertise declined. Overall then, developments continued the negative trend of the first transitional period.

The Threat of a Military Coup against the New Regime, 1992-1996

I shall now argue that the threat of the Russian military staging a coup was present under Yeltsin. To identify the presence of this threat I briefly document the threats of force made by military personnel against the new regime and then examine relevant opinions publicised during this period, which show that the threat was recognised and deemed serious enough to warrant discussion. I believe that two broad opinions are discernible. First, the threat of a coup was taken seriously and anxiety was expressed over this threat. Second, the threat of a coup was downplayed. However the military's loyalty was not taken for granted. Three sources of analysis are utilised here to support this argument. First, the relevant opinions and actions of civilian and military officials are noted. Second, similar opinions and actions are identified among scholars. Finally, the work of journalists is examined.

It is evident that the threat of a coup against the new regime was present in Russia. The willingness of some personnel to intervene against the civilian leadership is most clearly shown by the 1991 coup. It has been argued that this was not led by the military. Apart from the important role of some KGB members that I have already noted, the military's role in the attempt has been downplayed. Defence Minister Shaposhnikov stated that most personnel were "free of guilt," a perception shared by lower-ranked personnel.[153] One soldier who believed that the army was not behind the coup, exclaimed, "Do you think the coup would

[153] *The Times*, 26 August 1991, n.p., quoted in Michael Evans, "3000 Generals Face The Sack After Coup Fails," Reuters, 26 August 1991.

have collapsed if it [the army] was?"[154] Scholars like Vyatcheslav Amirov also argued that it was "not a military coup."[155]

However key supporters of the coup participants were from the military. Although it is estimated that only 15 of the 180 regular divisions were involved in the attempt, it is evident that the coup involved the military.[156] In total 30 Generals from the high command, 9 Deputy Ministers of Defence, 10 MD and fleet commanders, 8 heads of major Ministry of Defence Departments, 3 lower-ranking commanders, and 316 additional Generals were reported to have actively supported the coup.[157] Though Yazov may have been a reluctant participant he was a member of the GKChP and commanded that the military support the coup. Yazov gathered military commanders on the second day of the coup to instruct them to ensure law and order and "As for the rest you'll learn that from the radio and newspapers."[158] Varennikov was another active participant and he was one of those who detained Gorbachev at his dacha. Likewise, other commanders supported the intervention and Shaposhnikov, an opponent of the coup, recalled that after speaking with members of the Ministry of Defence "it became clear that I would have difficulty in finding allies."[159] Even Grachev initially was involved in the planning of the attempt.[160] Lepingwell is thus accurate when he argued that the military was a key player in both the initiation and collapse of the coup.[161]

The threat of a coup remained after the failed coup of 1991, with a minority of personnel threatening to use force against the civilian leadership. At the general level, it was felt by at least some politically active officers that the military should have a larger political role. Only 19 percent of 1,500 officers polled at the All-Army Officers' Assembly in January 1992

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[154] Richard Meares, "Westernised" Soviet Troops Say They Had No Sympathy For Coup," Reuters, 22 August 1991.
[155] *New Zealand Herald*, 21 August 1991, p9, quoted in "Soviet Coup Approved By Professor," Reuters, 21 August 1991.
[156] Patrick Tyler, "After The Coup; Leadership Of Soviet Military Facing Shuffle And Reduced Independence," *NYT* Ondisc, 23 August 1991, pA14.
[157] "On the Military Leadership's Participation in the State Coup of 19-21 August 1991," *Armiya*, no.6, 1992, p24, quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p140.
[158] *Coup in the Soviet Union Day 1 18-19 August 1991: A Minute-By-Minute Chronology*, no publisher, n.d., available from http://artnet.net/~upstart/1819aug.html, Internet, accessed 12 September 1998, p1 of 11.
[159] Shaposhnikov, interview by *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 27 August 1991, p3, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "Notes," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/macnair34/34tan.html#25, footnote 35, p2 of 4.
[160] "Why the Thunder Did Not Rumble," *Moskovskiye novosti* no.29, 17-24 July 1994, p8, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "Notes," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/macnair34/34tan.html#25, footnote 29, p1. More generally, with regard to military involvement in the coup see Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The August 1991 Coup," pp1-4.
[161] Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p539.

believed that the army should wait for politicians to make decisions on issues relating to the military. [162] More specifically, in 1992, 10 percent of officers believed that it was permissible to use force "as a result of the failure to carry out demands," and 4 percent agreed with this in 1993 (see table 10 and graph 3). Indeed in January 1993 an armed Major was apprehended in Moscow intending to assassinate Yeltsin.[163] The willingness of a few personnel to directly challenge the new regime is best shown by the active support some gave to the 1993 revolt. One Colonel in command of a regiment near Podolsk led eighteen of his men to defend the White House, but was arrested in transit. Another 18 personnel followed a Deputy Company Commander in Noginsk and set out for the White House, and were also arrested.

Threats of direct action continued after this revolt and though personnel overwhelmingly showed little desire to intervene the threat appears to have increased. According to a Centre for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research (CMSPLR) survey, the willingness of officers to use force so as to meet their demands peaked after 1993 at 26 percent, and averaged 16.7 percent from 1994 to 1996 (see table 10). One senior officer in November 1993 actually threatened that "the politicians will be swept out."[164] A Colonel serving on the General Staff stated that same month that if Yeltsin became unamenable to the military his "illusions about his power functions will be dispelled at once."[165] The most popular saying among personnel fighting in Chechnya during its initial stages was also that "We will be here another week or so, then on to Moscow." [166] It was further reported in June 1996 that a group of officers had planned to kidnap the President by intercepting his motorcade.[167] Similarly, during the same month then Security Council Secretary Lebed asserted, at least initially, that he had foiled a coup involving supporters of Grachev. These

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[162] *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5 February 1992, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Officers and Politicians," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 6 February 1992, accessed 18 March 1998.
[163] Serge Schmemann, "Russian Major Caught Seeking To Kill Yeltsin," *NYT* Ondisc, 31 January 1993, Section 1 p 13.
[164] "Article Examines Armed Forces' View of Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, pp60-2, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p332.
[165] "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, pp39-40, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p331.
[166] "Zavtra on Army as Threat to Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995, p22, quoted in Goldstein, p118.
[167] Kevin Ferdarko, "Giving the Big Kiss-Off," *Time* no vol., no.23, 3 June 1996, p26.

Table 10: The Opinions of Russian Officers with regard to the Permissible Ways of protecting their Rights and Interests 1992-1997

This table records the percentages of personnel who believe that the following actions are permissible. The most relevant of these are displayed in graph 3.

Forms of Action	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Dealing with complaints and proposals in line with existing regulations	56	41	41	41	36	32
Early Discharge from army	23	17	20	24	38	41
Participating in activities of organisations defending servicemen's rights	21	16	13	19	26	46
Issuing statements and demands to the media	22	16	11	23	24	37
Ostentatious passivity in carrying out official duties	2	6	9	14	19	22
Using force as a result of the failure to carry out demands	10	4	6	18	26	31

These polls were undertaken by the Center for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research. The results for 1996 and 1997 are based on expert opinion, as mass polls using the same methodology were not carried out during these years. These findings are based upon a poll of 300 experts. Those polled included the leaders of major military collectives, military journalists, observers, General Staff and Defence Ministry analysts. Please note that all the figures listed are from the original source. Source: Andrey Korbut, "Lev Rokhlin and the Officers Movement in Russia. Popularity of Political Leaders With Officers," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, no.33, 5 September 1997.

Graph 3: Russian Officers and Persmissible Ways of Protecting Rights and Interests 1992-1997



accusations however are not very credible and Lebed distanced himself from them.[168]

The warnings and actions of the civilian and military leadership also indicate that a coup was feared. Evidence indicates that anxiety arose over the possibility a coup, even before the new regime took power. For example, St Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak exclaimed that a military coup was a real possibility in December 1991.[169] Likewise, anxiety arose during the second transitional period. In March 1994 rumours of an imminent coup involving military personnel were reported to have encouraged urgent talks between Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin.[170] Later that November, Zhirinovsky warned that military rule was possible.[171] Following this, in early 1995 former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar claimed that the potential for a coup was increasing and that it could easily succeed given the disastrous Chechnyan war. [172] Indeed rumours of a coup in early 1995 encouraged Yeltsin to cancel a trip abroad and in April the new regime denied that a coup attempt had occurred.[173] Similarly, in June 1996 Anatoliy Chubais, then a leading member of Yeltsin's re-election team, warned that a coup was a "very real danger."[174] Moreover some military personnel spoke of the possibility of another coup. Immediately after the 1991 coup, Colonel Viktor Alksnis swore that another was possible.[175] Lebed also claimed in May 1995 that the probability of a military revolt was "50-50."[176]

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[168] Alexander Lebed, "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup, New Security Policy-Interview," interview by NTV, Moscow, in Russian, 1535 gmt, 18 June 1996, carried by BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR (BBC MS: FUSSR), quoted in "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup, New Security Policy-Interview," Reuters, 20 June 1996. However evidence indicated that no such attempt occurred and Lebed distanced himself from his initial claims. See ITAR-TASS news agency (world service), Moscow, in Russian, 0849 gmt, 21 June 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 22 June 1996, quoted in "Parliament Finds No Evidence Of Attempted Coup," Reuters, 22 June 1996; and Ostankino Radio Mayak, 21 June 1996, quoted in "Lebed Tells Parliament How He Headed Off Unrest In Army," Reuters, 24 June 1996.

[169] *Megapolis-Express*, 5 December 1991, n.p., quoted in "Shevardnadze Issues New Coup Warning, Says Newspaper," Reuters, 4 December 1991.

[170] See *The Financial Times*, 22 March 1994, p1, quoted in John Lloyd, "Russian Coup Plot Reports Spark Urgent Yeltsin Talks," Reuters, 22 March 1994.

[171] Doug Clarke, "Zhirinovsky Tells Americans That Military A Threat In Russia," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 9 November 1994, accessed 28 June 1998.

[172] Wendy Sloane, 'Yeltsin Critic: Chechnya's 'Disastrous' Fallout," *Christian Science Monitor* (*CSM*), 87, no.32, 13 January 1995, p7.

[173] See "Defense Ministry Shakeup Predicted in March-April," FBIS-SOV-95-018, 28 January 1995, p19 quoted in Goldstein, p118; and "Filatov Says Yeltsin "Absolutely in Control," FBIS-SOV-95-019, 30 January 1995, p15, quoted in Goldstein, p118. With regard to the alleged coup see "Yeltsin Press Office Denies Coup Rumours," Reuters, 28 April 1995.

[174] Russian Public TV, Moscow, 0930 gmt, 20 June 1996, carried by BBC MS:FUSSR, 22 June 1996, quoted in "Chubays Says A Coup Attempt Has Been Averted," Reuters, 22 June 1996.

[175] David Remnick, "Three Days of Drama, Terror Will Shape the Future," *The Washington Post*, 22 August 1991, pA25.

[176] Alexander Lebed, "Interview: General Lebed on the Army & the Kremlin," interview by Alexander Zhilin, *Jamestown Prism* 1, no.2, 12 May 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/001/002_006.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998, p3 of 4.

Scholars and journalists also feared that a military coup might be staged. Scholars like Stephen Foye recognised that the threat of a coup was becoming increasingly serious during the months prior to the 1991 coup.[177] Though I believe that most scholars downplayed the threat of a coup, some emphasised the possibility of such an intervention. Richard Spence argued that "Russia appears to be a military coup waiting to happen" because of Yeltsin's lack of political support.[178] Lyle Goldstein also wrote after examining the instability of civil-military relations during the Chechnyan war that the "ugly specter of military coup" had arisen.[179] Likewise, Kunio Sakuma feared that a military coup could be staged in 1995 as "the military, political, and economic crisis deepens."[180] Journalists also expressed anxiety. Directly after the 1991 coup journalists wrote of the possibility of another, and in 1992 James Carney wrote that the planning of a coup "could become a reality."[181] Similar fears were expressed in *The Economist*. An article in the magazine claimed in 1993 that it could only be a matter of time before officers staged a second coup, and an article in 1994 raised the possibility of Lebed using force to take power. In 1995 another article claimed that Yeltsin's actions could precipitate a coup.[182]

Despite these warnings, the threat was also downplayed, as is again shown by the three sources of analysis. Overall, this was the dominant view among scholars, including those who specifically examined the likelihood of a coup. Both the leaders of the former Soviet regime and the new regime downplayed the threat. Gorbachev in early 1993 ruled out the possibility of a coup, and in early 1995 Yeltsin responded to coup rumours through Sergey Filatov, effectively his Chief of Staff, by declaring that he was clearly in control.[183] The civilian leadership also promised to prevent the occurrence of such an intervention. Yeltsin during his

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[177] Stephen Foye, "The Case for a Coup: Gorbachev or the Generals," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no.2, 11 January 1991, pp1-5.
[178] Spence, "The Military in the "New Russia," in Danopoulos and Zirker, p30.
[179] Goldstein, p124.
[180]Kunio Sakuma, "Invasion of Chechnya a Failure-Serious Political Instability in Russia," no publisher, 12 January 1995, available from http://kaleido.smn.co.jp/opinions/0015o01e.html, Internet, accessed 31 May 1996, p1 of 2.
[181] *The Financial Post*, 26 August 1991, p13, quoted in "To be Successful, Coup Needs a Despot," Reuters, 26 August 1991; and James Carney, "The Dark Forces," *Time* 140, no.23, December 7 1992, p37.
[182] "The Threat that was," *The Economist* 328, no.7826, 28 August 1993, p21. With regard to Lebed see "Alexander Napoleonovich," *The Economist* 332, no.7878, 27 August 1994, p44. For information on Yeltsin's actions see "The wrong man for Russia," *The Economist* 334, no.7896, 7 January 1995, pp15-6.
[183] See *The Financial Post*, 26 March 1993, p4, quoted in Diane Francis, "Gorbachev sees no Current Threat of a Russian Coup," Reuters, 26 March 1996; and "Advice From Two Old Pros," *Time*, no vol. or no., 5 April 1993, p19. With regard to Yeltsin see "Filatov Says Yeltsin "Absolutely in Control." See also Oleg Lobov, "The War

1996 re-election campaign proclaimed that his main aim was to ensure stability and prevent divisive events like coups.[184] Finally, in June 1996 Oleg Soskovets, First Vice-Premier, Aleksandr Korzhakov, Head of the Presidential Security Service and Mikhail Barsukov, Director of the FSB were removed. Chubais declared that these removals were paramount to "striking the last nail in the coffin of both Communism and military coups."[185]

The military leadership echoed these civilian views. Directly after the 1991 coup Shaposhnikov ruled out the possibility of another and claimed that military involvement in the failed coup was minimal. [186] Shaposhnikov during the January 1992 All-Army Officers' Assembly further downplayed the prospect of a coup and declared that "We aren't some Thailand, after all."[187] Likewise, in July 1992 the military denied that it was planning a coup and in October 1992 General Konstantin Kobets, the Chief Military Inspector, stated that the army would prevent any coup against Yeltsin.[188] That year Grachev also said that the officer corps would not permit a coup to be staged.[189] Similarly, a survey of officers from December 1993 to March 1994 found that only 16 percent believed that the military would take over the leadership of the state.[190] In June 1996 Colonel General Viktor Barynkin, the First Deputy of the Russian Military's General Staff, also denied Lebed's coup allegations. Barynkin claimed that an attempt aimed at undermining the state system would not be possible.[191] Likewise, officers during the 1996 elections dismissed the notion that a coup might be staged.[192]

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in Chechnya: as Seen From a Kremlin Perspective," interview by Wendy Sloane, *CSM* 87, no.36, 20 January 1995, p18.

[184] "Yeltsin promises Russians 'normal life'," *The Press*, 1 June 1996, p12.

[185] "June 20, 1996 - 4:00pm Moscow Time-Special News Flash," Source-NNS, quoted in *Campaign Tales from Moscow*, no publisher, n.d., available from http://www.unc.edu/home/mroseman/daily.html, Internet, accessed 26 May 1998, p8 of 13.

[186] See Evans, "3000 Generals face sack"; and "Soviet Defence Minister Rules Out Military Coup," Reuters, 13 December 1991. With regard to the military involvement in the attempt see Evans, "3000 Generals face the sack."

[187] "Army without a country, countries without an army," *Economist* 322, no.7743, 25 January 1992, pp41-2. Thailand has experienced many military coups, the last being in 1991.

[188] Steven Erlinger, "Russian Military Men Deny Any Thought Of Coup," *NYT* Ondisc, 9 July 1993, pA6. With regard to Kobets' see Interfax, 19 October 1992, quoted in Doug Clarke, "Kobets: Military Would Prevent Coup," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, NSS, Internet, 20 October 1992, accessed 16 March 1998.

[189] Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 18 August 1992, carried by FBIS-SOV, 19 September 1992, pp27-8, quoted in Zisk, footnote 1, p19.

[190] Aleksandr Golovkov, "Za Kovo Progolocuyet Leytenenant Ivanov," *Izvestiya*, 24 April 1995, p4, quoted in Busza, p170.

[191] Interfax, 21 June 1996, quoted in "Russian Military Official Denies Alleged Army Plot," Reuters, 24 June 1996.

[192] Thomas Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup? Nyet," *CSM*, 6 November 1996, available from http://plweb.csmonitor.com/plweb-turbo/c...n1+archives+175658+8++Russian%20military, Internet, accessed 14 March 1998, pp1-2 of 2. It should be noted however that officers dismissed the likelihood of a coup prior to the 1991 attempt. See IAN, 8 February 1991, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Alksnis Dismisses Possibility Of Army Coup," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 11 February 1991, accessed 7 December 1998.

Numerous scholars also argued that a coup was unlikely, at least in the near-term. Michael Desch in late 1993 wrote that most analysts were optimistic about the future of Russian civil-military relations.[193] Although scholars recognised that the military's loyalty was not guaranteed, they doubted that it would stage an act as extreme as a coup. Desch argued that the danger was not of a coup being staged, but rather of the military playing an increasingly indirect role in politics via its ties with civilian factions.[194] Tsypkin concluded that intervention was unlikely, as the military was focused on its corporate interests and sought influence via political alliances rather than political power itself.[195] Kimberly Zisk argued that the military did not intervene because Yeltsin "bent over backwards to meet the interests of military officers." For instance, he provided it greater budgetary support and control over foreign policy.[196] Similarly, Natalie Gross-Hassman argued that positive incentives and coercive controls discouraged intervention. These positive incentives included the military's greater role in policy-making, the greater size of the officer corps and more promotion opportunities, and moves to make domestic and foreign policies more attuned to military demands. Accompanying these was the presence of other armed forces and the surveillance of the military.[197]

More specifically, the military's failure to intervene was often explained, at least to some degree, in terms of its poor cohesion and professionalism. Mendeloff's work is particularly relevant as he specifically studied the military's political quiescence. Mendeloff argued that the danger of a coup was "largely a myth."[198] He argued that poor cohesion was an organisational barrier to intervention and this contributed to the "paradox of disintegration." Here the lack of "organizational cohesion" provided a coup motive, however once cohesion had declined too far it inhibited intervention by causing a fall in prestige. This encouraged

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[193] Desch, p455.
[194] Ibid., p456.
[195] Tsypkin, "Will the Military" p65.
[196] Zisk, p3.
[197] Natalie Gross-Hassman, "A Military Coup in Russia? -prospects and constraints," *JIR* 7, no.11 (November 1995): pp493-4.
[198] Mendeloff, p225. Other scholars who have argued that poor cohesion discouraged intervention include: Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p164; and Gross-Hassman, p494. With regard to the role of professionalism see Porter, *Red Armies*, p65; and Deborah Ball, "The Pending Crisis in Russian Civil-Military Relations," *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series Number* 4, Lawence Livermore National Laboratories, October 1997, available from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Ballmemo.html, Internet, accessed 13 June 1998, pp1-4 of 4.

officers to believe that a coup would be met by "mass social unrest." [199] He further argued that most officers continued to hold "professional values" that encouraged them to accept civilian authority.[200] Mendeloff believed that this professionalism was strengthened by the historic professionalism of the military, by recent events like the 1991 coup, and by an aversion to risk common among professionals.[201]

Many journalists expressed similar opinions. At the general level, the likelihood of dramatic political changes was downplayed. Nathaniel Knight wrote that Russia's economic and political situation had been exaggerated with predictions of civil wars, its dismemberment, and the establishment of a hard line dictatorship.[202] Likewise, Serge Schmemann argued that "the doomsday notion of a fascist dictatorship slouching toward Moscow is overblown."[203] More specifically, the likelihood of the military playing a decisive role in politics, such as during the 1996 presidential elections, was downplayed.[204] The probability of the military staging an actual coup was also downplayed. For example, some journalists from *The Economist* argued that a coup was unlikely, given poor cohesion would inhibit any direct action.[205]

As I believe that the military did not have the capacity, strong disposition, or the opportunity to intervene, as I argue during the following chapters, I do not believe that the threat of a coup was high. However I have doubts over many of the above explanations of why the military did not intervene. Apart from their dated analysis, none of the explanations take into account the 1995 Duma elections or 1996 presidential elections, at least some of the arguments made are contentious. I believe that Zisk was making an over-statement when she argued that Yeltsin "bent over backwards" for the military. For instance, Yeltsin publicly criticised the military, and budgetary support fell in real terms, increasing the hardships of serving. Moreover when I assess the military's disposition I argue that the military lacked involvement in the making of key decisions, like that to invade Chechnya. Gross-Hassman's argument has weaknesses too. Her argument shares the same problem with regard to the assertion that the military enjoyed a greater level of influence and, I argue later, civilian interference in the

[199] Mendeloff, p239. See also pp240-3.
[200] Ibid., p233. See also pp234-5.
[201] Ibid., pp236-8. See also pp337-43.
[202] Nathaniel Knight, "In Yeltsin's Russia, Glimmers Of Hope Emerge," *NYT* Ondisc, 28 January 1993, pA20.
[203] Serge Schmemann, "As Clinton Finds Russia, It's Messy but Working," *NYT*, 24 January 1993, Week in review, p5. See also Martin Malia, "Apocalypse Not," *The New Republic*, 22 February 1993, pp21, 24-7.
[204] Lee Hockstader, "Russia's Pendulum of Power," *The Washington Post*, 11 June 1996, pA19.

promotion process actually could be a source of discontent. Nor should the strength of the coercive controls be over-emphasised. This is because armed forces apart from the military lacked its capacity, and the determination of their personnel to defeat a coup is debatable. This is a point I stress when I examine whether the military had the capacity to intervene.

More specifically, I doubt the validity of arguments that stress the inhibiting role of poor cohesion. Although I concur with Mendeloff's argument that the fall of cohesion contributed to a loss of prestige, which in turn discouraged a coup because of the prospect of civilian opposition, it is overly simplistic. This is because I believe that the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene must all be examined in-depth to adequately explain the absence of a coup. I also believe that although poor cohesion was a factor which contributed to the failure of the military to intervene, it was not of critical importance. This is because those forces available to the new regime for protection experienced a similar loss of cohesion, had less firepower, and were of debatable loyalty. In addition, military personnel were united over key issues that I discuss when the military's disposition is assessed. These include the shared belief that budgetary support was inadequate. Such beliefs were potential coup grievances.

Turning to professionalism, the military remained professional if one defines such a military as being very reluctant to stage a coup. However I believe that overall professionalism declined markedly, as is illustrated by the decline in both military expertise and cohesion. This decline was recognised by both personnel and civilians. A survey of officers in 1995 found that only 26 percent rated Lebed favourably in terms of his professionalism. Another survey in February 1996 found that only 4 percent of civilian survey respondents believed that Russian military professionalism was superior to that of other armies, whereas 21 percent believed that it was lower.[206] Indeed I believe that the decline of qualities like expertise and cohesion commonly associated with professionalism reduced the likelihood of a coup. This is because the capacity to intervene fell and an interventionist mood did not develop. I also believe that the qualities professionals are attributed do not prevent their intervention. For instance, Yazov had served in the army since 18 years of age, fought in the Second World War, and was a graduate of both the Frunze Military Academy and General Staff Academy. Yeltsin himself acknowledged Yazov's professional attributes. He wrote that Yazov

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[205] See "Army without a country," *The Economist*, p41.
[206] "The Army Through Civilian Eyes," *Moscow News*, no.9, 7-13 March 1996, p4.

"perceived everything with the soldierly bluntness and through the morose bureaucratic prism of duty, obedience, and orders."[207]

In summary, although a military coup was not staged, the threat that one could occur was taken seriously. This is illustrated by the warnings of such an intervention, and the reaction by the regime and resultant discussion by civilian commentators. Indeed an investigation of the political opinions of officers in 1993 concluded that "[w]hether or not the threat [of the military establishing a dictatorship] is great today is still a moot point. That it does exist is beyond doubt."[208]

Conclusions

As with the 1985 to 1991 period, major changes to the military occurred under the new regime. Most importantly, the structure of the civil-military relationship changed, as the main actors became the new regime and the Russian military rather than the Communist party and the Soviet military. Penetration methods of control were thus realigned to enhance Yeltsin's authority. Indicative of this is the continued monitoring of personnel by the new regime. An outcome of the decline of the Communist party and continued use of penetration control methods was the military's increased political activity. With regard to the three models of Soviet civil-military relations, they became ever more irrelevant. This is because all three were based on the relationship between the now defunct Communist party and the defunct Soviet military. They all fail to adequately explain the dramatic change that occurred during this period.

Apart from changes to the structure of the civil-military relationship, other changes also occurred. Changes were made by the new regime in accordance with its commitment to Russia rather than the Soviet Union, and in line with the new regime's security perceptions. With regard to budgetary support, this fell in real terms because of the continued downplaying of the military's traditional external role, and the lack of resources. Similarly, popular support for the military, for officers, and for military service, along with the morale of personnel, and military cohesion were not isolated from change. Whereas the military had enjoyed much

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[207] Yeltsin, *The View*, p56.
[208] Alexander Zhilin, "Does An Underground Committee Function?" *Moscow News*, 19 March 1993, p10 quoted in Desch, footnote 173, p486.

support before 1985, under Yeltsin the perception of the military officers, and military service was negative. Limited support can essentially be attributed to the same two key factors that encouraged negative perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Second, the new roles allocated to the military, and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions.

In line with these negative developments, morale among personnel was low. To assess the level of cohesion I again examined relations between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, and officers and soldiers (but not between various ethnic groups as ethnicity is examined later). The Chechnyan war is illustrative of the lack of cohesion as personnel were bitterly divided over the invasion's merits. Cohesion was so poor that casualties from 'friendly fire' were high. Adding to these divisions were those that arose because of divergent opinions over restructuring the military, over service conditions, and over the continued debate concerning the place of politics in the military.

Finally, both the military's size and expertise changed. As with the level of cohesion, the transition entailed a drastic decline in the number of personnel. This change was in line with the decline of the military's traditional external role; and the real fall of budgetary support. In addition, it became increasingly difficult to find those willing and able to serve. Turning to military expertise, the inadequate level of expertise evident under Gorbachev remained and probably worsened given the military's performance in Chechnya. Most importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Other factors that contributed to this inadequacy include the loss of experienced personnel and the lack of training.

Although a coup was not staged, the threat that one could occur was taken seriously. This threat is shown by the threats of force made by military personnel against the new regime, and by the various opinions that were held with regard to a coup. The willingness of some personnel to intervene against the civilian leadership is shown by the 1991 coup and by the 1993 revolt. Two broad opinions on the threat of a coup are discernible. First, the threat of a coup was taken seriously and anxiety was expressed over the threat. Second, others downplayed the likelihood of a coup, though the military's loyalty was not taken for granted. However I doubt the validity of many of the explanations for the absence of a coup.

Therefore, I believe that in the context of the second period of the transition hypothesis one is valid. According to hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military. This is because the transition affected the structure of the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, and the military morale. Cohesion and size along with expertise changed too. It is equally clear that these changes were of an overwhelmingly negative nature. The brief outlining of the coup threat also provides the context within which hypotheses two to four are evaluated. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. These factors are detailed in the following chapters. With regard to hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four, a transition may be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene.

The following chapter starts to examine why the Russian military did not stage a coup with regard to the first of the three intervention determinants I assess, the military's perceived capacity to stage a coup. The chapter is divided into four parts. First, the presence of those personnel whose participation increases the likelihood of a successful coup is examined. Second, the military's cohesion is examined. Third, the number of personnel available to participate in a coup is estimated. Finally, the mood of the military and whether it was predisposed to intervention is assessed. Therefore, this chapter examines hypothesis two through to four. Most generally, hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is assessed. More specifically, the validity of hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the first of the three factors, the capacity is assessed. Similarly, hypothesis four, a transition may be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, is also examined, again according to the first factor.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S POLITICAL QUIESCENCE, 1992-1996: THE CAPACITY TO INTERVENE

This chapter examines why the Russian military did not intervene against the new regime from 1992 to 1996 in the context of its capacity to stage a coup. The military must believe that it has the capacity to defeat, or successfully intimidate, the regime's leaders and supporters, seize strategic sites necessary for the excising of power, and must be able to act swiftly to guarantee surprise and to minimise organised opposition. Therefore, the military's self-perceptions are directly relevant as they influence whether personnel have the confidence to intervene. The military's popularity is not examined here because it is addressed in the context of the opportunity to intervene. As factors that might discourage intervention are closely associated with the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, I shall note their influence within the context of the chapters that assess these coup determinants. Thus, factors that might discourage intervention within the context of the capacity to intervene are noted here.

I believe that the Russian military's capacity is influenced by four main factors. First, the type of personnel involved in a coup is important. Most importantly, leaders popular among personnel both willing and able to lead a coup have a significant impact on the capacity. The participation of strategically located officers, those commanding units located near strategic sites, can further increase the speed and thus the surprise of an intervention. Effectively armed and trained personnel similarly enhance the capacity to intervene. The participation of army personnel is important given their weaponry and expertise in ground operations. In addition, the participation of elite units facilitates a swift operation and can discourage opposition. This is because of their presumed high level of readiness and expertise. Second, the cohesion of the coup forces is relevant. For instance, the unwillingness of personnel to risk civilian casualties and civilian opposition to a coup increases the risks of intervention. Third, the number of participants might be relevant. The more personnel, particularly of the above type, that can be effectively co-ordinated, the more likely that the operation can be swiftly staged. Numerous sites, personalities, and opponents might need to be seized and countered. Finally, the military's mood is vital. Personnel must ultimately decide whether they have the capacity to intervene successfully, and at least initially, exercise power.

Therefore, this chapter examines hypothesis two, three, and four. With regard to the case study, I have already argued that hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is valid. Here I examine the validity of hypothesis two, various factors (as noted in full in the introduction) can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. In the context of the capacity to intervene these factors are: the presence of potential coup leaders; participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites; participation of effectively armed and trained personnel; cohesion of the coup forces; number of personnel; and the military's mood. I shall also examine hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. This hypothesis is examined in the context of the capacity to intervene. Hypothesis four, that a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, is also examined, again according to the capacity to intervene.

Type of Personnel

Leaders

I do not believe that transitional developments led to the emergence of the leader or leaders capable, and willing, to lead a Russian military coup. This absence of strong leadership is vital given the need to effectively lead and to win support for an operation as hazardous as a coup. The importance of capable leaders is shown by the 1991 coup where poor leadership contributed to the attempt's failure. For instance, personnel were not briefed on the operation's objectives except for being told that they were to "preserve calm in Moscow."[1] Coup leaders like Yazov also showed little enthusiasm. Yazov told the other coup leaders that "I will not be another Pinochet [the Chilean military dictator]" and ordered the army to withdraw from Moscow. [2] Similarly, Yazov appears to have already been depressed at the start of the coup, and afterwards called himself a fool for having participated.[3] This poor leadership is noted by scholars like John Lepingwell who wrote "the absence of any clear mission and of firm leadership at the top precluded success."[4] The coup's poor leadership is in stark contrast to Yeltsin's decisive rallying of people against the coup. Yeltsin swiftly denounced the coup, addressed crowds outside the White House, and actively sought support

[1] Yeltsin, *The View*, p74.
[2] Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order," pA18.
[3] Yeltsin, *The View*, p80. See also Schofield, p220. With regard to his view after the coup see *Der Spiegel* no no., 6 October 1991, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Junta Pleading For Mercy," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 7 October 1991, Internet, accessed 16 March 1998.
[4] Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p565.

from other countries. [5] He also courted personnel by issuing leaflets that said they were subordinate to him as the popularly elected President, whereas the coup leaders' actions were illegal. This was a skilful move as it directly appealed to their sense of legality. [6]

The absence of the strong leadership required to intervene successfully is shown by the lack of strong political attachments among personnel to a specific party or group that might have been able to unite them behind a coup. Two key indicators show that such a leader, or leaders, were absent. First, the opinions and actions of personnel show that despite the overall negative impact of the transition there was no opponent of the new regime who enjoyed their overwhelmingly support. This reduced the likelihood of many personnel actively supporting a coup. The failure to win over the military was reinforced by the reluctance of potential coup leaders to co-operate. Although I recognise that successful coups do not necessarily involve large numbers of personnel, I believe that the larger the number involved in the execution of a well-led coup, the greater the likelihood of success. The widespread and active support of personnel would be vital in Russia given the complexity of seizing power in a large modern state. Second, those opponents of the new regime who received the most support from personnel did not advocate that a coup be launched. I believe that key factors here include their realisation that power had to be taken legitimately rather than via force, and at least an acknowledgment of democratic rights. Thus, the military lacked the leadership to stage a coup, a key factor likely to discourage intervention.

The military did not have an attachment with any one opposition party or group strong enough to have enabled them to unite personnel behind a coup. Although personnel became increasingly politically active during this period, as I have already argued, they showed a lack of a strong commitment to a specific political party. For instance, in 1993 a survey of 13 military schools found that only 12 percent of officer cadets perceived themselves to be followers of the opinions of a specific socio-political movement or party. Indeed by 1994 this had declined to 8 percent.[7] Likewise, a study published in April 1995 found that no political party enjoyed strong support among officers.[8] Later that year a survey of 2,500 servicemen and 500 members of their families found that 90 percent of them did not identify with any

[5] For an eyewitness account of Yeltsin's importance see Elliot, "Three Days in August," p66. Also see Yeltsin, *The View*, pp41-103.
[6] See Barylski, *The Soldier*, p112.
[7] Chernavin, p738.
[8] *Izvestiya*, 21 April 1995, n.p., quoted in Robert Orttung, "Izvestiya Examines Political Tendencies In The Military," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 21 April 1995, accessed 17 June 1998.

particular party.[9] In 1996 another report also found that personnel had divided political loyalties.[10] Those parties often associated with extremism like the LDPR and the Communist party also failed to enjoy a strong and unconditional bond with the military, as should become apparent when I assess the popularity of their leaders.

Similarly, extremist groups aimed specifically at the military enjoyed limited support. Only 2 percent of officers in poll findings published in 1993 had been involved in protests, and in February 1993 only 250 officers attended the All-Army Officers' Meeting rather than the 1,500 expected. The majority of these officers were not on active duty.[11] From 1992 to 1996 on average only 19 percent of officers indicated in the CMSPLR survey that it was permissible to participate in the activities of any organisations defending their rights (see table 10). This lack of support corresponds with the overall reluctance among personnel to become politically active, especially with regard to direct action against the new regime. Among groups aimed at personnel, political involvement was not necessarily advocated either. Indicative of this is the stance taken by the Servicemen's Independent Trade Union in 1993, which declared that politicians should leave the military out of their conflicts.[12] The limited appeal of military interest groups was encouraged by the negative perceptions many personnel had of such groups. For instance in 1992, 43 percent of officers indicated that officer's assemblies were ineffective and useless.[13] Moreover, personnel who attended meetings were not necessarily content with the proceedings. One important member of the Officers' Union was booed off the podium when he rose to speak in January 1992. [14] Attempts by these groups to win support are also likely to have been hindered by their weaknesses. For example, Stanislav Terekhov, head of the Officers' Union, attempted to usurp the authority of the All-Army Officers' Assembly. Apart from this, I have already noted that such groups were closely monitored by the new regime.

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[9] P. Povesmo, "What Is Your Mood, Man In Uniform?" *KZ*, 26 December 1995, p2, quoted in Orr, *The Current State*, p13.

[10] *Moskovskie novosti*, 31 March-7 April 1996, n.p., quoted in Scott Parrish, "Military Leadership Maneuvers In Presidential Campaign," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 4 April 1996, accessed 10 June 1998.

[11] S. Solovev and S. Ianin, "Rossiiskaia armiia god spustia: problem ne ubavliaetsia," *Armiia* no.10, May 1993, p32, quoted in Mendeloff, p234. With regard to the 1993 meeting see *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 February 1993, n.p. quoted in Konstantin Sorokin, "Russia And The Former Soviet Union," ed. Constantine Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson, *The Political Role Of The Military: An International Handbook*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), p397.

[12] Steven Erlanger, "Crisis In Moscow: Divided And Burdened, The Army Stays Neutral," *NYT* Ondisc, 24 March 1993, pA8.

[13] P. Zalesskii, "Chto segodnia trevozhit ofitserov," *Armiia* no no. August 15 1992, p13, quoted in Mendeloff, footnote 21, p233.

[14] See Iurii Orlik, "Manvry vokrug ochen' vooruzhennykh sil," *Izvestia*, 20 January 1992, p2, quoted in Mendeloff, p235.

More specifically, the evidence indicates that no opponent of Yeltsin who might have played a leadership role in a coup enjoyed an overwhelming level of support from personnel. This is shown by the military not acting decisively in support of an opponent, personnel failing to use force against the civilian leadership on their behalf, or to strongly and consistently support them. Such failures were clearly visible to the opponents given the military's actions during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt, the military voting patterns, and the numerous surveys of personnel. The ability of potential coup leaders to unite the military behind an intervention is critical in Russia. This is because I argue later that a key factor behind the reluctance to intervene was the threat that personnel would be divided and fight each other, in turn threatening a civil war. The importance of this ability to unify the military was further enhanced by the need to use large numbers of personnel to seize power in a large modern state like Russia. This is another point I make later in the chapter. Apart from the strong reluctance to intervene and the attachment to democratic values, which I discuss when the military's mood is assessed, I believe that the actions of the potential coup leaders and the policies associated with them limited their appeal.

The most popular opponents of the new regime failed to win widespread military support, a failure likely to have discouraged them from seeking a leadership role in a coup. According to the CMSPLR survey taken throughout this period, the opponents most favoured by personnel were: Rutskoi; Zhirinovsky; Zyuganov; Lebed; and Gromov. Rutskoi, who was not on active duty, received minimal support from the military when he used force to challenge Yeltsin's leadership in 1993. Very few officers joined the 1993 revolt and only an estimated 100-200 officers occupied the White House from 21st September to 2nd October.[15] There were even fewer active officers involved. Grachev claimed that only 15 supported the revolt and even Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, an officer in the reserves and a leader of the revolt, claimed that 80 active officers participated.[16] To put this in perspective, in mid-1993 the Russian army had 690,000 officers.[17] Active support from soldiers was similarly minimal.[18] CMSPLR findings further indicated that while Rutskoi enjoyed the highest level of sympathy

[15] Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p10. See also Stephen Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow: The Army Backs Yeltsin, for Now," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no.42, 22 October 1993, pp12-3.
[16] Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," footnote 19, p23.
[17] Barylski, *The Soldier*, p278.
[18] Pavel Grachev, "The Khaki October," interview by Dmitriy Kholodov, 8 October 1993, *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 8 October 1993, pp1, 4, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 11 October 1993, quoted in "Defence Minister On Storming Of White House And The Army's Role In The Crisis," Reuters, 11 October 1993.

among officers, this averaged only 19.3 percent, peaking at 48 percent in April 1992. This compared with sympathy for Yeltsin averaging 25.3 percent (see table 11 and graph 4). [19] Even then Rutskoi's support was artificially high because personnel could choose two or three political leaders to support. The level of this support was unlikely to constitute a strong enough bond to motivate intervention. Rutskoi, at least by May and July 1995 when Ball surveyed 600 officers, enjoyed a high degree of confidence among 4.4 percent of officers, only 2.7 percent more than Yeltsin (see table 12). Similarly, in a survey earlier that year 11 percent supported Rutskoi as a presidential candidate, whereas Yeltsin was supported by 12 percent (see table 13). Another March 1995 survey found that only 7.4 percent of personnel said that they supported Rutskoi.[20]

Rutskoi's lack of widespread support during the latter part of this period was primarily a result of his actions during the 1993 revolt. Apart from imploring the military to intervene despite its reluctance, Rutskoi failed to skillfully court the military. For instance, he appointed Achalov, the former superior of Grachev, as his Minister of Defence despite his unpopularity among personnel.[21] Support was further discouraged by his attempt to divide the military. This angered the military hierarchy as they felt that their authority was threatened.[22] When casualties were sustained, personnel blamed these on the revolt leaders and immediately after the assault on the parliament, personnel involved in the assault supported Yeltsin.[23] Finally, Rutskoi treated officers with contempt and lost their support. Lebed wrote that during the revolt an envoy of Rutskoi in a bossy tone ordered that he attend a conference. Lebed refused and responded that "With human beings, I conduct myself in a human way. With swine like a swine."[24] Rutskoi lost his rank in October 1993 and his popularity did not recover from his bloody failure, sympathy having fallen over 50 percent within a year (see table 11).

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[19] For the level of sympathy in 1992 I divide the two survey results to obtain an average level of support. To calculate the average level of sympathy for the five years I use the 1992 figure and combine it with those for the next four years, and then divide it by five.

[20] Alexander Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win The Russian Army's Hearts And Minds?" *Jamestown Prism* no vol. or no., 8 September 1995, available from http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/russia_/milpol2.txt, Internet, accessed 31 May 1998, p2 of 8

[21] Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p9.

[22] Ibid., pp9-14; and Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow," p13.

[23] Buzgalin and Kolganov, p152; and Fiona Fleck, "Russian Troops Say No Doubts Yeltsin Was Right," Reuters, 8 October 1993.

[24] "Ne veruiushchii, no veruiu...," *Soldat Otechestva*, 13 March 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p535.

Table 11: Ratings of Political Leaders Among Russian Officers 1992-1997

- Officers could choose two or three political leaders with whom they sympathised.

Leaders:	April 1992 (percentage)	July-August 1992	To October 1993	To October 1994	To December 1995	May 1996	July 1997
Rutskoi	48	46	35-45 (40)	5-10 (7.5)	2	-	-
Yeltsin	38	35	25-30 (27.5)	20-30 (25)	10-15 (12.5)	25	9
Zhirinovsky	17	14	12	25-35 (27.5)	21	9	18
Zyuganov	-	-	-	19	30	28	24
Lebed	7	-	7	12	20	22	28

With regard to those that range between two figures, such as Rutskoi's popularity in 1993 and 1994, the figure in the middle of this range is quoted in the main text (these figures appear in brackets).

The polls were undertaken by the Center for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research. The 1997 figure is based upon a poll of 300 experts. For further information on the survey see Table 10. Source: Korbut, "Lev Rokhlin and the Officers Movement in Russia."

Graph 4: Ratings of Political Leaders, Russian Officers 1992-1997



Source: Table 11, p202.

Table 12: Confidence of Russian Officers in Key Figures Mid-1995

Russian Officers were asked: "How much confidence do you have in the following individuals?"

Personality	Valid number of responses	A Lot (percentage)	Some	Not much	None
Lebed	592	21.1	64.2	11.5	3.2
Gromov	585	11.1	62.6	22.1	4.3
Yavlinsky	565	4.1	50.8	31.9	13.3
Zyuganov	576	7.3	42.4	32.6	17.7
Chernomyrdin	591	4.2	42.6	38.7	14.4
Rutskoi	565	4.4	35.6	37.7	22.3
Yeltsin	585	1.7	29.1	44.4	24.8
Zhirinovsky	585	1.5	14.4	35.6	48.5

This survey examined the level of confidence in twenty figures whereas I have limited this table to those previously identified as the new regime's key opponents along with Yeltsin, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and Grigory Yavlinsky a liberal democrat. The survey was conducted in 12 regions of Russian between May 24 and July 1 1995. A total of 600 field-grade officers (122 Colonels/First Captains, 200 Lt. Colonels/Second Captains, and 278 Majors/Third Captains) were interviewed, 320 were from the ground forces, 84 the air force, 97 the navy, 89 the strategic missiles, and 10 the air defence. Source: Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, "The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12, no.2 (April-June 1996): Tables 1 and 8, pp161, 171.

Second, support for Zhirinovsky was not high throughout this period. Although Zhirinovsky in July 1991 said that he would endorse a coup and he supported the forthcoming attempt, the military did not unite behind it.[25] Under the new regime sympathy for him, according to the CMSPLR survey, peaked at around 30 percent in 1994 and from 1992 to 1996 averaged 17.5 percent, 7.8 percent less than for Yeltsin (see table 11). Like Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky was not highly regarded by the vast majority of officers, at least by mid-1995 when a mere 15.9 percent held him in any confidence, 14.9 percent less than Yeltsin (see table 12). Similarly, in 1995 only 9 percent of personnel preferred him as President, 2 percent less than Yeltsin, (see table 13) and another 1995 survey found his support was limited to 15.6 percent, only 1 percent more support than for Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin.[26] The validity of figures that indicated that Zhirinovsky won overwhelmingly support in the 1993 Duma elections are

[25] With regard to Zhirinovsky's declared support for a coup see *The Times*, 31 July 1991, n.p., quoted in Bruce Clark, "Soviet Hardliner Would Support Military Coup," Reuters, 31 July 1991.

also doubtful, and even those indicative of widespread support often failed to show that a majority of personnel supported him. For instance, the Ministry of Defence and the Central Electoral Commission stated that 99 percent of personnel voted with citizens in open electoral districts, thereby making accurate data unavailable.[27] Moreover reliable estimates indicated that 74 percent of personnel in 1993 supported Yeltsin's Constitution.[28] Similarly, independent reports indicated that only around 20 percent of personnel voted for Zhirinovsky during the 1995 Duma elections.[29] Finally, Zhirinovsky won only 14 percent of the military vote in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections.[30]

Table 13: Russian Officer and Civilian Preferences for Presidential Candidates 1995

This survey asked respondents whom they preferred as their presidential candidate in April 1995.

Preferred candidate	Officers (percentage)	General public
Yeltsin	12	3
Yavlinsky	11	14
Lebed	11	4
Rutskoi	11	4
Zhirinovsky	9	6

The surveyed officers were from the Moscow and North Caucasus MDs. Source: *Izvestia*, 21 April 1995, n.p., quoted in Meyer, "The Devolution," p327

This lack of universal support was encouraged by various factors. Zhirinovsky's lack of long-term military service would have limited his ability to form close relations with many officers. Accompanying this, I doubt whether his political performance would have strengthened his

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[26] Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," p2.

[27] See John Lepingwell, "How Did The Russian Military Vote?" *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 16 December 1993; and Steven Erlanger, "Question With No Answer: How Army Voted," *NYT* Ondisc, 17 December 1993, pA12. See also Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p20, and footnote 58, p29. With regard to figures showing a widespread level of support see Brusstar and Jones, "Aftermath Of The October Crisis," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34aft.html, pp1-2 of 3.

[28] Lepingwell, "How Did the Russian Military Vote?"

[29] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532. This estimation is supported by surveys of personnel. See *Moskovskie novosti*, 3-10 September 1995, n.p., quoted in Laura Belin, "Support For Zhirinovsky In Army Still Strong," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 8 September 1995, accessed 27 May 1998; and Korbut, n.p.

[30] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Richard Woff, "Ruthless Moves Head Off Communist Revival," Reuters, 10 July 1996. See also Simon Saradzhyan, "Sample: Russian Military Chooses Yeltsin;

support among personnel. For instance, several splits within his party occurred. Also he acted outrageously. He actually proposed that Russia attack the US and Japan.[31] Apart from the obvious danger of nuclear war, many personnel sought better ties with the US regardless of their continued suspicions of the West. For instance in 1994, 57 percent of officers advocated that Russia and the US form a partnership.[32] More specifically, Zhirinovsky endorsed policies, such as the reduction of terms of military service, unlikely to have been favoured by high-ranking personnel.[33] Nor is his close relationship with Grachev likely to have won widespread support, given Grachev's unpopularity.[34] Likewise, Zhirinovsky was a vocal supporter of the Chechnyan campaign, a campaign widely opposed.

Neither did Zyuganov, the Communist party leader, win overwhelming support. From 1992 to 1993 he did not enjoy the sympathy of officers, and when this did develop it peaked at 30 percent and averaged 15.4 percent from 1992 to 1996, 9.9 percent less than Yeltsin's support (see table 11). Zyuganov's lack of strong support is shown by the lack of confidence in him during 1995, the year when officers are meant to have been most sympathetic. That year, 7.3 percent had a high degree of confidence in Zyuganov according to Ball, only 5.6 percent more than Yeltsin (see table 12). Earlier that year another survey found that only 14.2 percent of personnel supported him.[35] In line with this, an estimated 20 percent of personnel voted for his party in the 1995 Duma elections, but none of the active military personnel elected in districts were Communist.[36] Zyuganov also appears to have failed to win widespread support during the 1996 presidential elections, winning perhaps as little as 8 percent of the military vote.[37]

Apart from Zyuganov's lack of long-term military service, I believe his lack of strong support was encouraged by the reluctance of personnel to return to Communism, and by Zyuganov's weaknesses as a campaigner. Surveys indicated that few personnel viewed Soviet Communist rule as a viable alternative to the new regime. In Ball's 1995 survey only 13.6 percent

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Shuns Zhirinovsky," *RFE/RL Features*, 17 June 1996, available from http://www.rferl.org/rus/features/F.RU.96061715082446.html, Internet, accessed 20 June 1996, p1 of 1.

[31] See *The Financial Times*, 14 December 1993, p2, quoted in "The Russian Elections-How The Maverick Put His Case," Reuters, 14 December 1993.

[32] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p4.

[33] Steven Erlanger, "Question With No Answer."

[34] With regard to Zhirinovsky's relationship with Grachev see Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," pp5-7.

[35] Ibid., p2.

[36] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp534, 541-2.

believed that the Soviet system was most suitable for Russia (see table 14). Similarly, though 73.6 percent of officers in 1995 believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union had been catastrophic, only 13 percent strongly believed that this collapse should have been prevented by any means. The majority accepted the post-Soviet borders too (see table 15).[38] Personnel also appear to have valued the greater political freedoms under the new regime rather than a return to Communist restrictions, as I argue later.[39] The many negative developments during the final years of the Soviet era, and the weak attachment to the Communist party among personnel encouraged these attitudes. Both of these factors have already been described. Likewise, Zyuganov's electoral skills were at least occasionally inadequate. For example, he campaigned poorly during the 1993 elections and failed to provide a coherent policy to the military.[40] Moreover it is unlikely that the military leadership favoured Zyuganov, given he wanted the military to report directly to him rather than via the Minister of Defence.

Table 14: Russian Officers and the Suitability of Various Political Systems in Russia Mid-1995

Officers were asked "What type of political system do you think is most suitable for Russia?"

Valid number of responses	Presidential republic (percentage)	Parliamentary republic	Soviet system	Monarchy	Other
590	41.4	38.6	13.6	4.1	2.4

For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 2, p164.

Fourth, although Lebed was popular among many personnel as a General, he was less popular as a politician. Both scholars and journalists wrote that Lebed was a potential coup leader.[41]

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[37] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Woff. See Saradzhyan, "Sample"; and Simon Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit Paid Off for Yeltsin," *RFE/RL Features*, 4 July 1996, available from http://www.rferl.org/rus/features/F.RU.96070417333373.html, Internet, accessed 7 July 1996, p1 of 1.

[38] With regard to the reluctance to take military action to preserve the Soviet Union see Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Demise Of The USSR," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34and.html, p2 of 2. Brusstar and Jones also found that the majority of officers did not believe that the fall of the Soviet Union should have been prevented by the use of force. See Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p4.

[39] See chapter 5, pp248-55.

[40] Thomas, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp333-4.

[41] Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" pp1-2; Charles King, "A Russian Pinochet Waits In the (Very Distant) Wings," *CSM* 87, no.56, 17-23 February 1995, p19; and Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p179. With regard to journalists see "Alexander Napoleonovich," *The Economist*, 332, no.7878, 27 August

Many personnel believed that Lebed should be Defence Minister, and 76 percent of 1,867 Moscow personnel in 1994 believed that he should replace Grachev.[42] Furthermore, in the first round of the presidential elections he could have won 47 percent of the military vote, though some preliminary results cast doubt on this.[43] The Friedrich Ebert-sponsored survey of 615 officers in August 1994 also found that 58 percent supported Lebed, and Ball in 1995 found that 85.3 percent of officers had confidence in him (see table 12).[44]

Table 15: Russian Officers' Views on Restoring Soviet Borders Mid-1995

Officers were asked "To what extent do you agree with the following?"

1. "Russia will lose respect of other countries if she does not rule over the other former Soviet Union [FSU] republics."
2. "I believe that the borders of the FSU [Former Soviet Union] are the borders of our country"
3. "The collapse of the USSR should have been prevented by any means, including military."
4. "Collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe for our country."

Valid number of responses	Fully agree (percentage)	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree
593	6.6	18.4	47.2	27.8
588	12.8	21.3	39.6	26.4
570	13.0	29.5	42.8	14.7
583	36.9	36.7	21.3	5.1

For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: OMIR survey. Ball and Gerber, Table 4, p168.

However I doubt Lebed's ability to unite the military behind a coup. According to the CMSPLR survey, from 1992 to 1996 sympathy for him as a politician peaked at 22 percent but averaged 12.2 percent, less than half the average level of sympathy for Yeltsin (see table 11). Although confidence in Lebed was widespread in 1995, this was strong among only 21.1 percent (see table 12). Moreover, Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber found that Lebed's

1994, pp43-4. See also EIU, Business Eastern Europe, quoted in "General Lebed Gives Western Firms Cause For Worry," Reuters, 10 July 1996.

[42] *Basapress*, 28 June 1994, 2 July 1994, quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Lebed Aiming High," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 6 July 1994, accessed 18 March 1998.

[43] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Woff. See also Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit Paid Off." For evidence which casts some doubt on this estimation see Saradzhyan, "Sample."

views on the economy rather than his imperialistic or authoritarian views were the most important determinant of this confidence. This was because his views corresponded with those of other officers.[45] Similarly, the Friedrich Ebert survey found that only 9 percent of officers believed that he was a "model contemporary military figure."[46] Therefore, Lebed's Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) received only an estimated 12 percent of the military vote during the 1995 Duma elections.[47] The following year, in at least some military towns Yeltsin appears to have won more electoral support than Lebed.[48] Even in Trans-Dniester, where Lebed commanded the 14th Army from 1992 to 1995, 50 percent of personnel did not vote for him during the first round of the presidential elections. Attitudes were also mixed concerning his decision to serve as Security Council Secretary.[49]

I believe that Lebed's actions and attitudes limited his popular appeal. Most generally, his political support among officers was limited by his perceived shortcomings as a leader. For instance, officers indicated that a coup would not be staged under Lebed because his political abilities were limited.[50] Many officers also believed that Lebed would make a poor leader, and his statement that he would only command troops in Chechnya to withdraw them received a hostile response.[51] Similarly, Lebed's peace deal in August 1996 was criticised by many personnel in Chechnya as they felt that they were being forced to accept defeat.[52] At the highest level, it is extremely doubtful whether Lebed enjoyed the support of the military leadership given their tense relationship. This was particularly tense between Grachev and Lebed. Conflict between the two Generals was encouraged by the Defence Minister's fear of Lebed's growing popularity and Lebed's knowledge of his past.[53] Indeed Grachev's sacking was one of the prerequisites for Lebed's support for Yeltsin during the second round of the

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[44] With regard to the Friedrich Ebert survey see Shlapentokh, p423. This survey included 60 Generals and Admirals.
[45] Ball and Gerber, pp176-8.
[46] *Der Spiegel* no.36, n.d., quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Military Opinion Survey," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 9 November 1994, accessed 18 March 1998.
[47] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532.
[48] See Saradzhyan, "Sample"; and Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit."
[49] Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 18 June 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 20 June 1996, quoted in "Mixed Reaction To Lebed's Appointment From Dnestr Region And 14th Army," Reuters, 20 June 1996.
[50] See chapter 5, p243.
[51] *Izvestiya*, 21 April 1995, n.p., in Joint Publications Research Service "Possible Voting Preferences of Military Personnel Examined," *Military affairs*, 2 May 1995, pp1-2, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p547. With regard to the response to his stance on Chechnya see Aleksandr Golovkov and Sergei Leskov, "Top Guns," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51, no.3, May/June 1995, p53.
[52] Gall and Waal, pp355-7.
[53] See Alexander Zhilin, "Battle For the Soul of the Russian Army," *St Petersburg Times*, n.d., available from http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/times/175-176/battle.html, Internet, accessed 1 September 1998, pp1-6 of 6. More generally see Simonsen, pp536-9.

presidential elections. Likewise, Lebed supported military reductions, claiming that if elected president he would dramatically reduce the size of the military, a move unlikely to have been well received by senior officers.[54]

Finally, many personnel supported Gromov, but again I believe that this support was not strong enough for him to unite the military behind a coup. The Friedrich Ebert survey found that 54 percent of officers supported Gromov, and in Ball's 1995 survey 73.7 percent indicated that they had confidence in him (see table 12).[55] However in the Friedrich Ebert survey only 9 percent of officers indicated that they perceived him to be a "model contemporary military figure," and in Ball's survey 11.1 percent had a lot of confidence in him, only 9.4 percent more than in Yeltsin (see table 12).[56] Similarly, a 1994 survey of Moscow personnel found that only 19 percent favoured Gromov as Minister of Defence.[57] Gromov would not have received much support from the military hierarchy given his insubordination. With regard to lower-ranked personnel, I believe that his support was restricted by the presence of Lebed. This is because both publicly criticised the new regime and shared similar stances on issues like Chechnya. Moreover, Gromov's criticism of Lebed is unlikely to have won him much support from personnel given Lebed's popularity.

The potential coup leaders also showed an unwillingness to unite. This is shown by the conflict between them. The two most popular opponents of the new regime, Rutskoi and Zhirinovsky showed little willingness to co-operate. In April 1994, Rutskoi claimed that Zhirinovsky was "a clinical case" and that he should not be taken seriously as a politician, while Zhirinovsky did not support the parliamentary revolt.[58] Similar conflict occurred between Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov. The Communist party downplayed the likelihood of an alliance with the LDPR. Zyuganov stated in December 1993 that there was "no common ground," and prior to the second round of the presidential elections Zhirinovsky told his supporters not to support the Communist party.[59] This lack of unity was encouraged by individual conflicts and by those of an ideological and political nature. Such disunity reduced

[54] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no no., 10 April 1996, quoted in Scott Parrish, "Lebed Proposes Sharp Reductions In Army," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 16 April 1996, accessed 11 April 1998.
[55] With regard to the Friedrich Ebert survey see Shlapentokh, p431.
[56] With regard to the Friedrich Ebert survey see *Der Spiegel* no.36, quoted in Socor, "Military Opinion Survey."
[57] Socor, "Lebed Aiming High."
[58] *L'Evenement Du Jeudi*, 5 April 1994, n.p., quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Rutskoi On Zhirinovsky," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 7 April 1994, accessed 10 June 1998.

the probability of an alliance between the potential coup leaders and the military, given the importance the military placed on cohesion.[60]

Similar inter-personal conflict involved Lebed and Gromov. Apart from Lebed's refusal to support Rutskoi during the 1993 revolt, he rejected appeals to make an alliance with Zyuganov prior to the second round of the presidential elections and called Zhirinovsky a "minus."[61] Such conflict is likely to have been encouraged by his disdain for civilian hard-liners, Lebed terming them "dangerous populist fanatics."[62] Similarly, Lebed had his own political agenda, and had intentions to hold political office.[63] With regard to Gromov, I have already noted that he publicly criticised Lebed, but his relations with civilian extremists were tense too. He refused to let his 'My Fatherland party' have close relations with extremists during the 1995 elections, and actively supported Yeltsin in 1996. Even if all these men had united they would not have enjoyed overwhelming military support. In 1995 when the total level of sympathy for Rutskoi, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, and Lebed peaked, 27 percent remained unsympathetic to all of them. Likewise, when the confidence levels of all five were combined only 45.4 percent of officers had a lot of confidence in them (see tables 11 and 12). Indeed Youry Averyanov, a Russian government official, told me in July 1998 that the military's political quiescence could be partly explained by the unpopularity of "ideas and especially leaders of opposition."[64]

This lack of coup leadership is further indicated by the reluctance of the above personalities to advocate a coup. I believe that although all five potential coup leaders held political ambitions, they came to recognise that power could only be obtained by legitimate means and that intervention could have a wide-ranging negative impact. Support for the attempts made to seize power was limited among the potential coup leaders. Similarly, all five at one stage or other contested both Duma and presidential elections. They also made comments at odds with a willingness to lead a coup. For instance, they are reported as either having renounced

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[59] Zyuganov, "Communists Are Not Sure Of Alliance With Nationalists," interview with the Russian Information Agency, 13 December 1993, quoted in Vera Tolz, "Communists Are Not Sure Of Alliance With Nationalists," *RFE/RL Daily report* NSS, Internet, 13 December 1993, accessed 17 June 1998.

[60] V.D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma," in *Russkii narod: Istoricheskaia sud'ba v XX veke* (Moscow: ANKO, 1993), p304, quoted in Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," p27.

[61] "Aleksandr Lebed: Sama zhizn zastavlyaet generalov zanimatsa politikoi," *Izvestiya*, 20 July 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p543.

[62] "V krainem sluchae general Lebed uidet v otstavku i budet klassnim plotnikom," *Golos* no.21, September 1994, n.p. quoted in Simonsen, p544.

[63] See Simonsen, pp539-44.

violence, or more specifically, openly expressed opposition to the use of the military in politics.

Assessing Rutskoi first, I believe that he would not have led a coup. Rutskoi actively resisted the 1991 coup and during his revolt, did not advocate a coup but rather sought to divide the military and thus reduce its support for Yeltsin.[65] He further termed the coup a "tragedy" in 1996.[66] Rutskoi also appears to have moved away from violence as a means to seize power. This is because he realised the magnitude of his mistake in hoping to seize power in 1993. During the government attacks on the White House he is reported to have ordered people not to shoot back and exclaimed, "There's no idea worth shooting people for."[67] After the revolt Rutskoi also accepted that he should not have used violence against the new regime. In 1996 Rutskoi acknowledged that "If I had known how many people would die, if I had known the price of the revolt, I would have given up."[68] This indicates that he recognised the negative impact an intervention could have. In accordance with this, he continued to participate in electoral politics after the revolt rather than seeking to forcibly seize power.

Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov showed a similar reluctance. Although Zhirinovsky claimed that his party would support another coup, he neither actively sought a coup against Yeltsin nor supported the 1993 revolt.[69] LDPR officials believed that the party would take power constitutionally.[70] Zhirinovsky had realised in 1991 that power could only be taken via winning electoral support. This is illustrated by his active involvement in electoral politics. For instance, he sought to win the military's support through his campaigning.[71] More

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[64] Youry Averyanov, Vice-Chief of Analytic Section, The Cossak Hosts Department (Kazac@gov.ru). E-mail to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz), 6 July 1998.

[65] See Yeltsin, *The View*, pp77, 101; and "Afghan War Hero Appeals To Soldiers To Join Yeltsin," Reuters, 20 August 1991.

[66] Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian, 1050 gmt, 19 August 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 21 August 1996, quoted in "Failed Coup Leader Gennadiy Yanayev Looks Back At Events In Moscow In 1991," Reuters, 21 August 1996.

[67] *Pravda*, 21 December 1993, n.p., quoted in Buzgalin and Kolganov, p160.

[68] Stephanie Baker, "Today Marks Third Anniversary Of Moscow Rebellion," *RFE/RL Features*, 4 October 1996, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1996/10/F.RU.961004154747.htm, Internet, accessed 23 May 1997, p1-2 of 2.

[69] Reuters, 29 March 1994, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Chubais, Zhirionvosky On Coup," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 31 March 1993, accessed 28 June 1998.

[70] Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, in Russian 1035 gmt, 11 December 1993, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 14 December 1993, quoted in "Profile of Zhirinovsky-Outlines Plans For Return To Empire," Reuters, 14 December 1993.

[71] See Jacob Kipp, *Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky and the Liberal-Democratic Party: Statism, Nationalism, and Imperialism*, Foreign Military Studies Office, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, January 1994, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/zhirinky.kip, Internet, accessed 25 May 1998, pp12-3 of 20.

specifically, in 1995 the LDPR contributed to the failure of an attempt to impeach Yeltsin. Zyuganov is similar to Zhirinovsky in that he too sought to win power legally. Zyuganov did not actively support the 1991 coup, the Communist party's 1995 electoral goals included the introduction of a military doctrine that banned the use of the military against Russians, and after the first round of the presidential elections he sought to make an alliance with Yeltsin. In March 1996 Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov actually appealed to the military not to intervene in politics. They reminded personnel that the Constitution prohibited its use against elected officials, and they recognised that intervention could have a negative impact, warning such an act would bring a "black shadow of shame" on the army.[72]

With regard to Lebed, it is more difficult to accurately judge his opinion of a coup given the diversity of his comments, but evidence indicates an unwillingness to lead a coup. Lebed's comments on civil-military relations were certainly inflammatory and he might be perceived as the most likely to lead a coup. This is best shown by his admiration for Augusto Pinochet, the General who led the 1973 coup in Chile. Lebed in 1994 announced that "I do not in principle praise Pinochet. But what did he do? He led the state from total collapse and put the army in the first place."[73] Later that year he further exclaimed "What's wrong with a military dictator? In all its history, Russia has prospered under the strictest control."[74] Lebed also expressed support for the use of the military to restore internal law and order.[75] In line with this, he moved to decisively halt the conflict in Trans-Dniester by strengthening the 14th army and actively using it.[76]

Despite such views, I do not believe that Lebed would have led a coup. Most generally, Lebed's active use of force in Trans-Dniester should not necessarily be seen as having threatened his superiors. A military spokesperson in 1993 stated that Lebed was acting with Moscow's full approval, and an adviser to Yeltsin repeated this in 1994.[77] Lebed's lack of support for a coup though is best illustrated by his actions in1991. Here Lebed actively sought

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[72] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 26 March 1996, n.p., quoted in Robert Orttung, "Opposition Duma Leaders Appeal To Military," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, NSS, Internet, 26 March 1996, accessed 10 June 1998.
[73] "Aleksandr Lebed: Sama zhizn zastavlyaet generalov zanimatsa politikoi," *Izvestiya*, 20 July 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p542.
[74] "General awaits call of destiny," *The Financial Times*, 6 September 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p542.
[75] *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 6 January 1993, quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Lebed Favours military Action To Restore Order," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 11 January 1993, accessed 18 March 1998.
[76] See Simonsen, pp529-32.
[77] See Desch, footnote 210, p488. More generally see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p17.

to prevent the coup from succeeding. Similarly, he did not support the 1993 revolt.[78] Afterwards, Lebed gave political support to the new regime and attempted to reassure it. He supported Yeltsin during the 1993 referendum that included a question on his leadership, and in early 1995 stated that he would only take power constitutionally.[79] He again showed a willingness to obey electoral laws by winning a seat in the 1995 elections. The following year he promised that any attempt to use force to prevent the second round of presidential elections would be ruthlessly suppressed. [80] In fact he joined Yeltsin before the second round, thus ensuring his re-election.

Neither should Lebed's vocal support of military rule be over-stated. At the very least, I believe that Lebed did not support a political role for the military firmly enough to lead a coup. Lebed did not unequivocally support authoritarianism and recognised that such systems could have negative consequences. In September 1994, Lebed commented that "Our history supplies some dreadful examples" of dictators.[81] Lebed accepted that a move back to a Soviet-style dictatorship would be very difficult. He commented that the re-establishment of the Soviet Union was "not only impossible but unnecessary" and that "those who dream of rebuilding it have no brain."[82] More specifically, he appears to have had divergent views on military leadership of the state. For instance, during the same month that Lebed asked what was wrong with a military dictator he said that he did not unconditionally defend the 'strong hand' of governing.[83] Similarly, in February 1995, he claimed that he would only take power by constitutional means. That month he commented that "I've had more than my share of war and have come to the conclusion that it doesn't resolve anything." [84] In June 1995 he further announced that "I am categorically opposed to using the army inside the country for the resolution of political problems and conflicts."[85] That year he also said, "I am not into

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[78] See Simonsen, pp534-6. For Lebed's personal account of the coup see Schofield, pp213-26.
[79] Lebed, "Awaiting His Nation's Call," interview by John Kohan, Yuri Zarakhovich, *Time*, no vol. or no., 27 February 1995, p25.
[80] "June 20-4:00pm Moscow Time-Special News Flash," p7, quoted in *Campaign Tales from Moscow*.
[81] "Hier müssen Köpfe rollen, gnadenlos," *Der Spiegel* no no., 5 September 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p543.
[82] Lebed, "General Lebed: Chechnya Was a Rake on the Path and We Stepped on It," interview by Dimitrina Gergova, *Trud* (Sofia), 25 July 1995, n.p.; and Lebed, "I, General Lebed, Will Be Russia's de Gaulle," Il Messagero (Rome), 12 December 1995, n.p., interview by Roberto Livi, both quoted in Benjamin Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed and the Outlook for Russia's Security Policy," *JSMS* 9, no.3 (September 1996): p550.
[83] "Hier müssen Köpfe rollen, gnadenlos," *Der Spiegel*, quoted in Simonsen, p543.
[84] Lebed, interview by Kohan and Zarakhovich, p25.
[85] Lebed, "Interview: General Lebed on the Army & the Kremlin," interview by Alexander Zhilin, p2.

mutinies, as a matter of principle."[86] Finally, in 1996 Lebed announced that "The army simply must be positioned with its back to the country and its face to the border."[87]

I believe that Lebed did not show the inclination to stage a coup because he realised the problems that could arise from intervention. This was encouraged by his experiences, both as a child and in the airborne forces. The most important event of relevance during Lebed's formative years was his witnessing at close quarters the 1962 shooting of civilians in Novocherkassk. This event encouraged him to resent the use of the military when politicians had allowed "appalling situations to develop." [88] Later experiences during the collapse of the Soviet Union influenced Lebed too. Lebed resented the loss of personnel during domestic operations and believed that politicians had allowed such instability to develop.[89] More specifically, he emphasised the dangers of attempting to seize power. For instance, shortly after the 1991 coup he commented that "Any combat in the streets of Moscow would have been guaranteed, 100 percent, to lead to large-scale bloodshed."[90] Likewise, Lebed refused to support the 1993 revolt because he feared that Russia would not survive another civil war.[91]

Finally, I believe that Gromov was an improbable coup leader. Gromov indicated that his opposition to the Chechnyan war was encouraged by his support of democracy. He argued that the war was 'incompatible with the concept of constitutional order and democracy."[92] More specifically, though Gromov helped plan the seizure of the White House in 1991, and later defended the coup, during it he made contact with the civilian leaders.[93] Under the new regime he appears to have moderated his stance. As a Deputy Defence Minister, Gromov disapproved of inflammatory warnings of military insubordination. For instance, when Lebed

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[86] Lebed, "Versions" Programme Quizzes Aleksandr Lebed On Politics And The Military," interview by Tatyana Zamyatina, Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian, 2125 gmt, 28 September 1995, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 30 September 1995, quoted in "Versions" Programme Quizzes Aleksandr Lebed On Politics And The Military," Reuters, 30 September 1995.

[87] Radio Station Ekho Moskvy, Moscow, 20 June 1996, quoted in Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed," p556.

[88] Schofield, p187.

[89] Ibid., pp187, 194.

[90] "Anti-Coup Leaders-The Men of the Future?" *JIR* 3, no.10, October 1991, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p535.

[91] "Ne veruiushchii, no veruiu...," *Soldat Otechestva*, 13 March 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p542.

[92] *Business Times*, Singapore, 24 Janaury 1995, n.p., quoted in John Helmer, "The "Afghanists' Were The Real Worry," Reuters, 24 January 1995.

[93] With regard to Gromov's actions in 1991 see *Longman Bibliographical Directory Of Decision-makers in Russia and The Successor States*, ed. Martin McCauley (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1993): p216. For information on his defence of the coup see Ralph Boulton, "Russian Official Defends General On Gorbachev Coup," Reuters, 13 July 1994.

said in 1992 that the army "is at the end of its tether," Gromov criticised him.[94] Neither did he actively support the 1993 revolt, but rather emphasised that the military should not intervene in politics.[95] Gromov further was willing to obey the electoral laws, he winning a seat in the 1995 elections for the centre-left 'My Fatherland' party. This party he claimed was pro-democratic. [96] He also campaigned for Yeltsin in 1996. I believe that such actions were encouraged by his ambition to hold a high military position. Indeed Grachev complained in May 1996 that Gromov was "dishonorable" for having independently met Yeltsin earlier that month, and for promising that he would implement military reform if appointed Defence Minister.[97]

In summary, I believe that no opponent of the new regime could have united the military behind their political views, and have been able to lead a coup. This inability to unite the military behind a coup was clearly visible given the military's actions during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt, military voting trends, and numerous surveys of personnel. I also believe that none of the potential coup leaders showed a clear and strong willingness to risk leading a coup against Yeltsin.

Strategically located

The transition impacted on all personnel and those strategically located were no exception. However, although discontent grew with the negative effects of the transition, this did not translate into a willingness to stage a coup. Those military personnel located near the Kremlin are the most important, given their close proximity to the centre of power and their familiarity with Moscow. The active participation of these personnel is thus likely to be a decisive factor determining a coup's outcome and, ultimately then, the likelihood of intervention. The importance of these personnel is illustrated by the new regime's active cultivation of their support. This is best shown by Yeltsin visiting the key military divisions located within the Moscow MD, the Taman and Kantemirov divisions, prior to their deployment during the 1993 revolt. Although they would have been reluctant to decisively support the new regime, it is

[94] Lebed, interview by Natalia Nikonova, Ostankino First Program television network, 14 September 1992, carried by FBIS-SOV, 14 September 1992, pp29-31; and Interfax in English, 17 September 1992, carried by FBIS-SOV, 18 September 1992, p29, both quoted in Zisk, pp13-4.
[95] Hungarian Radio, Budapest, in Hungarian 0805 gmt, 3 October 1993, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 5 October 1993, quoted in "Deputy Defence Minister Gromov On Crisis On 3rd October," Reuters, 5 October 1993.
[96] With regard to the 'My Fatherland' party see Richard Balmforth, "Russian General Launches Centre-Left Offensive," Reuters, 20 September 1995.
[97] ITAR-TASS, 29 May 1996, quoted in Scott Parrish, "Grachev Pans Gromov," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 30 May 1996, accessed 19 July 1998.

unlikely that the military personnel based in Moscow would have actively supported a coup. I have utilised two indicators to support this argument. First, I examine the actions of Moscow personnel, especially during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Second, I shall seek to identify whether the attitudes of these personnel were interventionist through focusing on their political opinions and voting preferences.

The actions of strategically located personnel indicate a reluctance among most to actively support a coup. The actions of personnel during the 1991 coup provide an early indicator of this. Lieutenant General Leonid Zolotov, Moscow MD Chief of Staff, opposed the coup, and the Taman division Commander stated that he knew nothing of the coup until being ordered into Moscow. His personnel then allowed children onto their tanks and a company defected to Yeltsin.[98] Likewise, members of the Kantemirov division supported Yeltsin.[99] The actions of personnel under Yeltsin further indicate this unwillingness. Although personnel of the Taman and Kantemirov divisions might have been reluctant to become involved, they remained loyal to Yeltsin and used force against the parliamentary revolt.[100] Moreover, Rutskoi failed to win over the personnel stationed in Moscow despite his appeals to them. Thus, the revolt clearly showed any potential coup plotters that they could not rely on the active support of strategically located personnel. A successful coup would also necessitate the taking of St Petersburg, as it was the second largest city in Russia. Here evidence suggests that personnel would not actively support a coup either. Personnel stationed in the city opposed the 1991 coup and showed little support for Zhirinovsky, Lebed, or the Communists, at least during 1995.[101]

The second indicator, the opinions of strategically located personnel, also indicates that though few strongly supported the new regime neither were they likely to support a coup. It is apparent that discontent arose among strategically located personnel. The Kantemirov Commander resigned over its role in the Chechnyan campaign, and reports indicated that

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[98] For information on the Taman division during the coup see Mark Urban, *UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1996), pp188-9.

[99] *The Independent*, 22 August 1991, p2, quoted in Christopher Bellamy, "Soviet Army Showed How Not To Breach Moscow's Barricades," Reuters, 22 August 1991.

[100] With regard to the reluctance of personnel to intervene see Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," *McNair Paper 34*, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34fal.html, p3 of 4. For Grachev's account of the deployment of the military against the revolt see Grachev, "Defence Minister on Storming Of White House," interview by Kholodov.

[101] Geneive Abdo, "Troops In Leningrad Ignored Coup Leaders' Crackdown," Reuters, 21 August 1991. With regard to political attitudes of personnel from the Leningrad or Northern MD see Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," pp3-4.

similar discontent emerged within the Taman division.[102] Personnel also showed an unwillingness to attack opponents of the new regime. In mid-1995, 63 percent of Moscow officers claimed that they would have disobeyed the order to attack the parliament in 1993 (see table 16).

Despite the discontent of strategically located personnel, it was very unlikely that they would support a coup. Nichols during a 1996 visit to Moscow found that officers did not seek a coup.[103] Likewise, Moscow personnel did not unite behind an opponent of the new regime. For instance, it appears that reports during the 1993 elections of the Taman and Kantemirov

Table 16: Active Russian Officer Loyalty According to Region Summer 1995

Officers were asked
1. "Would you disobey orders to attack separatists?"
2. "Would you have disobeyed orders to attack parliament in October 1993?"

Location of Officers	Question One (percentage)	Question Two
Kaluga	68	80
Mari El	70	72
Tuva	31	72
Krasnoyarsk	61	70
Moscow	37	63
Chita	33	62
Primorye	39	60
Sverdlovsk	59	53
Murmansk	19	52
Nizhnii Novgorod	27	49
Saratov	46	41
Voronezh	21	27
All Officers	39	51

Source: Deborah Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's Officers?" *Jane's Intelligence Review* 8, no.5 (May 1996): Table 5, p207. The statistics are based on the findings of her 1995 survey of 600 officers. See Table 12.

[102] With regard to the Taman division see *The Times*, 12 January 1995, n.p., quoted in Anatol Lieven, "Elite Russian Troops Denounce Their Officers-Chechnya," Reuters, 12 January 1995.
[103] Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" p1.

divisions voting overwhelmingly for Zhirinovsky during the 1993 elections are false. [104] Neither were Lebed, Zhirinovsky, or Rutskoi strongly supported by Moscow officers according to a 1995 survey (see table 13). Similarly, a survey from December 1994 to March 1995 of the Moscow and Northern Caucasus MDs found that Rutskoi and Zhirinovsky were poorly supported, and most felt that Lebed would not be a good leader. In fact, at least 59 percent did not even believe that the military would be periodically involved in politics.[105] The following year the Moscow MD Commander suggested that the 1996 presidential elections be postponed so as to prevent Yeltsin's possible defeat.[106] Moreover, during the elections Yeltsin appears to have won strong support from military towns near Moscow.[107] Finally, Yeltsin could deploy personnel from elsewhere if Moscow personnel were reluctant to act (see tables 16 and 17).[108]

Table 17: Russian Officers and the use of the Military to protect the President and Parliament Summer 1995

Officers were asked whether they approve or disapprove of using Russia's armed forces to

1. Protect parliament
2. Protect the president

Question	Approve (percentage)	Disapprove
Protect parliament	45	52
Protect president	47	50

For information on the survey see Table 16. Source: ROMIR Survey, Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's Officers?" Table 5, p205.

Apart from the absence of an interventionist mood I cover later, Yeltsin's cultivation of support among Moscow personnel helps to explain the reluctance to intervene. Grachev in 1994 stated that the MD should be an elite among the districts and it thus received preferential

[104] Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p20; and Joint Publications Research Service, "Possible Voting Preferences of Military Personnel Examined," *Military Affairs*, 2 July 1995, pp1-2, in *Izvestiya*, 21 April 1995, n.p., quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p547.

[105] "Possible Voting Preferences," pp1-2, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p547.

[106] Simon Saradzhyan, "Communists Assail Yeltsin's Wooing Of Military," *RFE/RL Features*, 8 May 1996, available from http://www.rferl.org/rus/features/F.RU.96050812503934.html., Internet, accessed 20 June 1996, p1 of 2; Marshall Ingwerson, "Russia's Army: A Loose Cannon In Power Transfer," *CSM*, 12 June 1996, available from http://plweb.csmonitor.com/plweb-turbo/c...1+archives+172528+10++Russian%20military, Internet, accessed 14 March 1998, p3 of 3.

[107] Saradzhyan, "Sample"; and Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit."

[108] Personnel were deployed from various regions see Grachev, "Defence Minister on Storming Of White House," interview by Kholodov.

treatment.[109] For instance, the elite Taman and Kantemirov divisions received advanced equipment and largely escaped the hardships other divisions suffered.[110] Nor were many of the best Moscow personnel sent to Chechnya.[111] In line with this, rather than seeking a medical certificate exempting their sons from service, many parents in Moscow sought to bribe an official to allow their sons to stay in the capital. In 1995 Moscow actually slightly over-fulfilled its conscription quota in the autumn of 1995, in stark contrast to the rampant draft evasion elsewhere.[112]

Effectively trained and armed

To successfully seize power in the modern state those personnel involved in the execution of the coup must be effectively trained and armed. To reiterate, expertise is an important determinant of the operation's outcome because the quality influences the ability of personnel to surprise, and to swiftly overpower, those forces loyal to the civilian leadership within the proximity of strategic sites. Similarly, the successful seizure or isolating of key figures of the regime requires much skill, given their security entourages and, at least with regard to the President, frequent travelling. The geographic vastness of the case study, the nature of the strategic sites that needed to be seized, and the likelihood that at least some personnel would actively oppose intervention reinforce the need for skill. With regard to weaponry, coup forces require an adequate level of firepower at their disposal to successfully defeat opponents or to intimidate them into submission. Of particular importance here is the availability of land based firepower, like that from tanks, given the potential need to accurately dislodge opponents located close to civilians. Such weapons also are very intimidating. Similarly, airlift capabilities are vital so that equipment and personnel can be swiftly moved to achieve maximum surprise and impact.

I have already argued that military expertise and the procurement of weaponry declined substantially as a result of the transition. However I shall stress two points of particular relevance here. First, the expertise shown by the military during this period is not of the high level I believe would be necessary to successfully stage a coup in a large modern state.

[109] Sergey Ovisyenko, "Arbat Military District' May Become Autonomous," *Rossiyskiye vesti*, 16 September 1994, n.p., carried by "Grachev Trip Linked to Military District," FBIS Central Eurasia, 16 September 1994, n.p., quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p538.
[110] Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces," p51.
[111] *The Observer*, 15 January 1995, p19, quoted in Victoria Clark, "Yeltsin Keeps Top Troops For Himself," in Reuters, 15 January 1995.

Expertise was inadequate both in terms of general combat skill and, more specifically, in areas such as urban combat relevant to the successful seizure of power. The 1991 coup and the military's performance under Yeltsin clearly show this inadequacy. Second, I believe that the type and quantity of weaponry available to potential coup leaders hindered the effective arming of personnel to overthrow the new regime. This is illustrated by the performance of key pieces of equipment in urban areas, and the overall decline in the quantity available of the pieces critical to a successful intervention.

First and most importantly, the military lacked the experience of staging coups, its only recent attempt ending in failure. This lack of the relevant expertise was compounded by the decline in overall expertise during the transition. Of key importance here is the inadequacy shown by personnel in operating within urban areas, as 74 percent of the population resided here.[113] The military fundamentally lacked experience in staging coups and thus the expertise to intervene successfully. This is a serious weakness given the difficulties of seizing power in a large state with various strategic sites. Historically the military had been politically active, as I have already argued, given the military operated under a penetration model of control. The military on several occasions during the past three centuries decided the fate of political leaders, climaxing this century with the military's involvement in the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and the resultant civil war.

However after the civil war and the consolidation of Communist rule the military did not play a decisive political role, hence denying the military the expertise such interventions require. Rouben Azizian, a former Soviet and Russian diplomat, told me in February 1998, "the reluctance of the Russian military to stage a coup can be partly explained by tradition. The military in Russia have been always powerful but have never assumed an independent political role."[114] Developments during the Soviet period are likely to have further hindered the obtaining of those skills required to successfully intervene. For instance, I have already argued that Soviet training did not take into account the uncertain nature of combat and thus discouraged initiative. This is an important quality given the need to act swiftly and decisively when staging a coup. Indeed 79.4 percent of soldiers told Gabriel (1980) that their officers

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[112] V. Litovkin, "Conscripts Explain Their Refusal To Serve," *Izvestia*, 5 April 1996, p2, quoted in Orr, *The Current State*, p3.

[113] Moshe Brawer, *Atlas Of Russia And The Independent Republics*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p30.

[114] Rouben Azizian, Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland (r.azizian@auckland.ac.nz). E-mail to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz), 12 February 1998.

failed to exercise initiative, and 92.3 percent believed that their officers were inflexible.[115] Yeltsin himself wrote that the 1991 coup leaders were "affected by their lack of experience in making independent decisions."[116] More specifically, the coup participants showed an inability to swiftly seize key figures like Yeltsin, a major failure given his ability to rally opposition. Likewise, the coup leaders were unable to seize control of communications. For example, Yeltsin was able to contact Grachev shortly after the coup's launch. Even elite personnel of the airborne forces showed little skill in their attempts to overcome barricades.[117]

This inadequacy is again evident under the new regime. During the 1993 revolt personnel were unable to effectively manoeuvre their tanks in urban areas.[118] Similarly, the military was unable to operate effectively in the urban fighting which ravaged Chechnya, as I have already argued. More specifically, the military lacked the skills to effectively police and control crowds. This inadequacy is shown by its lack of expertise in 'peacekeeping' and the use of Ministry of Interior forces for domestic policing.[119] The obstacle this posed was strengthened by the fact that Yeltsin ensured loyal divisions like the Dzherzhinsky were well trained in urban combat and deployed in Moscow.[120] Such a lack of expertise was apparent to potential coup plotters. For instance, at the 1992 All-Army Officers' Assembly where many officers publicly attacked Yeltsin, 90 percent said that combat readiness was in disrepair.[121] Moreover, it is unlikely that Zhirinovsky, or Zyuganov had the necessary skills to stage a coup given their limited military service, and Rutskoi showed poor judgement during the 1993 revolt, apparently losing his nerve during the bombardment of the White House.[122]

It is also debatable whether Gromov or Lebed would have had the skills required to successfully lead a coup. Gromov had much combat experience but this was primarily in fighting guerrillas in Afghanistan, experience of limited value in staging a coup. The number of personnel under his control, he was the senior military officer in Afghanistan from 1987 to 1989, also peaked at 115,000, not even enough to seize Moscow, as I argue later.[123] Lebed's limitations as a leader were derived from his lack of experience conducting large-scale multi-

[115] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, pp92, 102.
[116] Yeltsin, *The View*, p52.
[117] *The Independent*, 22 August 1991, p2, quoted in Bellamy, "Soviet Army Showed How Not To Breach."
[118] See Ronal Lewis, "Assault on the Russian Parliament," *AFM Airforces Monthly* no.73, April 1994, pp45, 48.
[119] With regard to the Interior Ministry's policing units see Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces," pp52-3.
[120] Clark, "Yeltsin Keeps Top Troops."
[121] A. Putko, "Moods in the Army Worry the Military Themselves," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 Febraury 1992, p2, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p15.
[122] "Red October," *Time*, 142 no.42, 18 October 1993, p22.

service operations, as a successful coup would involve. His combat experience under Yeltsin consisted of commanding the 14th Army whose ground forces peaked in 1992 at one army headquarters, two motor rifle divisions, two artillery brigades, and two Scud brigades.[124] To place this in perspective, the 1991 coup involved an estimated 15 divisions.[125] Lebed's ability to co-ordinate the various services was also questionable given his predominantly airborne background.

Contrasting this, Yeltsin showed himself capable of defeating direct challenges, both during the 1991 coup, as I have already argued, and the 1993 revolt. Here I believe that the delay in putting down the revolt is attributable to the military's reluctance rather than its neglect or Yeltsin's indecisiveness. For instance, Yeltsin courted the military immediately before its deployment and ordered two decrees declaring a state of emergency to prompt the military to act, in his second decree accepting full responsibility for the consequences. [126] Grachev described Yeltsin as having "quite confidently" taken charge.[127]

The successful seizure of strategic sites like Moscow would also require much skill. The Russian capital has numerous routes to the Kremlin, which would need to be blockaded to prevent the civilian leadership from escaping or receiving reinforcements.[128] During the 1991 coup Yeltsin was able to drive from his dacha into Moscow, and personnel experienced difficulties in navigating through the capital. Moreover, much skill would be required to successfully seize key structures. The Kremlin is a strong fortress with walls as thick as 6.5 metres and each of the eighteen towers can defend themselves and cover the approaches to the walls. It also has various secure escape routes.[129] Likewise, the White House has a secure bunker, which Yeltsin used during the 1991 coup, and various escape routes. In addition, there are at least 19 other strategic sites spread throughout Moscow ranging from the First

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[123] *The Military Balance 1987-1988* (London: IISS, 1988), p45.
[124] With regard to those forces under Lebed in 1992 see *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p100.
[125] Tyler, pA14.
[126] For an overview of Yeltsin's actions see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pp7-13; and Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," pp1-4. For his personal account see Yeltsin, *The View*, pp241-83.
[127] Kholodov, "The Khaki October."
[128] For a detailed map of Moscow see Brawer, p39. For a map showing the deployment of the military in the capital during the 1991 coup see George Church, "Anatomy of A Coup," *Time*, 138, no.35, 2 September 1991, p29.
[129] Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, pp235-8.

House of the Ministry of Defence, within which the General Staff reside, to the Ostankino Television Tower.[130]

Even if the coup were staged when key members of the civilian leadership were not residing in Moscow, it would have taken much skill to seize them. This is best illustrated by the failure of the 1991 coup, despite neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin being in Moscow when the intervention was launched. Security around Yeltsin, who was at his Arkhangelskoye dacha, was tight and alert security staff prevented his arrest.[131] Such security also existed when the civilian leaders were in transit. The 1991 coup leaders rejected a plan to seize Yeltsin en transit because of his armed entourage. The planned kidnapping of Yeltsin while in a motorcade, which I have already mentioned, was similarly discouraged by the realisation his security would kill anyone before they came too close. Yeltsin wrote that his security men "are particularly careful to watch my back" and "walk along very close behind me, in my footsteps, almost stepping on my heels."[132] Likewise, the civilian leadership ensured that if the need arose they could swiftly reach Moscow. This is illustrated by Yeltsin's swift return by helicopter from Barvikh to use force against the 1993 revolt. The level of security during such flights is shown by the anti-aircraft defence system maintaining an 'air corridor' for the helicopter, and the President and Prime Minister did not fly together. Even if their return to Moscow was prevented, the leaders had other secure sites which could act as their headquarters.[133]

Second, both the type and the quantity of equipment available to coup forces would have complicated intervention. This is less important, given the ability to use equipment rather than the actual equipment is often the decisive factor in determining the outcome of combat. This is shown by the military's experiences in Chechnya. Although at least some pieces of equipment showed inadequacies, here the key problem was the lack of expertise. The rebels themselves were poorly equipped relative to the Russians but continued to inflict casualties because of their superior tactics.[134] With regard to the type of equipment, it is doubtful whether key pieces in the Russian arsenal were suitable for operation in urban areas, and thus a coup. For instance, the firepower of Russian tanks is restricted by the depression and

[130] See Schofield, pp224-5. See also Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces," p53.
[131] See Yeltsin, *The View*, pp62-3.
[132] Ibid., p142.
[133] See Suvorov, *Inside The Soviet Army*, pp238-40.
[134] See Orr, *The Current State*, p12.

elevation limitations of their guns. This prevents them from attacking coup opponents in basements or in the upper floors of buildings, a problem tank crews faced during the assault on the White House. In addition, the quantity of weaponry available declined, making it more difficult to effectively arm coup forces. This is best shown by the Chechnyan campaign, which further reduced military stocks due to heavy Russian losses. During the campaign the equipping of one regiment required the 'cannibalisation' of a division, and shortages of even the most basic weapons occurred. For instance, some personnel in Chechnya were forced to pay for their own rifles.

More specifically, the equipment required to swiftly execute a coup through the seizure of strategic sites became increasingly unavailable. For instance, the military's airlift capability declined. The number of Military Transport Aviation aircraft fell by nearly 50 percent from 1992 to 1996.[135] Thus, by early 1995 it was reported that it required all of Russia's airlift capability to move just one airborne division in two sorties.[136] To put this in perspective, the 1991 coup involved 15 divisions. This would have reduced the ability of coup leaders to swiftly transport their forces to staging points, and is particularly important given the reduced availability of equipment near strategic sites. For instance, the number of main battle tanks in the Moscow MD declined from 1993 to 1996, likewise with the Leningrad (then Northern) MD whose headquarters are in St Petersburg.[137]

However I do not believe that weaknesses with regard to expertise and equipment would alone have discouraged a coup. Although the military's expertise and thus capacity declined, the capabilities of at least some of the forces close to Yeltsin were limited. Doubts have been expressed over the combat capabilities of those personnel based in Moscow, who I have already argued were unlikely to actively support a coup.[138] Similarly, those forces not under the Ministry of Defence would not have been able to effectively repulse a united military. These forces lacked the military's firepower. Although the Border Troops had artillery and aircraft they were well out-numbered by the military. Neither did the MVD rival the military

[135] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p98; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p119.
[136] Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," p90.
[137] *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, p104; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p115.
[138] For such doubts see Pavel Felgengauer, "Balans sil vokrug Kremlia: Vozmozhnosti silovykh ministerstv orgranicheny," *Segodnia* no.4, 16 March 1993, p71, quoted in Mendeloff, p228.

in terms of equipment.[139] The capabilities of such forces is also doubtful given they proved unable to effectively contain the protests during the 1993 revolt.[140]

Had these forces been deployed against better-equipped military personnel it is doubtful whether they would have steadfastly defended Yeltsin. For instance, the November 1994 attack organised by the security forces on Grozny failed miserably, and during the Chechnyan campaign anger grew among Special Designation Police Unit (OMON) personnel at their deployment without adequate equipment.[141] Moreover, the loyalty of these forces cannot be taken for granted. MVD personnel deployed in Chechnya rapidly became disillusioned and resentful of the new regime.[142] An elite Interior Ministry unit actually mutinied in early 1995.[143] Apart from Chechnya, in May 1994 Border Troops in the Far East intercepted Chinese naval craft without authorisation from Moscow.[144] More dramatically, Yeltsin apparently contemplated using troops to close parliament in March 1996 after it renounced the treaty which dissolved the Soviet Union. However, Yeltsin refrained from doing so after Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov told him that he could not guarantee the loyalty of his personnel. [145]

Cohesion

I have already argued that military cohesion declined after 1985; however, of special interest here is the impact of this on the capacity to intervene. I believe that two main factors emerged from this fall in cohesion that discouraged intervention. First and most importantly, poor cohesion meant that if a coup was staged the threat arose of a civil war. Such a war could occur if different military factions came into conflict. This is an important disincentive given personnel feared that a civil war could occur. Second, poor cohesion made it more difficult to

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[139] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, pp97-8, 101; *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, pp99-100, 106; *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, pp112-3, 119; *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, pp114-5, 120; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp114, 119.

[140] See Buzgalin and Kolganov, pp69-76.

[141] With regard to the November 1994 attack see Gall and Waal, pp155-7, 163. With regard to the OMON see *The Moscow Times*, 10 January 1995, n.p., in Gall and Waal, p209.

[142] Sovset, 13 December 1994, in Vladimir Socor, *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no no., 13 December 1994, quoted in Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," p262. With regard to the expression of discontent see Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p540.

[143] *The Independent*, 11 January 1995, p12, quoted in Tony Barber, "Top Russian Unit Quits Over The Cold And Chaos," Reuters, 11 January 1995.

[144] See Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," pp20-21. From 1994 Border troops were termed Frontier Troops by the IISS. However for consistency I continue to use this term.

[145] David Remnick, *Resurrection: The Struggle For A New Russia* (New York: Random House, 1997), pp331-2. See also Ingwerson, "Russia's Army: A Loose Cannon."

successfully stage a coup, as coup leaders needed to take into account the real possibility of personnel remaining loyal to the new regime. However this decline is less important because personnel were united on key issues, and because poor cohesion also impacted upon the ability of the new regime to counter intervention. The limited impact of the fall of cohesion on the capacity to intervene is shown by the 1991 coup, which occurred despite the serious internal divisions that the military suffered. Moreover, had a coup appeared likely to succeed, many personnel might have united behind it.

First, the fall in cohesion meant that the threat of instability and civil war was a possible outcome of a coup, a threat the military recognised and was determined to avoid. The military knew first-hand that intervention could lead to internal conflict from its experiences in Afghanistan. Here the regime, which took power in April 1978 via a Soviet assisted coup, became increasingly unstable and hostile. This led to a long and bloody conflict after the Soviet invasion in 1979. The presence of this threat perception is shown by the 1991 coup where there existed a real potential for internal military conflict. Shaposhnikov later claimed that he was prepared to launch an air attack on the coup leaders, and when a submarine of the Pacific Fleet declared its allegiance to Gorbachev, pro-coup vessels hunted it.[146] The reluctance of personnel to support the coup was encouraged by the threat of a resultant civil war, or at least the threat of instability. Illustrative of this is Lebed's stance, which other personnel shared.[147] Likewise, the alleged refusal of the Alpha KGB unit to storm the parliament was influenced by the fear that such an act would encourage a civil war.[148] This anxiety remained under the new regime, as is shown by the 1993 revolt. Here Grachev, prior to the military's deployment, accused the parliamentary leaders of courting a civil war and the threat posed to cohesion encouraged the military to support Yeltsin.[149] Moreover, officers during this period believed that a coup would result in a civil war, and would ultimately

[146] With regard to Shaposhnikov's claim see Fred Hiatt, "Soviet Generals Feared each Other During Coup," *The Washington Post* 13 September 1991, n.p.

[147] With regard to Lebed see pp211-2. More generally see Meyer, "How the Threat," p30; and Zhong, "The Transformation," p66. The threat of a civil war because of the military's poor cohesion was also recognised outside of the Soviet Union. See Don Oberdorfer and David Hoffman, "U.S Officials See Major Chance Takeover Will Be Unsuccessful," *The Washington Post* 21 August 1991, pA15.

[148] Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order."

[149] "[Grachev] Reaffirms Support for Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 22 September 1993, p16, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p337. With regard to the impact of the perceived threat to military cohesion posed by the revolt see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p13.

destroy the military.[150] Thus, poor cohesion discouraged personnel from supporting direct challenges against Yeltsin.[151]

The second key impact of the fall in cohesion was the reduction of the military's ability to effectively intervene. This is shown by the failure of the 1991 coup, where the lack of unity played a key role. As I have already noted, the military was split on the coup. Yeltsin wrote that the military was in "chaos--real chaos," and Lebed wrote that "aircraft were suddenly showing up and landing at the wrong bases. Divisions of regiments were intermingled and the chain of command partially disrupted."[152] Similarly, numerous scholars identified the role of the military's poor cohesion in influencing the coup's outcome.[153] Likewise, I have already mentioned that scholars have attributed the military's political quiescence after the coup to its disunity.

However, although the threat of instability arising from the lack of cohesion is important, poor cohesion alone did not deny the military the capability to intervene. First and most importantly, although overall cohesion did fall, personnel were united on key issues. For instance, personnel were united in decrying the state of living conditions and the decline of the military.[154] Yet this was countered by an overwhelming reluctance to intervene. Second, disunity does not prevent a coup from being staged, though it reduces the possibility of success and thus the probability of intervention. For example, the 1991 coup occurred despite cohesion having fallen under Gorbachev. Indeed some commentators wrote of the military's poor cohesion when they dismissed the likelihood of a coup prior to the 1991 coup.[155] Likewise, this fall in cohesion may have influenced the decision to intervene. The coup leaders had promised in late July 1991 that "no one will succeed in turning the armed forces into an amorphous mass, disintegrating from within."[156]

Third, the fall in cohesion was universal, its impact being felt throughout the military and thus reducing the likelihood of the military swiftly uniting in defence of the new regime. The

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[150] See Nichols, "An Impending Coup?" p1; and Arnett, "*Russia After the crisis*," p54
[151] See Lepingwell, "Soviet civil-military relations," p569.
[152] Yeltsin, *The View*, p89.
[153] See Desch, p466; Zhong, "The Transformation," p66; Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p564; and Miller, "The Soviet Coup," pp72-3. Journalists also expressed similar views. See "Yeltsin's army," *The Economist*, 320, no.7721, 24 August 1991, p12.
[154] See Mendeloff, pp228-9.
[155] See Richard Pipes, "Soviet Army Coup? Not Likely," *NYT*, 20 November 1990, pA21.
[156] Jonathan Lyons, "Soviet Hardliners Suggest Only The Army Can Save The Day," Reuters, 23 July 1991.

impact of poor cohesion on the ability of the regime to defend itself is shown by the apparent unwillingness of the majority of personnel to actively oppose the 1991 coup. The divisions that emerged when the military was deployed against the 1993 revolt also show this poor cohesion. The revolt shows that although few personnel actively supported the revolt, neither did the military unite swiftly behind Yeltsin. Yeltsin wrote that Chernomyrdin's call for suggestions from the Ministry of Defence on the taking of the White House was "received by a heavy, morose silence." He further wrote that the army failed to act swiftly because it was being "pulled into pieces and everyone was jerking on his part."[157] Similarly, James Brusstar and Ellen Jones argued that Grachev's reluctance to act was encouraged by anxiety over the reliability of personnel.[158] In addition, those forces not under the Ministry of Defence showed an inability to act cohesively, as they competed for funding and fought over who was to blame for the failures in Chechnya.[159]

Finally, though an overall decline in cohesion did occur, had a coup appeared likely to succeed many personnel might have united behind it. This argument is supported by the actions of personnel during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. With regard to the 1991 coup, it is evident that many remained neutral. For example, Colonel General Novozhilov, Commander of the Far East MD, commented that it was difficult to argue that the army supported either the coup or Yeltsin.[160] More specifically, officers like Colonel General Viktor Pavlovich, Commander of Naval Air Forces, were not active during the attempt. But when the coup's outcome was decided they expressed loyalty to the winning authorities.[161] Indeed Porter wrote that the coup was defeated too quickly to estimate how the majority of officers would have acted if its success appeared likely. [162] Similarly, during the 1993 revolt Yegor Gaidar, the First Deputy Prime Minister, appealed to Muscovites to publicly support Yeltsin to convince the military that the new regime had popular support.[163] Sergei Stankevich, a presidential advisor, also commented after the revolt that the military might have played a game of 'wait

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[157] Yeltsin, *The View*, p277.
[158] Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p3.
[159] Galeotti, "Russia's Internal Security Forces-Does More mean Better?" *JIR* 6, no.6 June 1994, p272. With regard to Chechnya see Gall and Waal, p208.
[160] *Le Monde*, 5 September 1991, p5, in "General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt," FBIS-SOV, 6 September 1991, pp59-60, quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p564.
[161] McCauley, pp499-500.
[162] Porter, *Red Armies*, p58.
[163] Irina Savveyeyeva, "Where Was the Army? It Was Ascertaining Who the People Were Behind," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 5 October 1993, p3, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p3.

and see.'[164] Finally, non-Ministry of Defence personnel might have shared this perception. For instance, a Deputy Chief of a Moscow Police District claimed that his superiors were "just waiting to see who will gain the upper hand."[165]

Number

The number of personnel is the final factor likely to have influenced the perception personnel had of their capacity to intervene. The number of personnel available to coup leaders is ultimately a coup determinant. This is because the seizure of power requires human resources to take key members or supporters of the new regime, and structures from which power is exercised. Both were likely to have security or at least be near armed personnel whose support of the intervention could not be guaranteed. More generally, the enforcement of a state of emergency or of curfews aimed at consolidating the position of the coup leaders requires human resources. It has been argued by some that a minimal number of personnel could successfully stage a coup. Gorbachev claimed after the 1991 coup that three planeloads of paratroopers could overthrow the government.[166] Had a leader capable of uniting the armed forces behind a coup been present, a successful coup might have been possible in terms of the number of personnel. They numbered 2,720,000 in 1992, before falling to 1,270,000 in 1996.[167]

However I have already argued that such a leader did not emerge and neither did many personnel support the use of force against the civilian leadership. Assuming that lower-ranking personnel share a similar perception to officers with regard to a coup, I believe that the number who might have been willing to participate in a coup was inadequate. This is because of the complexity of staging a successful intervention in Russia. The difficulty of seizing power would have been evident to potential coup plotters given the minimal number of personnel who actively supported the 1993 revolt.

I believe that three key factors necessitated a large number of active coup participants, a number I believe was not present. First, the large size of Russia, both in terms of its

[164] *The Observer* 10 October 1993, p17, quoted in Mark Urban, "Army Suspected Of Playing A Game Of 'Wait And See," Reuters, 10 October 1993.
[165] *The Independent*, 8 October 1993, p12, quoted in Andrew Higgins, "Why The Guards Decided To Fall Into Line," Reuters, 8 October 1993.
[166] Jerry Hough, "Assessing the Coup," *Current History* 90, no.558 (October 1991): p305.
[167] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p92; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p113.

geography and population, would require the seizure and control of numerous strategic sites. Second, the large number of armed personnel not under the Ministry of Defence who might have opposed a coup would necessitate a large force capable of defeating opponents. The loyalty of at least some of these personnel to the new regime is clearly shown by their actions during the 1993 revolt. Countering such opposition with a large-scale military intervention in turn would require much time and make it difficult to keep secrecy. Third, it would have been clear to personnel that a coup ran the real risk of meeting civilian opposition. I have already argued that personnel believed that civilians did not support the military, and the failure of the military to win political support is examined when I assess the opportunity to intervene.[168] Thus, I shall focus on the recognition among personnel that civilian opposition to a coup would likely have been widespread.

A high number of personnel would be required to successfully seize power given the Russian population in 1993 numbered over 150 million, and the Federation covers one-eighth of the earth's land surface.[169] Although the Russian population declined during this period it still was 149,120,800 in 1996.[170] More specifically, in 1993 it was calculated that 125,000 personnel would be needed just to control Moscow in an emergency, the capital's population that year was 9 million. However the total number of armed personnel in Moscow was only 15,000 to 20,000. [171] Moreover this number would probably need to be higher to stage a coup so as to repel anti-coup forces. This would be a demanding task given the capital's size, the strength and number of key structures, and its numerous entry points. Similarly, the military would need to seize other key locations, like St. Petersburg with 5 million people in 1993.[172] The combined population of Russia's six main cities in 1993 was 19.7 million and thus, based on the need for 125,000 to control 9 million people (Moscow's population), would alone require over 250,000 personnel.[173]

The realisation of personnel that their intervention was likely to be widely opposed would have further encouraged them to doubt whether a coup was a realistic option. Throughout 1992 and 1993 the military press was filled with commentary over the potential for civil war

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[168] See chapter 7, pp325-30.
[169] *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, p98. With regard to the size of Russia see Sakwa, p31.
[170] *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p113.
[171] See Pavel Felgengauer, 'Balans sil vokrug Kremlia: Vozmozhnosti silovykh ministerstv ogranicheny," *Segodnia* 4, 16 March 1993, p2, quoted in Mendeloff, p241. See also Farcau, pp209-10. With regard to Moscow's population see Brawer, p24.
[172] With regard to St Petersburg's population see Brawer, p24.

and mass social unrest if the army acted "illegally." It was on these grounds that many officers argued against "pulling the military into politics."[174] Similarly, one officer stated in 1992 that the military was no longer feared by the civilian population, a fact that he believed would doom any attempt to establish a military dictatorship.[175] Officers also told Nichols in 1996 that civilians would oppose an intervention and that the degree of opposition would destroy the military.[176] This realisation would have been encouraged by the view that society held little respect for the military and by the minimal support for the 1991 coup. Similarly, the lack of electoral success for military politicians and the many surveys that indicated military rule was not supported would have discouraged the view that a coup would be welcomed.[177] This constitutes an important barrier to intervention, as personnel showed a clear unwillingness to use force against civilians, as I later argue.

Successfully defeating coup opponents placed further strains on human resources, especially the army personnel whose participation was very important. Such resources would be strained by the need to intimidate potential opponents into submission. Assuming that officers and lower-ranked personnel shared the same opinions on the role of the military in politics, and evidence indicates that personnel from all ranks were reluctant to intervene, in 1995 at least 314,900 army personnel could have been willing to protect the President.[178] This compares with a maximum of 140,000 army personnel, barely enough to impose a state of emergency in Moscow, and an average of only 93,400 from 1992 to 1996, who could have been willing to actively participate in a coup.[179] Moreover, this figure includes those serving outside of Russia and thus unable to participate decisively, at least initially, in a coup. Another challenge was posed by those personnel not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. This is particularly important as though paramilitary forces declined from 520,000 in 1992, they still

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[173] Ibid., p24.
[174] Aleksandr Golts, "Mozhet byt', khavtit dergat' armiiu?" *KZ*, 27 March 1993, p2; Golts, "Skol'ko mozhno iskat' vragov," *KZ*, 3 April 1993, p2; and Pavel Grachev, Russian Television Network, 1403 GMT, 21 March 1993, carried by FBIS Daily Report, 22 March 1993, pp39-40, all quoted in Mendeloff, pp238-9.
[175] O. Belkov, "Armiia i politicheskaia bor'ba (zametki politologa)," *Armiia* no.20, October 1992, p25, quoted in Mendeloff, p239.
[176] Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" p1.
[177] See chapter 7, pp325-30.
[178] This is based on 47 percent of the 670,000-army personnel in 1995 (see table 9) protecting the President. This percentage is in turn based on the 47 percent of officers, 53 percent of who were from the ground forces, who indicated in 1995 that they approved using the military to protect the President according to Ball. See table 16.
[179] This maximum figure is based upon 10 percent, the percentage of officers in 1992 who believed that it was permissible to use force to protect their rights and interests, of the 1,400,000 army personnel in 1992. This is the highest number from 1992 to 1996, based on the CMSPLR survey. The average number is based on the percentage of officers who indicated that it was permissible to use force from 1992 to 1996 and the number of army personnel during that period. See tables 9 and 10.

numbered 352,000 in 1996 compared to 460,000 army personnel.[180] Although I have argued that the capabilities and loyalty of some of these forces was debatable, neither were they likely to actively support a coup. This was encouraged by their preferential treatment by the new regime.

The loyalty of key security officers is best shown by the actions of Korzhakov, the President's close bodyguard. Korzhakov headed the Presidential Security Services from December 1993 to June 1996. This service by mid-1994 numbered over 20,000 personnel.[181] Korzhakov actively supported Yeltsin during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Yeltsin himself wrote "Many times I turned to him [Korzhakov] for help."[182] Apart from Korzhakov, personnel of the Interior Ministry played a key role in protecting the Ostankino Television Tower during the 1993 revolt. Such personnel also remained loyal to Yeltsin despite their losses during the revolt. For instance, many of the non-Ministry of Defence personnel blamed their casualties on the revolt leaders, not Yeltsin.[183] Though these personnel lacked key pieces of heavy equipment, they did have the equipment to ensure coup participants suffered casualties. For example, both the MVD and Border Guards or Frontier Forces had armoured personnel carriers (APCs). The MVD alone in 1992 had 1,200 APCs and this number increased to 1,700 in 1996.[184] The potential use of these forces against a coup was recognised by personnel. Colonel General Gennady Borzhenkov commented in mid-1995 that they provided the civilian leaders a system of checks and balances.[185] Similarly, scholars argued that such forces prevented a coup. Lester Grau wrote that Yeltsin had "surrounded himself with layers of security--and the Ministry of Defense is the outside layer. They would have a tough time getting to him now."[186]

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[180] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p101; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp119, 114.
[181] Galeotti, "Russia's Internal Security Forces," p272.
[182] Yeltsin, pXIX. See also p142. With regard to Korzhakov's role in the 1991 coup see Yeltsin, p85. With regard to the 1993 revolt see Yeltsin, pp11-4, 277-9. More generally, for information on Korzhakov's power during this period see Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p535.
[183] Thomas de Waal, "Knights Saved The Day-Elite Squad Snatched TV Centre From Rebels' Hands," *The Independent on Sunday*, 10 October 1993, p12, quoted in Reuters, 10 October 1993; Ralph Boulton, "Russia Mourns Dead, Rebel Leader Arrested," Reuters, 7 October 1993; and *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 13 October 1993, n.p., quoted in Buzgalin and Kolganov, pp130-34.
[184] *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p101; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p119.
[185] Colonel General Gennady Borzhenkov, "Voennaya reforma," *KZ*, 30 June 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p380.
[186] Lester Grau, Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (GRAUL@LEAV-EMH1.ARMY.MIL) E-mail to Paul Bellamy (Pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 29 June 1998.

The difficulty of seizing and controlling Russia was even more draining on manpower given the decline in the number of vital ground force personnel. I have already argued that the seizure of strategic sites would have been difficult, however potential coup leaders faced a further problem. This related to the decline in the number of personnel whose skills were most relevant. For instance, whereas in 1992 ground personnel numbered 1.4 million, by 1996 they numbered only 460,000.[187] More specifically, taking urban areas requires a large number of personnel, given the difficulty of dislodging defenders. Indicative of this is the Soviet doctrine that called for a four to one advantage over urban defenders. However in Grozny even a five to one advantage was sometimes not adequate, as personnel had to guard every seized building.[188] Though opposition to a coup might not have been as determined as that shown by the Chechnyan rebels, there is no doubt that urban combat would be demanding. This is shown by the 1993 revolt. Here over 7,000 personnel alone participated in the assault on the White House.[189] Furthermore, Moscow is much larger than Grozny.[190]

Finally, to plan and deploy a large number of personnel would require much time and secrecy. Given its complex nature much time would be required to organise a coup. To put these requirements into perspective, planning for the Chechnyan campaign started over six months prior to the actual invasion by 40,000 personnel.[191] This was not even half the number needed to control Moscow. Moreover the willingness of officers to put their time into this planning was doubtful, given their heavy workloads.[192] With regard to secrecy, this would be very difficult to maintain. Other than the size of the operation, numerous security agencies operated, and political officers and the secret police remained active.[193] Even US President George Bush appeared to have had knowledge of the impending coup and warned Gorbachev in June 1991 of an attempt.[194] I believe too that the new regime was more likely to act on rumours of a coup, given the 1991 coup. The regime established a direct line of communication with the commanders of all army units, which facilitated surveillance and a

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[187] *The Military balance 1992-1993*, p97; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p114. By 1996 the term 'ground forces' had been replaced by the term 'army.' The figure for the army is thus used.
[188] Grau, *Russian Urban Tactics*, p3.
[189] Mark, "Army Suspected Of Playing A Game."
[190] For a map of Grozny see Gall and Waal, p384.
[191] See Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," pp259-61, 264-5.
[192] With regard to the additional work many officers undertook to supplement their income see Orr, *The Current State*, p7.
[193] Amy Knight, "Is the Old KGB Still in Power?" *The Washington Quarterly* 20, no.1 (Winter 1997): pp63-5.
[194] See David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Random House, 1993), p436; and Gorbachev, "Russia: Interview With Gorbachev—"Five Years Ago, We All Lost," interview by RFE/RL, *RFE/RL Features*, 19 August 1996, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1996/08/F.RU.96081916302569.html, Internet, accessed 23 May 1996, p2 of 3.

swift response to any conspiring. Yeltsin also instructed Grachev to immediately report any meetings personnel had with political groups.

In summary, it is unlikely that the military perceived itself capable of staging a coup. This is because the military lacked the necessary leadership, support of strategically placed personnel, the relevant expertise, and cohesion. These inadequacies outweighed the military's continued access to much firepower and the weaknesses of potential coup opponents. As one Lieutenant Colonel in October 1994 commented: "We don't want to get into politics. We have so many unresolved problems of our own."[195] Therefore, hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the first of the three factors, is valid. This is because the transition influenced the capacity to intervene; however, hypothesis four is inaccurate as the transition actually reduced this capacity.

Mood

The military's mood influences both the perceptions of its capacity and its disposition. Though this is more difficult to establish, Finer argued that one element is always present, the military's awareness of its special and separate identity. According to Finer, to this only two factors need be added to encourage intervention, the sense that nothing can stop the military from having whatever it wishes, and a grievance.[196] These grievances are examined in the following chapter when disposition is assessed. Finer identified two moods that might encourage intervention:

1. The "self-important" military. Here personnel have a good, though not excessive, opinion of themselves relative to that they hold of the government or civilians and may take action when they feel humiliated by the government.[197]
2. Armies with a "morbidly high self-esteem." This is more extreme as personnel believe they are inherently superior to civilians. Again, perceived affronts to their pride are likely to create resentment, though in this case they are more likely to motivate intervention.[198]

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[195] Boris Soldatenko, "Tak khochetsya spokoino zhit,' spokoino delat'svoye delo," *KZ*, 1 October 1994, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p287.
[196] Finer, p61.
[197] Ibid., p.63.
[198] Ibid., p67.

The two mood types are examined here together. This is because they are essentially based upon the perception that the military is superior to civilian institutions. I have already argued that personnel did not have high self-perceptions, so I shall only briefly outline their mood before attempting to explain their lack of an interventionist mood. A lack of confidence was very unlikely to encourage personnel to believe that they could overcome the problems associated with seizing power in Russia. Poor confidence also reduced the likelihood of the new regime being accused of violating the high level of prestige enjoyed by the military, and failing to recognise the military's power. Similarly, poor confidence reduced the likelihood of personnel believing that they could perform better than the new regime's leaders, regardless of their mistakes and their lack of strong support. Apart from the military's expertise and capacity to intervene, I believe that three key factors can encourage an interventionist mood. First and most basically, officers expect their orders will be swiftly executed, and have an overly positive assessment of the utility of force. Second, personnel hold a negative view of the current method of leadership transferral. This is relative to the military's formal and proper procedures. Third, personnel hold a negative view of civilian politicians, particularly those in government.

I do not believe that personnel had an interventionist mood. This is because they lacked the qualities likely to encourage a sense of superiority relative to the new regime and to civilians in general. The lack of morale and confidence among personnel does not indicate that there was a sense of "self-importance" or "morbidly high self-esteem." As I have already noted, one 1993 survey found that 51 percent of officers feared "taunts and degradation" by civilians.[199] More specifically, morale was low among potential coup supporters. For instance, at the February 1992 All-Army Officers' Assembly where many officers attacked Yeltsin, 95 percent said that they were demoralised.[200] This lack of confidence would have been particularly influential because of their realisation that a coup was likely to be widely opposed.

I shall now explain why the military did not have an interventionist mood. First and most importantly, I believe that many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly executed nor held an overly positive assessment of the utility of force. This was encouraged by the belief that the military would be unable to provide effective governance by swiftly

[199] Vladimir Dudnik, "Genshtab preduprezhdaet," *Moskovskiye novosti* no.15, 11 April 1993, pA4, quoted in Mendeloff, p239.

solving the state's problems. After I argue this I assess the second and closely inter-linked factor. I believe that although many personnel wanted strong state leadership they wanted this to be provided through, rather than in violation of, the democratic electoral system. They ultimately were not confident that they knew of a viable alternative. Finally I shall argue that although Yeltsin was not strongly supported by many personnel, his support relative to that for his main opponents and for the military leadership, could be high. This also reduced the likelihood that personnel believed a viable alternative was present. These all contributed to an acceptance of civilian supremacy among most personnel.

Military perception of loyalty and the utility of force

With regard to the first factor, many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly executed or had an overly positive assessment of the domestic utility of force. The acceptance that orders would not necessarily be swiftly implemented, and the reluctance to use force against civilians is shown by the reluctance of the military leadership to intervene during the 1993 revolt. Here Grachev's reluctance was encouraged by his fear that orders would not be followed. Yeltsin recalled that by seeking support from the military against the revolt he was "trying to bring my combat generals out of their state of stress and paralysis." [201] Indicative of Grachev's concern over the military's reliability are his moves to ensure its unity. For instance, he invited the press to meetings of his deputies and his service commanders to ensure that the military provided a united front to the media. Grachev also stipulated that special authorisation was required to communicate with units to hinder attempts by the parliament to court personnel. Moreover when personnel were deployed they were from various units, a move encouraged by the desire to spread responsibility.[202] Anxiety over the willingness of personnel to take an active political stance appears to have been founded. This is because 51 percent of all officers in 1995 indicated that they would have disobeyed orders to attack the parliament (see table 16).

Similarly, the actions of officers in Chechnya showed that orders would not necessarily be followed, and would have reinforced concerns over the swift execution of orders. The reluctance of officers to follow orders in Chechnya, at least during the initial offensive, has been well documented. This shows that it could not be guaranteed that personnel would

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[200] A. Putko, p2, quoted in *Crisis In The Former Soviet Military*, p15.
[201] Boris Yeltsin, *Zapiski prezidenta* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ogonyek, 1994), pp381, 383, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p2.
[202] *The Independent*, 8 October 1993, p12, quoted in Higgins, "Why The Guards Decided To Fall Into Line."

follow orders. Indeed Gromov announced "It seems to me that... a general who receives orders in this specific situation has a duty to ponder and to decide whether or not the order issued meets certain basic rules, certain human principles."[203] Personnel defended the insubordination of officers too. Members of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office asserted that "no court will be able to prove the guilt of those who have refused to get themselves mixed up in a dubious operation."[204] These developments encouraged Goldstein to write of a new liberalism among officers, based on a willingness to question the orders of their superiors.[205]

With regard to the military's negative perception of the utility of force, soldiers were reluctant to both have an internal role and, more specifically, to violate the democratic processes. Many personnel opposed their growing internal role. In 1995, 39 percent of officers stated that they would not obey orders to attack separatists (see table 16). Much discontent also arose against the military's deployment in Chechnya, as I have already mentioned. Indeed even Varennikov, a leader of the 1991 coup, called in February 1995 for a law to be passed to prevent the use of the military in internal conflicts.[206] Focusing on the military's political role, at the most general level it is apparent that personnel willingly participated in the democratic processes, hardly a sign that they would violate them by staging a coup. This is clear from the high electoral turnout of personnel, and from an unwillingness to have their voting preferences determined by their superiors. With regard to the military turnout, according to Ministry of Defence estimates, 95 percent of personnel voted during the 1993 elections, 97.6 percent voted in the 1995 elections, and over 80 percent voted in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections.[207] This was high relative to civilians. The military turnout was 40.2 percent higher than the general turnout of registered voters in 1993, 33.2 percent higher in

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[203] "Gromov Interviewed on Army Role in Chechnya," FBIS-SOV-95-020, 31 January 1995, p13 quoted in Goldstein, p114. See also Goldstein, pp109-119.

[204] "Legality of Actions Against Generals Doubted," FBIS-SOV-95-012, 19 January 1995, p22 quoted in Goldstein, p113.

[205] Goldstein, p122-3.

[206] Interfax, Moscow, in English, 1259 gmt, 18 February 1995, carried by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, quoted in "Varennikov Calls For Law To Forbid The Use Of Army In Internal Conflicts," 22 February 1995.

[207] Lepingwell, "Yeltsin On Military Vote." With regard to the 1995 elections see Anatoliy Madarov, "Ordered to Vote. Military Observer's Opinion of Elections in Army Units," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 21 December 1995, p5, carried by FBIS-SOV-95-245, 21 December 1995, p16, quoted in Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532. With regard to the 1996 election see Interfax, 16 June 1996, quoted in "The Military Vote," *Jamestown Monitor* 2, no.114, 17 June 1996, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon_002_114_000.htm#002, Internet, accessed 10 June 1998. Please note that it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of these statistics but it has been recognised by scholars that the military turnout was high. See Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," p1.

1995, and over 10.2 percent higher in 1996.[208] Personnel also showed a willingness to determine their vote independently. This is best illustrated by Grachev's failure to unite the military behind the 'Our Home is Russia' party.

More specifically, the military was reluctant to act against the new regime. I have already argued that few personnel were actively involved in seeking political redress, and this is further supported by their reluctance to go outside the accepted channels. In 1993, only 16 percent indicated that they had articulated their grievances through the mass media, and 22 percent had participated in organisations which sought to address their concerns.[209] Similarly, from 1992 to 1996 on average only 12 percent of officers believed that the use of force to meet their demands was permissible. This compared with 43 percent believing that acting in compliance with existing regulations was most acceptable (see table 10). Even here it should be noted that indicating that the use of force is permissible is a lot different that actually using force. This is shown by the 1993 revolt. Although 4 percent of officers said that year the use of force was permissible, according to figures from the revolt leaders likely to over-estimate the level of support, only 0.01 percent of officers participated.[210] Personnel also put forward their grievances through the legal avenues. For example, members of the Space Forces sued their commanders instead of protesting. Moreover, many of the reported protests within the military involved the families of personnel rather than the personnel themselves.[211] In line with this, a willingness to defend the legitimate regime remained, as 47 percent of officers in 1995 approved of the military's use to protect the President (see table 17).

I believe that there are two key explanations for the uncertainty over the loyalty of personnel when deployed domestically and the negative perception of such deployments: the recognition that playing a major political role would be very difficult, and the reluctance to cause civilian casualties and to violate the law. Assessing the military's perception of politics first, most personnel were well aware of the many problems that politicians faced, and the difficulties they would experience if they were to exercise power. This is important because I have already argued that personnel did not unite behind a civilian opponent of the new regime, who they could have transferred power to after overthrowing Yeltsin. I argue later that personnel

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[208] Sakwa, Appendix 2.5-2.7, pp391-3.
[209] S. Solovev and S. Ianin, "Rossiiskaia armiia god spustia: problem ne ubavliaetsia," *Armiia* no.10, May 1993, p32, quoted in Mendeloff, p234.
[210] Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," footnote 19, p23; and Barylski, *The Soldier*, p278.
[211] See Andrei Koliev, "Russia's Army: The Gathering Storm," *Jamestown Prism* 2, no.17, 1 November 1996, available from http://jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/002/017_001.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998, p3 of 4.

held their leaders in poor esteem so I shall focus here on arguing that the military was generally realistic in its appraisal of its ability to take and exercise power. I believe that the majority of personnel did not have optimistic attitudes, but were rather dismissive of its ability. This reduced the likelihood that the military believed its own leaders, or civilians popular among personnel, would have the ability to provide the strong leadership sought.

Though personnel expressed discontent in the actions of politicians, many recognised the problems they faced and the difficult nature of exercising power. Grachev stated in May 1993 that the army must stay out of politics in the name of those who fought in Afghanistan and thus knew the costs that political actions could incur.[212] Later that year retired Major General Aleksandr Vladimirov commented that "Everybody understands the difficulties he [Yeltsin] faces."[213] The following year a survey found that nearly two-thirds of officers believed that Russia was so unstable and economically weak that even its military potential could not guarantee its security.[214] Likewise, personnel did not under-estimate the problems facing Russia, problems that they would confront if they seized power. In 1994, only 13 percent of officers expected that the economy would improve over the next year. However, 82 percent believed that unemployment would increase, and another 78 percent believed that crime would increase.[215] Although officers were more optimistic in the 1995 Ball survey, only 26.9 percent believed that the economy would improve in 1996.[216]

Neither did personnel have over-optimistic beliefs that military figures could solve such problems better than civilian politicians. In July 1994 the military leadership replied to Lebed's praising of Pinochet by stating that such a figure was probably not suitable because of his methods, and "problems of a military character."[217] Gromov in early 1995 said that only those experienced in politics should be politically active.[218] Lebed similarly exclaimed in June 1996 that he sought close relations with many professionals, such as economists, as one expert was not sufficient. This was because "[Russia's] too big, too diverse, and its problems

[212] Vasiliy Fatigarov and Anatoliy Stasovskiy, "Mobilize the Combat and Life Experience of Afghan Veterans for Military Reform," *KZ*, 6 May 1993, n.p., carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 10 May 1993, quoted in Reuters, "Grachev-Army Cannot Be Blamed For Mistakes Of Politicians," 10 May 1993.
[213] "Do Not Make Us Into a Bogeyman: A Specialist's Opinion," FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, p63
[214] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p1.
[215] Ibid., p2.
[216] Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p171.
[217] "Kremlin Disowns General's Praise For Pinochet," Reuters, 21 July 1994.
[218] Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed About Chechnya Operation [corrected]," interview by Aleksandr Lyubimov, Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, in Russian, 2010 gmt, 27 January 1995, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 31

are far too diverse."[219] Indeed I have already mentioned that Yazov told the other coup leaders in 1991 that he had no desire to govern the Soviet Union.[220] Some evidence also suggests that many personnel had not discounted that Russia's problems could be solved by the new regime, at least in the long term. Ball found that 62.2 percent of officers did not believe that a return to authoritarianism would solve Russia's problems, and 63 percent disagreed that an 'iron hand' rather than democracy was required to restore order (see table 18). Thus, when C.J. Dick asked "Is it really fanciful to predict [that personnel will see themselves] as somehow superior to ignorant, often corrupt politicians who are seen not to understand, or care for those [Russia's] interests?" I believe the answer must be that yes, such a sense of superiority was unlikely.[221]

Table 18: Russian Officers' Views on Domestic Political Issues Mid-1995

Russian officers were asked to what extent do you agree with the following?

1. "Russia will need authoritarian rule to solve her problems?"
2. "An 'iron hand' is needed to restore order in our country-not democracy."
3. "Russia could not defend herself from foreign attack due to domestic instability."
4. "Democracy does not suit the peoples of Russia."
5. "It is important that Russia protect human rights."
6. "It is necessary to prohibit dangerous ideas in any society."

Question	Valid number of responses	Fully agree (percentage)	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree
1	593	5.2	32.5	43.5	18.7
2	588	8.3	28.6	40.6	22.4
3	593	4.4	28.5	55.6	11.5
4	589	4.1	16.5	44.8	34.6
5	594	50.3	42.1	5.6	2.0
6	587	23.0	31.9	32.7	12.4

For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 2, p164.

January 1995, quoted in Reuters, "Gromov Interviewed About Chechnya Operation [corrected]," 31 January 1995.

[219] Lebed, "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup, New Security Policy-Interview," interview by NTV, Moscow.

[220] Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order."

[221] Dick, "*The Current State of the Russian Army*," p6.

Likewise, opponents of the new regime recognised that the military's capabilities had declined, and it is unlikely they foresaw the military using force to assist their quest for power. Rutskoi said in mid-1993 that the military was in a disastrous state and was not fit for battle, hardly the qualities that would enable the staging of a coup.[222] Likewise, Zhirinovsky acknowledged that the military's strength had declined.[223] Zyuganov also wrote that military power was threatened.[224] The Generals held similar views. Lebed in 1994 exclaimed that the military was increasingly comprised of low-quality personnel "who have porridge in their heads."[225]

I believe that the primary factor behind the perception among personnel that the military was incapable of intervening was their many negative perceptions of the military, and more specifically, of military politicians. With regard to the military's capabilities, I have already argued that personnel believed that the military was negatively changed by the transition, and that their morale declined. The Chechnyan campaign is of particular interest here. This is because the reluctance of officers to follow orders was encouraged by their low opinion of the military's capacity. Vorobyev's decision not to command the invasion was influenced by his realisation that the military was ill prepared to undertake such an operation. [226] Indeed in early January 1995 no fewer than eleven Generals appealed to the Duma, claiming that the military was not prepared for the campaign.

More specifically, many personnel recognised the political limitations of their own comrades, which became highly visible after 1985 as their political activities increased. Personnel doubted the military's ability to become an effective political actor. For example, one officer exclaimed that he had "never seen such a mess" when he described the military's moves to win political support in 1995.[227] Similarly, personnel often doubted the suitability of military politicians. This is shown by Grachev's disastrous attempt to unite them behind military

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[222] *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 17 June 1993, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Rutskoi Hits Yeltsin On State Of Army," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 18 June 1993, accessed 10 June 1998.
[223] Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," p6.
[224] A. Kennaway, *"I Believe in Russia" Notes by A. Kennaway on G. Zyuganov's book of that title*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, April 1996, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/a1038, Internet, accessed 25 May 1998, p2 of 4.
[225] 'Aleksandr Lebed: "The Military Is a Mirror of Society-and It's Useless to Upbraid It,"' *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 15 September 1994, n.p., quoted in Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed," p554. See also pp555-6.
[226] Vorobyov, interview by Gall and Waal, 19 July 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal p177-81.
[227] Aleksey Overchuk, "The Order is Go and Win," *Obshchaya Gazeta* 43, no.119, n.p., 26 October 1995, quoted in Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p521.

candidates. In a 1995 survey of Leningrad (Northern) MD personnel, only 12 percent of soldiers said that they would vote for military candidates.[228] The political performance of many former and active personnel provided little to encourage confidence in the military's political abilities. Rutskoi's actions clearly showed personnel that military experience and achievement did not necessarily deter extreme and dangerous acts. Many officers also judged Lebed to be a "good general, bad politician."[229] Indeed the official military press in December 1995 interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei Tsarev, a former parliamentarian, who argued that he had been ill prepared for politics by his military service and had found politics very difficult.[230] Thus, many personnel realised that military skill did not necessarily equate with political skill. Likewise, the military's plight showed personnel that military politicians would not necessarily be able to solve its problems. Many personnel felt that the officers elected to the Duma in 1993 had performed poorly and achieved little for the military.[231] Zhirinovsky also claimed that "All the wars have been lost, all positions have been surrendered, all troops have been withdrawn. The generals have nothing left to do but to go to parliament to get immunity for four years."[232]

Turning to the second key explanation, a reluctance to act against civilians and to violate the law is evident. In 1995, 39 percent of officers disapproved of their use against separatists (see table 16), and opposition to the Chechnyan invasion was encouraged by a reluctance to use force against civilians. For instance, Babichev justified his initial reluctance to advance on Grozny by claiming "They can condemn us, but we are not going to use tanks against civilians."[233] Lebed, another vocal opponent of the campaign, commented that "It is absolutely unclear to me why it is necessary to kill people."[234] Vorobyev was also encouraged to resign because the reaction of civilians to the invasion had not been contemplated.[235] Another "well placed army officer" commented that "many [personnel] feel only aversion for the slaughter of fellow countrymen, which their government has forced upon them in

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[228] Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," p4.
[229] Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" p1.
[230] Aleksei Tsarev, "Sochustvuyut armii mnogie. Reshit' eye problemy v Gosdume smogut tol'ko professionaly," interview by Vladimir Ermolin, *KZ*, 8 December 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p343.
[231] Thomas, "The Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp535-6.
[232] Anatoly Verbin, "Russian Generals March In Parliamentary Campaign," Reuters, 2 October 1995.
[233] Gall and Waal, p176.
[234] "Lebed Criticizes Chechnya Military Operations," FBIS-SOV-94-250, 29 December 1994, p20, quoted in Goldstein, p120.
[235] Vorobyov, interview by Gall and Waal, 19 July 1996, p179.

Chechnya." [236] Similarly, lower-ranked personnel were reluctant to fight civilians. One Captain commented "We are fighting civilians, it would be better if we left."[237]

More specifically, the military was reluctant to act against Russian civilians. This is best shown by the 1991 coup. Yazov opposed the use of force against the civilian opposition. He told his General Staff "Please, don't do anything stupid, because you'll certainly face some people who will throw themselves under tanks...and I don't want any blood."[238] Likewise, Varennikov apparently opposed the use of force, and officers in Moscow expressed an unwillingness to act against the protesters.[239] Nor were coup opponents willing to risk civilian casualties. Lebed wrote "People were swarming round the [military] vehicles, begging the soldiers not to shoot them." He also addressed the crowd around the White House "giving them my word, as an officer, that no one in my battalion would open fire on them."[240] Immediately after the coup Major General Nikolai Stolyarov further declared that "The army will never turn its bayonets against its own people."[241] Lower-ranked personnel were unwilling to use force too, as already noted. Soldiers showed the crowds that their weapons were not loaded, and even personnel stationed in Germany said that they would refuse orders to shoot civilians.[242] Other armed personnel shared such attitudes. Of particular importance here is the alleged reluctance of the KGB Alpha unit to seize the White House, as this would have "led to horrible bloodshed."[243]

A similar reluctance is evident under the new regime. This is best shown by the military's actions during the 1993 revolt. High-ranking officers urged the parliamentary leaders to accept political defeat rather than risk bloodshed, and Grachev was reluctant to act. During a Security Council meeting Grachev argued against the use of troops to seize the White House

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[236] "Letter From Officer X," *Time*, no vol. no.3, 23 January 1995, p18.
[237] Gall and Waal, p176.
[238] Hiatt, "Soviet Generals Feared Each Other." See also Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order."
[239] Boulton, "Russian Official Defends General." With regard to the stance of Moscow officers see Michael Dobbs, "Yeltsin Becomes the Focus of Russian Opposition in Coup," *The Washington Post*, 20 August 1991, pA17.
[240] Schofield, p217. See also Yeltsin, *The View*, pp68, 99.
[241] "Once-Mighty Soviet Superpower Adrift With No Clear Leader On War 'Threshold,' New Talk Of Coup In Divided Military," *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 12 November 1991, pA1.
[242] Dobbs, "Yeltsin Becomes the Focus." See also Bill Keller, "The Soviet Crisis; Sporadic Mutinies Rack Soviet Army," *NYT* Ondisc, 21 August 1991, pA1; and Steve Pagani, "Lack of Support Among Soviet Military Undermined Coup-Analyst," Reuters, 21 August 1991. With regard to personnel in Germany see Marc Fisher, "Some Soviet Soldiers in Germany Oppose Coup, but Others Back It," *The Washington Post*, 21 August 1991, pA28.
[243] Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order."

while a large crowd remained. During this meeting he exclaimed, "I am not going to crush a crowd."[244] He further ordered personnel not to fire if civilians were in their way, and commented afterwards that the storming of the White House could have been executed earlier but crowds around the building increased the risk of civilian casualties.[245] Yeltsin acknowledged this reluctance. He wrote after the revolt "I recall Grachev's look. It was a hard look because the decision was a hard one for him. To use weapons of battle in peacetime is a most arduous test for soldiers and officers."[246] Similarly, members of the airborne forces were reluctant to open fire on the White House, even when they came under attack. The new regime also stressed the need to gain civilian support so as to win military support. For example, Gaidar appealed for Muscovites to publicly support Yeltsin.

An increasing willingness among personnel to ensure that their orders were legal is also evident. This strengthened the aversion to domestic operations and intervention. This willingness is apparent during the Chechnyan war. Georgy Kondratyev, a General once close to Grachev, described Dudayev as a legitimate leader and Vorobyev doubted the legality of the operation.[247] Similarly, Babichev justified his reluctance to advance on Grozny by claiming that "This [operation] contradicted the constitution. It is forbidden to use the army against civilians."[248] However most relevant is the reluctance to break the law and intervene. This is shown by the 1991 coup. Grachev before the coup had told Yeltsin that he would remain loyal to the civilian leaders "if our lawfully elected government in Russia were ever threatened--a terrorist act, a coup, [and there were] efforts to arrest the leaders," and he ultimately did.[249] During the coup Yeltsin also followed Lebed's advice that to win military support he should legitimise his orders and assume the office of Commander-in-Chief.[250] Even the coup leaders sought to legitimise their actions. Vice-President Gennadii Yanaev announced that he was taking the President's powers "in accordance with Article 127(7) of the USSR Constitution."[251] A state of emergency was similarly claimed to be in accordance

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[244] Pavel Fel'gengauer, "Army's Role: Less Than Certain," *The Moscow Times*, 12 October 1993, pp1-2, quoted in Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p12. With regard to officers contacting the parliamentary leaders see Barylski, *The Soldier*, pp252, 261-2.
[245] Grachev, "Defence Minister on Storming Of White House," interview by Kholodov.
[246] Yeltsin, *The View*, p287.
[247] Gall and Waal, p181. With regard to Vorobyov see his interview by Gall and Waal, 19 July 1996, pp179, 181.
[248] Ibid., p176.
[249] Yeltsin, *The View*, p58.
[250] Ibid., p87.
[251] TASS, 19 August 1991 quoted in Carla Thorson, "Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Coup," *RFE/RL Report on the USSR* 3, 6 September 1991, p19; and *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 20 August 1991, n.p., quoted in Thorson, p19.

with the Constitution and Law on the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency.[252] Conservatives like Colonel Viktor Alksnis also expressed reservations that the civilian leadership was not being challenged within the legislative framework.[253]

The military remained committed to the law under the new regime as it related to politics. Prior to the climax of the 1993 revolt when Yeltsin attempted to bypass the legislature, Grachev did not support him but rather the Constitution. That May Grachev said, "The political struggle [between Yeltsin and the parliament] must be conducted strictly within constitutional bounds, within the bounds of the law."[254] Such actions led one senior Western diplomat to comment that "they [personnel] are apparently not at the disposal of the President, unless they decide that what he asks them to do is constitutional."[255] Moreover when the military was called on to act against the revolt, Yeltsin was forced to issue a decree authorising the Ministry of Defence to act, as it doubted the legality of its internal use.[256] When the military was deployed, Grachev justified its actions by referring to the law on the state of emergency.[257] Lower-ranked personnel shared similar attitudes. One paratrooper who participated in the storming of the White House commented that as Yeltsin had been voted in as President "they [the rebels] had no right to defy him."[258]

The military's reluctance to cause civilian casualties and to violate the law by intervening was the result of three key factors. First, the military had no tradition of being deployed against fellow citizens. This meant that personnel were not accustomed to confronting Russian civilians and being deployed to maintain domestic order. Second, on those occasions when the military was deployed, the military was negatively affected. For instance, its actions caused civilian casualties which resulted in much criticism and encouraged negative perceptions of the military. Third, there was no strong division between civilians and military personnel, hence the military found it very difficult to use force against them. This was especially the case when civilians pleaded with them not to use force.

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[252] Thorson, p20. See also p21.
[253] FBIS-SOV, 17 September 1991, p29, quoted in Zhong, "The Transformation," p66.
[254] Fatigarov and Stasovskiy, "Mobilize the Combat and Life Experience of Afghan Veterans."
[255] Erlanger, "Crisis In Moscow."
[256] Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p14.
[257] Kholodov, "The Khaki October." With regard to the impact of the use of violence by the parliament see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pp11-2 and Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow," pp10-1.
[258] Fleck, "Russian Troops."

With regard to the first point, I have already argued that the military was externally oriented before 1985. The influence of this tradition is evident during the 1991 coup. For instance, Commander Vladimir Lopatine, Vice-President of a special defence committee established by Yeltsin, stated "There is a very old tradition in the Russian army that says the army should not turn its weapons against its own people."[259] This tradition was strengthened by the second factor, the military's negative domestic experiences. The first such experience was the military's 1962 deployment in Novocherkassk, as its actions resulted in the deaths of 24 civilians. One Major committed suicide after seeing the casualties, and the continuing impact of the incident is shown by Lebed's memory of the killings. Moreover the soldiers initially deployed in Novocherkassk were from the local garrison and they fraternised with the protesters despite their orders. Similarly, soldiers ordered to stop the protesters from marching actually helped them. [260]

The more recent deployment of personnel against civilians had additional negative repercussions. The April 1989 deployment in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, had a negative impact as the military was widely criticised. Criticism arose as nearly 20 civilians were killed as the military broke up a demonstration. This criticism was resented and personnel believed that they were being unfairly blamed. An outcome of this was a reluctance to being domestically deployed, termed the 'Tbilisi Syndrome.'[261] This was reinforced by the use of the military in Baku in January 1990 and Vilnius in January 1991, where, together with Tbilisi, civilian casualties numbered around 300 and led to an outcry.[262] Such experiences, along with uncertainty over the legality of its domestic use, encouraged the military to intervene during the 1993 revolt only after Yeltsin issued a decree authorising it to disarm illegally armed groups. Grachev also directly asked Yeltsin whether he was sanctioning the use of force.[263]

This reluctance to fight Russian civilians remained strong after the 1993 revolt. Officer cadets at Russia's first officer cadet school said that they would not shoot Russian people. Moreover, when a cadet was asked whether he would act against protesting Russians he replied that "I will stand by my people. If they [the Russian people] get desperate I will protect them, even if

[259] Pagani, "Lack of Support." See also Brian Moynahan, "The Soviet Coup."
[260] For an account of the event see Piotr Suda, *The Novocherkassk Tragedy, June 1-3 1962*, 1 July 1988, available from http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/russia/sp000197.txt, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998.
[261] See Barylski, *The Soldier*, pp63-4.
[262] Ibid., pp61-75.
[263] See Yeltsin, *The View*, p278.

it means I have to go to a tribunal and execution afterwards."[264] Likewise, Lebed in early 1995 commented that "No such force exists which would compel me" to shoot at Russian civilians. [265]

Finally, there was no strong division between civilians and personnel. Personnel strongly related to civilians. One 1995 survey found that 88 percent of officers believed that the interests of the Russian people were their first priority.[266] Personnel also acknowledged that civilians had rights. In 1995, 78.5 percent supported the right of civilians to criticise the government (see table 19). Neither does there appear to have been a major difference between civilian and military political attitudes. In 1993, 74 percent of military personnel and 58.43 percent of civilians voted for the Constitution in the referendum.[267] Likewise, civilian and military support for politicians was often similar. Whereas in 1995 an estimated 20 percent of military personnel voted for the Communist party, it received 22.30 percent of the vote nationwide.[268] That same year a survey of civilians and officers found that attitudes toward the presidential candidates on average differed by 5.8 percent (see table 13). Another survey in December 1995 found that the level of support from all Russians for parties and the level of military support for parties differed on average by 6.2 percent.[269] Similarly, during the second round of the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin was the most popular candidate among both personnel and civilians.[270] However Lebed's military background might have won him stronger support from personnel in the first round of the 1996 elections, winning perhaps 32.48 percent more military than civilian votes.[271]

Apart from the military's domestic roles, I believe that civilian-military interaction encouraged their similar attitudes. Even under Communism, 54 percent of soldiers told

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[264] Yevgenia Borisova, "Soldiers of the motherland look to the future," *St Petersburg Press*, n.d., available from http://www.times.spb.ru/archive/sppress/94/soldiers.html, Internet, accessed 29 May 1998, p1 of 2.
[265] Lebed, interview by Kohan and Zarakhovich, p25. However it should be noted that he showed little reluctance to use force outside of Russia as Commander of the 14th Army
[266] Deborah Ball, The Pending Crisis in Russian Civil-Military Relations," p2.
[267] Lepingwell, "How Did the Russian Military Vote?"; and Sakwa, Appendix 2.5, p391.
[268] With regard to the military vote see Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532. With regard to the civilian vote see *OMRI Daily Digest* no.249, Part 1, 27 December 1995, n.p.; *OMRI Daily Digest* no.1, Part 1, 2 January 1996, n.p.; ITAR-TASS, 22 December 1995; and *The Moscow News* no.51, 29 December 1995, p2, all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.6, pp392-3.
[269] Stephen White, Matthew Wyman, and Sarah Oates, "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no.5 (July 1997): Table 3, p786. Military personnel refers to "military, MVD, procuracy." This figure was calculated by comparing the average level of support from both poll findings in December 1995.
[270] With regard to the military vote see Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit."
[271] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Woff.

Gabriel (1980) that they were allowed a pass or leave from their bases every month. Another 72.6 percent of soldiers said they had been allowed to leave alone, or in groups not accompanied by a supervising officer.[272] Similarly, though the Soviet army strove to control the entry of information, surveys of personnel before Gorbachev indicated that they failed. Surveys indicated that on average they were exposed to the mass media for an hour and a half per day, and had a high level of awareness of current events.[273] Furthermore, the draft ensured that civilians constantly entered the military. In 1992, 71.4 percent of the ground forces were conscripts, and in 1996, 31.3 percent of army personnel were still conscripts.[274]

Table 19: Russian Officers' Views of Democratic Characteristics Mid-1995

Officers were asked: "How useful are the following characteristics of democratic society for Russia?"

1. "Freedom of citizens to choose where to reside within Russia."
2. "Freedom of citizens to travel abroad."
3. "Freedom of citizens to criticize the government."
4. "Freedom of the press to criticize the government."
5. "Freedom of citizens to join social organizations."
6. "A strong system of political parties."

Question	Valid number of responses	Fully useful (percentage)	Somewhat useful	Rather not useful	Fully not useful
1	598	22.4	34.4	30.6	12.5
2	591	17.4	57.5	24.0	1.0
3	599	11.9	66.6	18.0	3.5
4	598	15.4	66.6	16.9	1.2
5	597	37.7	56.8	4.9	0.7
6	594	3.4	36.7	49.8	10.1

For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 2, p164.

[272] Gabriel, *Red Legions*, p58.
[273] V.N. Kovalev, *Sotsialisticheskiy voinskiy kollektiv. Sotsiologicheskiy ocherk* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1980), pp147-8, quoted in Jones, *Red Army*, p164.
[274] *Military Balance 1992-1993*, p97; and *Military Balance 1996-1997*, p114.

In summary, many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly executed nor had an overly positive assessment of the domestic utility of force. There are two key explanations for the uncertainty over the loyalty of personnel when deployed domestically and for the negative perception of such deployments. First, personnel recognised that intervening would be very difficult. Second, personnel were reluctant to risk civilian casualties and to violate the law.

Military perception of the method of power transferral

It is clear that many personnel had a preference for strong leadership, but I believe that this was within the constraints of democracy. With regard to the desire for strong leadership, the most vocal military supporter appears to have been Lebed. Support for strong leadership is evident among other personnel too. Two-thirds of officers in a November 1992 survey supported an authoritarian style of government, and the 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey found that 61.9 percent of officers agreed that Russia "needs a iron hand." [275] The 1994 survey also found that 64 percent dismissed Western-type democracy as being unsuitable for Russia.[276] Moreover Grachev in November 1993 ostensibly joked that if the new parliament amended the military doctrine "We shall amend the parliament."[277] Earlier that year a poll also found that 73 percent of Moscow officers said that they were "crazy to decide against storming the [Yeltsin held] White House" during the 1991 coup. [278] Such evidence encouraged analysts like Ilana Kass to argue that the officer corps was unlikely to either tolerate or be compatible with an unstable democracy.[279]

However although personnel sought strong leadership, most did not support a military regime or coup. First, the above evidence needs to be assessed with care. With regard to Lebed, I have already argued that he was unlikely to lead a coup and his views on authoritarian, and more specifically military rule, should not be over-stressed. Most importantly, Lebed did not support the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Similarly, despite his above comments, Grachev had been very reluctant to use military force against the revolt the previous month, and remained loyal to Yeltsin throughout his tenure. This loyalty helped ensure that he held his position for

[275] *The Moscow News* no.7, 14 February 1993, p11B, quoted in Alexander Konovalov, "Russia: security in transition," in Karp, p210; and Ball and Gerber, p163.
[276] Christopher Bellamy, "Disgruntled military poses constant threat," *The Independent*, 28 October 1995, p11.
[277] "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, pp39-40, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp327-8.
[278] "Poll Shows 73% Regret Not Storming White House," FBIS-SOV-93-028, 12 February 1993, p33, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p335.
[279] Ilana Kass, "The Russian Military, Fractured not Shattered," *International Defence Review* 2, no.26 (September 1993): p695, quoted in Spence, p24.

so long.[280] The evaluations of some scholars need to be treated with care too. For instance, Kass wrote immediately before the climax of the 1993 revolt when there were doubts over the military's loyalty to Yeltsin, doubts that ultimately were disproved by its action against the parliament. I also believe that Kass's evaluation of the officer corps is at odds with the military's clear reluctance to intervene.

Turning to the survey findings, it is important to note that authoritarian rule does not necessarily mean military rule or a coup. Very few personnel were either politically active, apart from voting, or supportive of a coup. The same year as the 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey, only 6 percent of officers said that it was permissible to use force to achieve their demands (see table 10). Nor does sympathy for strong leadership necessarily equate with the high level of discontent one would associate with the staging of a coup. Indicative of this is a 1995 survey of 3,000 personnel stationed in Novosibirsk. In this survey, 81 percent said that the President must have the ability to impose order in the country.[281] This survey was taken the same year that Ball found officers had more confidence in Chernomyrdin than either Rutskoi or Zhirinovsky, and Chernomyrdin's confidence rating was only 2.9 percent less than Zyuganov's. Yeltsin also retained the confidence of 30.8 percent of officers, nearly double the level of confidence expressed in Zhirinovsky (see table 12). More specifically, there is a stark difference between expressing authoritarian views and moving to seize power. The 1993 survey of Moscow officers is particularly relevant here. This is because very few supported the revolt later that year, despite their earlier comments. As one Russian army commentator in 1993 wrote, "[I]t is one thing to be unsatisfied with something...and completely another--God forbid--to snap a magazine into a machine gun or to load a shot into a gun barrel."[282] The 1993 survey is also quoted by Nichols, a scholar I believe over-emphasised civil-military conflict. For instance, he argued that the military voted overwhelmingly for Zhirinovsky in 1993 and its growing influence posed a serious threat to civilian authority, both points I dispute.[283]

More specifically, the Friedrich Ebert survey findings need to be used with caution. First, the findings appear to be conflicting. Although the survey found that democracy was not widely

[280] See chapter 6, pp267-8.
[281] "Military personnel live in hopes of a "Strong Hand," *Vecherniy Novosibirsk*, 1 September 1995, p5, carried by FBIS-SOV-95-188-S, 28 September 1995, p46, quoted in Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p525.
[282] "Chem zanimaetsia armiia," *KZ*, 27 March 1993, p1 quoted in Mendeloff, p234.
[283] See chapter 5, pp204-5, and chapter 6, pp264-9.

supported, it found that Grigory Yavlinsky, a liberal democrat, was the most popular politician with 44 percent support. Contrasting this, Rutskoi received 29 percent support (the same as Yeltsin).[284] Nor did many believe that Lebed's outspokenness was necessarily a positive attribute, as I have already mentioned that only 9 percent believed that he was a "model contemporary military figure."[285] Second, the wording of questions asked is dubious. Most relevant here is the finding that 64 percent dismissed Western-type democracy as being unsuitable. This is a 'loaded' question given that the West had traditionally been the main adversary of the military and that suspicions of the West remained.[286] The survey also used generalised terms like an "iron hand" when asking personnel to indicate the style of rule they sought. Though Ball used the same term, she asked personnel to decide between this and democracy. Third, the survey had structural weaknesses. For instance, Ball argued that it did not adequately assess the level of support for authoritarianism by directly making such evaluations relative to other forms of rule.[287] This is important as it allows one to assess whether personnel were confident that a viable alternative to the new regime existed. Fourth, the findings did not correspond with the actions of personnel. Statistics that I have already presented indicate that the voting turnout among personnel was very high, despite their supposedly strong opposition to democracy. Neither did many support the 1993 revolt or unite behind Zhirinovsky, despite his authoritarian views. Indeed 74 percent of the personnel who voted in 1993 supported the 1993 Constitution. This formally asserted "the immutability of its [Russia's] democratic foundations," and recognised the electoral process and individual and civil rights.[288]

Apart from their actions, when personnel were specifically asked to evaluate regime types relative to others they often showed little enthusiasm for a move away from the current electoral system to more authoritarian types. Therefore, though personnel sought strong leadership, and this encouraged at least some to support authoritarian rule, when asked more specifically and in the context of other systems many appear to have moved away from such a stance. I believe that a lack of support for a move away from the new regime is primarily derived from the support for democracy among many personnel. I believe that most personnel sought strong state leadership within the context of a democratic framework. Apart from the

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[284] *Argumenty i Fakty*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, quoted in Shlapentokh, footnote 21, p434.
[285] *Der Spiegel* no.36, quoted in Socor, "Military Opinion Survey."
[286] With regard to these suspicions see chapter, pp.
[287] Ball and Gerber, p163.
[288] *KZ*, 14 December 1993, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p284. With regard to the Constitution see Sakwa, Appendix 2.5, p391.

reluctance of personnel to break the law and to intervene, democratic sympathises are apparent both before and after the new regime took power. These sympathises are shown most generally by the willingness of personnel to exercise their democratic right to vote, as I have already argued. More specifically, many personnel supported democracy relative to other regime types. Similarly, many personnel supported democratic politicians.

It is clear that democratic sympathises were held by many personnel, particularly after the new regime took power. Even during the 1991 coup Yazov is reported to have been ready to give up on the second day of the coup, as he believed that there were too many democrats within the military.[289] Democratic sympathies are evident after the coup too. In November 1991, Defence Minister Shaposhnikov claimed that the democratisation of the military was irreversible.[290] Under the new regime scholars labelled personnel like General Major Vladimir Dudnik as "democratic advocates."[291] Likewise, at least some military groups had democratic sympathises. For instance, a reformist military association called the 'Soldiers for Democracy' urged personnel to vote for Yeltsin in 1996.[292] Surveys also indicated that many personnel supported democracy. A survey of officers in 1994 found that 77 percent supported the statement that Russia "should more resolutely than before uphold the values of democracy and human rights."[293] Similarly, the Ball survey found that 63 percent did not agree with the statement that an 'iron hand' was needed to rule Russia rather than democracy. Another 79.4 percent disagreed with the statement that democracy did not suit Russians (see table 18). Many thus did not feel confident that another regime type was a more viable alternative.

In line with the survey findings, many personnel supported liberal and democratic politicians. Indicative of this is the support Yavlinsky and his Yabloko political party received. Apart from the Friedrich Ebert survey that found Yavlinsky was the most popular politician among officers, in 1995 Yavlinsky was the second most popular presidential candidate surveyed among personnel (see table 13), and in another survey the second most trusted.[294] That year 54.9 percent of officers indicated to Ball that they had a lot or some confidence in him. This compared with 49.7 percent for Zyuganov, 40 percent for Rutskoi, and 15.9 percent for

[289] FBIS-SOV, 17 September 1991, p29, quoted in Zhong, "The Transformation," p66.
[290] Richard Murphy, "Democratisation Of Soviet Army Irreversible," Reuters, 12 November 1991.
[291] See Arnett, "*Russia after the Crisis*," pp54-5.
[292] Interfax, 1 July 1996, quoted in "Military Group Backs Yeltsin," *Jamestown Monitor* 2 no.130, 2 July 1996, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/002/130_004.htm, Internet, accessed 2 September 1998.
[293] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p4.

Zhirinovsky (see table 12).[295] Likewise, support for Yavlinsky's party could be high relative to others. In a 1995 survey of Leningrad MD personnel the party ranked third in popularity among junior officers with 10 percent expressing support. Among warrant officers it was the second most popular party, again with 10 percent of their support.[296] Indeed in the 1995 elections an independent source in Moscow calculated that Lebed's party received only 2 percent more support than Yabloko from personnel.[297] Brusstar and Jones also argued that mid-level and senior officers gave their support to liberal politicians rather than conservatives.[298] Such sympathises are likely to have been further encouraged by democrats actively courting the military. For instance, Yavlinsky in August 1995 said that the Yabloko party was "pro-military," and that "Russia needs a strong modern army."[299]

Most personnel did not advocate military rule or a coup, and neither should support of authoritarianism be equated with this. Apart from the strong reluctance of personnel to become actively involved in politics outside of voting, personnel sought strong leadership within a democratic framework. This became evident when personnel were asked to evaluate regime types relative to others, and whether they would support a move to authoritarianism at the expense of democracy. This reluctance to support the establishment for a regime at the expense of democracy was primarily motivated by the military's general reluctance to intervene. More specifically, I believe that the military's fondness of freedoms associated with democracy encouraged it to seek the retention of democracy. Likewise, personnel indicated that they supported of at least some of the reforms undertaken by the new regime.

Military support of principals associated with democracy is apparent. Ball's 1995 survey is particularly relevant. This found that 92.4 percent of officers believed that it was important to protect human rights, and the freedoms of citizens were favourably received by the majority (see table 19). For instance, most officers supported the freedom of citizens to choose where they lived, their right to criticise the government, and their right to join social organisations (see table 19). Moreover, even opponents of the new regime who were popular among personnel publicly accepted that individual rights were important. Zyuganov accepted that

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[294] With regard to trust in Yavlinsky see Belin, "Support For Zhirinovsky."
[295] For a profile of Yavlinsky see Martin McCauley, pp675-7.
[296] Alexander Zhilin, "The Race for the Military Vote Heats Up," *Jamestown Prism* 1 no.19, 8 September 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/001/019_002.htm, Internet, accessed 2 September 1998, p4 of 9.
[297] Thomas, "The Russian Military And The 1995 Elections," p532.
[298] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p3.

Stalin "committed no few violations of legality," and that condemnation for such violations was "quite right."[300] Zhirinovsky also spoke in 1992 of the importance of individual rights. [301] Similarly, Lebed said "Fascists [and] national extremists" were "unacceptable."[302]

I believe that a determination to retain the greater political freedoms allowed under the new regime, and recognition that at least some liberal reforms were required, encouraged this support. Indicative of this is the determination of many personnel to exercise their voting rights and to vote according to their own preferences. One army Captain said in 1995 that at least now "no one can tell us who to vote for."[303] Similarly, a Lieutenant after the 1996 elections commented after voting for Yeltsin that "As they say, I chose freedom."[304] In line with the support of democratic principals, at least some liberal reforms were supported. In a 1992 survey, 75 percent of officers favoured the sale and privatisation of land, and though most officers favoured the slowing down of economic reform, only 20 percent in the Ball survey wished them to stop (see table 20).[305] This 1995 survey found too that 58.2 percent of

Table 20: Russian Officers and Economic Reforms Mid-1995

Officers were asked:

"What are your views regarding economic reforms-should they be..."

Valid number of responses	More radical (percentage)	The same	Slower	Stopped
585	12.8	8.1	58.4	20.7

For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 5, p171.

[299] "Yavlinsky "Pro-Military," *Jamestown Monitor* 1 no.68, 7 August 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/068_007.htm, Internet, accessed 2 September 1998.

[300] Russia TV channel, Moscow, 22 December 1995, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 28 December 1995, quoted in "Zyuganov Interviewed On Stalin, The Presidency, Presidential Election Prospects," Reuters, 28 December 1995.

[301] I.S. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," in (E.A. Kocherin), *Biblioteka Zhurnala Kontrolling, Seriya "Tayny vlasti v organizatsiyakh, Vypusk 3*, Moscow, Kontrolling, 1992, p9, in Kipp, *Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky*, p5.

[302] Zhilin, "The Race for the Military Vote Heats Up," p8.

[303] Sarah Hurst, "The Will Of People," *St Petersburg Press*, 1995, n.p., available from http://www.times.spb.ru/archive/sppress/131/the-will.html, Internet, accessed 29 May 1998, p1 of 1.

[304] Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit."

[305] With regard to the 1992 survey see ITAR-TASS, 29 April 1992, quoted in Stephen Foye, "Survey of Servicemen," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 5 May 1992, accessed 18 March 1998.

officers believed that a market economy for Russia was "useful."[306] Even Lebed commented that privatisation was "an irreversible process" that must be completed.[307]

Military perception of politicians

It is clear that many personnel held negative opinions of the civilian leadership. According to the CMSPLR survey, from 1992 to 1996 Yeltsin's level of sympathy among officers averaged 25.3 percent (see table 11). In a November 1992 survey Yeltsin's rating was under 30 percent.[308] This level of support was similar to that among civilians, at least according to some surveys. Survey findings published in May 1992 indicated that 30 percent of Muscovites said that Yeltsin's actions corresponded with their own positions.[309] The August 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey estimated Yeltsin's approval rate to be a little over 25 percent.[310] A survey in September 1994 likewise found that 28 percent of civilians were satisfied with Yeltsin's performance.[311] In another report published in January 1995, only 17 percent of officers approved of Yeltsin's performance, and one in four trusted him.[312] That same month a survey found that 17 percent of civilians were satisfied with Yeltsin's performance.[313] Surveys also found that officers and civilians shared a lack of confidence in Yeltsin. The May to July 1995 Ball survey found that 69.2 percent of officers had not much or no confidence in Yeltsin (see table 12). This is comparable to a survey in September 1994 that found 57 percent of civilians did not have any confidence in Yeltsin.[314] I believe that the primary source behind the negative opinions of the new regime's leadership among personnel is the detrimental impact of the transition on the military. This impact has already been examined in-depth and is further assessed in the context of the military's disposition during the next chapter.

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[306] Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p171.
[307] "Lebed Advocates Authoritarian Path To Democracy," *Jamestown Monitor*, 1 no.133, 14 November 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/133_011.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998.
[308] *The Moscow News*, (7), in Konovalov, p209.
[309] Central TV, 17 May 1992, quoted in Kathy Mihalisko, "Poll Of Moscow And Kiev Residents," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 18 May 1992, accessed 13 August 1998.
[310] John Lloyd, "Russian Military In Troubled Mood," *The Financial Times*, 8 September 1994, p2. See also *Izvestia*, 21 April 1995, n.p., quoted in Meyer, "The Devolution," p327.
[311] Russian TV, "Vesti," 12 January 1995, quoted in Julia Wishnevsky, "Yeltsin's Approval Rating," 13 January 1995, *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, accessed 13 August 1998.
[312] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p3.
[313] Russian TV, "Vesti," 12 January 1995, quoted in Wishnevsky, "Yeltsin's Approval Rating."
[314] ITAR-TASS, 26 September 1994, quoted in Julia Wishnevsky, "Poll Findings On Most Influential Russian Politicians," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 27 September 1994, accessed 13 August 1998.

However I believe that for an accurate assessment of the level of support for the new regime's leaders the attitudes of personnel must be compared to those for other figures. This allows an assessment of whether the level of support for the new regime's leaders is high or low relative to that for military figures and potential coup leaders. First, I believe that it is not a simple case of personnel having a negative perception of civilian politicians. This is clear from the salient divisions among personnel, particularly between senior officers and their subordinates. Evidence suggests that attitudes toward key military figures were more negative compared to those of the new regime's leaders. This is important because it discouraged the belief that military personnel were superior to civilians, and thus would be able to govern better. After putting forward this argument I shall then contend that, second, the perception of the new regime's leadership could be high relative to its most popular opponents among personnel. This is important too because it reduced the likelihood that the military would feel that these opponents could provide superior leadership if they were brought to power.

First, personnel often did not hold their superiors in high regard. As this should already be apparent from my assessment of cohesion, I shall focus on assessing the attitudes that personnel had of military figures relative to the new regime's leaders. Many personnel held negative perceptions of the military leadership given the military's state and its poor performance. The clearest indicator of this is the opinion many personnel held of Grachev, a perception that could be worse than that of the new regime's leaders. Although the Friedrich Ebert survey found that fewer than 30 percent of officers trusted Yeltsin, less than 20 percent had any faith in Grachev.[315] Similarly, Ball's survey found that 46.8 percent of officers had confidence in Chernomyrdin and 30.8 percent of officers had confidence in Yeltsin. However only 19.1 percent had any confidence in Grachev (see table 12). Timothy Thomas wrote "Rightly or wrongly, the military rank and file fix the blame for their degradation on Grachev."[316]

Relative to his opponents, Yeltsin's support could be high, as I indicated when assessing the popularity of potential coup leaders. Whereas the CMSPLR survey found that the level of sympathy for Yeltsin from officers between 1992 and 1996 averaged 25.3 percent, Rutskoi's average was 19.3 percent, Zhirinovsky's 17.5 percent, Zyuganov's 15.4 percent, and Lebed's 12.2 percent (see table 11). Similarly, the 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey found that Yeltsin was

[315] Bellamy, "Disgruntled military poses constant threat," p11.
[316] Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p542.

supported by 29 percent of officers, one percent less than the support for Zyuganov and the same as Rutskoi.[317] The following year, Yeltsin was the preferred presidential candidate among officers, beating Zhirinovsky, Rutskoi, and Lebed (see table 13). Other members of the new regime were also widely supported, at least relative to the opponents most popular among personnel. The Friedrich Ebert survey found that Chernomyrdin outranked Zyuganov by 5 percent, Rutskoi by 6 percent, and was only 10 percent behind Gromov.[318] The following year, Ball's survey found that Chernomyrdin had the confidence of 46.8 percent of officers. This was only slightly lower than the confidence in Zyuganov and higher than the confidence in Rutskoi and Zhirinovsky (see table 12). Moreover Chernomyrdin won electoral support. It is estimated that Lebed's KRO party received only 5 percent more of the military vote than his party, 'Our Home is Russia,' in 1995.[319]

Even when support for the new regime's opponents was high relative to the support for the new regime, its strength should not be over-emphasised. This is illustrated by the support for Rutskoi in 1993. Although about 40 percent of officers supported Rutskoi in 1993, compared to about 27.5 percent support for Yeltsin (see table 11), only 0.01 percent of officers actively supported his revolt against Yeltsin in October 1993. Nor did support for opponents necessarily equate with strong anti-Yeltsin attitudes. In 1993, only 13 percent of LDPR voters said they voted for Zhirinovsky because he was the main opposition to Yeltsin.[320] More specifically, though sympathy among officers for Rutskoi, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, and Lebed peaked in 1995 at 73 percent, only 18 percent indicated that they were willing to use force to have their demands met (see tables 10 and 11).

I believe that the level of support for the regime leaders relative to their opponents is primarily because of three factors; the weaknesses of the opponents, military disunity over who was to blame for negative developments, and the regime's courting of personnel. As I have already examined the new regime's opponents, I shall focus on the other two factors. First, many personnel believed that there was no viable alternative to Yeltsin. After the 1993 revolt, Major General Aleksandr Vladimirov, the former Chief of Staff of the 28th Army,

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[317] *Argumenty i Fakty*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, in Shlapentokh, footnote 21, p434

[318] *Argumenty i Fakty*, October 1994, n.p.; and *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 26 October and 11 November 1994, n.p., both quoted in Shlapentokh, footnote 21, p434. See also Shlapentokh, p431.

[319] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532.

[320] A. Oslon and Ye. Petrenko, *Parlamentskiye vybory I oprosy obshchestvennogo mneniyo vrossii vo vtoroy polovine 1993 goda* (Moscow: publisher not known, 1994), n.p., quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "Aftermath Of The October Crisis," p2.

commented that the military trusted Yeltsin before admitting "There is nobody else to trust anyway."[321] Similarly, in a 1994 survey, 49 percent of personnel said that no state institution expressed an interest in the army and its personnel.[322] The absence of an alternative figure to Yeltsin is further illustrated by the reaction of an officer in mid-1996 when asked whether a coup was possible. The officer exclaimed "Against whom? For what?" and was emphatic that replacing one President for another would not change anything.[323] Colonel Viktor Baranets, a member of the General Staff and head of the Ministry of Defence press service, also indicated that a viable alternative to Yeltsin was absent. Baranets wrote that he had contemplated assassinating Yeltsin, but did not because another 'scoundrel' would only replace him.[324] As Mark Galeotti wrote in November 1994, "For all his many flaws, Yeltsin remains the only figure currently capable of holding together the ramshackle coalition of individuals and interests running Russia."[325]

Second, personnel did not necessarily blame the new regime's leaders for the negative impact of the transition on the military, thus diverting at least some of their discontent. When officers were asked in 1994 who was responsible for the mistakes in military policy since 1985, 70 percent did not name Yeltsin.[326] Nor did critics of the Chechnyan campaign necessarily blame the civilian leaders. Vorobyev blamed Grachev rather than the civilian leadership for the poorly organised campaign. He claimed in early 1995 that it had been up to the Defence Minister to inform the President that more time was needed to organise the campaign.[327] This diverting of blame was encouraged by the new regime, as I have already mentioned that Yeltsin made public attacks on the military leaders.

It is clear that the new regime, despite its many destructive actions, did court personnel. This included moves to make service more bearable. For instance, pay was continually increased, though such increases did not keep up with inflation. It was increased six times in 1992 alone and the following January increased again by 170 percent.[328] Similarly, attempts were made to

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[321] "Do Not Make Us Into a Bogyman: A Specialist's Opinion," FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, p63.
[322] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p1.
[323] Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" p1.
[324] Viktor Baranets, "At Whom Will a Hungry Army Shoot?" *Sovershenno sekret'no* no.2, February 1997, n.p. quoted in Kipp, "Military Pluralism And The Dilemma Of Russian Military Professionalism," p25.
[325] Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall- Who Needs Another Coup?" *JIR* 6, no.11, November 1994, p482.
[326] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p3.
[327] "Vorobyev Blames Grachev for "Mistakes" in Chechnya," FBIS-SOV-95-018, 27 January 1995, p13, quoted in Goldstein, p112.
[328] "Pavel Grachev: Armii segonya trudno, kak i vse mu narodu," *KZ*, 23 February 1993, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p172.

ensure that at least some aspects of service were satisfactory. For example, in 1995 only 10.5 percent of officers complained that their medical care was poor or very poor.[329] Yeltsin also could align himself with personnel. In 1992 he agreed that personnel in the 'near abroad' could use force to defend themselves, and vowed that Russia would maintain an army commensurate with its status as a great nuclear power. The following year he also acknowledged that personnel faced hardships.[330] Indeed Yelena Agapova, the Ministry of Defence Press Secretary, publicly accepted in mid-1992 that Yeltsin appeared to be committed to addressing the military's problems.[331] Particularly indicative of Yeltsin's responsiveness to military opinion, at least when he needed its help, are his actions prior to the climax of the 1993 revolt. In September 1993 he appealed to personnel to remain calm and to concentrate on their training rather than becoming politically active, a move which won him support.[332]

In summary, I do not believe that the military had an interventionist mood. I believe that three factors are behind this. First and most importantly, many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly executed nor held an overly positive assessment of the utility of force. This was encouraged by the belief that the military would be unable to effectively exercise power by swiftly solving the state's problems. Second, although many personnel wanted strong state leadership they wanted this to be provided through, rather than in violation of, the democratic electoral system. Finally, although Yeltsin was not strongly supported by many personnel his support relative to that of his main opponents and of the military leadership could be high. This reduced the likelihood that personnel believed a viable alternative was present.

Conclusions

This chapter argues it is unlikely that the Russian military perceived itself capable of staging a coup. I believe that six key factors contributed to this incapacity. First, a potential coup leader was absent. This is because there was no opponent of Yeltsin capable of uniting the military

[329] Ball and Gerber, Table 6, p173.
[330] With regard to Yeltsin's courtship of the military see Zisk, pp11-18. More specifically, see Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin On Role Of Russian Military," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 11 June 1992, accessed 18 March 1998; and ITAR-TASS, n.d., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Aware Of Army's Social Problems," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 11 August 1993, accessed 18 March 1998.
[331] Yelena Agapova, "Servicemen and Their Families Should Not Be Victims of Unsettled Lives," *KZ*, 23 July 1992, n.p., carried by FBIS-SOV, 23 July 1992, p17, quoted in Zisk, p12.
[332] Boris Yeltsin, "Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii-Glavnokomanduyushchego Vooruzhennymi Silami Rossii," *KZ*, 24 September (no year), p1, quoted in Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p8.

behind their position or willing to lead a coup. My assessment of military attitudes toward Rutskoi, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Lebed, and Gromov illustrated this. Second, strategically located personnel showed an unwillingness to actively support a coup, as is shown by their actions during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Third, the military lacked the expertise required to swiftly and successfully stage a coup, though it remained equipped to intervene. Most relevant here is the military's lack of experience in intervening and the inadequate level of expertise evident during the 1991 coup, 1993 revolt, and the Chechnyan war. Fourth, poor cohesion meant that the threat of instability and a civil war was a possible outcome of a coup. Many personnel recognised this threat. However I do not believe that poor cohesion prevented a coup. This is because disunity also affected those personnel the new regime would call upon for protection and disunity did not prevent the 1991 coup. Fifth, I doubt whether a coup leader would have been able to both recruit enough active supporters and effectively lead them. Although the number of participants is not necessarily an important determinant, given the complexity of taking power in a modern state like Russia it did influence the decision not to intervene.

With regard to the military's mood, this is closely related to the capacity to intervene as the level of self-confidence is vital given the difficult nature of seizing power in Russia. I have already argued that personnel did not have high self-perceptions so only briefly outlined their mood before focusing on the key factors that influenced this feeling. The military did not have an interventionist mood because personnel essentially did not believe that they were superior to civilians. The view among officers that orders to intervene would not be swiftly executed, and their negative assessment of the utility of force further discouraged an interventionist mood. This view was reinforced by the belief that the military would be unable to effectively exercise power over the state. Similarly, although many personnel wanted strong state leadership they wanted this to be provided within the confines of democracy. This is because of the military's fondness of freedoms associated with democracy. Likewise, personnel were supportive of at least some of the new regime's reforms. Finally the new regime's support needs to be put into perspective. This is because Yeltsin and other key members of the new regime often enjoyed a high level of support relative to their opponents and the military hierarchy. This reduced the likelihood that personnel believed a viable alternative was present and encouraged them to accept the new regime's supremacy.

Overall then, I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is valid. To be more precise, the presence of potential coup leaders, the participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites, the participation of effectively armed and trained personnel, the cohesion of the coup forces, the number of personnel, and the military's mood all influenced the decision not to intervene. This is because they influenced the military's perception of its capacity to intervene. Hypotheses three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the first of the three factors, is also valid. The transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's capacity to intervene. The transition impacted upon the loyalty of strategically located personnel as discontent did emerge, on the military's expertise and cohesion, on the number of personnel available to stage such an intervention, and on the mood of personnel. However strong potential coup leaders did not emerge during this period. Turing to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup. The validity of the hypothesis is thus doubtful. Although the transition did encourage discontent, this was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. The transition actually reduced the level of military expertise and cohesion, along with the prospective number of participants. Moreover, the transition's negative impact on the military ensured that personnel did not develop an interventionist mood. The poor morale of personnel hindered the development of a sense of supremacy over civilians and hindered a high level of confidence.

The following chapter examines whether the Russian military had the disposition to intervene from 1992 to 1996. This examination is carried out by categorising factors into primary or secondary factors according to their importance. The factors are the same as those presented in my theoretical framework that appears in chapter 2 apart from the military's mood, which has been examined here. Thus, the military's sectional interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, external actors, and 'mixed motives,' are examined to judge whether an interventionist disposition was present and strong enough to motivate the military to intervene.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S POLITICAL QUIESCENCE, 1992-1996: THE DISPOSITION TO INTERVENE

This chapter examines whether the Russian military under the new regime had the disposition to stage a coup. The military's sectional interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, external actors, and 'mixed motives' are examined to judge whether an interventionist disposition was present. First, I examine those factors that I argued in my theoretical framework are the most important and are thus termed 'primary' factors. The primary factors are the potential coup grievances derived from the violation of corporate and individual self-interests. More specifically, grievances derived from violations of the military's autonomy, the presence of functional rivals, changes to the level of budgetary support, and individual grievances are examined. After these factors are assessed I shall examine those factors that I believe are less influential and are thus termed 'secondary' factors. Here class and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors are examined. Finally, I shall assess the presence of 'mixed motives.'

This chapter again examines hypothesis two, three, and four. I have already argued that hypothesis one, regime transitions have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is valid. With regard to hypothesis two, three, and four I have already examined their validity with regard to the capacity to intervene. In this chapter I examine the validity of hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, and hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. These hypotheses are examined according to the factors that influence whether the military has the disposition to intervene. These factors are corporate, individual, class, and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors. Similarly, hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, is also examined within the context of the disposition. Thus, I evaluate here the impact of the transition on the disposition and whether this impact encouraged an interventionist disposition to emerge, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup.

Primary Factors

Corporate interests

Autonomy

The military's autonomy increased in some areas under the new regime. However it remained restricted in other areas, and this encouraged resentment over the perceived civilian interference in internal military matters. The potential influence of this grievance is shown by the 1991 coup where the violation of institutional autonomy influenced the decision to intervene. Although some personnel might have been placated by increases in autonomy, among other personnel discontent arose over the perceived civilian interference. Therefore, Russia is not a clear case of the military's autonomy either increasing or decreasing with the transition, but one where its impact varied according to the specific matter of concern to the military, the attitude of personnel varying accordingly. In line with this, after examining the 1991 coup I shall argue that the military's overall autonomy increased under Yeltsin before arguing that violations did occur, which led to discontent. This casts doubt on the argument that a key factor behind the military's political quiescence was its greater autonomy, but also whether the violation of autonomy was serious enough to motivate intervention.

The potential influence that violations to institutional autonomy can have is shown by their role in motivating the 1991 coup. Whereas the military had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy under Brezhnev, the transition led to a decline. Military control over its doctrine fell as civilians played an increasingly active role in determining the institution's roles, as I have already noted. This occurred against a background of much debate and opposition from officers. Indicative of this is Yazov's expression in 1987 that the military rather than civilians should determine the level of armaments needed to counter external threats.[1] Similarly, Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, Yazov's First Deputy of Defence and a leader of the 1991 coup, complained in 1990 that "irresponsible" and "incompetent" politicians were meddling in military affairs.[2] More specifically, the planned signing of the Union Treaty on the 20th of August which loosened the central government's control over the Soviet republics, and control over resources in the republics, such as the draft pool, encouraged intervention.

[1] D.T. Yazov, "Voennaya doktrina Varshavskogo Dogovora-doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma," *KZ*, 28 July 1987, n.p., quoted in Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*, p80. See also pp75-92.

This violated the military's autonomy, as defined by Finer, by threatening the military's control over recruitment and hence the size of the military. The growing sovereignty of the republics that occurred under Gorbachev encouraged the military hierarchy to become increasingly involved in politics as they moved to oppose the perceived threat to their authority. For instance, military bases were closed and weaponry stolen from armouries. [3] Varennikov in March 1991 warned that only direct participation of the hierarchy in the union treaty process would ensure that defence issues were resolved properly. Similarly, Kryuchkov that August warned Grachev "after the Union Treaty is signed it will be too late to institute a state of emergency."[4]

In some areas institutional autonomy increased, as influence over key security issues grew. This represents the provision of a positive incentive to remain loyal. Evidence of this includes Yeltsin's moves to align at least some policies more closely with the military to win its support. This is shown by the policy change towards the Kurile Islands, the return of these to the Japanese a contentious issue. Yeltsin's 1992 proposal to withdraw from the islands led the military to immediately reinforce its island forces. Yeltsin then adopted the military's position.[5] That this move corresponded with the military's stance is further shown by 98 percent of officers telling Ball that they would defend the islands from Japanese attack.[6] Moreover, institutional autonomy increased in other areas after the 1993 revolt as Yeltsin rewarded the military for its support. For example, Yeltsin supported the new draft of the military doctrine in 1993.[7] At least some senior officers like Grachev were pleased with the greater influence that they enjoyed in areas such as foreign and security policy-making.[8]

However, although autonomy in some areas increased, and this might have placated some personnel, I believe that it was not a major determinant of the military's quiescence. Potential coup grievances derived from the violation of institutional autonomy developed. First, serious violations of the military's autonomy continued under the new regime. This is illustrated by

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[2] Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, *KZ*, 6 September 1990, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, pp77-8.
[3] Meyer, "How the Threat," pp23-6.
[4] Varennikov, interview by Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network, 1200 GMT, 23 March 1991, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Union Treaty," *McNair Paper 34*, p2. With regard to Kryuchkov see Remnik, p448.
[5] See Desch, p468; and Zisk, pp15-6.
[6] Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's Officers?" Table 2, p205.
[7] With regard to the aftermath of the revolt see Desch, pp472-4; Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pp15-20; and Alexander MacLeod, "Why Military Backed The President," *CSM*, 6 October 1993, available from http://plweb.csmonitor.com/plweb-turbo/c...1+archives+148802+32++Russian%20military, Internet, accessed 14 March 1998, pp1-4 of 4.

the lack of military input in the decision to invade Chechnya, and by the civilian interference in the promotion of officers. After arguing this, I shall express my doubts over whether many personnel would have been placated by greater autonomy in some areas of security policy. Apart from the overwhelmingly negative impact of the transition on the military, many personnel opposed the role of the military in these areas. This is demonstrated by the active role of the military in the 'near abroad.' Members of the military hierarchy supported this role but many lower-ranked personnel opposed it, particularly those involved in 'peacekeeping' operations.

It is clear that institutional autonomy continued to be violated in many areas. Even when the military's role in the formulating of security policy increased in some areas, violations occurred. This is shown by the limited input that the military appears to have had in the decision-making process regarding the invasion of Chechnya, the largest military operation during this period. Here participants at the Security Council meeting where the vote was taken to invade recalled that the President would not tolerate any discussion, and was determined that the vote support the use of force. Members unanimously did vote for the use of force despite some misgivings.[9] This episode is especially important because it indicates that at least some of the speculation regarding Yeltsin's tenuous hold on power was exaggerated. It occurred shortly after Yeltsin's highly publicised failure to disembark from his aircraft on the 30th of September 1994 to meet the Irish Prime Minister, a failure that encouraged much talk about his ability to govern. This is relevant because the increase of military influence was supposedly one of the outcomes of Yeltsin's frailty. Apart from Yeltsin, after the ultimatum to Chechnya in mid-December 1994, a secret headquarters for coordinating all action in Chechnya was secretly set up and was headed by Chernomyrdin. Likewise, Nikolay Yegorov, Russian Nationalities Minister, coordinated the actions of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service in Chechnya.

More specifically, the role of senior officers was often limited. Grachev does not appear to have been closely involved in planning the invasion, nor did he support such action until after November 26th 1994, the invasion being launched on December 11th. Grachev did not lead the attempt to seize Grozny on November 26th, and after it's failure commented that he had "no

[8] See Umbach, p468.
[9] Gall and Waal, pp158-60, 167.

interest" in the republic. [10] He further complained in January 1995 that "I could have ended this war faster and with fewer casualties and less damage but I am being interfered with and am not allowed to fight in a manner that I know would have been more successful."[11] Other senior officers apparently were even less involved. Though Gromov was Deputy Defence Minister, he only found out about the November attack via the press.[12] When Gromov was asked about the high losses he complained that "the whole trouble is that the major decisions are not being taken by military people."[13] Similarly, Babichev, First Deputy of the Ground Forces, only learnt about the December invasion from the press despite being expected to take command of the operation and he lamented this poor communication.[14] This supports Tsypkin's argument that civil-military relations were characterised by a contradiction between the military's crucial political importance in some areas, and its lack of power in other policy areas.[15]

Likewise, civilian interference in the promotion process caused discontent as political loyalty was stressed. The 1993 Constitution gave the President the power to appoint and remove any officer and this power was frequently exercised. Lebed complained that officers were promoted according to their ability to say "Yessir [sic]!"[16] Gromov also commented that the failure of officers to oppose the invasion of Chechnya was encouraged by the fear that they would be fired.[17] More specifically, Grachev's promotion and continued service because of his political loyalty rather than military skill caused discontent. Grachev's loyalty to Yeltsin is shown by his support during the 1991 coup and this facilitated his swift promotion over other more senior officers. He became the Defence Minister in May 1992 at the age of only 44. He further supported Yeltsin, however reluctantly, during the 1993 revolt and is said to have reminded Yeltsin after the revolt that "I have twice saved you."[18] This loyalty encouraged officers to nickname him "the President's shooting crutch."[19] Another "well-placed" army officer in early 1995 stated that many officers resented the promotion of the incapable Grachev over those more experienced because of his "loyalty to his patron." He also accused

[10] Ibid., pp164, 157.
[11] KZ, 12 January 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p318.
[12] Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed," interview by Lyubimov.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Vorobyov, interview by Gall and Waal, pp177-8.
[15] Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," p36.
[16] Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed," p554. See also p555.
[17] Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed," interview by Lyubimov.
[18] "Letter From Officer X," p19.
[19] Ibid.

Grachev of "surrounding himself with an entourage of loyal but dull military hacks."[20] In line with this, the likelihood of promotion was influenced by the officer's loyalty to a patron who in turn was loyal to his superiors, and ultimately to Yeltsin. This meant that problems could arise if a patron was not available. Nearly one quarter of officers in the Ball survey believed that their opportunity for promotion was poor or very poor (see table 21).

Table 21: Russian Officers' Views of Corporate Interests Mid-1995

Officers were asked:

"How would you evaluate the following aspects of your personal and professional life?"

1. "Opportunities for promotion within the military"
2. "Your salary"

Question	Valid number of responses	Very poor (percentage)	Poor	Average	Good	Very good
1	587	3.7	21.1	56.9	17.9	0.3
2	595	30.4	41.2	25.5	2.4	0.5

For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 6, p173.

Finally, despite the greater influence of the military hierarchy over some policies this did not mean that many personnel endorsed their decisions, thereby casting doubts over whether such influence placated them. This is illustrated by the lack of enthusiasm among many personnel towards their use in the 'near abroad,' despite the influence that their superiors had over this. I have already mentioned that most personnel appear to have pragmatically accepted the post-Soviet borders of Russia, however, more specifically, many personnel deployed in the 'near abroad' lacked morale and enthusiasm. By March 1994, 107 soldiers had been killed and a further 193 wounded in 'peacekeeping operations.'[21] It was within this context that discontent arose. As previously mentioned, a survey of personnel in Tajikistan during 1994 found that 43

[20] Ibid., p18. See also Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," pp540-3.
[21] Orr, *The Russian Army And Peacekeeping*, p1.

percent did not wish to serve.[22] Many other units experienced a lack of officers, as many were reluctant to serve in the 'near abroad' given its hazardous nature and the high workload. In 1994, one regiment deployed in Moldavia was short of 10 company or platoon level officers and 17 warrant officers.[23]

Functional rivals and the survival of the military

This interest was violated by the new regime, though it did not actually seek to replace the military. The presence of armed forces not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence was not a new phenomenon. However, the importance of such forces relative to the army grew with the transition. Whereas para-military personnel numbered 675,000 in 1985, by 1996 they numbered 352,000. This equates to a decline of 47.9 percent, but the military ground forces declined by 76.9 percent.[24] This trend had negative consequences for the military that were a source of discontent, and ultimately a potential coup grievance. I shall first argue that the expansion of non-Ministry of Defence forces stretched already limited resources and deprived the military of urgently needed resources. Thus, equipment procurement and conditions of service were affected. Second, the expansion led to rivalry between the Ministry of Defence and non-ministry forces over the control of these forces.

It is evident that military discontent emerged from the expansion of non-ministry forces. The head of the OMON accused military personnel of preparing and coordinating attacks on the police during the 1993 May Day rally. [25] Additional inter-ministry rivalries became visible during the Chechnyan campaign. Here conflict occurred from the start as the leaders of other armed forces were often more supportive of the invasion than the military. [26] During the campaign coordination and cooperation was inadequate. One military General even accused the security forces of orchestrating an attack on his personnel.[27] Similarly, the disastrous nature of the campaign led to much 'passing of the buck' between the various ministries. In

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[22] *Armiya* no. 8 1994, n.p., quoted in Orr, *The Russian Army And Peacekeeping*, p7.
[23] Orr, *The Russian Army And Peacekeeping*, p6.
[24] *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp22, 30; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p114. The 1996 figure refers to the army rather than ground forces as this term was no longer used by the IISS.
[25] See AFP 3 May 1993, quoted in Lepingwell, "Riot Police Head Blames KGB, MVD, Army For Riot," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 4 May 1993, accessed 6 July 1998.
[26] Dmitriy Muratov, "The Country's Incumbent leadership will be put on trial for the Reckless Adventure in Chechnya," *Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta*, 14 December 1994, p1, carried by FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, p40, quoted in Timothy Thomas, The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: I. Military-Political Aspects 11-31 December 1994," *JSMS* 8, no. 2 (June 1995): p236.
[27] Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL 13 December 1994, carried by Sovset, 19 December 1994, quoted in Thomas, "The Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," p263. More generally, see Gall and Waal, pp207-8.

fact a 1996 counter-intelligence report that listed twelve key grievances among personnel against Yeltsin noted that one was the development of a "parallel army."[28]

Much of the hostility between the various forces resulted from their rivalry over resources and power. With regard to resources, many military personnel resented the loss of resources to other forces, especially given the other forces already received preferential treatment. Mikhail Kolenikov, Chief of the General Staff, complained in 1994 that armies were appearing throughout Russia, and he expressed concern over funding all of them.[29] Lebed commented the following year that the Interior forces received a higher level of pay than military personnel did, and "to put it mildly, this upsets many army officers."[30] In addition, rivalry over power grew. Rivalry between Grachev and the other ministries apparently encouraged him to finally support the Chechnyan invasion in an attempt to strengthen his political position.[31] Furthermore, Grachev struggled to have the border troops placed under his jurisdiction, a move resisted by their commander Colonel General Andrei Nikolaev.[32]

Budgetary support

Discontent derived from an inadequate level of budgetary support was a possible coup grievance. I have already argued that in real terms budgetary support declined during this period, so here will assess the attitudes of personnel to this trend. The majority of officers believed that budgetary support was too low. The influence that the level of this support could have on political loyalty is shown by the new regime's moves to increase expenditure when it deemed the military's support essential. The resentment of personnel was derived from the negative impact the fall of support had on the military, especially on the service conditions and the prompt payment of personnel. Thus, although I support to some extent Zisk's

[28] The grievances listed were: 1. His [Yeltsin's] role in the break-up of the Soviet Union; 2. his arms control concessions to the US; 3. his lack of concern about military living conditions; 4. his use of the army in 1993 against the Supreme Soviet; 5. his toleration of corruption and his favouritism in military appointments; 6. his "passivity" on the military budget; 7. his "impulsive" military-industrial policies on privatization and financing; 8. his formation of a "parallel army"; 8. his lack of involvement in military reform; 10. his "inadequate reaction" to the withdrawal of Russian forces from abroad; 11. his "weakness" in the face of NATO and other CIS countries and in Yugoslavia; 12. and the war in Chechnya. Viktor Baranets, "At Whom Will a Hungry Army Shoot?" *Sovershenno sekret'no* no.2, February 1997, n.p., quoted in Kipp, "Military Pluralism And The Dilemma Of Russian Military Professionalism," p25. The 'parallel army' referred to was not stipulated.

[29] Alexander Rahr, "Five Armies," RFE/RL e-mail Bulletin, no no., 25 May 1994, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p536.

[30] Lebed, interview by Alexander Zhilin, "Interview: General Lebed on the Army & the Kremlin," p1 of 4.

[31] Gall and Waal, p163.

[32] Richard Woff, "The Border troops of the Russian Federation," *JIR* 7, no.2 (February 1995): pp70-3, quoted in Stefanie Babst and Heribert Schaller, "The Future of the Russian Military," *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1996*, ed. Michael Clark (London: The Centre for Defence Studies, 1996), p177.

assertion that "Yeltsin appears to be doing his best to ensure that socio-economic policy for servicemen is fair and generous," I believe that such actions were not adequate to prevent discontent.[33]

Military discontent over the increasingly harsh service standards and lack of pay was widespread. Whereas before the transition at least officers enjoyed material comforts, service conditions fell during the transition. The growing perception among officers that their superiors were ignoring or unable to rectify these problems facilitated the emergence of various political groups.[34] However, the potential influence of this grievance is best illustrated by its role in motivating the 1991 coup: Yazov repeatedly spoke out against budgetary cuts prior to the intervention. With regard to the new regime, 82.5 percent of officers in the 1995 Ball survey believed that the military budget was "too little." Another 71.6 percent believed that their salary was very poor or poor (see table 21).[35] In extreme, though relatively rare, instances this grievance motivated action. Personnel at the Baykonur Cosmodrome mutinied in early 1992 because of poor living conditions, and a submarine crew in August 1995 refused to sail without receiving overdue pay. The following year officers involved in the alleged plot to seize Yeltsin hoped to force him to provide them with their pay.[36] In late 1994 Grachev, after describing the problems the military faced, such as unpaid salaries and its lack of resources, said to politicians that "Not a single army in the world is in such a catastrophic state" and that "this should be taken as a warning."[37]

The importance of this grievance is further shown by the role that budgetary support had in determining the military's support of the civilian leaders. During the 1991 coup a detachment of paratroopers asked for a pledge to improve their housing situation before they would support Yeltsin.[38] Likewise, the military let it be known after the 1993 revolt that the parliament's dissolution meant that the executive branch now bore full responsibility for ensuring that the pay and benefits of personnel increased.[39] This grievance is also shown by the new regime's recognition that it needed to address discontent over inadequate financial

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[33] Zisk, p11. See also pp11-2.
[34] Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," pp554-5; and Meyer, "How the Threat," pp19-20.
[35] With regard to the budget see Ball and Gerber, Table Six, p173.
[36] With regard to the plot see Fedarko, "Giving the Big Kiss-Off," p26. More generally, see Koliev, "Russia's Army," p3.
[37] Fedarko, "The Red-Army Blues," p24.
[38] Mikhail Sokolov, "Slovo protiv broni," *Sobesednik*, no.35, (August 1991): np., quoted in Tsypkin, "Will the Military," p45.
[39] *KZ*, 12 October 1993, n.p., quoted in Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," p48.

support. The new regime sought to win military support when this was deemed vital through actual or promised increases in support. For instance, Chernomyrdin sought to win electoral support by disbursing back pay to personnel a few weeks before the 1995 elections.[40] The following year Yeltsin ordered that pay be promptly provided before the presidential elections.[41]

Individual interest

Individual grievances arose during this period that could have encouraged intervention. Individual grievances were encouraged by the transition's overwhelmingly negative impact upon the military, an impact that has already been assessed. Thus, I shall focus here upon a key individual interest, which could be threatened and has yet to be examined, the safety of personnel both in terms of their life and their military positions under the new regime. However the protection and promotion of the interests of key personnel accompanied the violation of these individual interests. I argue this after my initial focus on the violation of interests. In addition, more negative means were used to ensure loyalty. These discouraged the growth of grievances among those whose actions would be most important in determining the success of a coup. Therefore, positive and negative incentives were used by the new regime to limit the impact of individual grievances.

At the extreme, the lives of personnel were threatened by the new regime. Although Zisk argued that Yeltsin showed a concern for the safety of personnel, and that this encouraged positive opinions of the President, the lives of personnel were threatened. [42] This threat resulted from developments originating from the Gorbachev era, and by the new regime's actions. Prior to the new regime taking power discontent had grown as casualties grew from internal operations aimed at countering the increasing security threat posed by instability. Before the 1991 coup discontent even arose among elite airborne personnel as they suffered losses and were accused of brutality.[43] The continued deployment of personnel in hazardous conditions under the new regime caused further discontent, as I have argued above with regard to personnel serving in the 'near abroad.'

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[40] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p539.
[41] Interfax and ORT and Russian TV, "Vremya," 23 May 1996, quoted in "Yeltsin Marks Military Anniversary, Promises Defense Funding," *Jamestown Monitor* 2, no.101, 24 May 1996, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/002/101_011.htm, Internet, accessed 2 September 1998.
[42] Zisk, p12.
[43] See Schofield, pp191-7, 202-6.

However, the most graphic indicator of the threat the new regime's decisions posed to the lives of personnel is the Chechnyan war. The military suffered heavy losses during the war, the initial battle for Grozny alone resulting in the deaths of an estimated 2,000 soldiers.[44] To put this in perspective, the 40th army in Afghanistan suffered 2,227 deaths throughout 1984, their worst year.[45] These losses encouraged much discontent. Gromov publicly complained in January 1995 that the high losses "could have been avoided and they should have been avoided."[46] Lebed the same month declared that he was prepared to go to Grozny "not to participate in this murderous war, of course, but simply to get the army out of the meat grinder."[47] Other personnel likewise attacked what they perceived was the unnecessarily high level of casualties. Vorobyev claimed in January 1995 that "if the operation had been planned correctly, the human, economic, and political losses could have been far smaller."[48]

Less dramatically, concern arose over the safety of individual positions within the military. Whereas during the 1970s and early 1980s on average 10 top commanders were replaced annually, this increased to 15 from 1985 to 1986, and to 20 from 1987 to 1988.[49] It was within this context that leaders of the 1991 coup came to fear that they would be dismissed. After the coup it became known that the KGB taped the July 30th 1991 meeting between Gorbachev and Yeltsin where it was decided that Valentin Pavlov, Yazov and Kryuchkov would be replaced. These figures were key instigators of the coup and they used the KGB recording to win support for the coup.[50] Thus, during the August 19th meeting of coup conspirators many expressed fears that they would shortly lose their positions.[51] This concern remained under the new regime. This is illustrated by the military's extraction from Yeltsin of a promise not to demobilise several units prior to its support for the President during the 1993 revolt.[52] There is also evidence that discontent arose among personnel closely associated with

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[44] Gall and Waal, p16.
[45] Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1731 gmt, 14 February 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 16 February 1996, quoted in "Commander Of Soviet Army In Afghanistan-Losses Are Worse In Chechnya," Reuters, 16 February 1996.
[46] Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed," interview by Lyubimov.
[47] "Lebed Calls for Negotiated Chechnya Solution," FBIS-SOV-95-009, 13 January 1995, p35, quoted in Goldstein, p115.
[48] "Vorobyev Blames Grachev for "Mistakes" in Chechnya," FBIS-SOV-95-018, 27 January 1995, p13, quoted in Goldstein, p112.
[49] Alexander Alexiev and Robert Nurick, *The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev: Report on a RAND Workshop* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1990), n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p48.
[50] Gorbachev, "Interview With Gorbachev—"Five Years Ago, We All Lost," pp1-2.
[51] Remnik, p472.
[52] See MacLeod, "Why Military Backed The President," p2.

Grachev after his sacking in mid-1996. It is plausible that officers close to him resented his removal and thus the threat to their own positions. They were removed shortly afterwards.[53]

Nevertheless, the new regime sought to limit such grievances among senior officers, particularly when their continued service and loyalty was deemed vital. This is shown by the continued service, and indeed promotion, of officers whose positions meant that they had much firepower under their control, were strategically placed, or who were both critical of the new regime and popular among personnel. Therefore, individual grievances are less likely to have been held among an elite few because of the use of positive incentives.[54] The positions of senior personnel were generally safe if the new regime and, to a lesser extent, the Minister of Defence, deemed it preferable that they continue to hold high positions. This meant that senior officers could remain on active duty despite their poor performance, violation of the law, and insubordination. This was as long as the civilian leaders believed that it was in their best interests not to violate the individual interests of officers. The regime's actions here were influenced by two key factors. First, officers loyal to the civilian leaders were retained and promoted despite their poor military performance. This has already been shown by my description of Grachev's promotion and continued service despite his many failures. Associated with this, I have already argued that loyal but unpopular officers diverted hostility away from the new regime. Second, those personnel whose loyalty was debatable continued to serve and receive promotions if the civilian leaders felt that the possible negative effects of their removal, such as their increased political activism, outweighed the benefits gained from their removal. Therefore, strengthening the position of the new regime was of utmost importance to the civilian leaders where promotion was concerned. Apart from positive

[53] With regard to this alleged resentment see Lebed, "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup," interview by NVT, Moscow. For information on the dismissal of personnel see NTV, Moscow, in Russian, 1535 gmt, 25 June 1996 carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 28 June 1996, quoted in "Military Expert Analyses Dismissals At Defence Ministry," Reuters, 28 June 1996.

[54] Though lower ranking officers like Colonels often lead coups, I focus here on the new regime's moves to placate officers from the rank of General, particularly those popular among personnel. This is because of three reasons. First, I have already argued that to intervene successfully in Russia would require the coup leaders command, and have experience in commanding, a large number of personnel. Second, officers from the rank of General were the most popular among personnel. For instance, 61.5 percent of the military officers elected by districts to the Duma in 1995 were Generals (Thomas, "The Russian Military And The 1995 Elections," pp541-2), and the two military figures most popular among personnel from 1992 to 1996 were Lieutenant General Lebed and Colonel General Gromov. Third, officers from the rank of General appear to have been most likely to intervene. Senior officers like Defence Minister Yazov and General Varennikov played a key role in deploying the military in support of the 1991 coup. Similarly, Lebed and Gromov were the most willing to publicly criticise the new regime, and it was Rutskoi, a Brigadier General not in active command, who played a leading role in the 1993 revolt. Contrasting this, the officers surveyed by Ball in 1995 ranged from Colonel/First Captain to Major/Third Captain (Ball and Gerber, Table 1, p161), and I used this survey extensively in the last chapter to argue that there was no strong interventionist mood.

incentives, more negative incentives were also used and these are examined last. However their effectiveness should not be over-emphasised, as the new regime was reluctant to act against popular officers and punishments were often minimal.

The individual interests of senior officers were generally not threatened. The new regime was generally reluctant to remove senior officers, and loyal officers were treated well even after their removal. With regard to the reluctance to remove senior officers, the disproportionate number of officers illustrates this. In 1980 there were 500,000 officers, in 1993 there were 690,000, twice as many as the international standard, despite the military having declined.[55] Similarly, in 1993, there were 2,218 Russian Generals for a military of 1,894,000 personnel compared to 1,008 Generals for the US active armed forces numbering 1,729,700.[56] In line with the retention of many Generals were their financial rewards. At the start of 1995 Generals received $180-200 a month and Colonels $160-180. State sector managers received $80-125. This was much more than lower-ranked officers, Lieutenants receiving $70-80 (see table 22). Many senior officers also appear to have been immune from criminal proceedings. Sources close to Yeltsin said they were instructed not to take action over "improper activities" as the officers would then "fall on the hook of the security services," and become "more

Table 22: Russian Military and Civilian Pay Early 1995

Military personnel	Monthly pay ($)	Civilians	Monthly pay ($) State-sector	Monthly pay in ($) Non-state sector
General	180-200	High school teacher	44-65	From 300
Colonel	160-180	Worker-builder	90-110	From 320
Lieutenant	70-80	Manager	80-125	From 300

Source: Chernavin, "The Status of the Army," pp736-7

[55] Gabriel, *The Red Legions*, p81; and Barylski, *The Soldier*, p278.
[56] Barylski, *The Soldier*, p278; and *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, pp20, 99-101.

devoted to the master of the Kremlin."[57] Moreover, promotions often occurred when military loyalty was vital. Prior to the 1993 revolt Yeltsin promoted eighty officers, and immediately before the 1996 elections the commanders of all five services received promotions. Even after their removal, loyal officers were treated well. Grachev remained loyal to Yeltsin despite his removal and was employed by a state-owned arms exporter from late 1997.[58] Shaposhnikov, Grachev's predecessor, also supported Yeltsin after his removal and became a presidential representative at a state-owned arms exporter.[59]

Apart from the retention of loyal officers, the new regime was reluctant to antagonise popular officers. This is illustrated by the treatment of Lebed and Gromov. The reluctance to act against Lebed is shown by Grachev backing down from removing him in August 1994 after Yeltsin disavowed plans to reduce the 14th army and to remove Lebed. Yeltsin's reluctance to act was reputedly encouraged by security and counter-intelligence officials arguing that Lebed's removal would severely damage Yeltsin's political standing, and that the 14th army might refuse to obey Moscow.[60] Furthermore, Lebed signalled to the new regime that his removal could lead him to become a political rival. In August 1994 when asked about the possibility of running for the presidency he said "We shall talk about it in detail if they force me to take off my epaulettes."[61] That Lebed only resigned in 1995 after years of protesting against the new regime may indicate that positive incentives had some influence. Nor was the new regime willing to take action against Gromov. Despite his insubordination he was merely transferred to a largely honorary position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1995. The *Kommersant Daily* speculated that "The probability of Gromov...entering the political arena is too high, which would be very unwelcome to the authorities."[62]

Accompanying such moves were negative incentives aimed at undermining the positions of dissident Generals through reducing their support. These incentives were aimed at creating fear among officers that challenging the new regime would have harmful consequences.

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[57] Zhilin, "Corruption Keeps Generals In Line," p7.
[58] Interfax new agency, Moscow, in English 1122 gmt, 3 July 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 4 July 1996, quoted in "Dismissed Russian Defence Minister Still Loyal To Yeltsin, Wishes Lebed Success," Reuters, 4 July 1996.
[59] See Michael Nakoryakov, "Former Russian Defense Minister Recalls Past, Ponders Future," *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 16 October 1994, pD3.
[60] *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 30 August 1994, n.p., quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Why Has Yeltsin Supported Lebed," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 1 September 1994, accessed 18 March 1998.
[61] *Moskovskie novosti* no.33, 14-21 August 1994, n.p., quoted in Vladimir Socor, "...And Hints He May Run For President," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 22 August 1994, accessed 18 March 1998.

Negative incentives were used after both the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. With regard to the 1991 coup, 376 personnel were relieved of their posts and the coup leaders were imprisoned until their release in 1993.[63] Leaders of the 1993 revolt were also arrested and Rutskoi was stripped of his rank. More specifically, the new regime moved to reduce Lebed's popularity and thus make it easier to discipline him. According to a former counterintelligence officer, the decision to appoint him Commander of the 14th Army was influenced by a desire to see him fail, as it was felt to be a particularly difficult assignment. Likewise, the Defence Ministry initially decided that Deputy Defence Minister Matvei Burlakov, a General accused by Lebed of corruption, was to inspect the 14th Army. This was to place Lebed in the difficult position of paying respect to a superior he had previously attacked, thereby losing credibility. However,Lebed refused to allow the inspection and Grachev backed down.[64]

However, the negative incentives should not be over-emphasised given the new regime's reluctance to act against popular officers. The punishments that were handed out were often minimal. Yazov, Varennikov, and Achalov were not even court martialled after the 1991 coup. It was also decided in September 1991 that formal compliance with orders issued by the coup leaders did not deserve punishment. Leaders of both the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt were amnestied in February 1994 with Varennikov, the only coup leader to stand trial, being acquitted in August 1994. Gorbachev exclaimed that this meant, "Future coup and putsch leaders can be sure ahead of time that they will be acquitted."[65] Nor did involvement in the coup and revolt prevent leaders from returning to military and political activities. Varennikov was elected to the Duma in 1995, and it was announced in June 1998 that Yazov was to become adviser to the head of the Defence Ministry's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation. Similarly, Rutskoi was elected the Governor of Kursk in October 1996. Even the Major who attempted to assassinate Yeltsin in January 1993 was freed in May 1993 due to insufficient evidence.

In summary, primary grievances derived from the negative impact on the military of the transition arose that could have encouraged support for a coup. Such grievances emerged from the violation of institutional autonomy, the growth of functional rivals, the fall in

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[62] "Gromov's New Job Seen as Way to Isolate Him From Politics," FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995, p20, quoted in Goldstein, p114.
[63] "On the Military Leadership's Participation," p24, quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p140.
[64] Zhilin, "Battle For the Soul," pp5-6.
[65] Oliver Wates, "Three Years On, War Of Words Over Soviet Coup," Reuters, 19 August 1994. See also Brusstar and Jones, "Aftermath Of The October Crisis," p3.

budgetary support, and the violation of individual interests. However, I doubt whether these grievances would have motivated intervention. This is because at least some personnel were placated by increases in military autonomy, and the individual interests of senior officers, especially those popular within the military, were often protected. Negative incentives accompanied these positive incentives but their strength is questionable.

Secondary Factors

Class interest

I have already argued that the class interest is not often a major coup determinant and this argument appears to apply to the Russian case study. I have been able to compile material on the class composition of the military and believe that the class interest was not strong enough to motivate intervention. Although the class origins of personnel could differ from those of members of the new regime, these origins did not play a major role in determining their actions and attitudes. This is illustrated by the military's actions during the 1991 coup and under Yeltsin. I shall then argue that the class position of personnel in monetary terms did not have a decisive impact on their actions or attitudes.

The class composition of the military and the new regime did differ, though not dramatically. Evidence indicates that personnel before and during the transition were generally from working class origins, rather than the middle class often associated with officers. In 1970, 78 percent of Generals and Admirals had peasant or worker origins. [66] Similarly, during the transition Colonel General A. Golonov, Head of Ground Forces' Training Directorate, said that the army was largely comprised of "illiterate workers and peasants," and at least 59 percent of those voluntarily serving were of working class origins.[67] My brief survey of key officers on active duty in early 1993, all of whom were serving before 1985, also indicates that 65.6 percent remained of working class origins. More specifically, my sample of airborne and Spetsnaz officers active in early 1993 found that 80 percent had working class origins (see tables 23 and 24). Moreover Shaposhnikov and Grachev, the Defence Ministers for most

[66] *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no.4 (no month, 1971): p31, quoted in Colton, *Commissars*, Table 14, p269.
[67] Dick, *A Bear*, p4. With regard to the make-up of those entering the military, see Chernavin, p740.

of the period, were from the working class.[68] Turning to the new regime, evidence indicates that middle class origins were more common. My brief survey of members of the new regime in early 1993 indicates that 47.4 percent were of middle class origins (see table 25). With regard to the military, 34.4 percent of military officers and 20 percent of airborne and Spetsnaz officers had middle class origins (see tables 23 and 24). It is apparent that this difference could be a source of tension. A "high-ranking General Staff officer" said in late

Table 23: Sample of Key Russian Military Officers in March 1993: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace

Ethnicity (Number followed by percentage)	Class (of father)	Most Common Birthplace
Slav: 52 100% *	Upper: 0 0% *	Moscow: 4 8 % *
Russian: 48 92.3%	Middle: 11 34.43%	Lipetsk: 3 6%
	Lower (working): 21 65.6%	Smolensk: 3 6%

See appendix 2. All percentages are rounded up to the first decimal point. The table includes Gromov but not Rutskoi. * The ethnicity of 52 officers, class of 32, and birthplaces of 50 is known. Source: *Longman Bibliographical Directory Of Decision-makers in Russia and The Successor States* ed. Martin McCauley (Harlow, Essex, Longman Group UK Limited, 1993).

Table 24: Sample of Active Officers of Spetsnaz and the Airborne Forces Serving in Early 1993: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace

Ethnicity	Class (of father)	Most Common Birthplace
Slav: 17 100% *	Upper Class: 0 0% *	No discernible place*
Russian: 12 70.6%	Middle Class: 3 20%	
	Lower (working) Class: 12 80%	

See appendix 3 (includes Lebed). All percentages are rounded up.* The ethnicity of 17 officers, class of 15, and birthplace of 16 is known. Source: Schofield, pp264-85 and *Longman Bibliographical Directory.*

[68] For a profile of Shaposhnikov that notes his social origins see McCauley, pp551-2 and appendix 2. With regard to Grachev see appendix 2. For a profile of Rodionov see Orr, *Rodionov and Reform*, p11 and appendix 2. Yeltsin himself was interim Defence Minister from March to May 1992 and is also of working class origins.

1993 that "The only hope is that our people will be able to acquire a normal government that will express the interests of the working people and not a handful of the bourgeoisie."[69] However, the greater prominence of working class origins in the military did not have a major impact on how personnel acted. Most basically, the class origin of a person does not necessarily mean that they will pursue the interests of this class and support figures with the same background. For instance, the greater presence of figures with middle class origins in the new regime did not discourage it from courting the military, despite the working class origins of many personnel. The military also supported the new regime against the 1993 revolt despite this class difference.

Table 25: Sample of Members of the New Regime in March 1993: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace

Ethnicity	Class (of father)	Most Common Birthplace
Slav: 63 91.3% *	Upper Class:0 0%*	Moscow: 25 34.7% *
Russian: 57 82.6% **	Middle Class: 9 47.4%	
	Working Class: 10 52.6%	

See appendix 4. All percentages are rounded up. * The ethnicity of 69 officials, class of 19, and birthplaces of 72 officials are known. Rutskoi is included. **This figure includes Vladimir Mashits of Belarusian/Russian origins.
Source: *Longman Bibliographical Directory.*

The willingness of personnel to support a coup because of a shared class interest is doubtful. This is shown by the 1991 coup, where both the regime and coup leaders had similar class backgrounds but opposed one another. Yazov shared the peasant origins of Gorbachev, with Kryuchkov and Yeltsin having working class origins. Similarly, both military supporters and opponents appear to have shared working class origins and theoretically the same class interest (see tables 26 A and B). This lack of class attachment is to be expected given the emphasis on a classless society during the Soviet era, and the military's role of promoting national integration.[70] A lack of class attachment is also evident under the new regime. During the 1993 revolt personnel did not swiftly unite behind Achalov, the 'Defence Minister' appointed by Rutskoi, or behind Yeltsin despite their working class origins. Likewise, class

[69]"Staff Officer on 'Shame' of October Events," FBIS-SOV-93-243, 21 December 1993, pp40-2, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny," p336.
[70] With regard to the integrative role assigned to the military see Odom, "The "Militarization" of Soviet Society," p269.

origins do not appear to have played a major role in determining attitudes towards the five opponents of the new regime most popular among personnel. Whereas Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, and Zyuganov had middle class origins, Lebed and Gromov had working class origins (see table 27). Thus, the combined support for Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, and Zyuganov, meant that officers from 1992 to 1995 sympathised most with figures from middle class origins. However by 1996 they sympathised most with Yeltsin and Lebed of working class origins (see table 11).

Table 26: A. Sample of Military Supporters of 1991 Coup: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace *

Ethnicity	Class (of father)	Most Common Birthplace
Slav: 15 100% Russian: 15 100%	Upper: 0 0% Middle: 4 40% Lower (working): 6 60%	Ukraine: 2 13.3%

B. Sample of the Background of Military Opponents of 1991 Coup**

Ethnicity	Class	Most Common Birthplace
Slav: 14 100% Russian: 13 92.8%	Upper: 0 0% Middle: 2 18.2% Lower (working): 9 81.8%	Rostov: 3 23.1%

See appendix 1 and 2. All figures are rounded up. *The ethnicity of 15 officers, class of 10, and birthplace of 15 is known. ** The ethnicity of 14 officers, class of 11, and birthplace of 13 is known. Table B. includes Rutskoi and Lebed. Source: *Longman Bibliographical Directory.*

Turning to the class position of personnel, in material terms most personnel under the new regime belonged to the working class. Officers before the transition belonged to the middle class, at least in material terms. In the mid-1970s Lieutenants on average received 150 rubles per month, Captains 160, Majors 220-230, and Lieutenant Colonels 250. This compares with the average salary of 145.8 rubles for white and blue-collar workers.[71] It was against this background that service conditions declined after 1985. This is indicated by the low level of

military pay relative to civilian pay, especially relative to the non-state sector (see table 22). Indeed a detailed study of the officer corps by *Krasnaya Zvezda* concluded that it was no longer part of the middle class but now the "lumpen proletariat."[72] However, though members of the new regime in financial terms often belonged to a higher class, the material position of figures did not play an important role in determining how personnel acted. This is shown by the support Chernomyrdin received from personnel despite his financial position starkly contrasting that of most personnel, given he was a millionaire. Personnel thus were similar to many civilians whose material position did not play a decisive role in determining their political opinions. According to a survey of civilians before and after the 1995 elections, the

Table 27: Background of Potential Coup Leaders: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace

Figure	Ethnicity	Class (of father)	Birthplace	Stance on 1991 coup
Rutskoi	Russian	middle class (officer)	Kursk	anti
Zhirinovsky	Russian	middle class (lawyer)	Alma Ata Kazakhstan	pro
Zyuganov	Russian	middle class (teacher)	Khotynetsky raion, Orlov oblast	Not active
Lebed	Russian	working class (electrician)	Novocherkassk, Rostov	anti
Gromov	Russian	Working class (specific occupation not known)	Saratov	pro

Source: *Longman Bibliographical Directory.*

[71] Harriet Scott, "The military profession in the USSR," *Air Force* no vol. or no., (March 1976), pp76-81; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. 1922-1982* (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982), p405, both quoted in Jones, *The Red Army*, p83.

[72] Orr, *The Current State*, p14. See also Yefimov, p2.

Communist party was the most popular among people of both the low and middle income quartiles.[73]

Particularistic interest

As with the class interest, I believe that loyalties derived from regional or ethnic affiliations were not strong enough to have an important role in motivating a coup. Of the two interests the regional one is of greater importance, as the attachment of personnel to regions did increase at the expense of attachment to the central leadership. However I do not believe that this interest would have motivated intervention, particularly a successful one. I shall argue this after describing the regional attachment many personnel displayed. There are two types of regional interests; those derived from the birthplace of personnel, and their service in a particular region. The second of these interests is evident, as shown by the increased independence of the MDs, and I thus assess this first. I believe that the new regime's weaknesses and inadequacies encouraged this development.

As I have already briefly noted, regional autonomy grew under the new regime and this is indicative of a regional interest among personnel, particularly among those stationed furthest from Moscow. Evidence indicates that where personnel were stationed could influence their political attitudes. This is shown by the willingness of personnel to attack separatists and attack the parliament in 1993 varying according to the region (see table 16), and is a significant trend given the importance of MDs. For example, the Siberian MD contained 42 percent of the military-industrial complex and had troops widely deployed.[74] Moreover, though I have argued that Lebed's insubordination should not be over-emphasised, it is apparent that the 14th Army enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy than many others did. Lebed criticised moves to withdraw and reorganise the 14th army without removal. Indeed he declared in late 1994 that "Theoretically we are under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces in Moscow. In practice, we make decisions here."[75] This regional interest was at the expense of Moscow's authority, and caused alarm even among the Generals that enjoyed greater autonomy. Lebed believed that the military might fragment, commenting in

[73] Stephen White, Matthew Wyman and Sarah Oates, "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49 no.5, (July 1997): Table 3, p786.
[74] Colonel General Viktor Kopylov, "Region's Colonel-General Interviewed," interview by *Vechernіy novosibirsk*, 1 November 1994, carried by FBIS Report: Central Eurasia, 15 November 1994, p76, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p538.
[75] Major General Edward Atkenson, "The Russian Armed Forces in Crisis," *Army*, November 1994, p10, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p537. See also Simonsen, "Going His Own Way," pp536-9.

early 1995 that "every regional "prince" now has his own troops. He pays them, and they are ready to unsheathe their swords."[76]

This trend accompanied the fall in cohesion and was an outcome of the new regime's weaknesses and inadequacies. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union led to the decline of central control mechanisms. This was worsened by the discontent among personnel aimed, though not exclusively, at civilian leaders and senior officers in Moscow. In addition, inadequate support from the new regime encouraged personnel to seek support from regional authorities, thus weakening their ties to the central leadership. For instance, officers of the Siberian MD signed an agreement that brought together the governor and eight regional leaders to support the MD, as the Defence Ministry was unable to provide adequate support.[77] The Russian military correspondent Dmitri Kholodov wrote, "A frightening process has begun in the army. District Commanders no longer rely on their ministry [but instead] turn to local authorities directly for help. In this way, the army is becoming tied to regions, something that, in the event of a crisis, could break it up into component parts."[78]

However, I do not believe that this interest was an influential coup motive. First, regional affiliations were not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene that I have already discussed in detail. Apart from the surveys of personnel throughout Russia I have referred to when assessing the military's mood, this is shown by the reluctance of personnel to unite behind a figure despite their service in the same region. Here the actions of personnel during both the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt are relevant. Second, the ability of those personnel stationed in a particular region to address a regional grievance via a coup was doubtful. I shall argue this after examining the influence of shared service experiences on the actions and attitudes of personnel. Apart from the doubtful willingness of many personnel stationed closest to the Kremlin to actively support intervention, the size and diversity of Russia would make it very difficult to unite the military behind a specific regional grievance. This is especially because regional grievances by their very nature are divisive.

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[76] Lebed, interview by Kohan and Zarakhovich, p25. Scholars also recognised the threat of this trend. See Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," pp536-9. Journalists expressed similar fears. See "The Threat that was," pp19-21.

[77] Discussion between Thomas and Russian officer, Moscow, February 1995, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p537.

Evidence supports my argument that service in the same regions did not equate with a regional interest strong enough to encourage intervention. Although where personnel served could influence promotions, as is shown by the promotion of Afghanistan veterans, the bond of loyalty derived from service in the same region was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene.[79] Officers could not count on political support from personnel where they had served. Even personnel stationed in Trans-Dniester did not unite behind Lebed during the 1995 Duma and 1996 presidential elections.[80] Nor did personnel show a desire to fight over a region. The Ball survey found on average 39 percent of officers were willing to disobey an order to fight separatists (see table 16).

More specifically, shared regional experiences did not equate with a willingness to intervene. This is shown by the 1991 coup. Although Yazov had been Deputy Commander of the Far East MD from 1976 to 1979 and Commander from 1984 to 1987, the district did not unite behind the coup. Indeed the MD Commander was an active opponent of the coup.[81] Likewise, Varennikov received little support from personnel stationed in Germany despite his service there as First Deputy Commander, and although he coordinated the withdrawal from Afghanistan, fellow veterans like Lebed and Grachev opposed him.[82] This reluctance to intervene remained under the new regime. Few personnel who had been stationed in the same regions as the leaders of the 1993 revolt supported them. Again this is shown by the shared service in Afghanistan of two of the key actors: Rutskoi and Grachev. Despite their shared service, Grachev used force against his fellow veteran. Nor did Lebed or Gromov actively support the revolt, again despite their service in Afghanistan.

Moreover, the ability to stage a coup motivated by a regional interest was doubtful. The diversity and size of Russia made it unlikely that a coup instigated by one MD because of its regional interest would win the support of the other MDs. This is because their interests are unlikely to have been identical, especially as they incorporated numerous subject components

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[78] *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 22 March 1994, n.p., in Joint Publications Research Service, "Imminent Collapse of Armed Forces Predicted," *Military Affairs*, 27 April 1994, p2, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p537.

[79] With regard to the promotion of Afghanistan veterans see Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp307-16.

[80] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p533. With regard to the 1996 election see Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, quoted in "Mixed Reaction," Reuters.

[81] "General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt," FBIS-SOV, 6 September 1991, p60, quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p565.

[82] For a profile of Varennikov see McCauley, pp642-3. With regard to the stance of those personnel stationed in Germany see Meares, "Westernised" Soviet Troops."

of the Russian Federation.[83] Neither were military grievances likely to have been identical. For instance, the North Caucasus MD was the district most involved with the Chechnyan campaign, given its location. It was thus more likely to have grievances derived from this campaign relative to others like the remote Far East MD.[84] Furthermore, conditions in the MDs varied. Although key divisions based in the Moscow MD enjoyed preferential treatment others, like those in the Far East MD suffered particularly harsh conditions. Indeed four sailors starved to death in the Far East in March 1993. In line with these conditions, grievances appear to have been stronger. That Yeltsin's would-be assassin in 1993 was from the Far East headquarters, and support for Zhirinovsky among Far East personnel was reported to have been especially strong in the 1993 elections illustrates this.[85] However those MDs with the strongest grievances were often those furthest away from Moscow and least able to act. The Far East MD is over 4,500 Kilometres from the capital.[86] Moreover, I doubt that regions would have united and called for intervention. Surveys indicate that rural people were more likely to support parties like the LDPR and Communist party compared to those in large cities, who were often supportive of parties associated with the new regime.[87]

Turning to the attachment of personnel to their birthplace, I do not believe that this would have motivated intervention either. Apart from the influence that the region of service could have on personnel, in turn weakening pre-service bonds, two key factors weakened this interest. First, evidence suggests that no one region dominated the military either before or during the transition. This reduced the likelihood of a strong bond of loyalty to one region. Nor does the new regime appear to have been dominated by one region or emphasised one region, thereby reducing the prospect of discontent among other regions. Second, the proximity of birthplaces did not necessarily equate with a similarity of political attitudes among personnel or a willingness to cooperate. Third, shared birthplaces did not necessarily equate with a willingness to support intervention.

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[83] Within the Russian Federation the basic territorial-administrative unit is the oblast (region). Oblasts cover the area of the state where industrial and agricultural activities dominate. There are 49 oblasts. See Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," footnote 48, p547.

[84] With regard to the North Caucasus MD and the Chechnyan campaign see Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," pp257-90.

[85] Moscow Interfax, 13 December 1993, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "Notes," available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34afn.html#86, footnote 91, p1.

[86] This is based on the distance between Khabarovsk, the headquarters of the MD, and Moscow.

[87] Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller, and Paul Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no.4 (June 1995): Table 3, p599; and White, et al., "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections, Table 3, p786.

First, no region appears to have dominated either the military or the new regime. With regard to the military, my sampling of key officers indicates that the most common birthplace was Moscow, as 8 percent of officers were born here (see table 23). Similarly, the Defence Ministers from 1987 to 1996 were all born in different oblasts. No trend is discernible among airborne and Spetsnaz officers either (see table 24). Turning to the new regime, Moscow appears to have been the most common birthplace. My sampling indicates that 34.7 percent of officials were born here (see table 25). Therefore, Moscow appears to have been the most common birthplace among military officers and civilians, but particularly civilians. Despite the greater presence of Muscovites, the new regime sought to prevent the perception that it was biased against other regions. The rights of Russia's 21 republics, 6 provinces, 49 regions, and 2 cities were significantly equalised by the 1993 Constitution. The new regime also sought accommodation with many of the republics. By the end of 1995, 9 treaties had been made between Moscow and republics providing them generous tax concessions, control over natural resources, and other rights.[88]

Second, though the military and civilian regional backgrounds differed, this was unlikely to motivate intervention. This is because birthplaces appear not to have had a major impact on the political attitudes and actions of personnel. Evidence suggests that the birthplace of personnel had little influence during the 1991 coup. Supporters and opponents of intervention do not appear to have been predominantly drawn from one region. Even the coup opponents from Rostov were from different places in the oblast (see tables 26 A and B). Nor do I believe that the birthplace of personnel had a major impact on their actions under the new regime. This is shown by the support for Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov, Lebed, and Gromov regardless of their diverse birthplaces. Indeed Zhirinovsky won support from personnel despite not having been born in Russia (see table 27). This support was primarily determined by the actions and views of the figures, as is shown by my assessment of the reasons behind their level of support. Similarly, personnel could have divergent stances despite their shared backgrounds. Both Lebed and Petr Deinekin, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, were born in Rostov but their stances toward the new regime differed because of their political opinions. Whereas Lebed openly questioned the new regime, Deinekin, at least during the first half of the period, believed that the military should be apolitical and assisted the regime. Deinekin reputedly maintained authorised contact with the parliamentary forces in the hope of

[88] Sakwa, p189.

defusing the 1993 revolt.[89] The conflict between Rutskoi and Grachev also occurred despite their birthplaces being less than 300 kilometres apart. Even had grievances derived from the violation of such regional interests arisen, it would have been very difficult to unite enough personnel behind their intervention, given their diverse origins.

Finally, I shall assess the likelihood that an ethnic interest would motivate intervention. I believe that this interest was even less likely to motivate a coup. A perceived violation of the interests of the ethnic group most closely associated with the military, such as through the disproportionate influence of minority groups, was unlikely given both the military and new regime shared the same ethnicity. Indeed the potential coup leaders, along with the military and civilian leaders, shared similar opinions on the key issue of ethnicity: Russians in the 'near abroad.' As I have already argued that ethnic tension declined within the military as other groups achieved independence, I shall only briefly assess this interest.

Russians dominated the state, the military, and the new regime. Whereas Russians represented slightly less than half the Soviet population, they represented around 85 percent of the Russian Federation.[90] Russians and Slavs dominated the officer corps before the transition, but not to the same degree that is apparent under the new regime. For example, 64.3 percent of Soviet Marshals in 1974 were Russian. [91] This contrasts my samples that indicate 92.3 percent of key officers, and 70.6 percent of airborne and Spetsnaz officers were Russian (see tables 23 and 24). Likewise, in 1995 a Ministry of Defence survey found that 95.2 percent of officers were Slav and 79.7 percent of officers were Russian.[92] As Soviet republics moved to become independent and were increasingly unwilling to supply men to the Soviet military, Slavs, and more specifically Russians, increasingly dominated the lower ranks too. In 1985, 45.3 percent of draftees were Russian speakers, by the summer of 1990 they accounted for 66.5 percent of draftees.[93] Similarly, my sample of Russian civilian officials indicates that 91.3 percent were Slav and another 82.6 percent Russian (see table 25). Both Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin were Russian.

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[89] Grachev, interview by *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 8 October 1993, p2, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p3. For a profile of Deinekin see McCauley, pp127-8.

[90] Richard Starr, "Russia's Army in Transition," (paper presented at the Pacific Northwest Colloquium on International Security, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 15 April 1994, pp10-1), quoted in Spence, footnote 51, p33.

[91] With regard to the ethnicity of Soviet Marshals see Colton, *Commissars*, Table 13, p261.

[92] Oleg Falichev, "Navestit' starushku mat'," *KZ*, 3 June 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, Table 8.1, p215.

[93] *Crisis in the Former Soviet Military*, Table 2, p23.

More specifically, ethnic origins were unlikely to motivate intervention. The most important disincentive was the reluctance of personnel to use force against other Russians. Apart from this, potential coup leaders at least broadly supported the new regime's more assertive stance on the major issue of ethnicity: the protection of Russians in the 'near abroad.' Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Lebed, and Gromov believed that the rights of these Russians should be forcefully protected.[94] The civilian and military leadership recognised that a military presence in the 'near abroad' was required. In April 1995, both Grachev and Lebed welcomed Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's comments that the military could intervene when ethnic Russians were threatened.[95] Although many personnel opposed their deployment in the 'near abroad,' 81.9 percent in the Ball survey believed Russian relations with the region were important.[96]

Manifest destiny and national interest

Some personnel claimed that the manifest destiny of the military was to protect the national interest of Russia, but it is very unlikely that this would have motivated intervention. Claims that intervention was needed to protect the national interest were made during the 1991 coup. It is also apparent that some personnel under the new regime continued to claim that it was the military's manifest destiny to protect the national interest. However I believe that such claims were merely excuses for intervention rather than actual motives. Indicative of this is the 1991 coup. Apart from the reluctance to intervene because of the possible negative consequences, two key factors discouraged the belief that it was the military's duty to intervene to protect the national interest. First, personnel showed little willingness to undertake domestic duties regardless of their nature, and recognised that a coup would not solve Russia's problems. Second, the 1993 revolt reinforced fears among personnel that intervention could have a negative impact. It also again illustrates the reluctance to intervene even when such an act could be associated with the national interest.

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[94] With regard to Zyuganov see Marian Leighton, "Red Revenge: Zyuganov and the Resurgent Communists," *Post Soviet Prospects* IV, no.3, March 1996, available from http://www.csis.org/html/pspiv3.html, Internet, accessed 2 February 1999, p3 of 5. For information on Zhirinovsky see Zhilin, "The Race for the Military Vote Heats Up," p7. With regard to Lebed see Simonsen, "Going His Own Way," pp536-7. With regard to Gromov see *The Sunday Times*, 14 November 1993, n.p., quoted in Matthew Campbell, "Russia's Afghan Hero Challenges For The Top-General Boris Gromov," Reuters, 14 November 1993.

[95] For more on Grachev's attitude towards the 'near abroad' see John Lough, *The Army Enters Politics*, 14 July 1992, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/K12, Internet, accessed 13 March 1996, pp3-4 of 6.

[96] Ball and Gerber, Table 4, p168.

Some personnel claimed that it was their duty to intervene when the national interest was threatened. This is apparent during the 1991 coup. Prior to the coup, its leaders had expressed support for an intervention in the national interest. Varennikov supported the manifesto published in late July 1991 which said that "We are convinced the army and navy... will prevent fratricidal war and the destruction of the Motherland."[97] During the meeting of conspirators on the 17th of August, Pavlov summarised their feelings. He argued that "The situation is catastrophic. The country is facing famine. It is in total chaos." He then exclaimed that "The only hope is a state of emergency."[98] During the coup these claims were repeated. Those who arrested Gorbachev claimed that the situation of the state had prompted their actions, and that as the state was "heading for catastrophe, steps must be taken, a state of emergency is needed--other measures won't save us." [99] These claims persisted after the coup's defeat. In 1994 Varennikov declared that he had sworn an oath of loyalty "to my Motherland." He believed that as Gorbachev threatened the national interest, a coup was necessary. He announced: "The Soviet criminal code describes high treason as an action aimed at undermining the Soviet state. We [the coup leaders] on the contrary tried to save the state from the attempts on it by the traitor [Gorbachev] who occupied the top."[100]

Claims that it was the military's duty to protect the national interest and that this might require intervention continued under the new regime. At the 1993 All-Services Officers' Assembly a resolution was adopted that "The country is ruined," and that the state's disastrous conditions meant that only the military could restore order.[101] Similarly, the Major caught attempting to assassinate Yeltsin that year claimed it was his "military and civil duty" to kill Yeltsin in the interests of the people.[102] The following year Gromov also defended the 1991 coup, claiming that the coup leaders' actions were "in line with saving the Soviet Union from collapse." [103] Less dramatically, connotations of the manifest destiny and national interest are evident in an appeal aimed at "the armed defenders of the country" made by the Officers' Union in early 1995. This appeal claimed that the "erosion" of the state had reached a crisis point and that its conference sought to "unmask antinational forces which destroyed

[97] Lyons, "Soviet Hardliners."
[98] Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb*, p450.
[99] Gorbachev, *The August Coup*, p20.
[100] *The Independent*, 11 August 1994, p10, quoted in Helen Womack, "Russia's 'Man Of Integrity' Has No Regrets Over Coup Attempt," Reuters, 11 August 1994.
[101] *Nasha Rossiya* no.3 1993, n.p., quoted in Konovalov, p210.
[102] Schmemann, "Russian Major Caught."
[103] See Boulton, "Russian Official Defends General On Gorbachev Coup."

the USSR and are completing this process in Russia."[104] Indeed Pavel Baev claimed that as the power of advisers and bodyguards increased, along with the greater unaccountability of bureaucrats and corruption, the prospect of a Russian coup increased. He believed that as this occurred "the greater are the incentives for the military leadership to remove it [the new regime], before a wide-ranging social explosion tears the country apart."[105]

However, I seriously doubt whether a desire to protect the national interest would have motivated intervention. This is shown by the 1991 coup. Though leaders of the coup claimed that they were intervening in the national interest, and this might have influenced their decision, I have already argued that corporate and individual interests were the important motives. Apart from these, the coup leaders ignored warnings about the detrimental impact intervention could have. Prior to the coup Yeltsin had warned that a coup would aggravate economic, social, and political problems.[106] Even an MVD newspaper article had previously noted that coups could have a negative impact, and claimed that there were no "good" coups.[107] The coup leaders also knew that civilian anxiety would arise from a coup. This was apparent from the impact of the deployment of troops in Moscow during September 1990. [108] The leaders also knew that intervention would be unlikely to reduce instability, given the military's problematic internal security role.

Similarly, the objectives of the coup leaders cast doubt on the validity of their claims, at least when the national interest is equated with the interests of civilians. Their objectives included the banning of all parties except the Communist party. This was despite the party's failure to remedy the disastrous state of the economy and resultant hardships.[109] More specifically, despite the coup leaders claiming that they were intervening to avert an economic catastrophe, the economy was stable immediately prior to the attempt and there was some optimism over

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[104] Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1648 gmt, 19 February 1995, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 22 February 1995, quoted in "Russian Officers' Assembly Warns Against "Barbaric Capitalism," Reuters, 22 February 1995.
[105] Baev, p26.
[106] Boris Yeltsin, "Armiya-eto nashi deti," *Syn otechestva* no. 1 (January 1991): n.p., quoted in Tsypkin, "Will the Military," p52.
[107] See Julia Wishnevsky, "Some Military Coups Are Better Than Others," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 30 July 1991, accessed 16 March 1998.
[108] With regard to this impact see Brian Killen, "Soviet Troop Movements Raised Military Coup Fears," Reuters, 15 September 1990.
[109] With regard to the goals of the coup leaders see Valery Rudnev, "Prosecutors Complete Coup Investigation," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 44, no.32 (September 9 1992): p18, quoted in Milnor-Beard, pp2-3.

long-term economic prospects.[110] A document held by the coup leaders that examined how to act during a coup also casts doubt on the desire to solve the Soviet Union's economic problems. It stated that immediately after seizing power they should introduce economic measures without regard of "economic integrity, the inflation rate, or other consequences."[111] The coup leaders had also ordered the printing of 300,000 arrest forms, indicating that they threatened the individual interests of many.[112] Indeed some of the coup leaders acknowledged that their claims of acting in the national interest were inaccurate. Yazov, referring to the manifest destiny claims made at the meeting of conspirators on the 17th of August, acknowledged that "we had no real aim at all."[113] Moreover, Kryuchkov accepted that he had "inflicted great harm on my Fatherland."[114]

To explain this lack of a manifest destiny it is first important to recognise that many personnel did not associate their service with the national interest, and disapproved of their domestic deployment regardless of its nature. Many personnel did not view their service in terms of serving the national interest, as is to be expected given their low morale and poor living conditions. In a 1993 survey of 'peacekeepers' in Tajikistan only 6 percent indicated that they were serving from a "Desire to Defend the Countries Of The CIS Against Penetration By Islamic Fundamentalism." This compares with 43 percent indicating that they did not wish to serve.[115] The following year, 35 percent of conscripts expressed a readiness to emigrate.[116] Indeed Grachev exclaimed, "A concept such as the constitutional duty to defend the state that was sacred for many generations has in effect turned into an empty sound."[117] These attitudes were encouraged by the belief that such tasks denied the military training time. A retired General in1994 said that "If you want to reform the army, don't send soldiers to pick potatoes, build roads or repair buildings" but rather "Give them a real challenge like intensive combat training."[118] The following year a *Red Star* Correspondent wrote, "Can one train a soldier to fight well if his "personal weapon" is a spade and the training area is the field of the nearest

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[110] See Moscow Home Service, 14 August 1991, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, n.d., quoted in "Economic Situation Unaltered In July," Reuters, 16 August 1991; and "Britain's Lamont Optimistic At Soviet Economic Prospects," Reuters, 12 August 1991.
[111] Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb*, p464.
[112] Ibid., p453.
[113] Ibid., p459.
[114] Robert Eksuzyan, "Russian Coup Leaders Defend Actions Four Years On," Reuters, 20 August 1995.
[115] *Armiya*, no.8, 1994, n.p., quoted in Orr, *The Russian Army And Peacekeeping*, p7.
[116] "Obshchestvo bolno bezdukhovnoctyu. Luchsee sredstvo ot etogo-patriotizm," *KZ*, 12 April 1994, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p174.
[117] Waters, *The New Russian Army*, p2.
[118] Deborah Seward, "Russia's Army Fights An Internal Battle Despite Political Influence, Forces Lack Money, Might," *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 3 July 1994, pA8.

collective farm?"[119] Likewise, officers were even reluctant to undertake domestic tasks that could have been associated with the national interest. In the Ball survey 88 percent of officers disapproved of their use in public works important to the national economy. This disapproval remained 27 percent even when the state faced a nuclear power-plant disaster (see table 28). More specifically, many officers recognised that a coup would not solve Russia's problems. Lebed commented that "It would be stupid to try to push aside our economic problems by

Table 28: The Opinion of Russian Officers on the Use of the Military

Officers were asked "Do you approve or disapprove of Russia's armed forces being called upon to help with":

1. Public works construction important to the national economy
2. Railroad construction and maintenance
3. Harvesting crops
4. Fight organized crime
5. Cleaning up oil spills
6. Nuclear power-plant accident
7. Natural disaster

Question Number	Disapprove (percentage)	Approve
1	88	12
2	85	14
3	82	17
4	60	38
5	52	46
6	27	72
7	3	97

For information on the survey see Table 16. Source: OMIR survey. Deborah Ball, Table 4, p206. Question 4 is from Table 3, p205.

bringing in the tanks."[120] Similarly, Mikhail Malei, Yeltsin's scientific adviser on the military-

[119] Dick, *A Bear*, p7.

[120] ITAR-TASS (world service), Moscow, in Russian 1328 gmt, 26 September 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 28 September 1998, quoted in "Lebed Rejects Possibility Of Military Coup," 28 September 1996.

industrial complex said that the complex did not want a coup because "There would be no winners."[121]

Finally, developments under the new regime reinforced fears among personnel that intervention would have a negative impact. The costs of intervention were shown by the 1993 revolt and were recognised by personnel. For instance, Grachev commented after the revolt that civil war had been possible.[122] The revolt is also important because it was possible to perceive the violence as threatening the national interest, and even personnel with positive views of the military's role in society were reluctant to intervene. Indeed Grachev had only announced in May 1993 that Russia needed a military which "will unite and revive Russia and society like we need the air to breath."[123]

External actors

I have found no evidence to suggest that the support of external actors for a coup would play an important role in motivating intervention. It is likely that at least some external actors would welcome a coup and express support for its leaders if they appeared to have more favourable policies. The presence of such actors is apparent from the support some expressed for the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. However I believe that the military was not dependent or close enough to an external actor to have any discernible influence on it. The military's relationship with the US is particularly relevant. This is because the US had the capacity to play a decisive role in a coup, and it had been historically involved in the staging of foreign coups and been an adversary of the Soviet Union. I shall examine this after outlining whether Russia was vulnerable to a foreign-sponsored coup. I conclude however that the US is very unlikely to have played a decisive role. This is because of the American support of the new regime, and the probable reluctance of Russian personnel to support or oppose a coup because of the US stance.

Overall, Russia was not a 'prime target' for a foreign-sponsored coup. The only factor that might have encouraged a foreign-sponsored coup was the new regime's tense relationship with external actors like Iraq. This, at least theoretically, made them potential supporters of a coup. However it was very unlikely that a foreign-sponsored coup would occur. This was

[121] Ralph Boulton, "Russia's Military Industry Seeks Its Own Way Out Of Disaster," Reuters, 28 January 1994.
[122] John Lepingwell, "Grachev On Elections," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 30 December 1993, accessed 17 June 1998.
[123] Fatigarov and Stasovskiy, "Mobilize the Combat and Life Experience of Afghan Veterans."

because the new regime was not dependent on foreign military aid or protection, which meant that the military was not susceptible to foreign influence. The military was not dependent on foreign weapons as the Russian military-industrial complex employed 30 million people in 1995.[124] The complex was able to produce a wide range of both conventional and nuclear weapons. Indeed Russia was one of the world's major suppliers of weapons, especially to the Third World. The military also was able to independently assess security threats, and was self-sufficient in terms of training and repair facilities. Moreover personnel, at least from the hierarchy, doubted the ability of foreigners to understand the military. Grachev responded to the Friedrich Ebert survey by stating that "the foreigners, the Germans, who carried out the survey must not be believed 100 percent."[125]

Russia did not have the characteristics of those states most prone to coups involving external actors. First, I do not believe that Russian society during this period can be accurately described as "relatively simple" with a "minimum of meaningful political participation and a maximum of political instability," as should become evident when I examine whether the military had the opportunity to intervene.[126] Second, the new regime realigned itself with other states despite the military's sympathy for its traditional allies. This was a potential coup grievance and theoretically could have made the military susceptible to the influence of actors 'out of favour.' However a coup was extremely unlikely given the military's self-sufficiency restricted the influence of external actors. Third, Russia was not involved in a war with an external actor that might have encouraged intervention on the grounds this would be more cost-effective than an invasion. Finally, Russia cannot be accurately classified as a state seeking to distance itself from a major power able and willing to support a coup.

The most important external actor, the US, is very unlikely to have played a pivotal role in the staging of a coup. There were accusations that the US would support a coup. Kryuchkov claimed before the 1991 coup that CIA agents were plotting a coup so that the democrats could seize power.[127] Such claims persisted under Yeltsin. In November 1994, Zhirinovsky claimed that "Western special services," sought to stage a "pseudo-coup" led by Lebed and

[124] Interfax, 7 July 1995, quoted in "Military Industrial Complex In Trouble," *Jamestown Monitor* 1, no.48, 10 July 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/048_018.htm, Internet, accessed 15 September 1998.
[125] Socor, "Military Opinion Survey."
[126] David, *Third World Coups d' Etat and International Security*, p145.
[127] See Yeltsin, *The View*, p55.

Gromov to establish a "liberal dictatorship."[128] Politicians like Zyuganov promoted anti-Western conspiracy theories too.[129] However it is very unlikely that the US would have sought or been able to inspire a coup. The US opposed the 1991 coup and the 1993 revolt.[130] This stance corresponded with the US goal of fostering democracy in the Soviet Union and Russia.[131] Nor is it likely that the US would have played a major role in shaping the Russian military's stance on a coup. The 1991 coup leaders held strong anti-Western views.[132] Similarly, potential coup leaders under Yeltsin were at least suspicious of the US.[133] Despite the decline of anti-West attitudes, distrust among personnel remained too. In survey findings published in 1995, 32 percent of officers believed that the US was an enemy.[134] Civilians were unlikely to support a US-sponsored coup either. This is important because of the military's reluctance to use violence against civilians. In a 1995 survey, 46 percent of civilians believed that the US had a completely or somewhat negative influence on Russia.[135]

Apart from the US, some external actors might actually have supported a coup but would have had minimal influence. Although the 1991 coup was widely condemned some actors supported it. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and Libyan leader Colonel Moamer al-Gaddafi both welcomed the coup.[136] The Palestinian Liberation Army also supported the coup.[137] Such support was encouraged by Gorbachev's foreign policies, as they realigned the Soviet Union

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[128] Interfax 12 November 1994, quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Foreign Plot With Domestic Accomplices Seen," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 14 November 1994, accessed 23 July 1998.

[129] See Evguenii Volk, "Who Are You, Comrade Zyuganov?" *F.Y.I.* no.108, The Heritage Foundation, 6 June 1996, available from http://www.cpac.org/heritage/library/categories/forpol/fyi108.html, Internet, accessed 13 June 1998, p4 of 8.

[130] With regard to the 1991 coup see Yeltsin, *The View*, pp92-3. With regard to the 1993 revolt see Suzanne Crow, "West Supports Use Of Force By Yeltsin," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 4 October 1993, accessed 15 July 1998; and Yeltsin, *The View*, p280.

[131] With regard to the US objectives as they related to the Russian military see McCarthy, pp761-5.

[132] With regard to the views of the coup leaders on the West see *The Independent*, 28 August 1991, p2, quoted in Peter Pringle, "Nuclear Control-Coup Leaders 'Gave Orders For Arms Tests To Warn West," Reuters, 28 August 1991; and *Den'* no.9., n.d., n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Military Officials Cry Betrayal," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 11 June 1991, accessed 15 September 1998. For Yazov's views of the US after the coup see *The Times*, 12 February 1992, n.p., quoted in Bruce Clark and Igor Baranovsky, "Coup Plotters Offer Verse And Vitriol," Reuters, 12 February 1992.

[133] With regard to Zhirinovsky see *The Financial Times*, 14 December 1993, p2, quoted in "The Russian Elections-How The Maverick Put His Case," Reuters, 14 December 1993; Rutskoi, see "Rutskoi Says Clinton Stance Disappointed Him," Reuters, 22 September 1993; Zyuganov, see Volk, pp4, 6; Lebed, see Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed," pp550-4; and Gromov, see *The Sunday Times*, 20 March 1994, n.p., quoted in Matthew Campbell, "Russian Defence Chiefs Blast NATO Partnership," Reuters, 20 March 1994, n.p.

[134] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, pp4-5.

[135] *US News and World Report* press release, 28 April 1995, quoted in "Russians See US as a "Negative" Influence on Russia," *Jamestown Monitor* 1, no.3, 3 May 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/003_003.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998.

[136] Lloyd's List, 20 August, p1, quoted in "Reaction of World Leaders to Soviet Coup," Reuters, 20 August 1991.

with the West. Similarly, Iraq hoped that the 1993 revolt would succeed.[138] However these actors did not have the power to have a decisive role, nor was the military dependent on them.

In summary, secondary factors are unlikely to have motivated intervention. Sectional interests derived from class, regional or ethnic affiliations were not strong enough to overcome the reluctance of personnel to intervene. Although some personnel believed that it was the military's manifest destiny to intervene in the national interest, their number was small and their claims questionable. Finally, the Russian military was not susceptible to external actors.

Mixed motives

The above work indicates that a mixture of potential coup motives was present during this period. This is to be expected given the size of the Russian military and the dramatic nature of the regime transition. Indicative of this is the 1991 coup. Here various motives, such as those derived from corporate and individual interests, encouraged intervention. Similarly, I have argued that these interests were violated by the new regime, and therefore remained potential coup grievances. I ultimately believe that a mixture of motives was present under the new regime, but this mixture was not strong enough to provide the disposition to stage a coup.

Conclusions

This chapter argues that personnel held potential coup grievances, but that the military did not have a strong interventionist disposition. I have reached this conclusion after assessing whether strong coup motives arose from the primary and secondary factors. The primary factors are grievances derived from the violation of corporate and individual self-interests that I argued in my theoretical framework are often influential. More specifically, grievances derived from violations of the military's autonomy, the presence of functional rivals, changes to the level of budgetary support, and individual grievances were examined. I then examined the less influential 'secondary' factors. Here class and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors were examined. Finally, I briefly assessed the presence of 'mixed motives.'

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[137] See *The Times*, 21 August 1991, n.p., quoted in Richard Beeston, "PLO Enthuses As 'Friend Of Israel' Falls From Power In Soviet Coup," Reuters, 21 August 1991.

[138] "Iraq Says "Russia's Saddam" Will Take Over," Reuters, 2 October 1993.

With regard to the primary factors, violations of the military's corporate interests occurred. The military's autonomy increased in some areas but remained restricted in others, encouraging resentment over the perceived interference in internal military matters. Therefore, Russia is not a clear case of the military's autonomy either increasing or decreasing with the transition but one where its impact varied. This casts doubt on not only the argument that a key factor behind the military's political quiescence was its greater autonomy, but also whether the violation of autonomy was serious enough to motivate intervention. Similarly, the military's monopoly was threatened by the growth of numerous armed forces not under the Ministry of Defence's jurisdiction. Although the new regime did not attempt to replace the military, the growth of such forces became a potential coup grievance. The expansion of non-Ministry of Defence forces stretched resources, deprived the military of resources, and led to conflict as the Ministry attempted to win control over these forces. It is also clear that the fall of budgetary support in real terms caused grievances derived from the fall in service conditions.

Apart from corporate interests, individual interests were violated. This violation is closely related to the military's corporate interests, given violations here impacted on the individual interests of personnel. The most direct threat to the individual interests of rank-and-file personnel was their deployment in combat without adequate preparation, thereby threatening their lives. Nevertheless, the new regime actively sought to limit grievances among senior officers through the use of positive incentives, particularly when their continued service and loyalty were deemed vital. This is shown by the continued service, and indeed promotion, of officers whose positions meant that they had much firepower under their control, were strategically placed, or who enjoyed much support among personnel. Therefore, individual grievances were less likely to have been held among an elite few. Accompanying such moves were those of a negative type. These were aimed at undermining the positions of dissident Generals through reducing their support and thereby discouraging insubordination. However negative incentives should not be over-emphasised, given the new regime's reluctance to act against popular officers and the minimal punishments often handed out.

Turning to the secondary factors, the class interest was not a major coup motive. Although the class origins of personnel could differ from those of civilian officials, these did not play a major role in determining their actions and attitudes. Nor did the class position of personnel in

monetary terms have a decisive impact on their actions or attitudes, as shown by their support of politicians regardless of their financial position. As with the class interest, loyalties derived from regional or ethnic affiliations were not strong enough to have an important role in motivating a coup. With regard to regional interests, the attachment of personnel to the regions where they were serving did increase. However, this attachment was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. This is shown by the reluctance of personnel to unite behind an opponent of the new regime, despite their service in the same region. Second, the ability of those personnel stationed in a particular region to address a regional grievance via a coup was doubtful, given the size and diversity of Russia made it very difficult to unite the military. Neither do I believe that an ethnic interest would motivate personnel to intervene. The perceived violation of the interests of the ethnic group most closely associated with the military was unlikely. This is because the military and new regime shared the same ethnicity and had similar opinions on the key issue of ethnicity: Russians in the 'near abroad.'

Likewise, although some personnel claimed that the manifest destiny of the military was to protect the national interest of Russia, this perception was not widely held by personnel and was very unlikely to motivate intervention. Although some personnel claimed that the military had the duty to intervene and protect the national interest, their claims were very questionable. Under the new regime, three factors played an important role in discouraging the perception. First, personnel showed little willingness to undertake domestic duties regardless of their nature. Second, they recognised that a coup would not solve Russia's problems. Third, the 1993 revolt reinforced fears among personnel that intervention could have a negative impact.

Finally, external actors would not have played an important role in motivating intervention. Though it is likely that some external actors would have supported a coup, the Russian military was not dependent or close enough to any external actor for it to have a discernible influence. The stance of the US is particularly important given its historic support of coups and its power. However, the US was very unlikely to have played a decisive role. This is because it was both very unlikely to support a coup, and Russians were very unlikely to abide by US wishes.

This chapter then indicates that a mixture of potential coup motives was present, but this mixture was not strong enough to provide a strong interventionist disposition. Hypothesis

two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is valid as various factors did impact on the military's disposition. These factors were corporate, individual, class, and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors. With regard to hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, the transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's disposition to intervene. The transition impacted upon both primary and secondary coup factors. However, primary factors were not violated drastically enough to motivate intervention. Nor would secondary factors and an external actor have played a major role in motivating intervention. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup. Although it did encourage discontent, this was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. Therefore, the validity of this hypothesis is questionable.

The following chapter examines whether the Russian military had the opportunity to intervene from 1992 to 1996 within the context of the level of regime attachment. I shall examine the level of public support for the new regime and how strong private associations were. This examination is undertaken within the context of the case study. I thus initially outline the level of attachment before the transition and then the impact of the transition.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S POLITICAL QUIESCENCE, 1992-1996

THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE

This chapter examines the level of civilian dependence on the military to assess whether the military had an opportunity to intervene. This opportunity was critical, as military personnel were very reluctant to risk civilian casualties. Although instability does not necessarily equate with the staging of a coup, the level of civilian dependence on the military influences the ease with which the military can seize power as the military's power grows relative to the regime. The domestic situation from 1985 to 1991 is first outlined to determine how the transition impacted on the situation and whether there was an "overt crisis," a "latent crisis," or a "power vacuum." I shall then assess the domestic situation from 1992 to 1996 to determine the level of civilian dependence. The opportunity to intervene under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin is studied separately because it differed significantly under the two leaders. Comparisons of civilian and military attitudes are made throughout this chapter to ascertain if their level of regime attachment differed. Similarly, comparisons are made with other states to put the situation and level of regime attachment into perspective.

After assessing the domestic situation under Gorbachev and then Yeltsin I shall attempt to explain the situation by examining the level of regime attachment. This is through using the questions Finer posed during his study of "political culture." First, "Does there exist a wide public approval of the procedures for transferring power, and a corresponding belief that no exercise of power in breach of these procedures is legitimate?" Second, "Does there exist a wide public recognition as to who or what constitutes the sovereign authority, and a corresponding belief that no other persons or centre of power is legitimate or duty-worthy?" Third, "Is the public proportionately large and well-mobilized into private associations? i.e. do we find cohesive churches, industrial associations and firms, labour unions, and political parties?"[1] These groups are examined separately because their size and capacity to mobilise people varied. Political parties require particular attention because of their close association with the new regime. Finally, for each group I shall assess their possible reaction to a coup, as

[1] Finer, pp87-8.

their strength would not hinder an intervention if they were willing to support one. Thus, the depth of commitment to the regime is often most important.

This chapter again examines hypothesis two, three, and four. I have already argued that hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is valid. With regard to hypothesis two and three, I have already examined their validity with regard to the capacity and disposition to intervene. I concluded that the military had neither the capacity nor the strong disposition to intervene. In this chapter I examine the validity of hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, and hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. These hypotheses are examined according to the factors that influence whether the military has the opportunity to intervene. Hence the level of regime attachment, the level of civilian dependence on the military, the domestic situation, and the military's popularity are assessed. Similarly, hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, is also examined within the context of the opportunity. Thus, I evaluate the impact of the transition on the opportunity and whether this would have facilitated a coup.

Civilian Dependence on the Military and the Domestic Situation: 1985-1991

Civilian dependence on the military increased during the transition. This increase occurred primarily because of the domestic situation as first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin became more dependent on the military to ensure internal security. Under Gorbachev, I believe that characteristics of an "overt crisis" arose. According to Finer, an "overt crisis" entails a:

> fragmentation of opinion into mutually hostile political movements of such pugnacity and power that the government is deprived of any coherent body of popular support, and to survive at all must turn to relying on overwhelming force: and this means relying on the armed forces. [2]

I believe that the Communist regime faced opposition that was, in Finer's terms, "willing and able to use violence," and during 1991 the regime's power was "equally matched" and then surpassed as republics renounced both Communism and the Soviet Union.[3] The military

[2] Ibid., p77.
[3] Ibid., p75.

withdrawal of support from Gorbachev in December 1991 also encouraged both his fall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Under Gorbachev the military's domestic security role increased because of the domestic situation. The Soviet Union was not involved in a major war after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989, but domestic upheaval forced the regime to deploy the military. Though open discontent had been rare before Gorbachev, in August 1989, 2 million people in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia protested together against Soviet rule. From January to March 1991 alone, over 1 million demonstrated in Moscow.[4] Likewise, whereas strikes were rare before 1985, half a million people participated in strikes at some 2,000 enterprises in 1991.[5] Bloody clashes occurred in the republics as their demands for independence grew. By 1991, of the 23 borders between the republics, only 3 were not contested and there were 75 border disputes.[6] To put this in perspective, the combined population of the 14 republics that increasingly demanded independence and broke away was over 139 million, much larger than the populations of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.[7] Demonstrations also grew, with a resultant increase in the loss of life. Whereas 24 died in Novocherkassk during 1962, apparently the bloodiest action by troops against Soviet demonstrators from 1953 to 1985, in three incidents alone from April 1989 to January 1991, 300 people were killed.[8] Indeed a February 1992 survey of Russians found that 70 percent believed "almost all" or "the majority" of people around them had "an irritable, malevolent or even hostile attitude to each other."[9] It was in this context that the military hierarchy's confidence in Gorbachev fell and it turned to Yeltsin and the CIS, making Gorbachev's position untenable. By December 1991 relations between Gorbachev and the military hierarchy were so poor that Shaposhnikov responded to Gorbachev's queries about talks between the republics and Yeltsin on a unified

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[4] Zvi Gitelman, "Nationality and Ethnicity in Russia and the Post-Soviet Republics," quoted in *Developments In Russian And Post-Soviet Politics*, third edition, ed. Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994), p242; and Sakwa, Appendix 1, pp380-1.

[5] Keith Bush, "The Disastrous Last Year of the USSR," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no.12, 20 March 1992, p41.

[6] George Church, "Into The Void," *Time*, 138, no.36, 9 September 1991, p22.

[7] *SSR v tsifrakh v 1989 godu* (Moscow: Fimansy i statistika, 1990), pp36, 38; and *USSR: Facts and Figures Annual* ed. Alan Pollard vol 15 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991), p504, both quoted in Sakwa, Table 1, p19. This figure is the 1989 population of the republics.

[8] Elizabeth Teague, "Novocherkassk Anniversary," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 29 May 1992, accessed 31 August 1998; and Barylski, *The Soldier*, p61.

[9] *Mir mnenuu i mneniya o mire* no.6 (1992), n.p., quoted in Matthew Wyman, "Russian Political Culture: Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys," *Journal of Communist Studies* 10, no.1 (March 1994): Table 31, p52. The survey interviewed 1,985 Russians.

military by informing him that he was tired of Gorbachev's indecisive leadership, and that Yeltsin could provide better leadership.[10]

Discontent was encouraged by a lack of regime attachment, as democracy became a viable alternative to Communism. Support for competitive elections was strong under Gorbachev. In December 1989, 87 percent of survey respondents throughout the Soviet Union believed that elections should involve several candidates.[11] The following year, 61.9 percent of Russians agreed that "competition between the Communist party and other parties will improve the way authorities work in the Soviet Union."[12] That year only 6 percent of Muscovites in another survey said that the Communist party should be able to govern without elections.[13] This support for democracy translated into the high voting turnout of registered voters during the 1991 Russian presidential elections. In Russia over 77.5 percent of eligible voters registered to vote, and 74.7 percent of registered voters voted.[14] This is comparable to the 1992 American presidential elections. In the US, 70.8 percent of eligible voters registered to vote and 78 percent of registered voters voted.[15] Moreover in May 1991, 51 percent of Russians compared to 64 percent of Americans believed that a democratic form of government should be relied on to solve the country's problems rather than a leader with a "strong hand."[16] More specifically, growing doubts over the military appear to have reduced support for military rule. From December 1989 to October 1991 the percentage of survey respondents who expressed no confidence in the military increased from 14 percent to 36 percent.[17] In contrast, the percentage of Americans with a "great deal" or "a lot" of confidence

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[10] Evgeny Shaposhnikov, *Vybor: Zapiski glavkomanduyushchego* (Moscow: Nezavisimoe Izdatel'stvo, 1993), pp127-8, quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p162.

[11] *Obshchestvennoe mnenie v tsifrakh*, no.7 (1990): n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 5, p41. The survey interviewed 2,096 people.

[12] James Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 7 ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, New York, London, M.E. Sharpe, 1995), Table 3.1, p68.

[13] Kent Tedin, "Popular Support For Competitive Elections In The Soviet Union," *Comparative Political Studies* 27, no.2 (July 1994): Table 1, p249.

[14] 'Soobshchenie tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi Komissii po vyboram Prezidenta RSFSR," *Izvestiya*, 20 June 1991, n.p.; *Pravda*, 20 June 1991, n.p. both quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.3, p390; and *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p92.

[15] Richard Scammon and Alice McGillivray, *America Votes* 20 (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1993), n.p., quoted in Congressional Quarterly Inc. *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections*, third edition (Washington DC; Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), p421.

[16] *The Pulse of Europe: A Survey of Political and Social Values and Attitudes* (Washington DC: Times Mirror Centre for the People and the Press, 1991), n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 9, p43.

[17] *Moscow News*, no no. March 1989, n.p.; *Moscow New* no no. August 1989, n.p.; *Moscow News* no no. December 1989, n.p.; *Moscow News* no no. March 1990, n.p.; *Moscow News*, no no. 3-10 June,. n.p.; *Izvestiia*, July 1990, n.p.; *Izvestiia*, 29 November 1990, n.p.; *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, October 1990, n.p.; *Nezavisimaia*

in the US military increased from 63 percent in 1989, to 69 percent in October 1991.[18] It was against this background that a 1990 survey of the Moscow oblast found that supporters of cancelling elections and introducing military dictatorship were one of the most disliked groups among Muscovites.[19]

The 1991 coup and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union illustrate the influence of the democratic alternative. Support for democracy relative to Communism is illustrated by the reluctance to support the coup where Communist leaders sought to re-introduce the one-party system. As with military personnel, most civilians did not actively support the coup. Throughout the Soviet Union 62 percent believed that the coup was illegal, and in Moscow the figure was 73 percent.[20] A 1992 survey found that only 1.5 percent of people participated in pro-coup demonstrations in the former Soviet Union and 0 percent in Moscow. However, 2.3 percent participated in anti-coup demonstrations nationwide and 7.5 percent in Moscow (see table 29). The survey also found that opposition was encouraged by support for democratic institutions and processes, particularly outside Leningrad and Moscow. [21]

Moves by republics to challenge the Communist regime's authority were encouraged by the view that democracy provided a viable alternative. This is shown by the greater support for democracy, relative to Russia, in republics that actively sought to win independence after years of subjection under Communism. In Lithuania, the republic that declared its independence in March 1990 and where 13 were killed by Soviet troops during nationalist demonstrations in January 1991, support for democracy was high, relative to Russia. Support for rapid political reform in Lithuania averaged 80.5 percent from 1990 to 1991, compared to 43 percent in Russia.[22] More specifically, in mid-1990, 55.0 percent of Lithuanians supported

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gazeta, December 1990, n.p.; and *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 24 January 1991, n.p., all quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, Table 10.1, p186.

[18] George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995*, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 1996), p70.

[19] James Gibson and Raymond Duch, "Political Intolerance In The USSR," *Comparative Political Studies* 26, no.3 (October 1993): Table 1, p299.

[20] VTsIOM, Data Express, 21 August 1991, p2, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, p17.

[21] Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values in the Former Soviet Union," *APSR* 91, no.3 (September 1997): Tables 2 and 3, pp678, 680.

[22] Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger, "Reassessing Mass Support For Political And Economic Change In The Former USSR," *APSR* 88, no.2 (June 1994): Table 4, p406.

Table 29: Protest Behaviour During the 1991 Coup

Respondents were asked whether during the coup did they-

1. Participate in demonstrations
2. Stay away from work
3. Sign a petition
4. Express views to political officials
5. Express views to the mass media
6. Distribute leaflets and letters

Activity	Former USSR		Moscow		Leningrad		Former USSR outside Moscow and Leningrad	
	Pro-coup	Anti-coup	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti
1	1.5	2.3	0.0	7.5	1.7	8.5	1.5	1.9
2	1.1	2.1	4.3	9.6	1.7	7.1	1.1	1.6
3	2.0	3.8	4.3	6.4	1.7	10.0	2.0	3.5
4	2.8	3.7	2.3	8.2	6.8	5.6	2.8	3.4
5	.9	1.3	2.1	.9	1.7	2.7	.8	1.3
6	.3	1.2	2.1	2.8	1.7	2.7	.2	1.0

This survey was conducted from February to March 1992 and is representative of the entire territory of the former USSR, as constituted in late 1991, except the Baltics. The survey involved 4,309 respondents. Source: Gibson, " Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991, American Political Science Review 91 no.3 (September 1997): Table 1, p67.

multiple political parties compared to 52.5 percent of Russians.[23] Furthermore, in other rebellious republics like Georgia and Estonia, support for competitive elections was higher than in the Soviet Union overall.[24] The apparent role that this support for democracy had in encouraging discontent contrasts the support of Communism and the Soviet Union among the 1991 coup leaders who sought to return power to the Communist party.

Apart from the emergence of a viable alternative, public recognition of the Communist party's authority fell, and people were increasingly willing to challenge the belief that no other person or centre of power was legitimate or duty-worthy. This decline is most generally shown by an increasing awareness that seeking redress from the party achieved little. Whereas from 1976 to 1981 the Central Committee received 3 million letters, by 1990 only 13,288 arrived.[25] Nor did a growing number of people feel the need to publicly support the party. This is illustrated by the fall in Communist party membership from 18.1 million in 1984 to some 15 million in August 1991.[26] This represents a 17.1 percent fall where membership among officers fell 8 percent from 1985 to July 1991.[27] Thus, civilian affiliations to the Communist party appear to have fallen more severely than among officers. This is to be expected given the indoctrination of personnel and the traditionally high level of support officers received from the party.

More specifically, the decline of the party's authority is shown in Russia by the move toward another centre of power, namely Yeltsin. Yeltsin left the Communist party in July 1990, and in March 1991 led a demonstration of 300,000 where he called for a "declaration of war against the Soviet leadership." Later that month he led another demonstration of 200,000 that encouraged Gorbachev to deploy troops in Moscow. [28] Such challenges to the party's authority were inconceivable before 1985, as people would have feared the negative repercussions of directly challenging the party. Yeltsin was then elected President of Russia in June 1991. This indicates that many civilians and military personnel shared similar opinions

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[23] Arthur Miller, "In Search of Regime Legitimacy," in *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies*, ed. Arthur Miller, William Reisinger and Vicki Hesli, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), Table 5.1, p101. The survey interviewed 702 Russians and 466 Lithuanians.

[24] *Obshchestvennoe mnenie v tsifrakh*, no.7 (1990): n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 5, p41.

[25] *XXVII s" ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otchet*, vol. I (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), p124; *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no.9, 1990, p31; *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no.9, 1990, p32; and *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no.7, 1991, p88, all quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, p201.

[26] Ian Derbyshire, *Politics In The Soviet Union From Brezhnev To Gorbachev* (Chambers Political Spotlights, Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd, 1987), p7; and Sakwa, p11.

[27] Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup," p28.

[28] Sakwa, Appendix 1, p381.

of Yeltsin, as many personnel voted for him.[29] That month a survey also found that 53 percent of civilians favoured this type of direct election. However only 17 percent supported the March 1990 election of Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union by the Congress of People's Deputies. [30] It was within this context that Yeltsin undermined the Communist party's control in Russia, and played a leading role in defeating the 1991 coup leaders. Other sources of power developed to rival the Communist party too, as republics sought to establish their own governments. In December 1991, 90.3 percent of the people in the Ukraine, 97 percent in the Trans-Dniester Moldavian republic, and 88 percent in the Gagauz republic voted for independence. [31]

Finally, domestic discontent was encouraged by the growing disillusionment in the Communist party. Survey figures published in 1975 indicated that 37 percent of Soviets were interested in extending their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. However, by 1992 only 15 percent had a positive view of the ideology.[32] Gorbachev's attempts to revitalise the economy were unsuccessful and the economy performed poorly, as did many other East European economies. According to Soviet data, the average level of Soviet GNP growth peaked from 1986 to 1991 at 2.5 percent before falling 17 percent in 1991.[33] By 1991, 65 percent of survey respondents said that Soviet rule entailed "shortages, queues and poverty," and for 28 percent it meant "powerlessness, constant insults and humiliation."[34] The same year, when Russians were asked to rate their 'life as a whole" on a scale of one (completely dissatisfied) to 7 (completely satisfied), the mean was 3.70. Thus, nearly 50 percent were dissatisfied.[35] In 1991, 12 percent of Americans had indicated that they were dissatisfied "with the way things

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[29] *The Guardian*, 15 June 1991, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "The Military Vote For Yeltsin," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 17 June 1991, accessed 18 March 1998.
[30] Yas' Valoshka, n.d., n.p., quoted in Kathy Mihalisko, "A President For, By, And Of The Apparat," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 11 June 1991, accessed 15 February 1999.
[31] Sakwa, Appendix 1, p383.
[32] *Sotsiologicheskie problemy obshchestvennogo mneniya I sredstv massovoi informatsii* ed. V.S. Korobeinikov (Moscow: ISI AN SSR, 1975), p103, quoted in Stephen White, "Political Socialization in the USSR: A Study in Failure?" *Studies in Comparative Communism* X, no.3 (Autumn 1977): p336; and Irina Boeva and Viacheslav Shironin, Russians between State and Market (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1992), pp30-1, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, Table 1.2, p19.
[33] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSR v 1985 godu* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1986); pp40, 420; *SSR v tsifrakh v 1990 godu* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p40; and Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, 1991, (no place of publication: no publisher, no date), pp62, 64, both quoted in Bush, "The Disastrous Last Year," p40.
[34] *Argumenty i fakti*, 1991, no.11, p6, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, pp14-5.
[35] David Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, "Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin," *Slavic Review* 56, no.4 (winter 1997): Table 1, p702.

are going" in their personal life.[36] Disillusionment was particularly high in republics where discontent was most violent. In 1990, 79.3 percent of Lithuanians said that they had a negative view of the Communist party compared with 46.4 percent of Russians.[37] Similarly, only 3.6 percent of Lithuanians in 1990 believed that government policies had helped the economy compared to 15 percent of Russians.[38]

In summary, I believe that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is most characteristic of an "overt crisis." This crisis arose because of widespread domestic discontent that included strong challenges to the Communist regime's authority and led to its fall. The lack of support for the Communist regime and the viable alternative provided by democracy were the primary factors behind this discontent. This domestic situation facilitated an increase in military influence and the 1991 coup.

Civilian Dependence on the Military and the Domestic Situation: 1992-1996

Under the new regime civilian dependence on the military remained. This is shown by the military's domestic security role. This role arose because of the domestic situation, as is illustrated by the new regime's dependence on the military during the parliamentary revolt and in Chechnya. As I have already described these in-depth I shall only outline them before examining the factors that contributed to the domestic situation. The lack of widespread support for democracy and dissatisfaction with developments under the new regime are most important here. I shall then argue that the level of discontent was not as serious as that under Gorbachev, the domestic situation thus more closely resembling a "latent" rather than "overt crisis." According to Finer, a "latent crisis" entails:

> A situation wherein a political or social minority rule in a way which the masses hate but which they are too weak to overthrow. Faced by a consensus of indifference or active hatred, often expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations, murders or *jacqueries*, the ruling oligarchy maintains itself by relying on the army, and, therefore, this [the army] becomes its master.[39]

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[36] George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1991*, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 1992), p29.

[37] Miller, "In Search of Regime Legitimacy," Table 5.1, in Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, *Public Opinion and Regime Change*, p100. The survey interviewed 702 Russians and 466 Lithuanians.

[38] John Willerton and Lee Sigelman, "Perestroika and the Public: Citizens' Views of the "Fruits" of Economic Reform," Table 9.1, quoted in Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, *Public Opinion and Regime Change*, p210. The survey interviewed 702 Russians and 466 Lithuanians.

[39] Finer, pp77-8.

The Russian case study had characteristics of a "latent crisis." This is because there were demonstrations and the new regime was dependent on the military in some instances, namely during the parliamentary revolt and the Chechnyan war. However I do not believe that Russia experienced an actual "latent crisis," as very few sought to overthrow the new regime and the military did not become the regime's "master." My argument that the domestic situation under the new regime cannot be accurately described as either an "overt" or "latent crisis" is supported by the comparisons I make to show that discontent in Russia often did not differ dramatically to other states. The lack of discontent serious enough to force the new regime to depend on the military is particularly important given personnel strongly opposed their domestic deployment.

Domestic discontent continued to ensure that the new regime was dependent on the military. Under Yeltsin there was an "active hatred" of the regime as demonstrations did occur. For instance, the 1993 May Day protest in Moscow was particularly violent.[40] Later that year the new regime was dependent on the military after protesters overwhelmed the police during the parliamentary revolt. Yeltsin acknowledged this dependence when he wrote that he had demanded the military act "to save Russia."[41]. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* reflected on the regime's dependence when it claimed that the military intervened, because "someone had to save people, the city and the state itself from chaos."[42] Two General Staff officers also said afterwards that "At present no one doubts that it is the army that controls the situation in the country," though I believe that this is an overstatement.[43] The invasion of Chechnya also illustrates the dependence on the military, as the new regime was forced to rely on the military to force the republic back into the Russian Federation after other means had failed. Indeed in January 1995 Gaidar claimed that the likelihood of a coup had increased because "War in young, unstable democracies decreases the power of civil institutions and increases the power of military institutions."[44]

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[40] See Serge Schmemann, "Foes Of Yeltsin Riot In Moscow; Dozens Injured," *NYT* Ondisc, 2 May 1993, Section 1, p1.
[41] Yeltsin, *The View*, p287.
[42] *The Independent*, 8 October 1993, p12, quoted in Andrew Higgins, "Why The Guards Decided To Fall Into Line," Reuters, 8 October 1993.
[43] "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, p40, quoted in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p337.
[44] Sloane, "Yeltsin's Critic."

A lack of widespread regime attachment helps to explain this discontent, as support for democracy fell. This is especially relevant, as support for democracy was an important motive for opponents of the 1991 coup in Leningrad and Moscow.[45] In September 1995 only 21 percent of Russians indicated that they had a positive attitude of democracy.[46] This was low compared to other countries. A survey of 17 states 5 months earlier found that on average 41.7 percent of people were satisfied with the "way democracy works in this country."[47] Support for elections was also limited. A 1993 survey of 8 East European states and former Soviet republics (hereafter referred to as the 1993 regional survey) found that 40 percent of Russians believed that there was no point voting, whereas the average for all the countries was 25.9 percent (see table 30). Voting also fell as 74.7 percent of registered voters voted in the 1991 Russian presidential elections but the turnout at the following Duma and presidential elections averaged 64.5 percent.[48] The 1993 regional survey found that 49 percent of Russians supported the "aim of introducing democracy in which parties compete for government." The average level of support for democracy for all the countries was 54.6 percent (see table 31). The following year, 43 percent agreed that "We do not need a Parliament and elections but a strong leader who can make decisions and put them into effect fast" compared to 40 percent who disagreed.[49] This indicates that support for democracy relative to authoritarianism was declining as disillusionment. In 1991, 51 percent of Russians had supported democracy rather than "a leader with a strong hand."[50] Both civilian and military surveys undertaken during this period suggest that there was no significant difference between civilian and military attitudes to an alternative authoritarian regime. In 1994, 43 percent of civilians sought strong leadership over democracy, and in a 1995 survey, 37 percent had supported rule by an "iron hand."[51]

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[45] Gibson, "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991," Table 3, p680.

[46] OMRI, no vol. or no., 26 September 1995, quoted in *Russia Election Watch* no.9, 1 October 1995, available from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/csia/sdi/Compendium/watch09.html, Internet, accessed 7 February 1999, p7 of 9.

[47] Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995*, p96. The countries surveyed were: Canada, the US, Iceland, Germany, Costa Rica, Thailand, Chile, France, Taiwan, Japan, Domican Republic, Spain, United Kingdom, India, Venezuela, Hungary, and Mexico.

[48] 'Soobshchenie tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi Komissii po vyboram Prezidenta RSFSR,' *Izvestiya*, 20 June 1991, n.p.; *Pravda*, 20 June 1991, n.p.; *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p1; *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel.noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1, no.12, 1994, p67; *OMRI Daily Digest* no.249 Part 1, 27 December 1995, n.p.; *OMRI Daily Digest* no.1 Part 1, 2 January 1996, n.p., ITAR-TASS, 22 December 1995; *Moscow News* no.51, 29 December 1995, p2; and *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 22 June 1996, n.p., all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.3-2.7, pp390-3. With regard to the second round of the 1996 elections see Sakwa, Appendix 2.7, p393.

[49] Richard Rose, "Getting By Without Government: Everyday Life in Russia," *Daedalus* 123, no.3 (Summer 1994): p57.

[50] *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 9, p43.

[51] OMRI, no vol. or no., 26 September 1995, quoted in *Russia Election Watch* no.9, 1 October 1995, p7.

Table 30: Attitudes of Voting in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993

Survey participants were asked whether "there is no point voting because the government can't make any difference."

Country	Agree with statement (percentage)	Disagree
Bulgaria	20	49
Estonia	27	39
Hungary	16	58
Lithuania	22	39
Poland	30	43
Romania	12	76
Russia	40	33
Ukraine	40	23

This survey was undertaken in the Summer of 1993, except in Hungary where the survey was carried out in early 1994. In Bulgaria 1932 were interviewed, in Estonia 2,285, Hungary 1,314, Lithuania, 2,000, Poland, 1,729, Romania, 1,621, Russia, 2,030, and the Ukraine, 2,537. Source: Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science*, 25, (October 1995): Table 4, p497.

Table 31: Attitudes of democracy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993

Survey participants were asked, "How do you feel about the *aim* of introducing democracy in [the respondent's country], in which parties compete for government? Are you a ... strong supporter, supporter, opponent, strong opponent, neither supporter nor opponent?"

Country	Number of respondents	Support (percentage)	Oppose
Bulgaria	1,924	56	21
Estonia	2,029	51	16
Hungary	1,310	54	13
Lithuania	2,000	57	18
Poland	1,729	49	12
Romania	1,620	81	10
Russia	2,026	49	21
Ukraine	2,537	40	20

For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 1, p489.

With regard to the military, in the 1995 Ball survey 36.9 percent of officers (though only 8.3 percent fully) agreed that "An 'iron hand' is needed to restore order in our country-not democracy" (see table 18).[52] This is not a significant difference and concurs with my arguments that civilian and military opinions did not differ greatly, and that most personnel and civilians sought strong leadership but within the democratic framework.

Support for democratic freedoms was limited too. In a 1992 survey, 51.4 percent of Russians believed that it was very important to protect the freedom of speech, 26.2 percent the freedom of association, and 64.4 percent the freedom of information.[53] This support was low relative to other countries. A 1988 survey of the European community found that on average 78.4 percent said that the freedom of speech should always be protected, 64.9 percent the freedom of association, and 85.1 percent the freedom of information.[54] Comparing the civilian attitudes to military attitudes, 15.4 percent of officers in the Ball survey believed that the freedom of the press to criticise the government was "fully useful," and another 11.9 percent believed that the citizen's freedom to criticise the government was "fully useful." On average, 19.2 percent of officers from 1992 to 1996 also believed that it was permissible to use the media to protect their rights and interests (see table 10). The figures suggest that civilians were more widely in favour of the freedom of speech and information relative to officers. This difference is perhaps indicative of resentment at the critical coverage the military received after 1985. However most officers believed that these rights were "fully useful" or "somewhat useful." Thus, the majority of both civilians and officers supported the freedom (see table 19).

Similarly, it is apparent that public recognition of the new regime's authority, and a corresponding belief that no other person or centre of power was legitimate or duty-worthy, was limited among some. In March 1992, 43 percent opposed the strengthening of the President's powers at the expense of "representative organs at all levels." [55] The willingness of people to support the parliamentary revolt also indicates some did not recognise the new regime's authority. The 1993 revolt threatened the new regime's authority and represented a competing centre of power, as Khasbulatov advocated a new form of Soviet power.

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[52] Ball and Gerber, Table 2, p164. With regard to military and civilian political opinions see chapter 5, p246.

[53] Gibson, "The Reliance of Mass Support," Table 3.2, pp72, 74. These figures relate to Russian panel respondents.

[54] James Gibson, Raymond Duch, and Kent Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union," *Journal of Politics* 54, no.2 (May 1992): Table 5, p346. The countries surveyed were France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.

Chechnyan rebels posed another challenge to the new regime's authority by supporting an independent government under Dudayev.

This lack of a widespread regime attachment was encouraged by disillusionment in the new regime, which was high relative to other states. The 1993 regional survey found that 21 percent of Russians believed that the government acted for the benefit of the majority in society, whereas the average for all the countries was 34.8 percent (see table 32). This survey indicates that disillusionment increased in some areas. For instance, 76 percent of Russians

Table 32: Attitudes of the government in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993

Survey participants were asked whether "the government acts for the benefit of the majority of society."

Country	In agreement (percentage)	In disagreement
Bulgaria	43	40
Estonia	31	59
Hungary	44	51
Lithuania	28	55
Poland	36	49
Romania	54	40
Russia	21	76
Ukraine	21	70

For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 4, p497.

believed that officials did not care compared, to the average of 71.8 percent for all the countries (see table 33), and by June 1995, 83 percent did not believe that the government cared about their fate. [56] These figures are higher than the 72 percent of Russians in May 1991 who believed that most elected officials did not "care about what people like me think." [57]

[55] *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 April 1992, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 12, p44.
[56] Ibid.; and "Moscow Does Not Care About People, Poll Suggests," *Jamestown Monitor*, 1 no.35, 20 June 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/035_007.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998; and *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 6, p42.
[57] *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 6, p42.

Likewise, many people believed that the transition had adversely impacted on them. In a 1994 nationwide survey, 68 percent believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a great

Table 33: Attitudes of Elected Officials in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993

Survey participants were asked whether "elected officials don't care much what people like me think."

Country	Agree (percentage)	Disagree
Bulgaria	71	7
Estonia	75	6
Hungary	61	11
Lithuania	63	11
Poland	80	6
Romania	70	9
Russia	76	7
Ukraine	78	6

For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 4, p497.

misfortune.[58] The opinion held by officers parallels this, as the 1995 Ball survey found that 73.6 percent believed the collapse was "catastrophic" (see table 15). A June 1996 survey that asked Russians whether they considered themselves winners or losers in the transition also found that only 13.7 percent identified themselves as winners.[59] In this survey only 9.9 percent said that the government very often or often "did what is right."[60] This pessimism is likely to have been encouraged by the new regime's serious mistakes, such as the disastrous invasion of Chechnya. As is to be expected, discontent was particularly high in Chechnya and reinforced the hostility felt toward Russians because of their historic repression of the republic.[61]

Various factors, especially economic conditions, encouraged disillusionment. As with other East European states, the Russian economy experienced many difficulties after the fall of

[58] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p4.
[59] Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, Table 3, p703.
[60] Ibid., Table 2, p702.

Communism. The Russian GDP fell by almost 50 percent from 1989 to 1994, and by 1995 it was reported that 45 million were living below the poverty line.[62] Conditions were particularly bad in republics like Chechnya where the new regime had ceased providing economic aid.[63] The number of registered unemployed also increased from 70,000 in February 1992 to 2.2 million, or 3 percent of the labour force, in December 1995.[64] Moreover the new regime often failed to pay wages promptly.[65] One 1995 survey found that 26 percent believed price and wage arrears might cause social unrest in their regions. This increased the following year to 40 percent.[66] The 1993 regional survey found that 63 percent of Russians said that their household living standards had declined over the last five years. On average 67.8 percent for all the countries believed this (see table 34). Thus, although Russians did not perceive that living standards had declined to the same extent as people in other countries, a majority perceived that such a decline had occurred. Most Russians blamed the government for these problems; in 1994, 73 percent blamed it for Russia's economic problems.[67] This influenced political attitudes. Supporters of the LDPR in 1993 and supporters of the Communist party in 1995 were more likely to have negative views of the economy relative to supporters of pro-government parties.[68]

Dissatisfaction over living conditions appears to have grown among civilians under the new regime with no major difference between civilians and officers. With regard to "life as a whole," on a scale of one (completely dissatisfied) to seven (completely satisfied) the mean was 3.70 in 1991. By 1996 the mean was 3.37. Likewise, satisfaction with the standard of living decreased from 3.01 to 2.92.[69] Thus, the majority of Russians were not satisfied with their lives. In comparison, the 1995 survey of 17 states found that on average 23 percent of

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[61] With regard to the disquiet of Chechnyans see Gall and Waal, pp6-8, 174, 196, 219-22, 235-7.
[62] *Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies* (World Bank), September-October 1995 and April 1997, n.p., quoted in Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, p700. With regard to poverty see Radio Mayak, 24 April 1995, quoted in Penny Morvant, "Goskomstat Says 45 Million Russians Below Poverty Line," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 25 April 1994, accessed 2 October 1998.
[63] See Gall and Waal, pp124-136.
[64] Biznes-TASS, 19 February 1992, quoted in Keith Bush, "Unemployment In Russia," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 20 February 1992, accessed 13 September 1998; and ITAR-TASS, 25 December 1995, quoted in Peter Rutland, "Latest Unemployment Figures," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 27 December 1995, accessed 13 September 1998.
[65] See *Segodnya*, 11 December 1996, quoted in Natalia Gurushina, "Wage Survey Published," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 13 December 1996, accessed 14 June 1998.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Rose, Table 5, p55.
[68] Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections," p607; and Richard Rose, Evgeny Tikhomirov, and William Mishler, "Understanding Multi-party Choice: The 1995 Duma Election," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no.5 (July 1997): Table 2, p808.
[69] Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, Table 1, p702.

Table 34: Attitudes of household living standards and expectations in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993

Survey participants were asked:
1. "Compared with five years ago, has your household's standard of living fallen a great deal, fallen a little, stayed the same, risen a little, or risen a lot?"
2. "Looking ahead over the next five years, do you think that your household's standard of living will fall a great deal from its current level, fall a little, stay about the same as it is now, rise a little, or rise a lot from its current level?"

Country	Respondents indicating a decline in the last 5 years (percentage)	Respondents expecting a decline in the next 5 years
Bulgaria	75	34
Estonia	68	19
Hungary	61	30
Lithuania	74	14
Poland	62	25
Romania	55	31
Russia	63	28
Ukraine	84	37

For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 3, p494.

people in all the states were not satisfied with "the way things are going" in their personal lives.[70] Both civilians and officers recognised that there were serious economic problems, but civilians, at least in 1995, may have been more inclined to view the situation in more negative terms. In February 1995, the greatest concern among civilians (83 percent of respondents) was inflation, and the third greatest concern was the economic crisis and fall in output (50 percent of respondents). Although parallel surveys could not be found, 92.8 percent of officers indicated in the Ball survey that the economy was "bad," but only 35.6 percent felt the economy was "very bad."[71] Similarly, many civilians and officers did not support the market economy. However the Ball survey suggests that officers were more likely to support the market economy, as 58.2 percent believed that it was "fully" or "somewhat useful," whereas

[70] Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995*, p95.
[71] Penny Morvant, "Russians Worried About Inflation," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 15 February 1995, accessed 30 August 1998; and Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p171.

38 percent of civilians supported the market economy in a 1995 survey.[72] This suggests that although officers faced many hardships, they still enjoyed some advantages and this might help to explain the greater political activism of civilians I discuss below. For instance, 13 percent of civilians in 1994 often or constantly had to go without medical treatment, only 10.5 percent of officers in 1995 believed their medical care was poor or very poor.[73]

I believe that the domestic situation had characteristics of a "latent crisis" but that it did not become this serious. Although there was "active hatred" expressed in sporadic demonstrations, very few sought to overthrow the regime and the military did not become its "master." When voters might have been able to restore Communism in the second round of presidential elections, 53.82 percent supported Yeltsin compared to 40.31 percent for Zyuganov.[74] People were also intolerant of groups liable to advocate violence. A 1992 survey found that supporters of a military dictatorship were among the most disliked groups.[75] Another survey from November to December 1992 found neo-fascists were the most disliked group and 88 percent wished to prevent them from demonstrating.[76] This intolerance is higher than many other states. A 1988 survey of the European Community found that on average 21.6 percent supported the right of fascists to hold public demonstrations.[77] Reflecting these views, 245 leading politicians signed the Civic Accord in April 1994 whereby they promised to refrain from using violence to pursue their political goals.[78] Civilian intolerance was comparable to that in the military as support for organisations that advocated the military play a major role in politics received limited support.[79]

The majority of Russians said that they would not challenge the new regime's authority. The percentage of people who said that they were willing to demonstrate remained low throughout this period. In 1993 when Russians were asked what forms of protest or political action they would take 68.7 percent replied "none at all." Only 7.8 percent were willing to take part in

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[72] Penny Morvant, "Russians Most Concerned About Inflation And Crime," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 3 April 1995, accessed 18 March 1998; and Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p171.
[73] Rose, Table 3, p51; and Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p171.
[74] Sakwa, Appendix 2.7, p394.
[75] Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support," p83.
[76] Donna Bahry, Cynthia Boaz, and Stacy Gordon, "Tolerance, Transition, And Support For Civil Liberties In Russia," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no.4 (August 1997): Table 1, p494.
[77] Gibson and Duch, Table 4, p303.
[78] ITAR-TASS, 5 May 1994, quoted in Vera Tolz, "Businessmen Sign Civic Accord," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 6 May 1994, accessed 30 October 1998.
[79] See chapter 5, pp198-9.

pickets or demonstrations and another 6.8 percent in strikes.[80] Although this figure had increased sharply by 1995 when 23 percent said they were willing to participate in protests and demonstrations, and the following year increased further to 26 percent, they remained a minority.[81] These figures suggest that political activism was lower than in other states. For instance, in July 1995, 42 percent of Poles did not disapprove of illegal demonstrations against civilian authorities and another 43 percent did not disapprove of illegal strikes.[82] These surveys also indicate that civilians were slightly more willing to protest relative to officers, at least after 1994. In the above 1995 and 1996 surveys on average 24.5 percent of civilians said that they would participate in protests and demonstrations. According to the CMSPLR survey of officers in 1995 and 1996, on average 22.5 percent believed that it was permissible to participate in the activities of organisations protecting their rights (see table 10). I believe this difference can be explained by the military's strong reluctance to intervene.

Most important however is the limited number who actually challenged the new regime's authority. It is difficult to argue that opposition to the new regime motivated the killings of politicians because deaths were generally attributed to criminals.[83] Few generally participated in demonstrations, far fewer than the number who said they would in surveys. This was a characteristic of both civilians and military personnel. During the 1993 May Day riots the number of protesters was estimated at only 2,000, and outside of the capital active protests were minimal.[84] Such demonstrations were limited relative to many of the protests under Gorbachev, and whereas strikes hit some 2,000 enterprises in 1991, the number was 264 in the tumultuous year of 1993.[85] Likewise, it was calculated in 1995 that the strike rate was only a tenth of the average for the 25 industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.[86] Even with the largest demonstrations the proportion of the

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[80] *Mir mnenii mneniya o mire* no.58 (1993): n.p., quoted in Stephen White, "Introduction: From Communism to Democracy," in White, Pravda, and Gitelman, p20.
[81] *Segodnya*, 11 December 1996, n.p. quoted in Gurushina.
[82] Jakub Karpinski, "Opinion Poll Shows What Poles Condemn," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 15 August 1995, accessed 18 March 1998.
[83] With regard to the murder of Parliamentarians see "Fourth Duma Deputy Murdered," *Jamestown Monitor* 1 no.141, 27 November 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/141_006.htm, Internet, accessed 20 October 1998. See also Alessandra Stanley, "Moscow Journal; Where Politicians Sometimes Tote Assault Rifles," *NYT* Ondisc, 10 May 1994, pA1. More generally see Victor Yasmann, "Contract murders on the rise in Russia," *Jamestown Prism* 1, no.15, 11 August 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/001/015_003.htm, Internet, accessed 20 October 1998, pp1-5 of 5.
[84] Schmemann, "Foes Of Yeltsin."
[85] Bush, "The Disastrous Last Year," p41; and *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 May 1994, p4, quoted in "Sharp Increase In Number Of Strikes During The First Quarter," Reuters, 2 June 1994.
[86] *The Financial Times*, 10 October 1995, p2, quoted in John Thornhill, "Russian Unions Struggle For Trust Of Workers," Reuters, 10 October 1995.

population actively involved was comparable to other countries. Nation-wide protests against wage arrears in late 1994 are estimated to have involved around 2 million people or 1.3 percent of the population. This was not significantly higher than the Paris demonstrations in January 1994 that involved 600,000 people, or 1.0 percent of the population.[87] Active support for the parliamentary revolt was also very limited, as I have argued was the case among personnel. The crowd that attempted to seize the Ostankino Television Tower numbered 40,000 (0.4 percent of the Moscow population), and those who broke through to the White House numbered 10,000 (0.1 percent).[88] This lack of support was evident to the military given its deployment, and was unlikely to encourage personnel to believe that another attempt to seize power would win widespread support. The death toll of some 146 also was not dramatically higher to that of the 1992 Los Angeles riots where 58 are estimated to have died.[89] The number injured during the riots also appears to be higher, as an estimated 4,000 were injured compared to an estimated 900 during the revolt.[90]

Nor did the Chechnyan war threaten the new regime's authority to the same degree as the threat posed to the Communist party by the break up of the Soviet Union. Though Finer wrote that an unpopular war might facilitate an "overt crisis," and the Chechnyan war is certainly likely to have contributed to long-term centrifugal pressures, the war did not lead to an "overt crisis." The challenge to the new regime's authority was essentially restricted to Chechnya rather than the violent challenges against Gorbachev that occurred throughout the Soviet Union. The Caucasian republics adopted an ambivalent position, the exception being Ingushetia which publicly condemned the war. Moreover rebel attacks outside Chechnya were limited, both in terms of their targets and their participants. The two largest rebel attacks were on towns close to the Chechnyan border and involved a total of some 300 fighters.[91] The number of casualties also needs to be placed in perspective. The estimated 58,000 to 59,000 killed is almost 10 percent lower than the number murdered in the US from 1993 to 1995.[92]

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[87] Reuters, in "Thousands Go Out On Strike," *St Petersburg Press* no.78, 1-8 November 1994, available from http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/sppress/78/thou.html, Internet, accessed 4 November 1998, p1 of 1; *Keesing's Record of World Events* (*KRWE*) 40, no.1, January 1994, p39831; and *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, pp45, 111.

[88] *The Financial Times*, 4 October 1993, n.p., quoted in "Suppression of Moscow Rebellion," *KRWE*, p39692. With regard to the White House crowd see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p11.

[89] "Los Angeles riots," *KRWE* 38, no.5, May 1992, p38894.

[90] "Red October," *Time*, 142, no.16, 18 October 1993, p27; and "Los Angeles riots," *KRWE*.

[91] Gall and Waal, pp257, 290.

[92] Ibid., p360. With regard to the US murder rate see the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, 1995* (no place of publication, no publisher, n.d.), n.p., all quoted in Information Please Almanac, *1998 Information Please Almanac* (Boston: Information Please Almanac, 1997), p854.

Likewise, many surveys suggest that most Russians did not fear domestic instability despite the magnitude of change. A survey in 1993, a particularly turbulent year, found that only 9.2 percent believed that they were living in a system of "chaos, anarchy, and rampant lawlessness."[93] Two years earlier 29 percent believed that the main result of 'perestroika' was the "chaos and disorganisation in government."[94] Nor did the majority express a great fear that Russia would fragment. A survey immediately after the Chechnyan invasion found that a quarter believed that it was very likely Russia would break-up.[95] Moreover though the number of people concerned about ethnic conflict increased with the war, they remained a minority. In July 1994, 16 percent were concerned about ethnic conflict; by early 1995 this had increased to 32 percent.[96] These results compare with 37 percent saying in 1991 that the main result of 'perestroika' was the "crisis of inter-ethnic relations."[97]

Russian fears often were comparable or even lower than those recorded in other states. The fears expressed in the above surveys did not surpass American concerns over militias; in April 1995, 63 percent of Americans believed militias posed "a threat to our way of life."[98] Indeed Russian fears of ethnic conflict in 1995 were slightly lower than American fears of millennium instability; in early 1999, 38 percent feared that when the year 2000 began "riots or other social unrest will occur."[99] Likewise, the 1995 survey that found 26 percent believed price and wage arrears might cause social unrest, increasing to 40 percent by 1996 needs to be put in perspective. The percentage of Russians who feared unrest in 1996 was only 6 percent above the average percentage of people from all 22 industrialised countries in a late 1986 survey who believed that strikes and industrial disputes would increase the following year. Indeed more people in Denmark, France, Greece, Belgium, and Switzerland believed that such unrest would occur.[100] Even when surveys did find that the majority feared instability

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[93] O.V. Kryshtanovskaya, *Politicheskie partii Rossii* (Moscow: unpublished manuscript) summarised in *Moskovskie novosti* December 1993, p9A, quoted in Stephen White, "Public opinion and political science in postcommunist Russia," *European Journal of Political Research* 27, no.4 (June 1995): p517.
White, "Public opinion and political science," p518.

[94] *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no.8, 1991, p14, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, p15.

[95] Morvant, "Russians Most Concerned About Inflation."

[96] Ibid.

[97] *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no.8, 1991, p14, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, p15.

[98] Jill Smolowe, "Enemies of The State," *Time*, no vol., no.18, 8 May 1995, p16. The survey interviewed 100 people.

[99] Richard Lacayo, "The End Of The World As We Know It?" *Time*, no vol., no.3, 18 January 1999, p48.

[100] The countries surveyed were: Denmark, France, Greece, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, Norway, United States, Ireland, Austria, Spain, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, West Germany, Portugal, Finland, Great Britain, and Sweden. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1987* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 1988), p4.

this could be comparable to other states. A 1994 survey found that 60 percent of Russians believed that "the shelling of Parliament could recur."[101] However 69 percent of Americans in September 1993 feared the prospect of "social unrest" after the retrial of the police officers who beat Rodney King.[102] Military and civilian concerns appear to have been similar. Whereas in 1994, 60 percent of civilians feared that the "the shelling of Parliament could recur," nearly two-thirds of middle and senior officers in 1994 believed that Russia was so unstable and economically weak that the military could not guarantee its security.[103] This military view of the domestic situation is likely to have been encouraged by their experiences attempting to maintain domestic security, and is unlikely to have encouraged a coup given the military's poor morale and lack of an interventionist mood.

In summary, I believe that the strength of domestic discontent against the new regime meant that, although the civilian leaders continued to depend on the military for internal security, domestic discontent was lower than during the 1985-1991 period. The strength of this discontent has characteristics of a "latent crisis," but I do not believe it was widespread enough to constitute a crisis according to Finer's typology. This discontent was encouraged by a lack of widespread regime attachment and the many negative developments that occurred under Yeltsin.

Explaining the domestic situation, 1992-1996

I shall now attempt to explain why the lack of a widespread attachment to the regime did not equate with discontent that seriously threatened its survival, or necessitate a degree of dependence on the military that facilitated its intervention. This is very important, as support for democracy was low relative to other states, but disillusionment was high. I believe that whereas under Gorbachev there was a viable alternative, namely democracy, few people had a viable alternative to the new regime. Therefore, although in absolute terms regime attachment was low, it was high relative to other regime types. Of particular relevance is the attitude toward military rule, given this directly influenced whether the military perceived that it had the opportunity to intervene, as personnel were reluctant to risk causing civilian casualties. Thus, even when more civilians supported strong leadership relative to democracy, the military would still have been reluctant to intervene. Having argued that the lack of a viable

[101] Rose, Table 4, p53.
[102] George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993*, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 1994), Appendix, p233.
[103] Brusstar and Jones, *Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps*, p1.

alternative was important, I shall then outline the concerns among people, such as over instability, that discouraged demonstrations. Finally, I shall argue that although living conditions were harsh the majority appears to have coped, and were not desperate for change.

Most importantly, many Russians recognised that there was no viable alternative to the new regime. Whereas under Gorbachev democracy was consistently more popular than Communism, thus providing a viable alternative, surveys indicate that under Yeltsin no regime provided such an alternative. In May 1993, although the largest number were pragmatic about the type of regime they wanted, democracy was the most popular specific regime with 63 percent in support (see table 35). A survey in December 1993 also found that only 16 percent believed "there is a better alternative" to democracy, and the following month only 11.0 percent of survey respondents believed that there was a "better alternative" to democracy.[104] The following year although 43 percent compared to 40 percent favoured a strong leader over democracy, only 23 percent supported a return to Communism.[105] By way of contrast, fully 27 percent of Americans in May 1991 supported a strong leader at the expense of democracy, only 16 percent less than Russians in 1994.[106] Indeed in July 1992, 27 percent of Russians had agreed that "the only way out of the current situation is a dictatorship"; the same percentage of Americans in the 1991 survey favoured a strong leader rather than democracy.[107] Even when surveys found that support for democracy was minimal, the majority did not support alternative regimes. In a 1995 survey only 21 percent said that they had a positive view of democracy, and rule by an "iron hand" was supported by 37 percent. Yet 49 percent opposed rule by an "iron hand" and a return to socialism was supported by 38 percent but opposed by 43 percent.[108] As Ball told me in December 1998, "Most Russians want a strong leader--in fact, most people probably do which is why we have leaders--but they do not want to forsake democracy."[109]

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[104] Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 5, p605. The survey interviewed 2,136 people. With regard to the January 1994 survey see Robert Grey, William Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, "The Structure of Russian political opinion," *Coexistence*, 32 (1995): Table 1, p190. The survey interviewed 1,032 people.
[105] Rose, pp56-7.
[106] *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 9, p43.
[107] *Moskovskie novosti* (33), 1992, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 13, p44
[108] OMRI, no vol. or no., 26 September 1995, quoted in *Russia Election Watch* no.9, 1 October 1995, p7.

Table 35: Russian Views of Political Systems 1993

Russians were asked: "What role in Russia's fate could the following play today?"
1. "the idea of strong unlimited state power"
2. "a return to the principles of socialism"
3. "consolidation of genuine democratic principles"
4. "calculation of what is the most useful, practical thing"
5. "flourishing of Russian nationalism"
6. "a rebirth of Orthodoxy"

Type of political system	Undoubtedly positive (percentage in agreement)	Mostly positive	Mostly negative	Undoubtedly negative	Can't say
Strong state power	23	21	27	8	21
Return to socialism	12	23	31	18	17
Genuine democracy	29	34	10	4	23
Pragmatism	77	17	2	0	4
Russian nationalism	6	15	26	32	21
Orthodoxy	23	38	3	22	14

This survey was undertaken in May 1993 and involved 1996 people. Source: Vox Populi poll of Russia, *Mir mnenii I mneniya o mire* 8, no.38, (May 1993): np., quoted in Wyman, Table 15, p45.

[109] Deborah Ball, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control Program, Livermore, California (dyball@llnl.gov). E-mail to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz).

I further believe that civilian support for strong leadership that could be provided by alternative regimes was not absolute but rather depended on variables. Although freedoms associated with democracy were not widely supported relative to other states, most Russians believed that the regime should be responsive to public opinion. In late 1993, only 11 percent believed that "Governments should ignore public opinion if they think it is wrong for the country."[110] Similarly, the level of support for strong leadership could depend on the domestic situation. A mid-1996 survey found that 42.6 percent supported the imposition of martial law if there was widespread political disorder. However support for martial law fell to 31.3 percent if such a law was to be permanent because of continuing unrest; only 11 percent opposed the restoration of the right to demonstrate once order was restored.[111] This further reduced the viability of an alternative regime, as most people appear not to have held serious fears over instability.

Nor was military rule a viable alternative. This is important given personnel were very reluctant to risk causing civilian casualties. Most generally, military politicians were not widely supported. This was evident to the military given the electoral performance of its candidates was poor. In the 1993 elections only 9 of the 27 active and semiretired personnel who ran for office in single member districts and on party lists were elected, and in 1995 this fell to 3 of the 123 personnel officially supported by the Ministry of Defence.[112] Even the 13 active and retired officers elected in districts during 1995 on average won only 27.3 percent of the vote.[113] Lebed's KRO also won only 4.31 percent of the vote in 1995, and he was a distant third in the first round of presidential elections with 14.52 percent.[114] As is to be expected, military personnel could be more sympathetic to military politicians relative to civilians, but the trend remained constant as neither they nor civilians united behind a military figure. In 1995, 4 percent of civilians supported Lebed as a presidential candidate compared to 11 percent of officers (see table 13). Similarly, on average 5 percent of Russians supported the KRO in a 1995 survey compared to 14.5 percent of military personnel.[115] The lack of widespread political support for the military is comparable to that evident under Gorbachev.

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28 December 1998.

[110] Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 5, p605.

[111] James Gibson, "The Struggle between Order and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 32, no.2 (July 1997): p278.

[112] Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp329-30; and Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p536.

[113] Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp541-2.

[114] Sakwa, pp392-3.

Although Yeltsin won the 1991 presidential elections in Russia with Colonel Rutskoi as his candidate for Vice-President, other military candidates failed to win widespread support. For instance, Colonel General Albert Makashov received only 3.7 percent of the vote, and Nikolai Ryzhkov won 16.8 percent despite having Gromov as his candidate for Vice-President.[116] Nor did personnel under Gorbachev unite behind military politicians. In areas with large numbers of military personnel the vote for Makashov averaged 10.8 percent, compared to his 3.7 percent support throughout Russia.[117]

Likewise, support for a military regime was minimal relative to the new regime. In a 1994 survey, only 11 percent supported army rule, compared to 40 percent for democracy.[118] A survey at the end of the year found that only 1 in 9 were prepared to have the military rule.[119] Another January 1996 survey of party supporters found few wanted the army to govern. The highest level of support for army rule was only 18 percent and was from supporters of the KRO, the party that failed to win widespread support in 1995. The average level of support for army rule was only 10.7 percent (see table 36). Although military support for the KRO was 9.5 percent higher than the average for all Russians, this should not be equated with a greater willingness to support army rule.[120] The figure includes MVD personnel and others in military related occupations. Neither did many civilians support the notion of a military figure governing. A survey from August to September 1993 found that Pinochet was the ideal political figure among only 1 percent of respondents.[121] The lack of support for a military regime was derived from the military's unpopularity. I have already examined the fall in public support for the military and the awareness of this among personnel, so I shall focus here on the political weaknesses the military was thought to suffer. Negative attitudes of the military were widespread, and would have encouraged few to believe that it either had the right to govern or could govern better than civilians. A survey undertaken in August 1996 found that only 15 percent of respondents believed that had the coup of 1991 been successful

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[115] White, Wyman, and Oates, Table 3, p786. Military personnel are defined as "military, MVD, procuracy." The survey had a total of 3,174 respondents.
[116] *KZ*, 20 June 1991, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p88.
[117] V. Urban, "Rossiya: vybor sdelan...,"*KZ*, 14 June 1991, p1; and T. Zamyatina, "Prezident RSFSR yudicheski izbran," *KZ*, 18 June 1991, p1, both quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," Table 1, p557.
[118] Rose, p56.
[119] Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: I," footnote 27, p254.
[120] White, Wyman, and Oates, Table 3, p786.
[121] I.M. Lkiamkin, "What Kind of Authoritarian Regime Is Possible in Russia Today?" *Russian Politics and Law* 32, no.6 (November/December 1994): p40.

Table 36: Russian Attitudes to Authoritarian Rule

People were asked which authoritarian form of government they most preferred.

Authoritarian alternative favoured	Communist party (percentage in support)	Liberal Democratic People's Party	Congress of Russian Communities	Women of Russia	Agrarian party of Russia	Party of Workers' Self-Government	Our Home is Russia	Yabloko	Russia's Democratic Choice
Return to Communist regime	78	45	32	31	26	23	19	12	12
Tough dictatorship	43	54	38	37	29	21	23	18	11
Army rule	14	15	18	10	8	12	9	5	6

This survey was carried out in January 1996 and involved 1,205 people. Source: Richard Rose, Eveny Tikhomirov, William Mishler, " Understanding Multi-party Choice: The 1995 Duma Election," Europe-Asia Studies 49 no.5 (July 1997): Table 3, p811.

their lives would have been better.[122] Furthermore, people were increasingly dismissive of the military's ability to seize power. Although 46 percent in mid-1992 believed that a coup was possible, in a February 1995 survey only 5 percent feared military dictatorship.[123] Nor is the military's political role during the transition likely to have won sympathy. In 1994 a poll found that only 21 percent supported the Duma's decision to grant an amnesty to the coup leaders, whereas 57 percent opposed the move.[124] Similarly, the military's actions during the 1993 revolt were unpopular, a March 1994 survey finding that only 6 percent supported the military.[125] Negative attitudes also arose when the military used 'scare tactics' and intimidation in its failed attempt to win support during the 1995 Volgograd local elections.[126]

Military personnel were attributed negative characteristics too. In February 1996, only 2 percent of Moscow and St Petersburg survey respondents said that the "intellectual potential" of the army leadership was superior to that of other armies, but 16 percent believed that it was inferior.[127] Generals seeking election were nicknamed "wedding generals," a term derived from a story in which a General is invited to a wedding, gets drunk, and then turns out to be an impostor.[128] At least some civilians also came to the same conclusion as personnel; military skill does not necessarily equate with political skill. Anatoly Sobchak, the St Petersburg Mayor, commented in October 1995 that "I do not think that generals can make good politicians. They usually know how to take power, but not what to do with it afterward. This is why countries that are governed by generals are usually in fact ruled by rogues."[129] Likewise, few people trusted military figures. This is important because whom people trusted influenced their vote.[130] Few civilians trusted senior officers; this is similar to the hostility among military personnel toward their superiors. In October 1994, only 0.5 percent of survey

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[122] Ibid.

[123] Teague, "Russian Poll." With regard to the 1995 survey see Morvant, "Russians Worried."

[124] See Justin Burke, "Marking Reform's Fragile Victory," *CSM*, 19 August 1992, available from http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/getasciiarchive?tape/92/aug/day19/19081, Internet, accessed 19 August 1998, p8. With regard to the 1994 survey see ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian 1431 gmt 19 August 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 21 August 1996, quoted in "Moscow Poll Shows Current Attitudes To August Coup Of 1991," Reuters, 21 August 1996. The survey interviewed over 1,000 people.

[125] Interfax, 28 April 1994, quoted in Julia Wishnevsky, "Polls Shows Steep Drop In Yeltsin's Popularity," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, accessed 18 March 1998.

[126] See Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp524-5.

[127] The Army Through Civilian Eyes," *Moscow News*, p4.

[128] Alan Cooperman, "Russia's Colin Powell?" *US News and World Report*, 10 September 1995, available from http://www.netaxs.com/~bluejack/lebed/pubs/misc/usnwp100995.html, Internet, accessed 30 August 1998, p1 of 3.

[129] David Hoffman, "Russian Lebed Roars Into Political Ring," *The Washington Post*, 21 October 1995, pA21.

respondents trusted Grachev, whereas 9.6 percent trusted Yeltsin, and the following month 72 percent believed that corruption accusations against Grachev were plausible.[131] Apart from Grachev, a December 1995 poll found that of the Generals running for the Duma, Lebed was the most trusted, but by only 30 percent.[132] Similarly, though a February 1996 survey found Lebed to be the most trusted General, he was only trusted by 20 percent in St Petersburg and 18 percent in Moscow. With regard to Gromov, in 1995, 15 percent said they trusted him and in 1996, 13 percent of St Petersburg residents and 17 percent in Moscow trusted him.[133] These figures indicate that officers were often less trusted than the regime. Some 21.2 percent of survey respondents from August to September 1993 had complete or substantial trust in the government.[134]

Even when more people supported strong leadership rather than democracy the military would have been discouraged from intervening. Survey results should be placed within the context of Russia's large population. The 1994 survey mentioned above that found only 40 percent supported democracy over a strong leader still meant that the military could face opposition from over 59 million people.[135] It would be a major task for a military that peaked under Yeltsin at 2,520,000 personnel, and by 1994 numbered 1,564,000, to subdue these people even if only a minority opposed a coup (see table 9). Even more importantly however, I have already argued that personnel were very reluctant to risk causing civilian casualties, and that they perceived their prestige had declined. Thus, the prospect of civilian opposition, regardless of the exact number, discouraged intervention.

Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, people feared instability could threaten their personal interests and this discouraged serious discontent. Many people were willing to support drastic measures to prevent serious instability, as is shown by my assessment of attitudes towards martial law. Support for Yeltsin rose in February and March 1996 when he stressed the threat that a civil war might result from a Communist victory in the forthcoming

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[130] See VTsIOM survey, December 1995, quoted in White, Wyman, and Oates, Table 6, p791.
[131] Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army," p431. With regard to the November survey see *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 17 November 1994, n.p., quoted in Shlapentokh, footnote 29, p435. For information on the view of senior officers among personnel see chapter 5, pp267-8.
[132] Peter Rutland, "Lebed Is The Most Popular General," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, 12 December 1995, Internet, accessed 27 May 1998. The survey interviewed 1,360 people.
[133] Rutland, "Lebed Is The Most Popular General"; and "The Army Through Civilian Eyes," *Moscow News*, p4. The survey interviewed 1,058 people in St Petersburg and 1016 people in Moscow.
[134] White, Figure 2, p518.
[135] *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, p111.

elections.[136] The influence of personal interests is apparent under Gorbachev too. James Gibson found that Moscow and Leningrad residents who perceived a higher degree of physical danger were more likely to oppose the 1991 coup, as they "felt it imperative to resist those creating the danger--the plotters."[137] This reflects the reluctance of personnel to support intervention under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin because they feared that a civil war could occur. Nor is the collapse of the Soviet Union after the 1991 coup likely to have encouraged support for another intervention given their fear of instability.

This unwillingness to risk personal interests was enhanced by the awareness that political activism might have negative repercussions. Participating in demonstrations could threaten personal interests, and this was shown by the use of military firepower against the parliamentary revolt, which also showed that the regime could successfully defeat direct challenges. That such fears discouraged activism is shown by the low turnout to 1993 commemorations of the 1917 revolution after Moscow and St Petersburg authorities banned demonstrations.[138] The influence of these fears would have been further enhanced by a feeling that political activism was not helpful. Only 24 percent of respondents in a 1995 survey believed that mass demonstrations would improve matters.[139]

Nor do I believe that many experienced living conditions harsh enough to demonstrate regardless of the lack of a viable alternative and the negative perceptions of unrest. Most importantly, at least some surveys indicate that many felt conditions were bearable despite widespread dissatisfaction. From 1992 to 1994 the percentage not "getting by" peaked at 29 percent before falling to 18 percent (see table 37). This is virtually the same as the figure in Great Britain.[140] The survey further found that in 1994 the majority were not deprived of necessities, and the proportion constantly without essentials is as low as in the US (see table 38).[141] Indeed one-quarter of households had cars and three-quarters had colour televisions. This is comparable to Western Europe in the 1960s.[142] Though homelessness by the late

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[136] Daniel Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): p66.
[137] Gibson, "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991," p677.
[138] ITAR-TASS, 7 November 1993, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "No Violence At October Revolution Anniversary Demonstrations," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 8 November 1993, accessed 31 October 1998.
[139] Morvant, "Russians Most Concerned." The survey interviewed 2,000 people.
[140] Rose, p49.
[141] Ibid., p51.
[142] Stephen Shenfield, *On The Threshold Of Disaster: The Socio-Economic Situation In Russia*, n.d., available from http://www.trud.org/index7-4.htm, Internet, accessed 7 February 1999, p6 of 15; and "Comparing Welfare

1990s reached between 1 to 2 million, this needs to be placed in perspective too. In the early 1990s between 1 and 3 million Americans were homeless.[143] Many Russians also had alternative sources of food and income. By 1996 at least 60 percent produced food from their land and these plots on average provided 20 percent of the income for urban families, and over 50 percent for provincial areas. Conditions were also eased by the state's continued provision of highly subsidised housing, and municipal services like heating. [144] In a 1995 survey only 8 percent claimed that they lived in poverty.[145]

Table 37: Russians "Getting By" Under the New Regime 1992-1994

Survey participants were asked whether they were "getting by" with one job or various jobs

Percentage who are getting by	1992	1993	1994
With one job	28	31	13
With a portfolio of activities	43	49	69
Total	71	80	82
Percentage not getting by	**29**	**20**	**18**

The 1992 survey was conducted from January to February 1992 and involved 2106 respondents with the 1993 survey being conducted from June to July 1993 and involving 1975 respondents. The 1994 survey involved 3535 respondents and was taken from March to April 1994. Source: Irina Boeva and Viachyslav Shironin, Russians Between State and market: The Generations Compared, Studies in Public Policy 205, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, 1992; Richard Rose, Irina Boeva, and Viachyslav Shironin, How Russians are Coping with Transition: New Russia Barometer II, Studies in Public Policy 216, and Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, New Russia Barometer III: The Results, Studies in Public Policy 228, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, 1993, 1994, all quoted in Rose, "Getting By Without Government," Table 2, p49

Across Time and Space," *Welfare in a Civil Society*, Annex II (Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, 1993), quoted in Rose, p50.

[143] James Patterson, "Wealth And Poverty," in *Encyclopedia of the United States In The Twentieth Century III*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Macmillan publishing company, 1996), p1085.

[144] Igor Birman, "Gloomy Prospects for the Russian Economy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no.5 (July 1996): p743; and Shenfield, pp6-7.

[145] See Russian TV, 24 October 1995, quoted in Penny Morvant, "Living Standards: Half Empty Or Half Full," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 25 October 1995, accessed 2 October 1995.

Table 38: Russian Household Living Conditions 1994

Russian Respondents were asked if their households had to do without the following:

Households that had to do without the following:	Never (percentage who go without)	Rarely	Often	Constantly
Heating	91	6	2	1
Food	43	35	21	1
Medical treatment	68	18	9	4
Clothing	22	37	34	7
Car gasoline	76	7	6	11
Household goods	18	34	35	13
Newspapers	35	21	19	24
Households repairs	29	22	23	26
Cinema, theatre	16	12	16	43

These figures are from the *New Russian Barometer, 1994*. For information on the survey see Table 37. Source: Rose, Table 3, p51

Finally, most people did not have high expectations that the new regime could not meet, but nor did they believe that the new regime could not, at least eventually, improve conditions. The absence of high expectations is important because it discouraged a 'revolutionary gap' from emerging where the new regime was unable to met expectations. The 1993 regional survey found that 28 percent of Russians believed that their living conditions would fall during the next 5 years, slightly higher than the 27.2 percent average for all the countries (see

table 34). By July 1995, 40 percent of survey respondents believed that the economy would worsen in the next 2 to 3 years, compared to 20 percent who expected an improvement.[146] This suggests that officers were slightly more optimistic about the economy, as in the 1995 Ball survey 26.9 percent believed that the economy would improve the following year.[147] However few believed that the situation would never improve, this being likely to discourage people from believing that drastic action against the new regime was their only hope. In 1994 only 18 percent said that they would never be satisfied with the economic system, and 12 percent with the political system.[148]

In summary, I believe that the domestic situation under the new regime had characteristics of a "latent crisis." However the situation cannot be accurately defined as a "latent crisis." This is because the masses did not seek to overthrow the regime, and the military did not become its "master." This is primarily because there was no viable alternative, there was concern that challenging the new regime could threaten personal interests, and the majority appears to have coped with living conditions. Finally, there were no high expectations that the new regime could not meet, and most believed that at least in the long term conditions would improve. Therefore, I do not believe that the domestic situation provided the military an opportunity to intervene.

Civilian Participation in Private Associations

I shall now outline the extent to which the general public was politically mobilised. This entails an examination of political parties and groups, the church, industrial associations, and labour unions. To assess their strength I shall focus on their resources and their ability to mobilise people. I shall first focus on the strength of political parties, as they are most important in determining the level of regime attachment. Following this, I shall examine the strength of labour unions because their strikes and demonstrations could pose an obstacle to a coup. The strength of industrial associations and the church is finally examined. The Orthodox Church is the focus because it was the strongest church in both the Soviet Union and Russia in terms of its resources and followers. Apart from assessing their strength, I shall briefly assess the potential response of each to a coup, as Finer makes a questionable assumption when he assumes that the stronger the organisation the less opportunity the

[146] *The Financial Times*, 29 September 1995, n.p., quoted in *Russia Election Watch*, p6.
[147] Ball and Gerber, p171.

military has to intervene. This is primarily because organisations, regardless of their strength, might actually support a coup if their depth of attachment to the regime is weak.

Political parties

During the transition many political parties developed. Although parties were not very strong, at least some evidence indicates that their strength was comparable to parties in other states. As I have already argued that support for the Communist party declined during the transition, I shall focus on the development of rival parties. I shall first argue that although the level of attachment to parties was weak, it was comparable to other states and occasionally higher. This is shown by the extent of electoral support for parties, by party affiliation, and by attitudes toward the parties. With regard to explaining the strength of parties, four factors are most important and I shall next examine these. First, the diversity of Russia and the political system did not facilitate the development of strong parties. Second, there was an overall lack of interest in politics. Third, many people held negative perceptions of the parties. Fourth, parties often were unable to campaign well or to maintain cohesion. Finally, I shall argue that few parties were likely to have supported intervention, because it was not in their interests.

During the transition many political parties and organisations developed that challenged the authority of the Communist party. Before the transition rival political parties had not been tolerated and attempts to establish parties were opposed. This was in line with Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution stipulating that the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the Communist party."[149] However the greater freedoms permitted under Gorbachev allowed the development of voluntary groups. In February 1988, there were an estimated 30,000 groups; within a year they numbered 60,000.[150] To put this in perspective, there were 2,000 general associations operating at the national level in Poland by April 1989.[151] Various political parties developed along with these groups with the abolition of Article 6 in March 1990. In October 1990 political parties were placed on a legal footing. Thus, by late 1990 there were at

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[148] *New Russian Barometer III*, quoted in Rose, Table 6, p58.

[149] David Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR* (London: Martin Robertson and Co Ltd, 1978), Appendix C/2, p555.

[150] *Pravda*, 5 February 1988, n.p.; and *Pravda*, 10 February 1989, n.p., both quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, p143.

[151] M. Dehnel-Szyc and J. Stachura, *Gry Polityczne* (Warsaw: Volumen, 1991), p15, quoted in Paul Lewis, "Poland's New Parties in the Post-communist Political System," p33, in *Party Formation In East-Central Europe: Post-Communist Politics in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria*, Studies of Communism in Transition, ed. Gordon Wightman (Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1995), p33.

least 457 political or politicised organisations, and by early 1991 some 100 could be recognised as parties.[152] A May 1991 survey found that 56 percent of Russians were interested in "following politics in my local community" compared with 45 percent of Americans.[153] Therefore, the Communist party's monopoly over power was increasingly threatened. This growth of parties followed a similar trend in the region. For instance, 66 parties were registered in Czechoslovakia in 1990, 65 in Hungary the same year, over 100 in Poland in 1991, and around 50 in Bulgaria at the end of 1989.[154]

After the collapse of Communism, political parties and organisations continued to develop. As the new regime permitted the development of a multi-party system and competitive elections, parties became closely associated with the new regime because they facilitated political representation. Thus, as parties developed it became more difficult to seize power through force, particularly as most parties were likely to oppose intervention. The majority of Russians supported the multi-party system. A 1992 survey found that 55.1 percent did not believe that the abolishment of parties would make the system of government "work better," compared to 50.3 percent of Ukrainians. [155] In late 1993, only 25 percent agreed that "there should be a one-party system/no parties at all."[156] In line with this the number of parties increased. In February 1992, 38 political organisations had been registered.[157] However by April 1996, there were 40,544 registered political parties and public organisations. The Justice Minister claimed that of these, 2,846 organisations and 85 parties could have a decisive impact on politics.[158] These public organisations included groups like the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers that campaigned for greater military openness and better service conditions.[159] The presence of such groups and their opposition to the military was recognised

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[152] V.N. Berezovskii et al, *Partii, assotsiatsii, soyuzy, kluby: spravochnik* vol. 1, no.1 (Moscow: RAU Press, 1991), p3; and Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Slovar'oppozitsii: novye politicheskie partii i organizatsii Rossii, Analiticheskie vestniki informatsionnogo agenstva Postfactum*, no.4/5 (April 1991): n.p., both quoted in Sawka, p79.

[153] *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 2, p40.

[154] *New Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* ed. Bogdan Szajkowski (London: Longman, 1991), pp59, 133; and no author, *Partie Polityczne w Polsce* (warsaw: Polska Agencja Informacjna, 1991), np, both quoted in Gordon Wightman, "Conclusions," in Wightman, p240; and John Bell, "Bulgaria," in *Developments in East European Politics* ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul Lewis, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993), p87.

[155] Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support," Table 3.1, pp66-7.

[156] Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 5, p605.

[157] *Narodnyi deputat*, no.8, 1992, p96, quoted in Sakwa, p79.

[158] "More News From Russia," Worldwide Media Relations, n.d., available from http://www.west.net/~wwmr/russia2.htm, Internet, accessed 9 September 1998, p1 of 7. For more information on the development of parties during the final years of Communist rule and under the new regime see Sakwa, pp77-100.

[159] See Vallance, "Shaping Society's Demands."

by officers. Indeed the Leningrad MD Commander called the head of the Soldiers' Mothers Organisation of St. Petersburg his "enemy."[160] Many of the parties successfully competed in electoral politics. In 1993, 12 parties and political blocs won seats in the elections, and 14 won seats in 1995.[161] This was similar to the 1992 Czech and Slovak federal assembly elections where 12 parties won seats, and more than the 1993 Polish parliamentary elections where 7 parties and coalitions won seats.[162]

Despite support for the multi-party system and the growth of parties, many were unable to mobilise supporters. The 1993 regional survey found that 13.3 percent of Russians supported a party compared to the average of 30.7 percent for all the countries (see table 39). However by early 1994, 23 percent of Russians supported a party and this indicates that more Russians supported parties than Estonians, Poles, and Ukrainians in 1993.[163] Surveys suggest that civilians were more likely to become active supporters of parties relative to personnel. This is because a 1993 survey of military cadets found that 12 percent followed the opinions of a particular socio-political movement or party; this had fallen to 8 percent by 1994.[164] This I believe was encouraged by the military's general reluctance to play an active role in politics. Nor did civilians, like personnel, unite behind a single party. The LDPR and Communist parties were the most successful parties, but their combined electoral support reached 35.32 percent in 1993 and 33.48 percent in 1995.[165] Support for an individual party peaked in 1993, with 22.92 percent voting for the LDPR.[166] This is slightly higher than in the 1993 Polish parliamentary elections where the most popular party won 20.41 percent of the vote, but much lower than states like Moldavia.[167] Here the Democratic Agrarian party won 43.18 percent in the 1994 parliamentary elections.[168]

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[160] "Soldiers'Mothers lead the way," *St Petersburg Press*, no day or month, 1996, n.p., available from http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/sppress/149/sm.html, Internet, accessed 1 September 1998, p1 of 4.
[161] Sakwa, Appendix 2.5 and 2.6, pp391-2.
[162] Gordon Wightman, "The Development of the Party System and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia," in Wightman, Table 4.3, p70; and Stanislaw Gebethner, "Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland," in *Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe*, Studies of Communism in Transition ed Paul Lewis (Cheltenham, Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1996), Table 6.1, p127.
[163] Rose, Table 4, p53; and Evans and Whitefield, Table 5, p500.
[164] Chernavin, p738.
[165] Sakwa, Appendix 2.5 and 2.6, pp391-2.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Gebethner, in Lewis, Table 6.1, p127.
[168] *Electorala '94: Document si Cifre* (Chisinau: no publisher, 1994), n.p., quoted in Willian Crowther, "The politics of democratisation in postcommunist Moldova," in *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Democratization and Authoritarianism in Postcommunist Societies: 3,

Table 39: Party Affiliation in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993

Survey participants were asked: "Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any particular party?"

Country	Respondents indicating party supporters (percentage)
Bulgaria	45.1
Estonia	17.6
Hungary	39.8
Lithuania	49.6
Poland	22.5
Romania	42.7
Russia	13.3
Ukraine	14.6

For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 5, p500.

Another indicator of party strength is membership. The majority of Russians did not belong to parties. Whereas under Gorbachev the largest non-Communist party in Russia was the Democratic Party of Russia with around 50,000 members, the largest party other than the Communist party under Yeltsin was the LDPR with about 80,000 in 1995.[169] The Communist party was the largest party with 550,000 members in 1995 (0.37 percent of the population).[170] This compares with 190,000 Poles (0.49 percent of the population) belonging to the Polish Peasant party, the largest Polish party in 1995, and compares with the National party, the largest New Zealand party, with 40,000 members in 1996 (1.12 percent of the population).[171] Thus, although fewer Russians belonged to parties their membership often did not differ widely from other states. Similarly, by 1994, 3 percent of Russian adults belonged to parties,

ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), in Dawisha and Parrott, Table 7.14, p312.

[169] Michael Urban, *The Rebirth of Politics in Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chapter 9, n.p., quoted in Michael Urban and Vladimir Gel'man, "The development of political parties in Russia," in Dawisha and Parrott, p182; and M. Fish, "The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the December 1995 Parliamentary Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no.2 (March 1997): p202.

[170] Sakwa, p88; and *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, p113.

[171] Gebethner, in Lewis, Table 6.2, p130; *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, p92; Richard Mulgan, *Politics In New Zealand*, second edition, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p249; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p192.

movements, and associations.[172] To put this in perspective, around 4 percent of people in the Czech Republic belonged to parties in 1993, and 2 percent of Hungarians.[173]

The failures of the political system and the weaknesses of parties discouraged widespread support. Most basically, the size and diversity of Russia made it difficult to produce policies of mass appeal. Neither did the political system encourage strong parties. The absence of an election until December 1993 meant that during the first two years after Communism there was little incentive to organise strong parties. Nor did the establishment of a party-list system for the election of half the Parliamentarians to the Duma make it easy to establish strong parties. The 1995 electoral rules allowed only 12 Moscow politicians on the party list, encouraging those lower down to establish their own parties.[174] Many parties exacerbated the situation by their poor campaigning and their lack of cohesion. The unimaginative campaigns run by the liberal parties in the lead up to the 1995 election illustrate a lack of campaigning skills.[175] Nor did the lack of talent and assistance provided by politicians to their supporters help. For example, many of the most able democrats entered the bureaucracy, and Yeltsin showed little interest in consolidating a 'party of power' around him, placing greater emphasis on his own team of advisers.[176] Similarly, the Communist Party's presidential campaign was poorly organised with the party providing inadequate support to its activists.[177] Many parties like the LDPR also lacked cohesion. In 1994 alone its Chief of Staff left after fighting with Zhirinovsky, and six members announced later that year they were establishing a separate Duma faction. Disunity was facilitated by many of the Duma deputies elected on party lists not belonging to the parties they officially represented, and the increased importance of parliamentary factions comprised of various parties.[178]

Further problems were caused by negative opinions of parties, though these were not restricted to Russia. This helps to explain the lack of major differences in the level of party support relative to other states. A common complaint was that parties complicated matters. A 1992 survey found that only 15.9 percent disagreed with the statement that "political parties

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[172] *Obshchaya gazeta* no.4 (1994): p8, quoted in Sakwa, p94.
[173] Ales Kroipa and Tomas Kostelecky, "Party Organization and Structure at National and Local Level in the Czech Republic Since 1989," in Lewis, pp112-3; and Bill Lomax, "The Structure and Organization of Hungary's Political Parties," in Lewis, p23.
[174] Sakwa, p92.
[175] Fish, pp201-8.
[176] Sakwa, pp91-2, 94.
[177] See Boris Kagarlitsky, "Russia Chooses-and Loses," *Current History* 95, no.603 (October 1996): p309.
[178] Sakwa, pp92-3.

complicate questions more than they help clear them up." This is essentially the same as in the Ukraine where 17.1 percent did not believe parties complicated questions.[179] Many Russians also questioned the motives of politicians. At the end of 1992, a survey found that 52.3 percent of Russians believed that all the new parties had been "founded by people that are greedy for power."[180] This appears to be slightly more positive than in the Ukraine, where 60 percent in a 1994 survey believed that Communists and Socialists were primarily seeking to satisfy "personal ambitions."[181] Another Russian survey in late 1993 and early 1994 found that on average only 30.5 percent disagreed with the statement that "no party represents the interests and views of people like me."[182] This though was better than the 6 percent in the Ukraine who believed that parties provided support for people.[183]

Nor would parties have been helped by widespread political apathy. Interest in politics had been high under Gorbachev as people for the first time enjoyed greater political freedom. In May 1991, 61 percent of Russians said that they were interested in local politics compared to 45 percent in the US, and 48 percent in the United Kingdom.[184] However apathy grew as disillusionment in the new regime grew. A survey in late 1993 and early 1994 found that on average only 32 percent were very or quite interested in politics.[185] Indeed Yeltsin admitted in November 1994 that popular interest in politics had declined.[186] Similarly, in January 1996, 35 percent of survey respondents expressed an interest in politics.[187] After the presidential elections, 32 percent of those who voted for Yeltsin were "indifferent" to his victory.[188] This apathy appears to have been even higher than in nations like the US. In May 1991, 50 percent of Americans said they were not "generally bored with what goes on in Washington." [189]

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[179] Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support," Table 3.1, p67.
[180] O.V. Kryshtanovskaya, *Politicheskie partii Rossii* (Moscow: unpublished manuscript) summarised in *Moskovskie novosti* December 1993, p9A, quoted in Stephen White, "Public opinion and political science in postcommunist Russia," *European Journal of Political Research* 27, no.4 (June 1995): p517.
[181] "A Political Portrait of Ukraine: Results of a Public Opinion Survey of Citizens in the South and East of Ukraine," (Democratic Initiatives Centre, Kiev, May-June 1994), p6, quoted in Zenovia Sochor, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Elections in Ukraine 1994," in Vladimir Tismaneanu, p214.
[182] Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 4, p603.
[183] Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine between pro-democracy and "soft" authoritarianism," in Dawisha and Parrott, p355.
[184] *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 2, p40.
[185] Wyman, White, and Heywood, Table 2, p597.
[186] "Steven Erlinger, "Dire Warnings For Parliament On State Of Russian Army," *NYT* Ondisc, 19 November 1994, p7.
[187] Michael Kramer, "The People Choose," *Time*, no vol., no.22 27 May 1996, p48. The survey interviewed 2,426 Russians.
[188] *Kommersant-Daily*, 29 August 1996, n.p., quoted in Laura Belin, "Poll Shows One-Third Of Yeltsin Voters Indifferent To His Victory," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 29 August 1996, accessed 18 March 1998.
[189] *The Pulse of Europe*, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 2, p40.

Finally, I believe that the main political parties are not likely to have supported a coup. This is very important because it further indicates their close association with the new regime and the obstacle to a coup they posed. The reluctance of Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov, the leaders of the two most popular parties, to support a coup already suggests this. However in addition, 'Russia's Choice,' the second most popular party in the 1993 elections, and 'Our Home is Russia,' the third most popular party in 1995, were closely associated with Yeltsin and also unlikely to support intervention. Nor were party supporters likely to support military rule (see table 36). Apart from the lack of a viable alternative and the negative perceptions of the military, this stance would have been encouraged by the potentially negative consequences of a coup. Leaders willing to use force to seize power are unlikely to have foreseen an important and independent policy-making role for parties. For instance, the 1991 coup leaders intended to ban all parties except for the Communist party.[190]

Labour unions

Many independent labour unions developed during the transition. Union membership was high and they were able to mobilise many workers. I shall first outline the growth of labour unions during the transition before assessing their strength. In numerical terms labour unions were very strong and this mass membership allowed them to mobilise large numbers of workers. The historic role of unions, the benefits of membership, and the support they received relative to other groups would have encouraged this mass membership. Finally, I shall argue that most unions are likely to have opposed intervention. Apart from the lack of a viable alternative and negative perceptions of the military, a coup threatened their interests, such as their independence.

Numerous independent unions developed under the new regime. Under Communism membership of labour unions was theoretically voluntary, but in 1972, 97.5 percent of the employed were union members in 25 unions.[191] This no doubt was encouraged by their administration of the social welfare system. However unions were not independent and their tasks included promoting a "high political consciousness" and combating "anti-social tendencies."[192] It is difficult to ascertain the level of attachment to unions because

[190] See Rudnev, p18, quoted in Milnor-Beard, p3.
[191] I. Smirnov, *Profsoyuzy SSR. Sto voprosov, sto otvetov* (Moscow: no publisher, 1972), p196, quoted in Lane, *Politics and Society* p305.
[192] Ustav professional'nykh soyuzov SSR," in *Spravochnik profsoyuznogo rabotnika* (Moscow: no publisher, 1968), n.p., quoted in Lane, *Politics and Society*, pp308-9.

independent unions were not allowed. This changed with the transition as greater freedom was allowed and Gorbachev sought to mobilise support for his reforms. The first independent workers' organisations developed during 1987. In March 1990 the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the largest grouping of unions with affiliated members representing 82.8 percent of the labour force, was established.[193] Unions in other post-Communist states enjoyed high membership rates too. The National Association of Hungarian Independent Unions claimed that 70 percent of workers were members.[194] In October 1990 unions were placed on a legal footing and the Independent Miners' Union was established that same month. Workers also became increasingly militant and challenged the Communist regime's authority, thereby contributing to the "overt crisis." For example, the nation-wide strike of the mining industry in July 1989 by a total of some 500,000 workers forced Gorbachev to make major concessions. The miners were encouraged to rebel by their disillusionment with Communist labour unions they felt were not promoting their interests. Consequently they organised their own workers' committees.[195]

Under the new regime, unions continued to enjoy mass membership and remained capable of mobilising large numbers of people. In 1995 it was calculated that 87.5 percent of enterprises had functioning unions, and 75 percent of the work force belonged to unions.[196] This was a decline of 22.5 percent since 1972, but was still very high compared to many Western states. In 1995, 14.9 percent of the American civilian labour force belonged to unions.[197] Though strikes were limited relative to the Gorbachev period and to other countries, unions could mobilise large numbers and that could contribute to the discontent the new regime faced. Statistics supplied by the FNPR (and thus likely to over-estimate participation) indicate that in October 1994 over 8 million people participated in a nation-wide protest action.[198] This represented 11.4 percent of the labour force.[199] The following year another strike by coal

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[193] *Kto est' chto* 2, 1993, p219, quoted in Sakwa, pp263-4.
[194] Martin Myant and Michael Waller, "Parties and Trade Unions in Eastern Europe: The Shifting Distribution of Political and Economic Power," in *Parties, Trade Unions and Society in East-Central Europe*, ed. Michael Waller and Martin Myant, (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1994), p173.
[195] David Lane, *Soviet Society under Perestroika*, completely revised edition (London: Routledge, 1992), pp178-9.
[196] *The Financial Times*, 10 October 1995, p2, quoted in John Thornhill, "Russian Unions Struggle For Trust Of Workers," Reuters, 10 October 1995.
[197] Europa Publications, *Regional Surveys of the World: The USA And Canada 1998*, third edition (London: Europa publications, 1998), p247.
[198] RIA News Agency, Moscow, in English, 1953 gmt, 28 October 1994, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 31 October 1994, quoted in "Trade Union Nationwide Rallies-National Protest Action In Russia A Success," Reuters, 31 October 1994.
[199] Harry Kelber, "Help Russian Workers Get Their Back Wages," *NYT* Ondisc, 4 November 1994, pA34.

workers closed 215 of Russia's 235 mines.[200] Similarly, strike action by coal miners in early 1996 involved nearly 75 percent of Russia's coal concerns.[201] These actions were important as coal was vital to many industries and provided heat for 60 percent of homes. [202] The new regime was thus forced to compromise with the strikers. This victory contrasts the defeat of the British miner's strike from 1984 to 1985 by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. No military demonstrations come close to rivalling these strikes and they further indicate that personnel were much more reluctant to become active in protests compared to civilians.

The strength of unions reflects their historic role and the working conditions. Unions had traditionally played a major role under Communism and administered the social welfare system until late 1993, whereas in nations like the US employers actively sought to reduce their power. Although most people were able to overcome harsh living conditions, workers who were particularly militant faced more pressing challenges. For instance, the ability to mobilise miners was facilitated by the new regime's moves to close many of the inefficient mines, thereby threatening workers with mass unemployment. In addition, although many Russians had negative perceptions of unions, and this helps to explain the decline of union membership, they were relatively well supported. Even though in 1995 only 16 percent of union members trusted their leaders to look after their interests, this was higher than the 9.6 percent of civilians who trusted Yeltsin in late 1994.[203] Likewise, although on average only 17.9 percent of party supporters trusted unions in January 1996, this was higher than the 15.8 percent of people who trusted the courts, police, and civil servants.[204] Union support was also high relative to other countries. In 1994, 36 percent of Russians said that they distrusted unions. [205] However that year, 43 percent of Americans had a low or very low opinion of the honesty and ethnical standards of union leaders.[206]

Despite their demonstrations against the new regime, unions were likely to oppose intervention. Unions like the Russian Independent Trade Union of Coal Miners opposed the

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[200] Alessandra Stanley, "Russian Miners Strike, Defying Yeltsin," *NYT* Ondisc, 2 February 1996, pA3.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid.
[203] Thornhill; and Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army," p431.
[204] *New Russia Barometer V*, (no place of publication: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1996), n.p., quoted in Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler, Appendix, quoted in Rose, Tikhomirov, Mishler, Table 3, p811. The survey involved 1,205 people.
[205] G. Rogova, "Stanovlenie podlinnogo profsoyuznogo dvizeniya v Rossii," *MEMO* no.2, 1994, p47, quoted in Sakwa, p265.
[206] Gallup, George. *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1994*. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 1995, p155.

1991 coup, the FNPR and General Confederation of Trade Unions ultimately supported Yeltsin during the 1993 revolt, and few union sympathisers supported army rule. This is shown by a 1995 survey that found the parties most supported by people who trusted unions were the Communist, KRO, and Agrarian parties. Of these party supporters, only 13.3 percent on average wanted army rule.[207] Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, and other factors I mentioned when I explained why people were reluctant to challenge the new regime, intervention could have had negative repercussions for unions. For instance, the 1991 coup leaders sought to ban strikes. Contrasting this, the new regime actively sought to work with unions. This is shown by the partnership of the new regime and the FNPR being formalised in January 1992. Also, the regime often compromised with workers. For example, after the October 1994 protest, moves were made to pay back wages. Finally, it is clear that the new regime would retaliate if union members supported direct challenges to its authority. This is evident during the aftermath of the parliamentary revolt, when Yeltsin removed the right of unions to administer the social security system after the FNPR Chairperson's initial support for the revolt.

Industrial associations and firms

Many industrial associations and firms developed with the transition as the Communist party's control over the economy declined. I shall first outline their development before assessing their strength under the new regime. To assess their strength I shall examine their resources and political influence, which I believe indicate that major associations and firms were strong. Of particular interest here is their ability to mobilise their own security forces, as they could play a key role in determining the level of opposition that the military could face if it were to intervene. After examining their strength, I shall argue that economic reforms and their 'courting' of politicians facilitated their growth. Finally, I shall argue that associations and firms even within the military-industrial complex (MIC) are not likely to have supported intervention, as a coup had the potential to have an adverse effect on their interests.

Many industrial associations and firms enjoyed little autonomy and power before Gorbachev. Under the Communist regime "production associations" were emphasised from the mid-1970s whereby business enterprises were merged into groups according to their location and line of

[207] *New Russian barometer V*, in Rose, Tikhomirov, Mishler, Table 3, p811. The survey involved 1,205 people.

products.[208] These associations enjoyed some autonomy and industrial managers could influence economic policy. However though managers might have controlled the process of production they had little power over its proceeds; and the economy was state controlled.[209] It is difficult to ascertain the level of attachment to these associations, but it is apparent that a large black market existed that included networks of private firms circumventing state control.[210] This suggests that many firms did not support Communist regulations.

The decline of the Communist regime's control over the economy after 1985 and Gorbachev's willingness to institutionalise contact with industrial associations facilitated their growth. In 1991, alone some 80,000 companies were created and associations developed to represent firms both for and against free-market reforms.[211] One of the first groups to represent free-market entrepreneurs was the Association of Joint Ventures formed in 1988. The Union of Associated Cooperatives began the first coordinated national lobbying effort to promote their interests the following year. This indicates that associations and firms increasingly resembled those in the West that lobbied policy-makers. Associations and firms also developed that opposed free-market reforms. By September 1991, over 1500 large state enterprises belonged to the anti-reform Scientific-Industrial Union.[212] Members of such groups were elected to the Congress in 1989 and to republic parliaments and local Soviets in 1990. More specifically, associations like the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs promoted MIC interests. The right of associations to attend sessions of the Council of Ministers, its presidium, and other government bodies in July 1990 indicates their growing strength. Later that year a Council of Managers of State Enterprises, Associations, and Organisations was established, and in October 1991 a Council of Entrepreneurship attached to the President's office was created. [213]

Under the new regime industrial associations and firms remained active. The 'Most' financial group illustrates the immense strength that businesses could achieve. The group was able to effectively mobilise its resources so as to have diverse business interests, ranging from the

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[208] Donald Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction*, second edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1982), p174.
[209] See Lane, *Politics and Society*, pp247-8, 297-302.
[210] For information on the black market see Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1976), pp108-32.
[211] "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1991 godu," *Ekonomika i zhizn* no.4, (1992): pp4-5, quoted in Sakwa, p244.
[212] White, Gill, and Slider, p167.
[213] See Ibid., pp164-77.

financial and construction sectors to mass media organisations. The group was able to mobilise well-equipped security forces that in Moscow alone might have numbered over

2,500 personnel, making it more powerful in military terms than associations under Gorbachev.[214] Individual firms had similarly well-equipped forces. Indeed Gazprom, a large oil company, had a 20,000 strong 'Security Service' headed by a former KGB and State Tax Service official.[215] Firms also exercised political influence because of their vast resources. For example, the new regime made concessions to MIC lobbyists that ensured it continued to receive large subsidies. This influence was recognised by personnel. A Ministry of Defence employee in March 1995 wrote, "the Army needs its own people in parliament just like the agrarians and Gazprom, the banks, and the others."[216] Businessmen also enjoyed greater popular support than other groups. In 1993, 9.2 percent of Russians associated their hopes with the business community compared to just over 3 percent with politicians.[217] That year, 23 percent of Americans expressed "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in "big business" compared to 19 percent in Congress.[218] This suggests that both Russians and Americans were more supportive of businesses than politicians. A 1994 survey also found that businessmen were one of the groups least blamed for Russia's economic problems, 38 percent blaming businessmen compared to 73 percent blaming the government and 64 percent Yeltsin.[219] Finally, 'Our Home is Russia,' the party led by Chernomyrdin, the head of Gazprom from 1989 to 1992, won 10.13 percent of the vote in 1995 and became the third largest party in the Duma. Likewise, the first vice-chairperson of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists also competed in the 1995 elections. His party 'Forward Russia' became the ninth largest party in the Duma by winning 1.94 percent of the vote. [220]

The growth of associations and firms was facilitated by the economic reforms that reduced state control of the economy, by their 'courting' of politicians, and by their resources. Business resources increased as speculative dealers exploited their insider knowledge to purchase the best shares. They were helped by the ineffectiveness of anti-monopoly

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[214] "A selection of Russia's security forces," *JIR* 9, no.2 (February 1997): p54.
[215] IISS, *Strategic Comments*. "Heirs to the KGB." 3, no.2, March 1997, p1.
[216] Vladimir Ermolin, "Kto i kak golosuyet v Gosdume," *KZ*, 3 March 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p338.
[217] Kryshtanovskaya, p9A, quoted in White, pp517-8.
[218] Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995*, p73.
[219] Rose, Table 5, p55.
[220] Sakwa, Appendix 2, Table 2.6, p392.

legislation.[221] Associations and firms were also able to amass large fortunes without paying taxes. In April 1995 the Labour Ministry estimated that 40 percent of incomes were not taxed.[222] Many businessmen also 'courted' politicians. The 'Most' group was closely associated with Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and several associations endorsed Yeltsin prior to the 1996 elections. Other business interests were closely associated with the new regime. This is best illustrated by Chernomyrdin's position as Prime Minister. Finally, the appeal of industrial associations and firms among the population is likely to have been encouraged by them owning much of the media.

Evidence indicates that few associations and firms would have supported intervention. Vladimir Tikhonov, the President of the Union of United Co-operatives, actively opposed the 1991 coup. [223] Nor were all MIC plants behind the coup, plant leaders in Novosibirsk condemning the action. Likewise, in the 1993 election, managers were most supportive of Russia's Choice, the party closely associated with Yeltsin, and the pro-reform Yabloko party.[224] The following year over 100 businessmen and bankers signed the Civic Accord and Mikhail Malei, Yeltsin's scientific adviser on the MIC, said the complex did not want a coup.[225] Businesses also addressed grievances within the law. For instance, when the Enisei Chemical Combine lost 112.3 billion rubles because of reforms, its response was to sue the regime.[226]

The potentially negative consequences of a coup encouraged this opposition. A coup could reduce consumer and investor confidence as uncertainty spread. This threat was very serious as the volume of investment in Russia fell in 1995 by 15 percent.[227] Another potential threat was to the provision of economic aid. For example, in 1991 Western aid was suspended. Controls on the economy could also be established that violated business interests. Tikhonov's opposition to the 1991 coup was encouraged by the need to protect private enterprises. Indeed Malei explained the MIC's reluctance to support a coup by commenting

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[221] See Ibid., p243.
[222] Penny Morvant, "Officials Say 40% Of Income Hidden From Tax Inspectors," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 20 April 1998, accessed 12 September 1998.
[223] *Coup in the Soviet Union Day 2 20 August 1991: A Minute-By-Minute Chronology*, no publisher, n.d., available from http://artnet.net/~upstart/20aug.html, Internet, accessed 12 September 1998, p9 of 11.
[224] Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 3, p599.
[225] Ralph Boulton, "Russia's Military Industry Seeks Its Own Way Out Of Disaster," Reuters, 28 January 1994.
[226] Interfax, 15 November 1994, quoted in Doug Clarke, "Defense Enterprise Director Sues Government," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 18 November 1994, accessed 8 October 1998.
[227] ITAR-TASS, 2 November 1995, quoted in Natalia Gurushina, "The Volume Of Investment In The Economy Drops By 15%," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 6 November 1995, accessed 14 September 1998.

that "There would be no winners."[228] Apart from these fears, the new regime sought to satisfy business interests. The MIC illustrates this. Although it was hit by cuts in defence expenditure, the regime's concessions won support. The new regime provided large subsidies, publicly endorsed the MIC, and promoted weapon exports.[229] Thus, an MIC spokesperson in early 1993 exclaimed, "Thank God there are currently people among the powers that be" who understood the complex.[230] In 1996 MIC leaders endorsed Yeltsin.

Church

The strength of the Russian Orthodox Church, the most powerful church in Russia, increased with the transition as the greater freedom allowed it to expand. I shall first outline the growth of the church under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as its worshippers increased and parishes expanded, before examining the factors that facilitated this growth. I believe that a key factor is the ideological void left by the fall of Communism as people sought to find another belief system, particularly given the uncertainties of the period. The church also became closely associated with national self-identification, given its guardianship of Russian traditions. However active participation in the church was discouraged by the difficult nature of the religion and the various problems the church experienced. Finally, I shall argue that the church was likely to oppose an intervention, as a coup violated its religious teachings and its interests.

The strength of the Orthodox Church increased with the transition, as people returned to the church after Communist restrictions were lifted. Under the Communist regime, religion was closely associated with class, and moves were made to reduce its influence. For example, church property was nationalised and campaigns against religion were undertaken. However in the 1970s, an estimated 25 percent of Russians still were committed to a religious organisation or faith.[231] More specifically, the Orthodox Church was closely associated with the Tsar and thus many of its churches were closed. From 1953 through to the late 1980s there

[228] Boulton, "Russia's Military Industry."
[229] With regard to the subsidies see Stephen Blank, "Reform and Revolution In Russian Defense Economics," *JSMS*, 8, no.4 (December 1995): pp694-5. More generally, see Stanislav Lunev, "The Surprising Vitality of the Russian Defense Industry," *Jamestown Prism* 2, no.13, 1 July 1996, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/002/013_006.htm, Internet, accessed 15 September 1998, pp1-6 of 6.
[230] *KZ*, 6 March 1993, n.p., carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 19 March 1993, quoted in "Russian Defence Industry Spokesman Criticizes Absence Of Conversion Policy," Reuters, 19 March 1993.
[231] N. Struve, Les Chretiens en URSS (Paris: no publisher, 1963), p341, quoted in Lane, *Politics and Society*, p462.

were 7,500 Orthodox churches open.[232] To put this in perspective Greece, another predominantly Orthodox country, had twice as many churches for a population of less than 9 million. However with the transition, the church was able to operate more freely. In 1988 the Orthodox Church celebrated the millennium of Christianity in Russia and from 1989 to 1991, over 6,000 churches reopened.[233] A 1991 survey also found that almost 1 out of 3 Russians said that they were affiliated with the Orthodox Church, despite only 1 out of 10 having been raised in the church.[234]

Under the new regime the Orthodox Church continued to grow. By the 1990s the Russian electorate, like most of Western Europe, had largely become secular, with a quarter identifying themselves as atheists.[235] This is comparable to the US where a 1992 survey found that 18.5 percent were non-religious.[236] In a 1992 survey, 47 percent of Russians said that they were Orthodox believers, and by 1994 the church had an estimated 60 million believers. This suggests that the number of Orthodox believers was similar to the number of Americans belonging to the Roman Catholic Church in 1995, but greater than in Germany where almost three-quarters said that they did not even have formal church ties.[237] In Moscow alone the number of parishes increased from 50 in 1990, to 200 by 1994, and that year an estimated 30 percent of Russians under 25 years old moved from atheism to a belief in God.[238] Though active participation in church affairs was limited, the number of worshippers was large. In 1992 one-tenth of survey respondents said that they regularly attended church and other surveys found that 9 percent went to church as often as once a month.[239] This was low compared to the US, where 59 percent of people in September 1992 said that they went to

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[232] Michael Bourdeaux, *Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p30, quoted in Nicolai Petro, *The Rebirth Of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation Of Political Culture* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), p72.

[233] Serge Schmemann, "The World: An Awakened Church Finds Russia Searching For Its Soul," *NYT* Ondisc, 26 April 1992, section 4, p3.

[234] Peter Steinfels, "Atheism Is Said To Fade In Russia," *NYT* Ondisc, 10 December 1993, pA14. The survey interviewed 2,964 Russians.

[235] Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1997), Table C2, n.p., quoted in Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler, p804.

[236] *National Survey of Religion and Politics 1992* (no place of publication: University of Akron Survey Research Center, no date of publication), n.p., quoted in Hull, p40.

[237] *The Guardian*, 14 June 1994, p17, quoted in James Meek, "Russia's Christian Soldiers Belie Weakness Of The Church," Reuters, 14 June 1994; Alessandra Stanley, "From Repression To Respect, Russian Church In Comeback," *NYT* Ondisc, 3 October 1994, pA1; *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches* (no place of publication: no publisher, n.d.), n.p., quoted in Hull, p40; and Thomas Gauly, "konfessionalismus und politische Kultur in Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zritgeschichte*, B32, July 1991, n.p., quoted in Padgett, p171.

[238] Stanley, "From Repression To Respect," pA1.

church at least once a month, but still meant that there were over 14 million active church worshippers in Russia.[240] Military personnel turned to religion too. A 1994 survey found that 38 percent of personnel classified themselves as religious compared to 22-25 percent at the end of 1992.[241] Grachev said in 1994 "the younger generation's spiritual education has never been so important."[242] The stance of the Orthodox Church was thus important to coup leaders, given both the number of worshippers and the close military relations with the church. Politicians likewise recognised the growing importance of the church, seeking its support before the 1995 elections and before the presidential elections.[243]

The ideological void left by the collapse of Communism encouraged the church's growth. As disillusionment in Communism grew, many people searched for a belief-system to provide them direction in a rapidly changing society. This move from Marxism-Leninism to Christianity is shown by a 1992 survey that found 73 percent of Russians had a positive feeling toward Christianity compared to 15 percent toward Marxism-Leninism.[244] The church also became closely associated with national self-identification, given its guardianship of Russian traditions. In June 1994 a senior cleric commented that many people were identifying with the church as "to consider yourself Orthodox...is a sign of being Russian."[245] That year Grachev signed an agreement to facilitate greater cooperation between the Orthodox Church and the military so as to encourage patriotic traditions. The church also had many resources, which facilitated its expansion. The church founded banks, imported goods like tobacco, and was involved in the oil industry. However active participation in the church was discouraged by the difficult nature of the religion. Many people found it difficult to understand the services, because they were conducted in old Slavonic rather than Russian. They also had little knowledge of the religion because of the Communist past. One brother commented in late 1994 that many people did not become actively involved with the church because "this

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[239] *The Guardian*, 14 June 1994, p17, quoted in Meek, "Russia's Christian Soldiers Belie Weakness," Reuters, 14 June 1994. With regard to additional survey information see White, Rose, and McAllister, *How Russia Votes*, Table C2, in Rose, Tikhomirov and Mishler, p804.
[240] Gallup, *The Gallup Poll 1995*, p18.
[241] Chernavin, p741.
[242] Stephen Foye, "Russian Army, Church Sign Joint Statement," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 3 March 1994, accessed 9 September 1998.
[243] See *The Times*, 9 December 1995, n.p., quoted in Richard Beeston, "Political Bosses Put Their Faith In Orthodox Votes-Moscow File," Reuters, 9 December 1995.
[244] Boeva and Shironin, pp30-1, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, Table 1.2, p19.
[245] *The Guardian*, 14 June 1994, p17, quoted in Meek.

faith is hard work."[246] This problem was probably increased by the preoccupation of many priests, as they sought to raise money, train new priests, and reclaim lost property.[247]

Evidence indicates that the Orthodox Church would have opposed intervention. This is shown by the church's reaction to the 1991 coup. Patriarch Aleksii II reputedly excommunicated all those who participated in the coup, an act that caused much concern to Gennadi Yanayev.[248] The unwillingness to support the seizure of power remained under the new regime, as the church attempted to mediate between Yeltsin and the parliament during the revolt. The church also publicly endorsed the new regime. Aleksii II in May 1996 endorsed Yeltsin and said, "the country will suffer new tremors" if Communism returned.[249] This opposition was primarily derived from the church's religious teachings, and from the transition's positive impact on the church. First, the use of force against Russian citizens to seize power would violate church principles as it publicly stood for peace and stability within Russia. Second, the church prospered during the transition, enjoying much greater freedom and some political influence. Accompanying this greater freedom were the financial benefits gained from the economic reforms.

In summary, I believe that civilian participation in private associations is generally comparable to other European states and that the level of public mobilisation would have discouraged intervention. Although most Russians did not have strong ties with political parties, the majority supported the multi-party system. Their party affiliations were often comparable to other states. With regard to labour unions, membership was very high compared to many other states, and they could mobilise large numbers of workers. Industrial associations and firms also grew stronger under the new regime as they accumulated immense wealth and enjoyed more support than other groups. Finally, the Orthodox Church grew as many people returned to the church after the removal of Communist restrictions. Therefore, many Russians were politically active in these groups. This reduced the military's opportunity to intervene, as evidence indicates that the groups would have opposed a coup.

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[246] Stanley, "From Repression To Respect."
[247] Ibid.
[248] Vesti TV, 21 August 1991, quoted in Oxana Antic, "Patriarch Anathematizes Participants Of Coup," *RFE/RL Daily Report* NSS, Internet, 22 August 1991, accessed 16 March 1998. With regard to Yanayev's reaction see *The Times*, 12 February 1992, n.p., quoted in Bruce Clark and Igor Baranovsky, "Coup Plotters Offer Verse And Vitriol," Reuters 12 February 1992.
[249] Alessandra Stanley, "Church Leans Toward Yeltsin In Russian Vote," *NYT* Ondisc, 30 May 1996, pA1.

Conclusions

This chapter argues that the military did not have the opportunity to intervene against the new regime. I have reached this conclusion after assessing the domestic situation and the level of regime attachment. I first assessed the impact of the transition on the domestic situation under Gorbachev and argued that the situation is characteristic of an "overt crisis." I then assessed the domestic situation under the new regime, and argued that, although some discontent developed that is characteristic of a "latent crisis," it was not serious enough to facilitate a coup. Finally, I examined the private organisations that developed with the transition and argued that their strength discouraged intervention.

With regard to the domestic situation under Gorbachev, this is most characteristic of an "overt crisis" and developed primarily because of the weak level of attachment to the Communist regime. Domestic discontent increased under Gorbachev, along with civilian dependence on the military to uphold security. Discontent manifested itself in demonstrations and violence throughout the Soviet Union, particularly in the republics that sought independence. This discontent led to the collapse of both the Communist regime and the Soviet Union, as republics broke away and the military withdrew its support from the regime. Such discontent primarily resulted from democracy becoming a viable alternative to Communism. This provided the population, particularly in the republics, an alternative to the Communist regime under which they enjoyed limited political freedom. Apart from this, public recognition of the Communist party's authority fell, and people were increasingly willing to challenge the belief that no other person or centre of power was legitimate or duty-worthy. This is shown by the decline in Communist party membership, especially among civilians compared to military personnel. More specifically, the decline of the party's authority is shown in Russia by the growing reluctance to accept its authority and by the move toward another centre of power, namely Yeltsin. Finally, domestic discontent was encouraged by the growing disillusionment with the Communist party. The party was unable to promote economic growth and prevent people from becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their lives. Disillusionment was particularly high in the republics where discontent was most violent.

Under the new regime civilian dependence on the military remained because of the domestic situation. The discontent evident under the new regime has characteristics of a "latent crisis" as there were demonstrations and the new regime was dependent on the military in some

instances, namely during the parliamentary revolt and Chechnyan war. This discontent was primarily encouraged by the limited support for democracy in absolute terms. Similarly, support for democratic freedoms was limited. The freedom of speech, association, and information all were not very important to many civilians. It is also apparent from the parliamentary revolt that public recognition of the new regime's authority was limited among some. Widespread regime attachment was discouraged by disillusionment in the new regime. Many Russians believed that the regime did not act for the benefit of society or care about their fate. Likewise, many people believed that the transition had adversely impacted on them. Dissatisfaction over living conditions appears to have grown among civilians under the new regime with no major difference between civilians and officers. This pessimism is likely to have been encouraged by the new regime's serious mistakes, such as the disastrous invasion of Chechnya.

However though the domestic situation had characteristics of a "latent crisis," I do not believe that the domestic discontent was serious enough to actually become a crisis. Most Russians neither supported the overthrow of the new regime nor actively challenged its authority. The reluctance to actively challenge the new regime is shown by the low turnout at many demonstrations and the lack of active support for the parliamentary revolt. This lack of support was evident to the military given its deployment, and is unlikely to have encouraged personnel to believe that another attempt to seize power would win widespread support. Nor did the Chechnyan war seriously threaten the new regime's authority. Apart from Yeltsin's dominance over the decision-making process, the war was essentially restricted to Chechnya, and rebel attacks outside Chechnya were limited, both in terms of their targets and their participants. Likewise, many surveys suggest that most Russians did not fear domestic instability despite the magnitude of change. Russian fears were often comparable or even lower than those recorded in other states. Similarly, relative to the military, civilian concerns do not appear to have been as serious.

To explain this is very important because support for democracy was low relative to other states but disillusionment was high. I believe that whereas under Gorbachev there was a viable alternative, namely democracy, few people had a viable alternative to the new regime. Therefore, although in absolute terms regime attachment was low, it was high relative to other regime types, particularly relative to military rule. The lack of support for a military regime was derived from the military's unpopularity. This discouraged people from believing that it

could govern better than civilians. This lack of support is important, given personnel were reluctant to injure Russian civilians. Nor was support for strong leadership absolute but rather depended on variables. Support of martial law depended on the level of domestic unrest. Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, people feared instability could threaten their personal interests and this discouraged political activism. Similarly, people were aware that demonstrating could threaten personal interests. Nor do I believe that many experienced living conditions harsh enough to demonstrate. Finally, most people did not have high expectations that the new regime could not meet. This discouraged a 'revolutionary gap' from emerging whereby the new regime was unable to meet expectations. Moreover few believed that the situation would never improve. This is likely to have discouraged people from believing that drastic action against the new regime was their only hope.

Turning to private associations, their presence helped to deny the military an opportunity to intervene, especially because evidence suggests that they were likely to have opposed a coup. Most importantly, during the transition many political parties developed. Although parties did not receive widespread support, at least some evidence indicates that their strength was comparable to other states. Before the transition rivals to the Communist party were not tolerated, but under Gorbachev they increasingly challenged its monopoly over power as his reforms allowed greater political freedom. As the new regime permitted the development of a multi-party system and competitive elections, parties became closely associated with the new regime. Thus, parties made it more difficult to seize power through force. Though the majority of Russians supported the multi-party system, many parties were unable to mobilise many supporters. Surveys found that party affiliations were limited, and the overwhelming majority of Russians did not belong to parties. Thus, neither civilians nor personnel were very active in politics. However Russian support of parties often did not differ greatly to other states.

The failures of the political system and the weaknesses of parties discouraged widespread support. The size and diversity of Russia made it difficult to produce policies of mass appeal. Neither did the political system encourage strong parties. The absence of an election until two years after the fall of Communism provided little incentive to organise strong parties, and nor did the party-list system for election to the Duma. Many parties did not improve the situation by their poor campaigning and lack of cohesion. Further problems were caused by negative opinions of parties, though these were not restricted to Russia, and this helps to explain the

lack of major differences in the level of party support relative to other states. Nor would parties have been helped by widespread political apathy. Finally, the main political parties were not likely to have supported a coup because it could have directly threatened their interests.

Like parties, independent labour unions developed with the transition as greater freedom was allowed and as Gorbachev sought to mobilise support for his reforms. Unions were soon able to mobilise large numbers of workers and this remained the case under the new regime. The strength of unions reflected their historic role and the working conditions. Unions had traditionally played a major role under Communism, administering the social welfare system until late 1993, whereas in nations like the US, employers actively sought to reduce their power. Similarly, although most Russians were able to overcome the harsh living conditions, workers that were particularly militant faced more pressing threats to their livelihood. Despite their demonstrations against the new regime, unions were not likely to support intervention. This is because of a coup's potentially negative effects, the new regime's moves to win over unions, and the threat of retaliation if union members supported direct challenges against the regime.

Many industrial associations and firms also developed with the transition, as the Communist party's control over the economy declined. During Gorbachev's rule associations developed to support various businesses and to influence economic policy. Under the new regime industrial associations and firms remained active. The 'Most' financial group illustrates the immense strength that businesses could achieve, given its diverse business interests. The growth of associations and firms was facilitated by the economic reforms that reduced state control of the economy and by their 'courting' of politicians. Businessmen were also able to win more public support than other groups; this is likely to have been encouraged by their ownership of much of the media. Evidence indicates that few associations and firms would have supported intervention. The potentially negative consequences of a coup encouraged this opposition. For example, a coup could reduce consumer and investor confidence. Contrasting the potentially negative consequences, the new regime sought to satisfy business interests and at least occasionally achieved this.

Finally, the strength of the Russian Orthodox Church, the most powerful church in Russia, increased with the greater freedom permitted under Gorbachev and the new regime. Civilians

ınd military personnel returned to the church after Communist restrictions were lifted. Religious beliefs became increasingly widespread and the number of churches and parishes grew. In line with this there was a large number of active worshippers. The ideological void left by the collapse of Communism was a key factor that encouraged the church's growth. As disillusionment in Communism grew many people searched for an alternative belief-system to provide them direction in a rapidly changing society. The Orthodox Church also became closely associated with national self-identification. Furthermore, the church increasingly had the resources to expand. However active participation in the church was discouraged by the difficult nature of understanding the religion. This problem was increased by the preoccupation of many priests with other issues like the reclaiming of lost property. Evidence indicates that the church would have opposed intervention because of its religious teachings and because of the transition's positive impact on the church.

This chapter then indicates that the military did not have an opportunity to intervene. Overall, I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is valid as various factors did impact on the military's opportunity to intervene. These factors were the level of regime attachment, the domestic situation, the level of civilian dependence on the military, and the level of the military's popularity. With regard to hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, I also believe that this is valid because the transition did impact upon the military's opportunity to intervene. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup. Although it did encourage discontent, this was not strong enough to equate with either an "overt crisis" or a "latent crisis." The transition also encouraged the development of private associations that were comparable to other states. These further hindered a coup as evidence suggests that the associations would have opposed intervention. Thus, within the context of the new regime the hypothesis is not valid.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

This thesis examines how regime transitions impact on the military; and more specifically how this impact influences the likelihood of a military intervention in politics, primarily through a coup. Regime transitions involve fundamental changes in the composition of the civilian leaders and the structures that determine how the state is governed, and how policy is made and implemented. With regard to coups, these involve the removal or attempted removal of a state's chief executive by the use of or threat of violence, during which active service regular military personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the operation. To examine the impact of a transition on the military, key areas were assessed. These relate to the structure of the civil-military relationship and the military's roles, support, morale, cohesion and size, and expertise. To examine the likelihood of a coup I examined various factors that might influence whether or not the military intervenes. Here I argued that the capacity, disposition, and the opportunity to intervene play a key role in influencing the military's decision-making. This approach was applied to a case study, the Soviet and post-Soviet state. I first provided a brief history of civil-military relations and examined the military on the eve of Gorbachev's accession, before arguing that various changes occurred to the military during the fall of Communism from 1985 to 1991. I then examined the military under the new regime from 1992 to 1996 and argued that further changes occurred. Having assessed the impact of the transition on the military I argued that the threat of a Russian coup did exist, but that the military did not intervene because it lacked the capacity, disposition, and opportunity.

I shall now examine the conclusions that have been made and will relate them directly to my hypotheses to judge their validity. This thesis assesses the validity of four hypotheses:

1. A regime transition can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military.
   This impact can change the:
   - Structure of civil-military relationship
   - Military roles
   - Military support
   - Military morale
   - Military cohesion and size

Military expertise

(See model 1)

2. Various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. In order of their importance these factors are:

The capacity to intervene:

Presence of potential coup leaders

Participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites

Participation of effectively armed and trained personnel

Cohesion of the coup forces

Number of personnel

Military's mood

The Disposition to intervene:

Corporate interests

Individual interests

Class interests

Particularistic interests

Manifest destiny and national interest

External actors

The Opportunity to intervene:

Regime attachment

Civilian dependence on the military and the domestic situation

Military popularity

Intervention inhibitors are essentially derived from these three factors:

Acceptance of civilian supremacy

Lack of capacity to intervene

Lack of disposition to intervene

Lack of opportunity to intervene

Professionalism

3. A regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup.

4. A regime transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene.

With regard to regime transitions and the military, I focused on key areas where they can impact on the military. The structure of the civil-military relationship and how this changed was assessed first. This structure provides the framework within which the civilian and military leaders inter-act. Second and also important, the roles that the military performs and the impact of the transition on the allocation of these were examined. Third, transitional changes to institutional support with regard to the military's level of budgetary support and popular support were examined. Fourth and closely related, the impact of transitional changes on the morale of personnel was assessed. Fifth, transitional changes to the military's cohesion and size were examined. Finally, a transition's impact on the level of military expertise was studied.

To explain why the military intervenes and the impact of a regime transition on the likelihood of intervention, I used a modified version of Finer's approach to the study of the military in politics. This is based on three main determinants influencing whether the military will intervene, though these are not mutually exclusive. First, I assessed whether the military had the capacity to intervene. Second, I assessed whether the military had the disposition to intervene. Third, I assessed whether the military had the opportunity to intervene. These three determinants are in turn comprised of numerous factors that can both encourage and discourage a coup. These factors were covered in-depth during both my study of coups and the case study. They range from whether there are figures able and willing to lead a coup, to the strength of potential coup grievances among personnel, to the level of attachment to the regime.

I then studied why the military might intervene, and concluded that the capacity and disposition of the military, along with the opportunity, could influence whether or not a coup

is staged. With regard to the capacity to intervene, the military must believe itself capable of defeating, or successfully intimidating, the regime's leaders and supporters, of seizing strategic sites, and of acting swiftly to guarantee surprise and to minimise organised opposition. The likelihood of success is enhanced by the active participation of personnel who have leadership skills, are strategically located, and are effectively armed and trained. Similarly, the cohesion and number of active coup participants, relative to the regime's forces and the size of the state, influences whether or not the military perceives itself capable of intervening. Transitions are especially relevant because their impact can influence whether or not the military can intervene. For instance, the level of military cohesion might change given the potential divisive nature of a transition.

Closely associated with the military's capacity, and indeed disposition, is the military's mood. The self-perceptions of personnel will determine whether they believe that they have the attributes to stage a coup. Threats to the military's prestige have the potential to create discontent. For instance, a new regime may be perceived as failing to properly recognise the military. However Finer's work needs to be expanded to better take into account the influence that negative self-perceptions among personnel have in discouraging coups. This is because when the self-perceptions of personnel decline to the extent that they doubt their own capabilities, the threat of a coup can decline. This is the result of personnel lacking the confidence that they can successfully stage such a risky and complex operation.

Another vital determinant is the military's disposition. There are two main types of factors that motivate intervention: primary factors that are often influential in encouraging intervention, and secondary factors that are generally less influential. Assessing the primary factors first, the violation of military corporate self-interests is the most influential coup grievance. This is chiefly because such a violation directly impacts upon the military's ability to successfully ensure national security, upon its ability to operate in the manner it wishes, and upon the conditions under which personnel operate. Actions by a regime that may be perceived as threatening the military range from grievances arising over the level of autonomy to the presence of a rival armed force. Given the probability that a new regime will seek to ensure its supremacy, and will make decisions in accordance with its own perceptions rather than those of the previous regime, the potential for corporate grievances is real. Individual interests are also very important and are closely associated with corporate interests. These again are likely

to be influenced by a transition because of its consequences. Perceived threats range from the lack of promotion opportunities to the threat of execution.

Apart from these factors are those that often have a limited influence, the secondary factors. First, I doubt whether class interests are important. Theoretically, intervention may result from the military's class interests being threatened, and thus by a transition's impact on the class interests. At one level clearly identifying the class of the officer corps is not necessarily simple; they might not be of one dominant origin. Associated with this, the approach assumes that classes are united and thus can be the focus of coup grievances whereas in reality this is unlikely. The approach also assumes that personnel will place a priority upon loyalties established before they joined the military, rather than those built up among personnel and their loyalty to the military. Indeed class or particularistic grievances may hinder the staging of a coup through denying its leaders broad support. Second, particularistic interests are unlikely to be influential. According to this approach coups are motivated by a regime threatening the regional and or ethnic interests of the conspirators. However the influence of these interests is likely to be reduced by the development of internal loyalties. Nor do I believe that the manifest destiny and national interest, are important. Statistical evidence indicates that corporate and individual grievances are more influential. Even when coup leaders claim to be intervening in the national interest they often renege on their promises and military regimes are often little better than the regimes they replace. Finally, though external actors might influence whether a coup occurs, their role is unlikely to be significant. A lack of military dependence on an external actor reduces the influence that an external actor might have, and the limited role of these actors is evident when past coups are examined.

The opportunity to intervene is another important coup determinant, but its influence does not match that of the capacity or disposition to intervene. If the military is capable and determined to intervene, civilian opposition will not deter it. When the military is wary of causing civilian casualties, I believe that the level of regime attachment is the most important determinant of the opportunity. The level of regime attachment is important because the hazards associated with intervening against a popular regime will influence coup leaders. This is primarily because the leaders must be sure that the military will obey their orders, and that personnel will be willing to use violence against civilians. With regard to war and the domestic situation, both can facilitate intervention, though the influence of a war will be largely determined by its domestic impact, especially by increased civilian dependence. The level of support for the

military is closely associated with the above two factors, as the level of regime attachment and the regime's performance directly influences the military's popularity. Support of the military is important because of its close relationship to the military's mood. All three factors are likely to be influenced by a transition.

Finally, intervention might not occur if the above factors are countered by what I term intervention inhibitors. The acceptance of civilian supremacy is primarily derived from a military's lack of the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene. Various methods might be used by a regime to ensure that a coup is not staged. For instance, a regime might ensure that loyal commanders control highly capable forces located close to strategic sites, utilise positive and negative incentives, and ensure that the level of regime attachment is strong. These factors then contribute to the high risk of intervening. This is important because officers are often averse to taking risks. An external actor can play an important role, but this is rare. It is unlikely that an external actor will determine the actions of a self-sufficient and independent military. I do not believe that professionalism, as defined by Huntington, is an effective inhibitor. Huntington was incorrect when he argued that the professional military was apolitical, as no military is completely isolated from societal attitudes. Thus, the military is aware of political developments and it will take a stance on such developments, particularly when personnel believe that the issues are of direct concern. Indeed the qualities Huntington attributed to professionals might actually encourage intervention.

The Soviet and Post-Soviet Case Study and the Transition

The Soviet military before the transition

I first provided a brief overview of the dominant theoretical models used by Western scholars to examine the Soviet civil-military relationship. Here three models were most important. First, Kolkowicz's conflict model stressed the conflict prone nature of the civil-military relationship and the military's potential threat to the party. Second, the symbiotic model put forward by Odom emphasised civil-military cooperation and the strength of the party's supremacy. Finally, according to Colton's participatory model the relationship was one of conflict and cooperation but party supremacy was not threatened. I believe that the participatory model was most useful in assessing the Soviet civil-military relationship from 1917 to 1985. This is primarily because Colton wrote of the various degrees of military

involvement in politics and those factors that influenced its political quiescence. Second, I believe that many of his arguments were particularly relevant in light of the transition. For instance, he envisaged military intervention if the regime initiated reforms that alarmed the military hierarchy. Third, the relationship was not one of inevitable conflict or cooperation. Finally, various scholars who examined Soviet civil-military relations in greater depth concluded that the model was the most valid.

I then examined the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition. The Soviet civil-military structure best resembled Nordlinger's penetration model and revolved around the Communist party's authority. This model was used to examine the Soviet civil-military structure because it was not confined to the case study, and avoided at least some of the problems of the three previous models. Soviet civil-military relations were characteristic of a penetration model. This was shown by the penetration of the military by the Communist party that ensured the party's supremacy. The military did not directly threaten this supremacy until the 1991 coup. Apart from the civil-military structure, the military's primary role was to protect and to promote the interests of the Communist party. This involved the military being externally focused and countering the perceived security threat posed by the West. With regard to the level of budgetary support and official support of the military, both of these were high, although perceptions of personnel differed according to their rank. Thus, officers had a higher level of morale relative to soldiers. Turning to cohesion, this was not defective to the point of threatening the central command structure. Here I examined five key institutional relationships and found that except for a salient division between officers and soldiers, cohesion appears to have been adequate. Finally, the military's expertise was inadequate. Most indicative of this were the military's experiences in the Afghanistan war. Overall, the military held a privileged position in Soviet society and it was a powerful institution.

The Soviet military and the transition 1985-1991

I next examined how the transition from Communism affected the military. Changes to the structure of the civil-military relationship had a significant impact. The fundamental change here was the weakening of the Communist party, and changes to the control methods that had characterised the penetration model. For instance, the role of the MPA was reduced and then abolished. Similarly, Communist party membership became less important and then was discouraged. These changes occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and to

implement policy changes. A key indicator of the decline of the party's authority was the military's greater political role during this period. However characteristics of the penetration model remained when Gorbachev deemed them useful to his quest for greater control. For example, politics continued to influence promotions and the secret police remained operative. The three Soviet models were problematic, but the participatory model appeared to remain most valid. This was primarily because Colton had argued that military intervention was possible if the regime initiated reforms that alarmed the military hierarchy.

With regard to the military's roles, these did not change in the sense that the General Secretary retained the power to deploy the military. However the orientation of the military changed from an external anti-West focus to an internal role. This change corresponded with Gorbachev's greater emphasis on Soviet-West cooperation. More specifically, domestic developments were increasingly seen as posing serious threats. The fall of the Communist party's authority and the policy of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' facilitated nationalism, and ethnic tensions and separatist aspirations. These led to the deployment of the military.

Reductions to budgetary support, in popular support, and in military morale occurred under Gorbachev. The level of budgetary support changed in accordance with the re-orientation of the military. Various factors discouraged defence expenditure. These included the poor performance of the economy and Gorbachev's perceptions that the military's global role should be reduced. The perception of the military, officers, and military service also declined. This decline was evident at the highest level and among the civilian population, as fewer were willing to serve, and personnel were attacked. Two key factors discouraged support. First and most importantly, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev discouraged a high level of support for the military. Second, it became evident that the military was failing to perform its allocated roles. The roles themselves were unpopular among many. In line with this, and the harsh conditions personnel faced, morale declined. For instance, opinion surveys indicated that pessimism among personnel increased. This equated with problems like desertion. More graphically, the frequency of suicide increased.

The military's cohesion and size changed under Gorbachev, but expertise remained inadequate. Changes occurred because of the repercussions of Gorbachev's reforms. Examining the military's cohesion, the emergence of salient divisions clearly indicated that a decline occurred, and this is reflective of the divisions that emerged throughout the Soviet

Union. More specifically, the relationship between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic groups was assessed. Here further tensions emerged, as divergent views were held of the transitional changes, of the actions of one another, and over who was responsible for problems that personnel experienced. With regard to size, the numerical decline of personnel reflected the different priorities of the party leaders and the impact of the reforms. Finally, the military continued to lack the expertise that was needed to successfully execute the operations that its roles entailed. This was shown by the military's performance in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Three factors best explained this inadequacy. First, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Second, personnel of a high quality left without being replaced by similarly qualified personnel. Third, the quality and quantity of training fell.

Therefore, I believe that in the context of the Soviet transition from Communism hypotheses one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is valid. This is because the transition changed the structure of the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, military morale, and cohesion and size. Likewise, the expertise of personnel was changed. These changes were of a negative nature for the military.

The Russian military, the transition, and the threat of a coup 1992-1996

As with the 1985 to 1991 period, I concluded that major changes occurred under the new regime that impacted upon the military. Most importantly, the structure of the civil-military relationship changed, as the main actors became the new regime and the Russian military rather than the Communist party and the Soviet military. Penetration methods of control were thus realigned to enhance Yeltsin's authority. Indicative of this was the continued monitoring of personnel by the new regime. An outcome of the decline of the Communist party, and continued use of penetration control methods, was the military's increased political activity. The three Soviet models became ever more redundant during this period. This was fundamentally because all three revolved around the relationship between the now defunct Communist party and the also defunct Soviet military.

Apart from the structure of the civil-military relationship, institutional roles and budgetary support changed. The roles allocated to the military continued to differ from those before 1985. Further changes were made by the new regime because of its commitment to Russia

rather than the Soviet Union, and because of the new regime's security perceptions. With regard to budgetary support, this continued to be limited relative to the pre-transitional period. This was illustrated by the decline of the military's budget in real terms. These changes occurred in accordance with the continued downplaying of the military's traditional external role, the lack of economic growth, and the increased competition for resources.

Nor was popular support for the military, along with the morale of personnel and military cohesion isolated from change. Although the military had enjoyed much support before the transition, under Yeltsin the perception of the military, officers, and military service was negative. Limited support can be attributed to the same two key factors that encouraged negative perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Second, the new roles allocated to the military, and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions.

Given these negative developments, morale among personnel was low. To assess the level of cohesion I again examined the relationship between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, and officers and soldiers. I did not examine ethnic relations as these were examined when I assessed secondary motives. The Chechnyan war was graphically illustrative of the lack of cohesion. The military was bitterly divided over the invasion's merits, and cohesion was so poor that casualties from 'friendly fire' were high. Additional divisions grew because of divergent opinions over restructuring the military, over service conditions, and the continued debate concerning the place of politics in the military.

Finally, both the military's size and expertise changed. The transition led to a drastic decline in the number of personnel. This accompanied the decline of the military's traditional external role, and the fall in budgetary support that occurred as a result of the poor performance of the economy. In addition, it became increasingly difficult to find those willing and able to serve. Turning to military expertise, the inadequate level of expertise evident under Gorbachev remained and probably worsened given the military's performance in Chechnya. Most importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Other factors that contributed to this inadequacy included the loss of experienced personnel and the lack of quality training.

Although a military coup was not staged in Russia the threat of one was taken seriously. This threat was shown by the threats made by military personnel against the new regime, and by the various opinions that were held with regard to a coup. The willingness of some personnel to intervene against the civilian leadership was most clearly shown by the 1991 coup and by the 1993 revolt. Two broad opinions on the potential for such an intervention were discernible. First, the threat of a coup was taken seriously and anxiety was expressed over this potential development. Second, others downplayed the likelihood of a coup, though this did not mean the military's loyalty was taken for granted. However I have doubts with regard to many of the explanations put forward for the military's political quiescence, which was often explained in terms of its poor cohesion and professionalism. This was because the military was united on some issues, and the other armed forces that the new regime could have sought assistance from experienced poor cohesion too. With regard to professionalism, this declined, and professional attributes did not prevent personnel from intervening.

Therefore, I believe that in the context of the second period of the transition hypotheses one is again valid. According to hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military. This is because the transition affected the structure of the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, and the military morale. Similarly, institutional cohesion and size along with expertise changed. It is equally clear that these changes were of an overwhelmingly negative nature. The brief outlining of the coup threat also provides the context within which hypotheses two to four were evaluated. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. With regard to hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene.

The Russian Military's Political Quiescence, 1992-1996

Acceptance of civilian supremacy

The Russian military accepted civilian supremacy in terms of the civilian right to govern, and was unwilling to directly challenge this by staging a coup. Apart from the new regime's right to govern, the relationship was not indicative of absolute civilian supremacy. The military

became increasingly influential in some policy-making areas, such as in the areas of foreign and security affairs, and was willing to express opposition to the new regime's policies. However despite the presence of civil-military tensions, the right of the new regime to govern was not directly challenged or questioned by the overwhelming majority of personnel.

The acceptance of civilian supremacy was primarily encouraged by three factors:

Lack of capacity

The military lacked the capacity to intervene and was aware of this. More specifically, I presented five key arguments. First, a potential coup leader was absent. There was no opponent of Yeltsin able to either unite the military behind their position or who was supportive of a coup. Second, strategically located personnel did not show any propensity to actively support a coup. Third, the military lacked the expertise required to swiftly and successfully stage a coup, though it remained equipped to intervene. Fourth, the fall in cohesion meant that the threat of instability, and indeed a civil war, was a possible outcome of a coup, a threat recognised by many personnel. However a lack of cohesion did not rule-out a coup, given this disunity also characterised those forces the new regime would call upon for protection. Finally, it was unlikely that a coup leader would have been able to recruit enough active supporters. The importance of these weaknesses was strongly reinforced by three factors. First, the lack of self-confidence meant that personnel were unlikely to believe that they could successfully overcome these weaknesses. Second, the military lacked a strong interventionist disposition that might have outweighed anxiety over the military's inadequacies. Third, the incapacity of the military was evident and was recognised by the personnel.

I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is valid within the context of the capacity to intervene. This is because many factors influenced the military's perception of its capacity to intervene. More specifically, hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the first of the three factors, is valid. I believe that the transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's capacity to intervene. The transition impacted upon the loyalty of strategically located personnel as discontent did emerge, on the military's expertise and cohesion, on the number of personnel available to stage such an intervention, and on the mood of personnel. However strong potential coup

leaders did not emerge. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup, and the validity of the hypothesis is doubtful. Although it did encourage discontent this was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. The transition actually reduced the level of institutional expertise and cohesion along with the prospective number of participants. Moreover the transition's negative impact on the military ensured that personnel did not develop an interventionist mood. The poor morale of personnel hindered the development of a sense of supremacy over civilians and of a high level of confidence.

Lack of disposition

Although personnel held grievances, a strong interventionist disposition did not arise. I made two key conclusions. First, primary grievances derived from the negative impact on the military of transitional events developed under the new regime, which were conducive to the staging of a coup. Such grievances emerged from the violation of the military's corporate self-interests as military autonomy was violated, functional rivals grew, and budgetary support in real terms declined. Reinforcing these grievances was the violation of individual self-interests. However those interests of officers strategically placed and popular with personnel were often protected and promoted by the new regime. Thus, the importance of these grievances declined. Moreover military influence in some policy areas increased. Of less importance were negative incentives. This was because the negative repercussions for those leading challenges against the new regime were often weak. Further restraining an interventionist disposition was the absence of a coup-conducive mood, which encouraged few to have the confidence to intervene. Although the new regime occasionally endorsed the military, the military was generally poorly regarded, and was aware of the difficult nature of seizing power.

Second, it was highly unlikely that secondary factors would play a discernible role in motivating a coup. Secondary factors are those that I believe are less likely to be important in motivating intervention. This was because coup grievances arising from the violation of sectional interests derived from class, regional, and ethnic affiliations were not strong enough to counter the reluctance to intervene. Similarly, it was most unlikely that the manifest destiny and the national interest would have motivated a coup. This was because the military showed little inclination that it would intervene in politics, or indeed play any domestic role, despite the situation. Many personnel also recognised that a coup would not help solve Russia's problems. Finally, although there were some external actors that might have supported a coup,

it was very unlikely that they would have been influential in determining a coup. This was because the military was self-sufficient and was not dependent on an external actor. I ultimately believe that a mixture of motives was present under the new regime, but this mixture was not strong enough to provide the disposition to intervene.

I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is valid within the context of the disposition to intervene. This is because many factors influenced the military's disposition to intervene. More specifically, hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the second of the three factors, is valid. I believe that the transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's capacity to intervene. The transition affected corporate, individual, class and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup and the validity of the hypothesis is doubtful. Although it did encourage discontent, this was not strong enough for a strong interventionist disposition to develop that overcame the reluctance to intervene.

Lack of opportunity

The military had a greater opportunity to intervene under Gorbachev than under Yeltsin. The situation in the Soviet Union can be most accurately described as an "overt crisis" because of the widespread discontent. This discontent was motivated by a lack of attachment to the Communist regime, and led to a crisis because a viable alternative developed. Under the new regime, however, although discontent did occur and characteristics of a "latent crisis" were evident, it did not become serious enough to force the new regime to become overly dependent on the military for its survival. Support for democracy was low relative to other states and disillusionment was high. Whereas under Gorbachev there was a viable alternative, namely democracy, few people had a viable alternative to the new regime. Therefore, although in absolute terms regime attachment was low, it was high relative to other regime types, particularly relative to military rule. The lack of support for a military regime was derived from the military's unpopularity. This discouraged people from believing that it could govern better than civilians. This lack of support was important, given personnel were reluctant to injure Russian civilians. Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, people feared instability could threaten their personal interests, few experienced living conditions harsh

enough to demonstrate despite the lack of a viable alternative, and most people did not have high expectations that the new regime could not meet.

Turning to private associations, their presence helped to deny the military an opportunity to intervene. Most importantly, during the transition many political parties developed. Although parties did not receive widespread support, at least some evidence indicates that their strength was comparable to other states. As the new regime permitted the development of a multi-party system, and competitive elections, parties became closely associated with the new regime and their strength made it more difficult to seize power through force. Though the majority of Russians supported the multi-party system, parties were often unable to mobilise many supporters. For instance, surveys found that party affiliations were limited and the overwhelming majority of Russians did not belong to parties. The failures of the political system and the weaknesses of parties discouraged widespread support. Support, though, was often comparable to other countries. Evidence suggested that parties would have opposed intervention, as a coup would have been detrimental to the interests of parties. For example, leaders who used force to seize power were unlikely to have foreseen an important and independent policy-making role for parties

Like parties, independent labour unions developed with the transition as greater freedom was allowed, and as Gorbachev sought to mobilise support for his reforms. Labour unions were soon able to mobilise large numbers of workers; this remained the case under the new regime. The strength of unions reflected their historic role, the positive opinions of unions relative to other groups, and the poor working conditions. Despite their demonstrations against the new regime, unions were likely to have opposed intervention. This was because of a coup's potentially negative effects, the new regime's moves to win over unions, and the threat of retaliation if union members supported direct challenges against the regime.

Many industrial associations and firms also developed with the transition as the Communist party's control over the economy declined. Under the new regime, industrial associations and firms remained active. The 'Most' financial group illustrated the immense strength that businesses could achieve. The growth of associations and firms was facilitated by the economic reforms that reduced state control of the economy, and by their 'courting' of politicians. Businessmen were also able to win greater public support than other groups; this was likely to have been encouraged by their ownership of much of the media. Evidence

suggested that few associations and firms would have supported intervention. The potential negative consequences of a coup, such as the threat to consumer and investor confidence, and the new regime's moves to satisfy business interests discouraged support.

Finally, the strength of the Russian Orthodox Church, the most powerful church in Russia, increased after 1985. The strength of the Orthodox Church increased with the transition and people returned to the church after Communist restrictions were lifted. The ideological void left by the collapse of Communism was probably a key factor that encouraged the church's growth. The church was also closely associated with Russian nationalism. However active participation in the church was discouraged by the difficult nature of understanding the religion. I believe that the church would have opposed intervention because of its religious teachings and because of the transition's positive impact on the church. Apart from the lifting of religious restrictions, the transition allowed the church to reclaim property and to acquire businesses.

I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, is valid within the context of the opportunity to intervene. This is because the level of regime attachment, the level of civilian dependence on the military and the domestic situation, and the military's popularity all influenced the military's perception of its opportunity to intervene. More specifically, hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the last of the three factors, is valid. I believe that the transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's opportunity to intervene. The transition affected the level of regime attachment, the level of civilian dependence on the military and the domestic situation, and the military's popularity. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup and the validity of the hypothesis is doubtful. Although discontent did occur and characteristics of a "latent crisis" were evident, it did not become serious enough to force the new regime to become overly dependent on the military for its survival. The transition also encouraged the growth of private associations that were comparable to other states. The development of private associations further reduced the opportunity to intervene, as evidence suggested that the associations would have opposed a coup.

I believe that the risk of intervention was too high for the military given its lack of capacity and opportunity. The military was aware that the risks involved in intervening were high because of its lack of capacity, and because of the likelihood that civilians would oppose a coup. This is important because the military was reluctant to use violence against Russian civilians. A lack of self-confidence and the absence of a strong interventionist disposition reinforced this.

A number of broad conclusions can be drawn from this thesis. Most importantly, regime transitions have a major impact that should be studied. This impact is not restricted to the country that experiences the transition, as the global economy and security system can be dramatically altered by a transition, especially if the transition occurs in a large state. The importance of studying transitions is reinforced by the many challenges they pose to scholars. This should be apparent, as I have found that theoretical models produced before a transition might not be able to satisfactorily explain transitional developments. The relevance of theoretical models can decline, as the factors on which they are premised change and factors arise that are not included in the model. This ultimately poses the question as to whether models are able to accurately explain developments in periods of exceptional change. Scholars face the problem of attempting to build accurate frameworks while change continues, often at a rapid pace. This increases the likelihood that theories will swiftly become out-dated and inaccurate. Hence, scholars might be faced with the challenge of finding new ways to explain the changes and their impact. This might involve looking at the theories that have been used to study past case studies that experienced dramatic change.

However the case study indicates that theoretical models can remain helpful, regardless of a transition. Although transitions are periods of exceptional change, they do not necessarily lead to a complete change; some features of the pre-transitional period often remain. This continuity might occur because it is easier for the new regime to retain pre-transitional structures relative to building new structures, particularly as the new regime will be seeking to swiftly consolidate itself. The structures might also be retained because of their historic traditions, and because they are deemed the best way of achieving the new regime's goals, despite their pre-transitional origins. When this continuity occurs, the arguments associated with theoretical models that pre-date the transition can remain valid, can provide some insight into future trends, and can provide the foundations from which new theories can be developed. This is shown by the continued relevance of the penetration model, despite its development

over 20 years ago. The usefulness of such models is further increased when the period within which the model was developed is recognised. This is because the recognition of the context within which the model was developed helps one to identify those models that might remain most relevant when a transition occurs.

More specifically, although Finer's approach to the study of civil-military relations remains useful, as it provides a broadly acceptable framework by which coups can be studied, it requires revision. The approach's weaknesses include its failure to adequately cover the capacity to intervene, particularly with regard to the incapacity to intervene, and to clearly rank the factors that might encourage intervention. Finer's study of the opportunity to intervene also was based on questionable assumptions. Apart from the use of the controversial term "political culture," Finer's arguments were based on the questionable premise that the stronger private associations were, the less opportunity the military had to intervene. I also believe that he failed to adequately examine why a coup does not occur.

The case study is indicative of how the status of an institution can change dramatically in a short period. It can thus move swiftly from an elite to an inferior position, and I expect the opposite, during a transition. With regard to a Russian coup, the most important conclusion is that grievances among personnel do not necessarily mean that they will intervene. This reinforces the need to examine why coups do not occur, rather than solely focusing on why they do occur. Nor does the case study support many explanations of intervention. For instance, the manifest destiny, the national interest, and external actors, were unlikely to play a significant role. Neither were the shared backgrounds and experiences of personnel influential in determining their willingness to cooperate during a coup. Turning to civilians, although the popularity of a regime might be low and living conditions for many harsh, this does not necessarily mean that there is a willingness to move to another regime, particularly through violence. This is because the level of support for the regime needs to be examined within the context of whether there is a viable alternative that people feel could provide better governance. The case study also supports my argument that no military is isolated from civilian society, as the attitudes of Soviet and post-Soviet personnel appear to have been similar to civilians.

With regard to the approach I utilised, I believe that it allows an accurate study of the Soviet and post-Soviet case study to be undertaken. I first provided an historic outline of the case

study and examined the models that have been used to assess Soviet civil-military relations. This not only provided a background, it put into perspective the changes that occurred with the transition. Turning to the actual transition, I believe that my approach examined the most important aspects of the military, and provided compelling evidence to support my arguments. Dividing the transition into three periods facilitated comparisons, and hence facilitated a clearer understanding of how the military changed. Comparisons of the case study with other countries also put changes into perspective. With regard to the assessment of coups, I believe that my approach is valid. The approach examined the key factors that evidence indicates might influence the decision to intervene. However the approach went beyond merely listing factors; it categorised them and then critically assessed their influence so that their importance could be ranked. This was also undertaken when I examined the Russian military, after clearly identifying the threat of a coup and the weaknesses of current literature on the topic.

There is room for a more comprehensive study of the Russian military's political quiescence. The very complexity of studying why a coup does not occur, particularly when there is much conflicting evidence, ensures that the arguments will not escape critique. This in turn should lead to alternative approaches that might provide a more comprehensive explanation for the military's political quiescence. One area of possible improvement relates to the interviewing of key actors. A more comprehensive study of the Russian military would certainly be assisted by access to key figures like Grachev and Yeltsin. This is because of their important roles during this period. Surveys were also problematic. I have already mentioned that the structure of the surveys and the questions asked influences how personnel respond. Likewise, there can be a major difference between what personnel say in a survey and how they act. Another problem has been the lack of surveys that specifically asked whether personnel would support a coup. Avenues of research could include a study of the impact of General Lev Rokhlin's 'Movement for Support to the Army, the Defence Industry and Military Research.' This movement is not examined in-depth, as it was formed after my period of analysis. However it won support from personnel and Rokhlin was identified as a potential coup leader. Another avenue of research could include a survey of attitudes among Soviet and post-Soviet military personnel, relative to attitudes in the East European militaries. This could indicate how a transition can impact on different militaries, and put into perceptive the attitudes expressed by personnel. Likewise, a study of both the transitions to Communism and from Communism in Russia would be useful. This would help explain how the transitions to and from the same ideology can impact on the society, and more specifically the military. There is also much

room for examining in greater depth the level of regime attachment among groups. For example, I have not examined the mobilisation of Russian tertiary students and their potential reaction to a coup.

Epilogue

Yeltsin remained at the head of the civil-military relationship after August 1996. In October 1996, Yeltsin replaced Lebed with Ivan Rybkin, a former parliamentary speaker, and sacked 6 Generals. The following May, Yeltsin replaced Rodionov as Defence Minister during a meeting of the Defence Council. Yeltsin accused Rodionov of failing to reform the military and replaced him with Igor Sergeyev, the Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Yeltsin re-emphasised his control by commenting that "I really, you could say, dropped back a little...due to certain circumstances [his poor health] but now that's over. I have everything in hand." [1] Yeltsin also removed General Viktor Samsonov, the Chief of the General Staff, the following day. In December 1997 Yeltsin approved the 'national security concept' and this, along with the 'Fundamentals of Russian Federation State Policy for Military Development up to the Year 2005' published in August 1998, outlined Russia's national security interests. These documents concluded that the principal threat to national security for the next 10 to 15 years was posed by domestic economic, social, and ethnic problems rather than large-scale external aggression.[2] However concerns about Yeltsin's health intensified and his ability to govern increased, especially after he dramatically sacked his entire cabinet in March 1998, though he re-appointed Sergeyev.

Despite Yeltsin's continued hold on power, the threat of a coup remained and might have become more serious. Yeltsin in late August 1996 commented that he "did not rule out that under certain circumstances such [coup] attempts are possible, although their probability is low."[3] The following month Lebed warned, "the army is on the verge of a mutiny, however in Russia there is no tradition of military coups."[4] In October 1996 a group of officers claimed

[1] Paul Quinn-Judge, "A Bold and Brutal Firing," *Time*, no vol. no.22, 2 June 1997, p41.
[2] *The Military Balance 1998-1999*, p101.
[3] *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 21 August 1996, n.p., carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 22 August 1996, quoted in "Yeltsin Appeals For An End To Divisions In Society Five Years After August Coup Attempt," Reuters, 22 August 1996.
[4] ITAR-TASS (world service), 26 September 1996, quoted in "Lebed Rejects Possibility Of Military Coup," Reuters, 28 September 1996.

that the military had enough force to make the new regime increase its support.[5] In April 1997 it was reported that Russian defence specialists, including the deputy chair of the Duma Defence Committee, estimated that the odds of military chaos, disintegration, or a coup were higher than 60 percent. That same month American intelligence officials put the odds at between 30 to 40 percent.[6] Later that year Josiah Beeman, the US Ambassador to New Zealand, told me that he feared another coup could occur in Russia.[7] More recently, in July 1998 rumours that a coup had been staged forced the Kremlin to issue a denial, and in September Chernomyrdin warned that a coup could occur. That month Lebed also warned of a coup. Lebed claimed that "there is a danger of the mood in the army turning aggressive."[8]

However after briefly assessing the period from August 1996 until late 1998, I doubt whether the military had the capacity to intervene. No figure willing and able to lead a coup appears to have emerged. For instance, Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov, Lebed, and Gromov continued to show little inclination to lead a coup. Although military experts in July 1997 estimated that Lebed was supported by 28 percent of officers, 6 percent less than in May 1996, he showed little willingness to use force to take power.[9] Indeed he was elected Governor of the Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia in May 1998, and indicated that he was aiming to compete in the 2000 presidential elections. One possible exception was General Lev Rokhlin, the General who led the successful assault on Grozny. Rokhlin formed the Movement for Support to the Army, the Defence Industry and Military Research in 1997. This included leaders of the 1991 coup and Rodionov. Military experts in July 1997 estimated that he was supported by 39 percent of officers.[10] Rokhlin that month said that if army officers "rise in rebellion and march to Moscow" he would support them.[11] However Rokhlin that September said that Yeltsin

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[5] Uli Schmetzer, "Though No Coup Is Expected, Russian Army Sees Kremlin As Its Enemy," *The Chicago Tribune*, 20 October 1996, available from http://www.nd.edu/~astrouni/zhiwriter/spool96/96102412.htm, Internet, accessed 19 April 1998, p1 of 3.

[6] *US News and World Report* 122 no.14, 1997, n.p., quoted in "Behind Closed Doors" (Russian And US Defence Experts Differ Sharply Over The Possibility Of A Coup)," Reuters, 10 April 1997, accessed 29 April 1997. Please note that the date I accessed articles from Reuters after 1996 is provided as they might be corrected or changed by Reuters. The articles accessed before 1997 had been available for at least one year before I accessed them, and are thus unlikely to have been since corrected or changed.

[7] Josiah Beeman, US Ambassador to New Zealand. Conversation with Paul Bellamy, 11 December 1997. In Christchurch after a meeting of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch Branch.

[8] *The Sunday Times*, 13 September 1998, n.p., quoted in Mark Franchetti, "Lebed Warns Russia Of Coup," Reuters, 13 September 1998, accessed 15 March 1999.

[9] See chapter 5, Table 11 and Graph 4, pp202-3.

[10] Ibid.

[11] *Segodnya*, 10 July 1997, p3, carried by Russian Press Digest, 10 July 1997, quoted in Lyubov Poleshanina, "Movement In Support For The Army Or A New Coup?" Reuters, 10 July 1997, accessed 12 June 1998.

should be removed by legal and constitutional means. [12] He died from a gunshot wound in July 1998. As Azizian told me in February 1998, "After 1991 no political group or institution in Russia has been able to incite the military to stage a coup. Without such political leadership the military (the dissatisfied elements) seem to be reluctant or incapable of staging a coup."[13]

The military capacity was further eroded by serious weaknesses. The number of personnel the military could deploy fell as restructuring continued. The number of personnel in the army, the strategic missile defence troops, the navy, and the integrated air force and air defence forces was 910,000 in 1998.[14] In 1996 the army, SRF, the air force, the air defence, and the navy had 1,070,000 personnel.[15] More specifically, by 1998 the number of army personnel had fallen to 420,000, compared to 460,000 in 1996.[16] In fact in October 1998 it was estimated that there were only 200,000 genuinely operational troops within the army, whereas in 1993 it was calculated that 125,000 personnel would be needed just to control Moscow in an emergency.[17] Contrasting this, the number of armed personnel not under the Ministry of Defence increased. The number of paramilitary personnel, such as members of the MVD, increased from 352,000 in 1996, to 543,000 in 1998.[18] Another serious problem continued to be a lack of morale. Only 44 percent of officers in a survey of three MDs and one army corps from September to October 1997 indicated that they were proud to defend Russia. Similarly, cohesion remained problematic. The 1997 survey found 27 percent of officers were dissatisfied with their relations with others, and two-thirds reported that conflicts between commanders and their subordinates occurred. [19]

Turning to the military's disposition, this might have increased after Yeltsin's second inauguration. By July 1997 Russian experts estimated that only 9 percent of officers supported Yeltsin, compared to 18 percent for Zhirinovsky, 24 percent for Zyuganov, and 28 percent for Lebed. More dramatically, experts estimated that 31 percent of officers could resort to the use

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[12] *Vremya*, 9 July 1997, n.p., quoted in Barylski, *The Soldier*, p483.
[13] Azizian, E-mail to Paul Bellamy. 12 February 1998.
[14] *The Military Balance 1998-1999*, pp108-112.
[15] *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp113-119.
[16] *The Military Balance 1998-1999*, p109. With regard to the number of personnel in 1996 see chapter 4, Table 9, p178.
[17] *JIR*, October 1998, p3, quoted in Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Shrinking Military," Reuters, 1 October 1998, accessed 10 March 1999; and Pavel Felgengauer, "Balans sil vokrug Kremlia: Vozmozhnosti silovykh ministerstv ogranicheny," *Segodnia* 4, 16 March 1993, p2, quoted in Mendeloff, p241.
[18] *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, p119; and *The Military Balance 1998-1999*, p114.
[19] *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 1 June 1998, n.p., carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 27 August 1998, quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied With Pay, Housing But Proud To Serve," Reuters, 27 August 1998, accessed 10 March 1999.

of force if their demands were not met, a 5 percent increase over 1996.[20] The military continued to experience many problems after 1996; and these are likely to have encouraged opposition to the new regime. A June 1998 survey of 1,500 officers found that over 70 percent were not content with their positions.[21] This indicates that dissatisfaction had increased since the 1995 Ball survey found that 67.8 percent were dissatisfied.[22] The 1998 survey also found that 31.3 percent believed that the lack of money for maintaining combat readiness was the military's main problem. The second and third problems (each identified by 23.7 percent) were bad social conditions and the poor discipline of troops.[23] The level of budgetary support encouraged this concern over resources. Although the official defence budget increased from 80,185 million roubles in 1996 to 104,300 million in 1997, it then fell to 81,765 million in 1998. Even though the budget increased in 1997, military expenditure still fell from $US 73 billion in 1996, to $US 64 billion in 1997.[24]

However the disposition was not strong enough to motivate intervention. Nor was there an interventionist mood, as there remained strong opposition to domestic security roles. In the 1997 survey, only 30 percent said that they were willing to participate in combat activities aimed at restoring constitutional order within Russia.[25] More specifically, polls of officers and warrant officers the following year found that only 8 percent participated, or would like to participate, in the activities of parties and movements opposing the new regime.[26] Similarly, no officers turned up at protest meetings held by Rokhlin's movement in April 1998. Both the 1997 and 1998 surveys help to explain this. They found that most officers were content with staying in the military despite the conditions. The 1997 survey found that 81 percent wished to continue to serve and although this fell rather dramatically, 55.1 percent in the 1998 survey indicated this too.[27] Indeed when I asked a Russian official in July 1998 whether a coup was likely he responded that "the reason of such must be only more than 6 month's unpayment of

[20] See chapter 4, Table 10 and Graph 3 pp185-6 and chapter 5, Table 11 and Graph 4, pp202-3.
[21] *Izvestia*, July 14 1998, p1, carried by 'What the papers say,' 14 July 1998, quoted in "Officers Are Not Happy With Their Life, But Are Not In A Hurry To Leave The Armed Forces," Reuters, 14 July 1998, accessed 10 March 1999.
[22] Ball and Gerber, Table 6, p173.
[23] *Izvestia*, July 14 1998, p1, quoted in "Officers Are Not Happy With Their Life."
[24] *The Military Balance 1998-1999*, Tables 12 and 14, pp104-5.
[25] *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 1 June 1998, quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied With Pay."
[26] *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* no.25, 1998, p3, carried by 'What The Papers Say,' 14 July 1998, quoted in Andrei Korbut, "Lev: Rokhlin Was The Most Popular Politician In The Armed Forces," Reuters, 14 July 1998, accessed 15 March 1999.
[27] *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 1 June 1998, n.p., quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied"; and *Izvestia*, July 14 1998, p1, quoted in "Officers Are Not Happy With Their Life."

salaries, serious starvation among officers and men."[28] Support for the new regime's reforms also increased according to the 1997 survey. In 1997, 25 percent supported the military and economic reforms compared to 16 percent in 1996.[29] Nor have I found any evidence that indicates secondary factors would have motivated a coup.

Finally, I do not believe that the military had the opportunity to intervene. Although demonstrations continued, they were not strong enough to force the new regime to become dependent on the military for survival. Disillusionment among Russians remained widespread. A March 1997 survey found that only 14 percent believed that "things in Russia" were "going in the right direction."[30] However the willingness to challenge the new regime was limited. This is shown by the nationwide protests in October 1998 that were expected to involve up to 25 million people, and had encouraged talk that there would be a revolution. An estimated 615,000 people participated nationwide, and in Moscow there were 13,000 police for 30,000 protesters.[31] Moreover, although disillusionment in the new regime increased, the majority still did not believe that there was a viable alternative. A January 1997 survey found that 38 percent supported a return to Communist rule, compared to 23 percent in 1994, and only 15 percent supported military rule, a 4 percent increase over 1994.[32] Similarly, the majority of Russians were able to survive living conditions, at least in early 1998. A March to April 1998 nationwide survey found that the vast majority of Russians said that they did not go without necessities like heat and electricity, and were seldom short of food or clothing.[33] More specifically, public support of the military remained limited. In July 1997, only 48 percent of those surveyed trusted the military.[34]

Assessing the situation today and making predictions is very difficult because of the dynamic nature of Russian politics. Overall, I believe that a coup is not likely in the near future because

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[28] Averyanov, E-mail to Paul Bellamy. 6 July 1998.
[29] *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 1 June 1998, n.p., quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied."
[30] "Two-thirds Of Russians Gloomy Over Future-Poll," Reuters, 30 March 1997, available from http://www.nd.edu/~astrouni/zhiwriter/97/97040301.htm, accessed 2 October 1998, p1 of 2.
[31] *Scotsman*, 8 October 1998, p13, quoted in Owen Matthews, "Anti-Yeltsin Protest Fails To Attract Large Crowds," Reuters, 8 October 1998, accessed 15 March 1999.
[32] "Russians Long For Strong Hand," Associated Press, 17 February 1997, available from http://www.nd.edu/~astrouni/zhiwriter/97/97022008.htm, Internet, accessed 30 August 1998, p1 of 1; and Rose, p56-7. The survey interviewed 2406 people.
[33] "Can't Pay, Don't Need To Pay": How Russians View Taxation," available from http://www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/CSPP/nrb7pr.html, n.d., accessed 2 October 1998, p1 of 2. The survey interviewed 2002 people.
[34] *Mneniye*, n.p., quoted in "Russian thoughts on war and peace," *The Economist*, 344, no.8028, 2 August 1997, p38

of the military's disastrous state and its strong reluctance to intervene. Other scholars concur with this conclusion. Lester Grau in June 1998 said to me that "I don't categorically discount any future coup attempt by the military, but I would be very surprised. The time is past."[35] Indeed a US State Department report publicised in March 1999 concluded, "there are no indicators that the military has, or aims to become, a viable political element."[36] This is supported by a survey undertaken in the Moscow MD in early 1999. This survey found that personnel most respected Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov was an opponent of the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt who announced in April 1999 that "The nation cannot withstand one more coup."[37] The second most respected politician was Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, another opponent of the 1991 coup (Primakov was suddenly sacked in May 1999 as Yeltsin moved against an attempt by the Duma to impeach him). Lebed, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovsky all followed Luzhkov and Primakov.[38]

However the domestic situation has become increasingly unpredictable. Yeltsin's poor health and increasingly unpredictable behaviour threatens stability, particularly with presidential elections scheduled for the year 2000. The military might feel obliged to act, or it might realise that it has the opportunity to intervene. The new regime might also fall if the military refuses to protect it from serious challenges to its authority. This scenario should not been ruled out. This is because the above 1997 survey suggests that people were gradually becoming more supportive of other regime types. Moreover economic conditions have worsened since the Asian downturn, a development that could make at least some people desperate enough to support a coup. However Sergeyev reiterated the military's loyalty to the President after the sudden removal of Primakov. Likewise, most people appear to remain reluctant to support a coup. Survey figures published in April 1999 indicated that although the Communist party was the most popular party with 35.4 percent support, the liberal Yabloko party was second with 27.2 percent support. Nor were potential coup leaders well supported. Zyuganov was the most popular candidate for President but he was supported by only 23.6 percent, Zhirinovsky by 5.7 percent and Lebed by 5.3 percent. To put these figures into

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[35] Grau, e-mail to Paul Bellamy, 29 June 1998; and Timothy Thomas, Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (THOMAS@LEAV-EMH1.ARMY.MIL) E-mail to Paul Bellamy (Pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 29 June 1998.

[36] *Janes Defence Weekly* 31, no.9, 3 March 1999, n.p, quoted in Greg Seigle, "US Report Details Russia's Decaying Military Readiness," Reuters, 3 March 1999, accessed 15 March 1999.

[37] Interfax News Agency Daily News Bulletin, 8 April 1999, quoted in "Luzhkov-Political Hysteria Must Not Be Incited In Russia," Reuters, 8 April 1999.

[38] Vremya MN, 21 April 1999, p2, carried by Defence and Security, 23 April 1999, quoted in Aleksei Karelov, "Multi-Party Armed Forces," Reuters, 23 April 1999.

perspective, Yavlinsky, the leader of the Yabloko party, was supported by 18.7 percent.[39] These figures are similar to the results of a March 1999 survey. This survey found that Zyuganov was supported by 21 percent, and Lebed by 10 percent. Yavlinsky was supported by 17 percent.[40] In conclusion, I believe a military coup within the next five years is possible, especially if the 2000 presidential elections cause instability, but is unlikely.

[39] *Novoe Vremya*, no.12, March 1999, p19, carried by 'What The Papers Say,' 6 April 1999, quoted in "A Rough Estimate Of Preferences," Reuters, 6 April 1999, accessed 16 April 1999.

APPENDIX 1: Soviet and Post-Soviet History: 1917-1999

1917:	October, revolution leads to the Bolsheviks taking power.
1918:	January, Russian Workers and Peasants Red Army is established by decree.
1918-21:	The Russian civil war.
1924:	January, Vladimir Lenin dies and this facilitates Stalin's rise to power.
1937:	Purge of military officers.
1941:	June, Germany invades the Soviet Union.
1944-45:	The Soviet military advances on Berlin and defeats Germany.
	The Demotion of Marshall Georgii Zhukov.
1953:	March, Stalin dies and this facilitates the rise of Nikita Khrushchev.
1956:	Zhukov becomes the first career officer to sit on the Presidium or Politburo.
1957:	June, Zhukov actively supports Khrushchev against his opponents.
1960:	January, Khrushchev announces military cuts and civil-military tensions increase.
1964:	October, Khrushchev is removed and Leonid Brezhnev's gradually takes power.
1965-75:	Civil-military accommodation, the 'golden age' for the military.
1967:	The conflict model is published.
1973:	The symbiotic model is published.
1976:	Dmitry Ustionov is appointed Minister of Defence.
1976-81:	Brezhnev defends détente against military opposition and civil-military tensions increase.
1977:	Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov is appointed Chief of the General Staff.
1977-84:	September, Orgakov is increasingly outspoken and is re-assigned.
1979:	The participatory model is published.
	December, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
1982:	November, Brezhnev dies and is succeeded by Iurii Andropov.
1984:	Andropov dies and is succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko.
1985:	March, Chernenko dies and is succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev.
1985-86:	Moves by Gorbachev to reform the military lead to civil-military tensions.
1987:	Marshal Dmitrii Yazov is appointed Minister of Defence.
1988:	December, Gorbachev announces major unilateral military cuts.
	Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, Chief of the General Staff, resigns.
1989:	The Soviet military withdraw from Afghanistan.

1990:	March, Article 6 of the Constitution that enshrines the Communist party's 'leading role' in society is removed.
1990-91:	Civil-military tensions climax under Gorbachev.
1991:	August, the coup is staged and fails. December, Gorbachev resigns and the Soviet Union collapses.
1992:	March, the formation of the Russian Ministry of Defence. May, the formal establishment of the Russian Ministry of Defence Pavel Grachev is named Defence Minister.
1993:	October, the climax of the parliamentary revolt. November, The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation are approved. December, Duma elections. The LDPR wins the most support from voters. In the elections 25 active duty servicemen and officers, along with 2 semi-retired officers, who stood for office in single member districts or on party lists, and 9 were elected.
1994:	December, the invasion of Chechnya, causes increased civil-military tensions.
1995:	December, Duma elections. The Communist party wins the most support. In total, 19 military officers (8 active and 11 retired) entered the Duma, with 13 winning districts and 6 entering the Duma through party lists.
1996:	June and July, presidential elections are held. Yeltsin wins re-election. June, Alexander Lebed is appointed secretary of the Security Council. Grachev is fired and Igor Rodionov is named Defence Minister. October, Alexander Lebed is fired.
1997:	May, Rodionov is fired and Igor Sergeyev is named Defence Minister.
1998:	March, Yeltsin sacks his cabinet. July, 16 former generals sit in the Duma. August, Fundamentals of Russian Federation State Policy for Military Development up to the Year 2005' are published. September, Viktor Primakov is appointed Prime Minister.
1999:	March, the US State Department concludes that a coup in Russia is unlikely. May, Yeltsin removes Primakov as he moves to defeat an attempt to impeach him. Sergeyev announces that the military remains loyal to the President.

APPENDIX 2: Key Military Officers in March 1993

Name	Position (as at March 1993)	Birthplace	Class (of father)	Ethnicity	1991 Coup stance (pro-coup/anti-coup)
Achalov, Vladislav	Military adviser of the speaker of the Supreme Soviet. Colonel General in reserve	Atamysh, Arsk raion, Tatar ASSR (now Tatarstan)	working class (farmer)	Russian	pro
Alekseev, Anatoly	Deputy head of the inter-departmental commission on social problems of military men and members of their families of the government. Captain 3rd class	not known	not known	Russian	anti
Baltin, Eduard	Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet. Vice-Admiral	Smolensk	middle class (civil-servant)	Russian	not known
Barannikov, Viktor	Minister of State Security until July 1993. Army General since 1992	Fedosevka, Pozharsky raion, Maritime krai	working class (specific occupation of father not known)	Russian	anti

Bukreev, Yury	Chief of the Main Headquarters of the Land Forces. Colonel General since 1991	not known	not known	Russian	pro
Chernavin, Vladimir	Commander of the Navy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the unified armed forces of the CIS. Admiral of the Fleet since 1983	Mykolaiv (Nikolaev in Russian), Ukraine	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	not known
Churanov, Vladimir	Head of Rear Services of the Armed Forces. Major General	Nevinnomysk, Stavropol krai	not known	Russian	not known
Deinekin, Petr	Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces. Air Force Colonel General	Morozovsk, Rostov oblast	not known (military pilot but rank not known)	Russian	anti
Egorov, Vladimir	Commander-in-Chief of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Admiral since 1992	Moscow	not known	Russian	not known

Erofeev, Oleg	Commander-in-Chief of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. Admiral since 1992	Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky	middle class (officer)	Russian	not known
Fuzhenko, Ivan	Chief of Rear Services, first deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Colonel General	Subbotsy Znamensky raion, Kirovograd oblast	working class (farmer)	Ukrainian	not known
Golovnev, Anatoly	Head of Chief Combat Training Administration, deputy Commander-in-Chief of land forces. Lieutenant General	Medvedovka, Smolensk oblast	working class (farmer)	Russian	pro
Grachev, Pavel	Defence Minister, May 1992-July 1996	Tula oblast	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	anti (though initially pro)
Gromov, Feliks	Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Admiral since 1988	Vladivostok	not known (serviceman but rank not known)	Russian	pro
Ivanov, Vitaly	Head of the Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy, St Petersburg. Admiral since 1987	Poltava, Ukraine	middle class (civil servant)	Russian	pro

Ivanov, Vladimir	Head of Space Weapons of the Strategic Forces of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Colonel General	Kamenka-Dneprovskaya, Zaporozhskaya oblast, Ukraine	not known	Russian	neutral
Kasatonov, Igor	First deputy Commander-in-Chief of the navy. Admiral since 1992	Vladivostok	middle class (officer)	Russian	neutral
Khvatov, Gennady	Commander-in-Chief of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. Admiral since 1987	Myshkono, Yaroslavl oblast	not known	Russian	pro
Kobets, Konstantin	Chief military inspector of the armed forces, chairman of the military legislative commission of the Ministry of Defence. Army General	Kiev	not known	Russian	anti
Kokoshin, Andrei,	First deputy of Defence, Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Moscow	middle class (officer)	Russian	not known

Kolesnikov, Mikhail	Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Colonel General	Eysk, Krasnodar krai	not known	Russian	pro
Kondratev, Georgy	Deputy Minister of Defence. Colonel General since 1992	Klintsy, Bryansk oblast	not known	Russian	neutral
Kopysov, Viktor	Commander of the Siberian Military District. Colonel General since 1991	Zavitaya, Amursk oblast	working class (specific occupation unknown)	Russian	not known
Kornukov, Anatoly	Air Defence Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow district. Colonel General of the Air Forces	Stakhanov, Lugansk oblast, Ukraine	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	pro
Korovnikov, Aleksandr	Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet committee on invalids, war and labour veterans, social protection of the military and their families. Lieutenant Colonel	Gryazi, Lipetsk oblast	not known (serviceman but rank not known)	Russian	not known

Kuzmin, Anatoly	Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the navy for combat training, chief of combat training in the navy. Vice Admiral since 1984	Leningrad	not known	Russian	not known
Lyashenko, Vladimir	First Deputy of the main Headquarters of the Navy. Vice Admiral since 1990	Moscow	not known	Ukrainian	not known
Maiorov, Leonid	Commander of the North-Western group of troops. Colonel General	Georgievsk, Stavropol krai	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	not known
Maksimov, Yury	Commander of Strategic Forces of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Army General since 1982	Kryukovka, Michurinsk raion, Tambov oblast	working class (peasants)	Russian	anti
Mironov, Valery	Deputy Minister of Defence. Colonel General	Moscow	not known	Russian	neutral

Mochaikin, Aleksandr	Chairman of Co-ordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies, Chairman of the Committee on the rights of military men with the Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Rear Admiral since October 1992	Pushkovo, Golovanevsky raion, Kirovograd oblast, Ukraine	middle class (civil servants)	Ukrainian	neutral
Panin, Vasily	President of the Naval Fraternity, the Russian Fund for Naval Exhibits and Traditions. Admiral since 1989	Borovoe, Usmansky raion, Lipetsk oblast	middle class (office worker)	Russian	pro
Potapov, Viktor	Commander of Naval Air Forces. Air Force Colonel General since 1985	Muratovka, Makshansky raion, Penza oblast	not known	Russian	neutral
Prudnikov, Viktor	Air Defence Commander-in-Chief. Air Force Colonel General	Rostov-on-Don	middle class (civil servant)	Russian	neutral

Pyankov, Boris	Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Colonel General since 1987	Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg)	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	pro
Rodionov, Igor	Head of the General Staff Academy, Colonel General. Defence Minister July 1996-May 1997	Kurakino, Penza Oblast	middle class (high-ranking officer)	Russian	anti
Samsonov, Viktor	Chief of Staff, first deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Colonel General	Dukhovnitsky raion, Smolensk oblast	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	anti (though initially pro)
Selivanov, Valentin	Chief of the main headquarters of the Navy, first deputy Commander-in-Chief of the navy. Admiral since 1992	Stanovaya, Stanovlyansky raion, Lipetsk oblast	not known	Russian	pro
Semenov, Vladimir	Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces. Colonel General	Karachaevo raion, Karachaevo-Cherkess autonomous oblast, Karachai	not known	not known	pro

Sergeev, Anatoly	Commander of the Volga military district. Colonel General since 1991	Ivanovka, Bolsherechinsky raion, Omsk oblast	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	pro
Sergeev, Igor	Commander-in-Chief of Strategic missile troops. Colonel General. Defence Minister from May 1997	Verkhny, Voroshilovgrad oblast, Ukraine	working class (miner)	Russian	anti
Shaposhnikov, Evgeny	Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, Defence Minister August 1991-Febraury 1992. Air Force Marshall since 1991	Aksaisky raion, Rostov oblast	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	anti
Smirnov, Vladimir	Adviser on military issues to the Russian government. Colonel	Babaevo, Vologda oblast	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	not known
Sorokin, Viktor	Commander of the Operative Group of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Abkhazia, Georgia, to March 1993	not known	not known	Russian	not known

Stolyarov, Nikolai	Chairman of the committee for personnel of the general headquarters of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, Adviser of Speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Air Force Major General since 1991	Aleksandrovka, Kalinkovichesky raion, Gomel oblast, Belarus	working class (specific occupation not known)	Belarusian	anti
Toporov, Vladimir	Deputy Minister of Defence. Colonel General	Baranovichi, Belarus	not known	Russian	not active
Tretyakov, Valery	Commander of the Baikal Military District. Colonel General since 1991	Syzran, Kuibyshev (Samara) oblast	not known	Russian	not active
Vorobev, Eduard	First deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces. Colonel General since 1988	Voronezh	middle class (civil servant)	Russian	pro

Vorobev, Vasily	Head of the Chief Military Budget and Finance Administration of the Ministry of Defence. Lieutenant General	Gidrotorf, Balakninsk raion, Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) oblast	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian	not known
Vysotsky, Evgeny	Head of the Chief Administration for Personnel Training and Assignment of the Ministry of Defence. Lieutenant General	Belyov, Tula oblast	middle class (civil-servant)	Russian	neutral
Zaitsev, Vitaly	Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the navy for maintenance, head of the chief maintenance administration of the Navy. Admiral since 1990	Kupalishi, Pestyaovsky raion, Ivanovo oblast	working class (farmer)	Russian	not known
Zazulin, Nikolai	Head of Chief Automobile Administration of the Ministry of Defence. Colonel General since 1992	Sebrovo, Mikhailovsky raion, Volgograd (formally Stalingrad)	working class (farmer)	Russian	pro

Source: *Longman Bibliographical Directory of Decision-makers.*

APPENDIX 3: Officers of the Airborne and Spetsnaz forces in early 1993

Name	Position	Birthplace	Class	Ethnicity	1991 Coup stance
Babichev, Ivan	Divisional commander, Pskov. Colonel	Orsha, Vitebsk oblast	not known	Ukrainian	not known
Borisov, Gennadi	Academy of the General Staff. Colonel	Byelorussia	working class (driver)	Belarusian	not known
Budyko, Georgii,	Chief of the medical service. Major	Bobruisk, Mogilev oblast	middle class (officer in the reserve and engineer-designer)	Russian	not known
Fedotov, Aleksandr	Head of the military department of the Institute of Physical Culture	Cherkessk, Stavropol Krai	middle class (accountant)	Russian	not known

Kazunin, Sergei	Commander of the 5th training parachute landing company, unit number 11929. Captain	Roslyspino, Vologodsk oblast	working class (farrier)	Russian	not known
Kolmakov, Aleksandr	Academy of the General Staff. Major General	Kaliningrad, Moscow oblast	working class (worker)	Russian	anti
Naumov, Yuri	Deputy division commander, 104 Division. Colonel	Tambovskaya, Tokaryovka	working class (farmer)	Russian	not known
Podkolzin, Evgeni	Commander in Chief of Airborne Troops. Colonel General	Kazakhstan	middle class (hydrologist)	Russian	pro
Popov, Aleksandr	Chief of staff of division. Colonel	Zhdanov, Donetskaya oblast	not known	Russian	not known
Shcherbak, Valery	Academy of the General Staff. Major General	Donetsk	working class (miner)	Ukrainian	not known

Shkirkov, Vladimir	Deputy chief of the division's political department. Colonel	Krasnoyarsk	working class (railway worker)	Russian	not known
Solonin, Igor	Regimental commander. Lieutenant Colonel	Livov	working class (milling-machine worker)	Russian	not known
Solyuyanov, Aleksandr	Commander of airborne division. Major General	Orenburg oblast	working class (mechanic)	Russian	not known
Soziro, Aleksandr	Divisional propagandist. Major	Borisov, Minsk oblast, Byelorussia	working class (driver)	Belarusian	not known
Tanenya, Stepan	Commander of 13 Airborne Brigade. Colonel	Brest oblast	working class (agriculture brigade leader in Zhitkovich)	Belarusian	not known
Zuev Aleksandr	Deputy regimental commander of the rear. Lieutenant General	Ufa	working class (serviceman)	Russian	not known

Source: Schofield, pp206-85

APPENDIX 4: Officials occupying key positions in the new regime: March 1993

Name	Position	Birthplace	Class	Ethnicity
Alekseev, Sergei	Member of the Presidential Council	not known	not known	Russian
Ambartsumov, Evgeny	Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	Armenian
Anisimov, Stanislav	Minister of Trade and Material Resources	Berezansky raion, Nikolaev (Mykolaiv in Ukrainian) oblast, Ukraine	not known	not known
Arbatov, Georgy	Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences	Kherson, Ukraine	not known	Russian
Barchuk, Vasily	Minister of Finance to March 1993	Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Siberia	not known	Russian
Basin, Efim	Chairman of the State Committee on Architecture and Construction	Khislovichi, Rzhaksinsky raion, Tambov oblast	not known	Russian

Belyaev, Evgeny	Chairman of the State Committee on Sanitary Epidemiological Inspection and Chief Medical Officer. Minister	Peskovka, Kirov oblast	not known	Russian
Bochin, Leonid	Chairman of the State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Structures. Minister	Zhitomir (Zhytomyr) oblast	not known	Ukrainian
Boldyrev, Yury	Chief State Inspector to March 1993	Leningrad	not known	Russian
Bulgak, Vladimir	Minister of Communications	Moscow	not known	Russian
Bunich, Pavel	Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	Russian
Burkov, Valery	Adviser of the President on invalids	Shadrinsk, Kurgan oblast	not known	Russian
Chernomyrdin, Viktor	Prime Minister	Cherny Otrog, Saraktashsky raion, Orenburg oblast	middle class (head of a motor tractor station)	Russian

Chubais, Anatoly	Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee on the Administration of State Property	Borisov, Belarus	not known (military family but rank not known)	Russian
Danilov-Danilyan	Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources	Moscow	not known	Russian
Efimov, Vitaly	Minister of Transport	Malinsky raion, Moscow Oblast	not known	Russian
Emelyanov, Aleksei	Member of the Council of the President	Vydrankom Smolensk oblast	working class (peasant)	Russian
Erin, Viktor	Minister of Internal Affairs	Kazan, Tatarstan	not known	Russian
Ermolenko, Vitaly	Director of the federal centre for land and agroindustrial reform. Minister	Gorlovsky raion, Donets oblast, Ukraine	not known	Ukrainian
Fadeev, Gennady	Minister of Railways	Shimanovska, Amur oblast	not known	Russian
Fedorov, Boris	Deputy Prime Minister	Moscow	not known	Russian
Fedorov, Nikolai	Minister of Justice	Marinsko-Posadsky raion, Chuvash republic	working class (peasant)	Chuvash

Fedotov, Mikhail	Minister of the Press and Information	Moscow	not known	Russian
Filatov, Sergei	Chief of Staff, Head of the Administration of the President	Moscow	not known	Russian
Filippov, Petr	Head of the Analytical Centre on Socio-Economic Policy of the President	not known	not known	not known
Gaidar, Egor	Member of the Presidential Council	Moscow	middle class (high-ranking officer)	Russian
Gefter, Mikhail	Member of the Council of the President	Simferopol	not known	not known
Glazev, Sergei	Minister of Foreign Economic Relations	Zaporozhe, Ukraine	not known	not known
Granberg, Aleksandr	Adviser of the President on Economic and Social Questions in the CIS	not known	not known	not known
Grushin, Boris	Member of the Council of the President	not known	not known	not known
Ignatev, Kirill	Member of the Council of the President	not known	not known	not known
Ilyushin, Viktor	First Assistant of the President, Head of the Secretariat of the President	Nizhny Tagil	middle class (metallurgist)	not known

Kadannikov, Vladimir	Member of the Council of the President	Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod)	not known	Russian
Karaganov, Sergei	Member of the Council of the President	not known	not known	not known
Karyakin, Yury	Member of the Council of the President	not known	not known	Russian
Kazannik, Aleksei	Member of the Council of the President	Chernigov (Chernihiv) oblast, Ukraine	working class (peasant)	Ukrainian
Khizha, Georgy	Deputy Prime Minister	Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan	not known	Russian
Khlystun, Viktor	Minister of Agriculture and Food	Shchuchinsky raion, Kokchetav oblast, Kazakhstan	working class (peasant)	Russian
Kostikov, Vyacheslav	Head of the Press Office of the President	not known	working class (news vendor)	Ryazan
Kotenkov, Aleksandr	Head of the state and legal administration of the President. Major General	not known	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian
Kozyrev, Andrei	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Brussels, Belgium	middle class (engineer)	Russian
Kovalev, Sergei	Member of the Council of the President	not known	not known	Russian
Krasikov, Anatoly	Head of the Press Office of the President	not known	not known	not known

Kruglov, Anatoly	Chairman of the state customs committee. Minister	Moscow oblast	not known	Russian
Kuramin, Vladimir	Chairman of the state committee for the social and economic development of the North. Minister	Bakursky raion, Saratov oblast	not known	Russian
Kvasov, Vladimir	Head of the Apparatus of the Government	Shaturo, Moscow oblast	not known	Russian
Lakhova, Ekaterina	Adviser of the President on the Family and the Protection of Mothers and Children	not known	not known	not known
Latsis, Otto	Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	Latvian
Lobov, Oleg	Head of the Working Apparatus of the Council of Experts of the President	Kiev, Ukraine	not known	Russian
Malei, Mikhail	Adviser of the President on Conversion	not known	not known	not known
Malyshev, Nikolai	Head of the Centre of Analysis of Special Presidential Programs of the President	not known	not known	not known

Mashits, Vladimir	Chairman of the Russian state committee on economic co-operation with states of the CIS	Moscow	not known	Belarusian/Russian
Melikyan, Gennady	Minister of Labour	not known	not known	not known
Migranyan, Andranik	Member of the Council of the President	Erevan, Armenia	not known	Armenian
Mikhailov,Viktor	Minister of Atomic Energy	Moscow	not known	Russian
Moiseev, Nikita	Member of the Council of the President	not known	middle class (intelligentsia, specific occupation not known)	not known
Morshchakov, Fedor	Head of the Main Social and Production Administration of the President	not known	not known	not known
Nazarkin, Yury	Deputy secretary of the Security Council	not known	not known	Russian
Nechaev, Andrei	Minister of the Economy to March 1993	Moscow	not known	Russian
Nechaev, Eduard	Minister of Health	Smolensk	not known	Russian

Pain, Emil	Member of the Council of the President	Kiev, Ukraine	not known	not known
Pamfilova, Ella	Minister of Social Security	Moscow	not known	Russian
Podoprigora, Vladimir	Deputy Head of the Administration of the President	Mozhgo, Mozhginsky raion, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic	not known	Russian
Poltoranin, Mikhail	Head of the Federal Information Centre, Office of the President	Leninogorsk, east Kazakhstan oblast	not known	Russian
Popov, Gavriil	Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	Greek
Rakitov, Anatoly	Head of the Analytical Centre on General Policy of the President	not known	not known	not known
Ryzhov, Yury	Ambassador to France and Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	Russian
Saltykov, Boris	Minister of Science and Technical Policy. Deputy Prime Minister to March 1993	Moscow	not known	Russian

Satarov, Georgy	Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	not known
Shafranik, Yury	Minister of Fuel and Energy	Ishimsky raion, Tyumen oblast	working class (peasant)	Ukrainian
Shakhrai, Sergei	Deputy Prime Minister, Chairman of the State Committee on Nationality Policy	Simferopol, Crimean oblast, Ukraine	not known (serviceman but rank not known)	Russian
Shatalin, Yury	Head of the Provisional administration in the North Ossetian SSR and the Ingush Republic	Moscow oblast	not known	Russian
Shokhin, Aleksandr	Deputy Prime Minister for Social Policy and Foreign Economic Issues	Savinskoe, Plesetsky raion, Arkhangelsk oblast	not known	Russian
Shumeiko, Vladimir	First Deputy Prime Minister	Rostov-on-Don	not known (serviceman but rank not known)	Russian
Shurchkov, Igor	Chairman of the state committee on industrial policy	Armavir, Krasnodar krai	not known	Russian
Sidorov, Evgeny	Minister of Culture	Moscow	not known	Russian

Skokov, Yury	Secretary of the Security Council	Vladivostok	middle class (KGB head in Krasnodar krai)	Russian
Soskovets, Oleg	First deputy Prime Minister	Taldy Kurgan, Kazakh Soviet republic	working class (specific occupation not known)	Russian
Stankevich, Sergei	Adviser of the President on Political Affairs	Moscow	not known	not known
Sukhanov, Lev	Head of the Group of Advisers of the President	Moscow	not known	not known
Tabeev, Fikryat	Chairman of the Russian fund of federal property; Minister	Azeevo, Ryazan oblast, Tatar	working class (peasant)	not known
Tikhonov, Vladimir	Member of the Council of the President, President of the League of Co-operators and Entrepreneurs	not known	not known	Russian
Tkachenko, Evgeny	Minister of Education	Omsk	not known	Russian
Volkov, Vyacheslav	Deputy Head of the Administration of the President	Murmansk	not known	Russian
Volkogonov, Dmitry	Member of the Presidential Council	Kyrinsky raion, Chita oblast	middle class (agronomist)	Russian

Vorontsov, Yuli	Adviser of the President on Foreign Policy	not known	not known	not known
Voznyak, Vasily	Chairman of the state committee on the social protection of citizens and the rehabilitation of territory affected by Chernobyl and other radiation catastrophes. Minister	Tyvrovsky raion, Vinnitsa (Vinnytsia) oblast, Ukrainian Soviet republic	middle class (office worker)	not known
Yablokov, Aleksei	Adviser of the President on Ecology and the Protection of Health	not known	not known	not known
Yaroshinskaya (Zgerskaya), Alla	Member of the Council of the President	not known	not known	Ukrainian
Yarov, Yury	Deputy Prime Minister	Leningrad	not known	Russian
Yeltsin, Boris	President	Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) oblast	working class (peasant/construction worker)	Russian
Zakharov, Mark	Member of the Council of the President	Moscow	not known	not known
Zaveryukha, Aleksandr	Deputy Prime Minister	Novosergeevsky raion, Orenburg oblast	not known	Ukrainian
Zhukov, Andrei	Member of the Council of the President	Leningrad	not known	Russian

Source: *Longman Bibliographical Directory of Decision-makers.*

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